
168. Weekly Summary Excerpt, 28 April 1950, The Soviet Offensive



SECRET Communists at home and abroad by demonstrating the power of the Soviet Union. Closely allied with this need, the Kremlin may feel that only by attacking and vilifying the West can it justify the rigid controls it maintains on the Soviet and Satellite people and prepare them psychologically for war. It seems likely, therefore, that the Soviet Union will continue its tactics of aggressive arrogance for some time, the intensity of the effort growing in proportion to increases in Soviet strength and concentrating on those issues and areas where Western strength is weakest. **Baltic** Plane The current Soviet offensive reached its peak of militancy with the recent aircraft incident in the Baltic. In addition to attempting to prove to the world that the Soviet Union can be neither imposed upon nor intimidated, the USSR has sought to emphasize the military significance of the flight, thus playing upon popular war fears and lending weight to peace appeals. Moreover, in decorating the Soviet pilots who presumably participated, Moscow was, in effect, pointing with pride to the ability of Soviet defensive aviation to protect the homeland from US strategic air power. Finally, the plane incident has been used to convince the Soviet and Satellite peoples that Western aggression is not merely a figment of Kremlin imagination. **Other Aspects** Soviet self-assurance is apparent in other East-West issues. Soviet defiance of the UN continues. Western missions are being subjected to increased insult and intimidation throughout the Soviet orbit. The tone of Soviet propaganda is growing steadily more provocative, and Communist parties outside the Soviet orbit show a mounting militancy. Concurrently with these aggressive moves, Moscow is probing the defenses of the opposition on a number of fronts. It is testing the degree of Western determination to remain in Berlin; it is agitating, through diplomacy and propaganda, the questions of Trieste and the Turkish Straits; and its support of the Communist movements of Asia is becoming more open and more direct. - 3 -SECRET


169. Weekly Summary Excerpt, 5 May 1950, China: Military Plans

SECRE FAR EAST CHINA Military Plans Although the capture of Hainan has placed the Chinese Communist Army in a position to invade Southeast Asia, there are no concrete indications that the Communists are ready to depart from previous international Communist strategy or to run the risk of precipitating general hostilities by taking such a step at this time. Moreover, the Communist troops available for such an invasion probably will be needed for more immediate and pressing problems confronting the Peiping regime. Many of the troops involved in the Hainan invasion will be occupied for some time in consolidating Communist control over that island; other troops in South China will be needed to strengthen Communist control over the many wide areas which remain in the hands of local authorities, brigands, or organized thieving bands. Moreover, a considerable number of Chinese troops probably will be employed to establish a strategic reserve for the coming invasion of Nationalist-held Taiwan. The Communists have already stated that they are planning to utilize a force of one million men for the invasion of this last Nationalist stronghold. There is also the possibility that the Chinese Communists may wish to augment their forces along the Hong Kong border in preparation for increasing their pressure against the British crown colony. Although the Communist conquest of Hainan probably will not result in organized military invasion of any Southeast Asian areas, the Chinese Communists, in addition to supplying advisers and technical personnel to the various Communist-led resistance groups in Southeast Asia and the Philippines, will be in a position to facilitate the shipment of material aid to these same areas. - 12 -SECRET


6 JUN 1950 1309 24913 GENERAL CIA - CONF 1. Possible Kremlin conference on Southeast Asia -- US Embassy Bangkok expresses the opinion that the imminent departure for Moscow of the Soviet Minister and the former Charge, following the recent departure of other Soviet officials, may indicate that an important consultation or planning conference on Southeast Asia will soon take place in Moscow. According to the Embassy, the British representatives in Bangkok concur in the view that the USSR may be calling an urgent meeting in order to decide upon immediate steps to prevent or counter the strengthening of Southeast Asia by the Western Powers. (CIA Comment: The recall of Soviet representatives from Bangkok, combined with the recall for consultations of top diplomatic personnel from all the Soviet diplomatic posts (except China) in Eastern Asia, indicates that the Kremlin is probably reviewing its over-all policy for the Far East. The additional presence in Moscow of the Soviet Ambassador to the US, a Far Eastern expert familiar with US thinking, is further evidence that the USSR is formulating new tactics designed to counter Western attempts to strengthen anti-Communist efforts in the Far East, especially in Southeast Asia.) Document No. 1 NO CHATED in Class. \Box DICLISSIFIED TS Class. Changed TO: LDA Mamo, 4 Apr 77 77/1763 DDA REG. Auth: 2 9 MAR 1978 By a Date:

170. Daily Summary Excerpt, 6 June 1950, Possible Kremlin Conference on Southeast Asia

171. Weekly Summary Excerpt, 9 June 1950, Soviet Union: New SEA Policy



172. ORE 18-50 Excerpt, 19 June 1950, Current Capabilities of the Northern Korean Regime



Despite the apparent military superiority of northern over southern Korea, it is not certain that the northern regime, lacking the active participation of Soviet and Chinese Communist military units, would be able to gain effective control over all of southern Korea. The key factors which would hinder Communist attempts to extend effective control under these circumstances are: (1) the anti-Communist attitude of the southern Koreans; (2) a continuing will to resist on the part of southern troops; (3) the Communist regime's lack of popular support; and (4) the regime's lack of trained administrators and technicians.

Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this report. It contains information available to CIA as of 15 May 1950.

subversion, and guerrilla operations against

southern Korea. This program will not be sufficient in itself, however, to cause a collapse

of the southern Korean regime and the exten-

sion of Communist control over the south so

long as US economic and military aid to south-

ern Korea is not substantially reduced or

At the same time the capability of the north-

ern Korean armed forces for both short- and

long-term overt military operations is being


further developed. Although the northern

and southern forces are nearly equal in terms

of combat effectives, training, and leadership,

seriously dissipated.

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173. Daily Summary Excerpt, 26 June 1950, Embassy Moscow's Views on Korean Conflict

ECRE (CIA Comment: CIA concurs in general with Embassy Moscow's estimate of Soviet intent in precipitating civil war in Korea, and further agrees that successful aggression in Korea will encourage the USSR to launch similar ventures elsewhere in the Far East. In sponsoring the aggression in Korea, the Kremlin probably calculated that no firm or effective countermeasures would be taken by the West.' However, the Kremlin is not willing to undertake a global war at this time, and firm and effective countermeasures by the West would probably lead the Kremlin to permit a settlement to be negotiated between the North and South Koreans. If the venture in Korea is successful, the Kremlin will fully exploit the "western failure" in Korea in an effort to undermine the western position throughout the world. Effective action by the UN to control the Kerean situation is possible only through military sanctions involving the immediate conclusion of "interim agreements" providing for armed contingents from member nations to enforce the UN cease fire order.)


ECRET PENTIA 50/5 3. Soviet troop movement against Yugoslavia reported--A Jource J transmits reports from fairly reliable informants that a considerable number of troops are being moved through Rumania toward Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. According to source, seven military trains composed of fifteen to twenty cars which are completely blacked-out are transporting tanks, artillery, and munitions to the south. (CIA Comment: CIA believes that a buildup of Soviet military equipment and strategic transport facilities in the Balkans has been under way for some time. There is little evidence, however, that Soviet military personnel in the Balkans have been increased sufficiently to enable the USSR to undertake military action in the area at this time.) - 2 -TOWNSHENNA

174. Daily Summary Excerpt, 27 June 1950, Soviet Troop Movement Toward Yugoslavia Reported

175. Daily Summary Excerpt, 28 June 1950, No Soviet Military Preparations in Germany and Austria

CONFIDENTIALE T 4. No Soviet military preparations in Germany and Austria --ARMY/5 General Handy, Commander in Chief of US Forces in ARMY/S Europe, reports that there are no indications of aggressive Communist military action in Germany. Handy states that the bulk of the Soviet occupation armies seem to be engaged in normal maneuvers and that the German Democratic Republic has manifested no warlike intentions. General Keyes, Commander of US forces in Austria, reports that there are no indications of a change in the present situation in Austria at this time. (CIA Comment: No evidence is available indicating Soviet preparations for military operations in the West European theater, but Soviet military capabilities in Europe make it possible for the USSR to take aggressive action with a minimum of preparation or advance notice.) - 2 -

176. Weekly Summary Excerpt, 30 June 1950, The Korean Situation



177. Intelligence Memorandum 301, 30 June 1950, Estimate of Soviet Intentions and Capabilities for Military Aggression

1-1085 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 12 30 June 1950 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 301 SUBJECT: Estimate of Soviet Intentions and Capabilities for Military Aggression. Although the USSR is considered to be unwilling to undertake a global conflict with the West at this time, the Soviet-Inspired attack on Korea and the US reaction make it critical to examine Soviet intentions with respect to exploiting other areas bordering the Soviet-dominated sphere along the general lines being followed in Korea. Within the limitation of aggressive actions short of global war, the Kremlin has available to it three general lines of action: (1) the encouragement of guerrilla activities and creation of local disturbances; (2) the incitement of rebellions, local uprisings which could lead to autonomous movements splitting off parts of presently non-Communist areas; and (3) the use of a Soviet-controlled regime to attack and capture control of an adjacent nation or area. Prospects for a Soviet decision to launch a new Korean-type venture or to institute general harrassing measures along the Soviet-dominated border line must be measured in terms of developments in the situation in Korea. If the USSR is successful in-picking-off Korea and if Soviet leaders do not become convinced that the new US policy prompted by the Korean incident requires immediate action to overrun all vulnerable areas before they can be sufficiently strengthened, then the Kremlin will probably call for a quiet period. If the Korean venture backfires on the Kremlin, then the minimum reaction will probably be instigation of all possible pressure tactics to divert world and internal Soviet attention from the Korean failure. Finally, if, as is more probable, hostilities in Korea are pro-Longed, the USSR might use Chinese Communist troops in Kores or possibly elsewhere in Asia, to engage the Mest in exorbitantly costly Far Eastern operations without directly involving Soviet forces. The likelihood of the Kremlin undertaking another Korean-type venture or aggression by some other short-of-war techniques in other peripheral areas will depend largely on local Soviet-Communist capabilities, and prospects for local resistance as well as UN and US reaction. Note: This memorandum has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army Navy, and the Air Force. dissem by ORE to Dept of State 7/10/50 NO CHANGE IN CLASS. CHAN DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS EXT REVIEW DATE: HR 70-2 AND REVIEWER: 006514

THEFT In Korea, the USSR is determined to continue the present attack and Chinese Communist forces may participate to whatever extent is necessary. Such Communist Chinese participation may be overt, under the pretext of North Korean "invitation" or the Chinese Communist troops may be advertised as "volunteers." In any event, the Soviet objective in Korea will be to make the situation as costly to the US, and as damaging to US prestige, as possible. The Kremlin may welcome the resulting involvement of the US with the Peiping regime. The USSR may seek to encourage the gradual extension of such US involvement by precipitating incidents in Southeast Asia and elsewhere which will draw the US into costly, difficult, and embarrassing situations. The USSR will continue to furnish substantial supplies and equipment, including air and naval craft, to the North Koreans, and perhaps later to its other Asiatic puppets. The USSR may also contribute to the North Koreans by supplying "volunteers," in aviation, technical, and advisory capacities. 1. Vulnerable Areas. The main areas vulnerable to Soviet-Communist aggression short of employment of Soviet military forces are, in order of probability: Iran, Yugoslavia, Indochina (Southeast Asia), Turkey, Greece, Germany, and Austria. Other vulnerable points are Formosa and Hong Kong. A. Iran. The USSR has sufficient troops on the Soviet-Iranian border to take over Iran without warning. The pro-Soviet Tudeh Party and other subversive elements both within and outside Iran are capable of creating serious disturbances, but the Iranian armed forces are believed able to cope with such a development. Nevertheless, the Kremlin might use these disorders, particularly in the northern areas, to invoke the 1921 Irano-Soviet Treaty and, under the pretext that Soviet security was endangered, launch an invasion of Iran. The frequency with which the USSR implies that it may have to invoke the treaty and the almost constant troop movements and Soviet feints in the border area make it impossible to detect accurately when this activity may presage an actual invasion.


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B. Yugoslavia


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There is no evidence available to indicate that there are sufficient Soviet-Satellite forces present in the Balkans to Launch a full-scale military attack on Yugoslavia with any prospect of success. Immediate and forceful Western reaction to the Soviet-directed invasion of Southern Korea has greatly increased the likelihood that an attack on Yugoslavia would evoke at least an equally strong Western reaction with a greater risk of general war, which the Kremlin considers undesireable at this time.


The USSR, however, will probably push its efforts to overthrow the Tito Government by all means short of open aggression. Widespread peesant and labor disaffection in Yugoslavia as well as virulent regional antagonisms afford the Kremlin considerable potentialities for the creation of internal disorder and/or guerrilla incursions. Yugoslav popular sentiment against Communism and the USSR is so strong as to suggest that the Cominform will attempt to camouflage much of its activities against the regime under the guise of existing anti-Communist currents. The strength and reliability of the Yugoslav security forces, however, are estimated to be adequate to control any probable increase in such activities in the near future. Meanwhile, the widespread training of guerrillas in adjacent Satellites points to an increase in border activity and incidents.



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D. Turkey The USSR can obtain control of Turkey only by direct military action. There is no subversive element in Turkey strong enough to bring about revolution or civil war; there is no group of Turks outside the country which the Kremlin could successfully exploit for the invasion of Turkey in the Korean pattern; the Turkish Government and people are determined to resist any act of aggression. Reports of troop movements in the Balkans and of projected maneuvers in the Black Sea, the recent departure of the Soviet Ambassador and other Soviet and Satellite diplomats from Turkey, together with sharply increased Bulgarian radio and press fulminations against Turkey indicate the possibility of a Bulgarian invasion of Turkish Thrace. Sconer or later, however, Soviet troops would have to be dispatched to assist the Bulgarians, and the Kremlin, realizing that a Soviet attack on Turkey would probably precipitate a global war, is considered to be unwilling to embark on such a course at this time.



Germany and Austria F. In both Germany and Austria, the USSR is able to take short-ofwar measures which could cause a dispersal of US efforts and contribute heavily to the Soviet "war of nerves." Local border clashes between East and West German police forces will probably take place. These would have a muisance value, but would not directly involve either Soviet or US forces. Strong provocative action can be expected in Berlin both by Soviet troops and by German paramilitary formations in the form of interference with public utilities and with East-West communications. Such interference with communications would tie up substantial numbers of US aircraft and require a high degree of US concentration on the Berlin situation. In addition, Soviet action in Berlin in the light of the current tense situation would sufficiently alarm the West Berlin population to cause serious unrest and produce adverse effects on the already unstable economy of the Western sectors of the city. Minor steps by the Soviet occupation forces in Austria to interfere with the Western position in Vienna are probable primarily for their diversionary value and their contribution to the Soviet war of nerves. The USSR is unlikely to take action against provide utilities and communications, which would reach the proportions of a blockade of Vienna, because such a blockade would result in a partion of Austria, which the Kremlin does not desire at this time.

57 6 JUL 1950 1334 24938 CIA- 5 2. Views of Hong Kong residents on Korean problem--US Consul General Rankin in Hong Kong reports that the initial hearty approval among Hong Kong residents of US and UN action regarding Korea is now being followed by sober realization that the conflict may spread. Rankin adds that local Chinese feel that the Chinese Communists probably will not attack the US 7th Fleet guarding Formosa but that Communist forces will be used in North Korea if the fighting goes against the North Koreans. The Consul General comments that another possible Chinese Communist action could be against Burma, which Hong Kong Chinese consider to be a push-over for the three Communist divisions now on the Sino-Burma border. Rankin also expresses the opinion that a direct attack on the Crown Colony by the Chinese Communists cannot be ruled out since there are nearly 100,000 Communist troops massing in the Canton area with only half of them scheduled to move north. 000 - 1 -THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT. 023 No. 2 9 MAR 1978 т 235038/


178. Daily Summary Excerpt, 6 July 1950, Views of Hong Kong Residents on Korean Problem


TOP (CIA Comment: The Chinese Communist forces are fully capable of launching military operations against Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia simultaneously but they are not likely to undertake such aggressive action unless specifically directed to do so by the Kremlin. The USSR, which is currently maintaining an official aloofness from the Korean situation and which is considered to be reluctant to undertake a global conflict at this time, is not likely to encourage military ventures by the Chinese Communists outside their borders where Western military forces would be encountered until the outcome of the present conflict in Korea becomes more apparent. The Chinese Communists, however, are capable of rendering Hong Kong virtually untenable to the UK through a program of economic boycott, sabotage, and strikes which could be initiated at any time.)


JUL 1950 24939 1335KOREA 1. Invaders' momentum undiminished -- US troop actions have failed to date in slowing the momentum of the North Korean attack and the weight of the invaders' offensive indicates that their immediate objective is the speedy defeat of all defending forces in South Korea. The tactical skill and resourcefulness of the attacking forces is probably the result of intensive and thorough training, plus the presence of Korean combat veterans who served with the Chinese Communist Manchurian armies and a considerable number of Soviet military advisers. In addition, the North Korean forces probably contain many Korean combat veterans who served with Soviet forces in major combat operations, such as, the defense of Stalingrad. Latest information indicates that 150 South Korean Assemblymen were able to escape from Seoul and report to their Government. The missing 60 Assemblymen, who apparently remained in Seoul voluntarily, include virtually all the middle-of-the-roaders. This group offers the invaders their best opportunity to set up a "legitimate" facade for any provisional government in the occupied areas. ments 1 -Decument Ne. NO CHANGE in Class. DEC!ASSIFIED Class. CHALCED TO: ΤS DDA Meme, 4 Apr 77 Auth: ______ REG. 77/1763 Date: 3 @ MAR 1978 By:

179. Daily Summary Excerpt, 7 July 1950, Invaders' Momentum Undiminished

180. Weekly Summary Excerpt, 7 July 1950, The Korean Situation: Soviet Intentions and Capabilities







181. Intelligence Memorandum 302, 8 July 1950, Consequences of the Korean Incident

CRE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 63 INTFLLIGFNCE MEMORANDUM NO. 302 8 July 1950 SUBJECT: Consequences of the Korean Incident I. Sovict Purposes in Launching the Northern Korean Attack. A. Apart from immediate strategic advantages, the basic Soviet objectives in launching the Northern Korean attack probably were to: (1) test the strength of US commitments implicit in the policy of containes ment of Communist expansion; and (2) gain political advantages for the further expansion of Communism in both Asia and Europe by undermining the confidence of non-Communist states in the value of US support. B. The Soviet estimate of the reaction to the North Korean attack was probably that: (1) UN action would be slow and cumbersome; (2) the US would not intervene with its own forces; (3) South Korea would therefore collapse promptly, presenting the UN with a fait accompli; (4) the episode would therefore be completely localized; and (5) the fighting could be portrayed as US-instigated South Korean aggression and the North Korean victory as a victory of Asiatic nationalism egainst Western colonielism. II. Probable Developments from the Korean Incident. There are at present four major alternative courses of action open to the USSR. They are not mutually exclusive courses of action. In particular, it is estimated that the USSR is very likely to try to prolong the fighting in Korea(alternative "B" below) for the short run and then within a few weeks or months, if conditions appear favorable to Soviet leaders, shift to the more aggressive course of creating similar incidents elsewhere (alternative"C" below). The alternatives are examined not in order of probability, but in order of increasing risk of global war and increasing expenditure of effort on the part of the USSR: Alternative A. The USSR may localize the Korean fighting, permitting US forces to drive the North Koreans back to the 38th Parallel and refrain from creating similar incidents elsewhere. In the meantime, the USSR would remain uncommitted in Korea and would develop the propaganda themes of US aggression and imperialistic interference in domestic affairs of an Asiatic nation. This memorandum has not been coordinated with the intelligence Notes organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force. Document N CHANGE in Class DECLAS SIFIFD àss. IANCED TO TS S đ Noma. 4 Apr 77 Anth Date:

This alternative is the most cautious course for the USSR to take. Its adoption would indicate complete surprise at the US reaction to the Korean incident and would suggest strongly that the USSR was unwilling to run even a minimum risk of provoking a global conflict involving the US and the USSR.
 US prestige and political influence would be substantially augmented, particularly with Western European alles and other nations aligned with the US.

3. Soviet prestige and influence would be damaged, but there would be compensations in the form of secondary political gains that would accrue as a result of:

(a) promoting the "peace campaign" and portraying the US as military aggressor;

(b) exploiting the theme of Asian nationalism versus Western imperialism;

(c) maintaining the North Korean and Chinese Communist threat to South Korea as an embarrassment to development of a constructive US or UN policy in Korea.

4. This alternative course of action is unlikely; Soviet advantages would be secondary, comparatively long-range, and intangible, while Soviet disadvantages would be immediate.


<u>Alternative B.</u> The USSR may localize the Korean fighting, still refrain from creating similar incidents elsewhere, but in order to prolong US involvement in Korea, give increasing material aid to the North Koreans, perhaps employing Chinese Communist troops, either covertly or overtly. The USSR would remain uncommitted in Korea and would develop the propaganda themes of US aggression and imperialistic interference in domestic affairs of an Asiatic nation.

1. This alternative is a moderately cautious course for the USSR to take. The USSR would probably consider that its adoption would involve only a slight risk of provoking a global conflict involving the US and the USSR.

2. US prestige would be seriously damaged if the USSR succeeded in prolonging the incident in this way. Western European allies and other nations aligned with the US would question the immediate military value of US commitments even though expecting them to be honored.

3. Soviet prestige would be augmented if the fighting in Korea were prolonged without an open Soviet commitment.

Volumenter



4. Deep involvement of US military forces in the Far East or Near East would leave Western Europe even more dangerously exposed than at present.

5. At some point further Korean-style incidents (requiring the commitment of US forces to stabilize the situation) presumably would force the US to adopt one of the following alternatives:

(a) revise the policy of general containment by limiting US commitments and by planning to combat Soviet aggression only at those selected points where existing US military strength would permit;

(b) begin partial military and industrial mobilization in an attempt to enable the US to combat any further Soviet-sponsored aggression anywhere in the world; or

(c) begin total mobilization to enable the US to threaten to meet any Soviet or Soviet-sponsored aggression with war against the USSR.

6. The USSR probably will adopt alternative "C" sconer or later if Soviet leaders do not estimate the risk of global war involved to be substantial or are prepared for a global war if it develops.

7. If Soviet development of this alternative course of action leads to a general US mobilization, it appears at this time that the USSR probably would in that event continue limited aggressions, accompanied by the customary "peace" propaganda, discounting actual US initiation of a general war and perhaps estimating that the political and economic strains of mobilization would weaken or discredit the US and its foreign policy. The USSR, however, may: (a) desist from further aggression of the Korean type, fearing

(a) desist from further aggression of the Korean type, fearing a global war and taking mobilization as an indication of greater risk than Soviet leaders had anticipated in choosing this course of action; or


(b) expecting US-initiated global war, attempt to soize the initiative by immediately attacking the US (in effect turning to alternative "D", below).


Alternative D. The USSR may consider US intervention in Korea wither as the prelude of an inevitable global war or as justification for beginning a global war for which it is prepared—in either case immediately attacking the US and its allies.

SECRET 1. Nothing in the Korean situation as yet indicates that the USSR would deliberately decide to employ Soviet forces in direct military action precipitating global war. Such a decision is unlikely if as now seems probable, Soviet leaders believe that: (a) there are continuing opportunities to expand Soviet influence by the comparatively cheap and safe means of Soviet-controlled Communist revolutionary activity (including propaganda, sabotage, subversion, guerrilla warfare, and organized military action by local Communist troops-as in Korea), which can be supported by Soviet diplomacy and the more threat of Soviet military strength-in-readiness; and (b) there is substantial risk involved for the USSR in the global war that almost certainly would ensue from direct military action by Soviet forces. 2. The USSR would appear to have little reason to be pessimistic about gains by methods short of global war, particularly by adopting the courses of action described in Alternatives "B" and "C" above. 3. The USSR is unlikely to choose the alternative of deliberately provoking global war at this time in view of: (a) the general superiority of the US and its allies in total power-potential; and (b) the fact that the present Soviet atomic capability is insufficient to neutralize US atomic retaliatory capabilities and to offset the generally superior power-potential of the US and its allies by interfering with the US military and industrial mobilization. III. Effects of a Failure of US Forces to Hold South Korea. A. The immediate consequences of a failure to hold South Korea would be a damaging blow to US prestige with loss in political influence greater than the loss that would have been incurred if the US had not undertaken to support its moral commitment in South Korea, B. The US would be confronted with a choice between two undesirable alternatives: (1) accepting the loss of US prestigeror (2) attempting to regain as much prestige as possible by committing substantial US military resources in a difficult and costly invasion of an area which is not of primary strategic importance to the over-all US military position. In either case US foreign policy and military capabilities would be discredited at home and abroad. C. If US forces were expelled from Korea, the USSR would probably adopt alternative "C" as described above (Section II). It might be tempted, however, to postpone further aggressive action elsewhere until it had determined whether, as a result of the loss of world confidence in the effectiveness of US aid, other areas might not be brought within its sphere of influence through intimidation alons,

182. Intelligence Memorandum 304, 10 July 1950, Effects of a Voluntary Withdrawal of US Forces From Korea

86 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 304 10 July 1950 SUBJECT: Effects of a Voluntary Withdrawal of US Forces from Korea. IM 302, 8 July 1950, "Consequences of the Korean Reference: Incident." CONCLUSIONS Voluntary withdrawal of US forces from Korea would be a calamity, seriously handicapping efforts to maintain US alliances and build political. influence among the nations on whose strength and energetic cooperation the policy of containment of Soviet-Communist expansion depends. It would discredit US foreign policy and undermine confidence in US military capabilities. Voluntary withdrawel would be more damaging than a failure to send US troops to Korea in the first place or than a failure of US forces to hold Korea. Not only would US commitments be shown to be unreliable when put to a severe test, but also considerable doubt would be cast on the ability of the US to back up its commitments with military force. DISCUSSION 1. US withdrawal from intervention in Korea on behalf of the UN, especially since UN action resulted mainly from US initiative, would disillusion all nations heretofore hopeful that US leadership within the framework of the UN could preserve world peace. As a voluntary act of the US, a withdrawal would demage US standing in UN affairs and would undermine the effectiveness of the UN as a device for mobilizing Western resistance to Soviet-Communist aggression. 2. The Western European allies and other nations closely aligned with the US would lose confidence in the military value of US commitments to assist them egainst armed aggression. This lack of confidence would militate against energetic measures to oppose the expansion of Soviet-Communism through the NATO and MDAP programs. Although some slight credit, Note: This memorandum has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force. DOCUMENT NO. LASS. NO CHANGE IN T DECLASSIFY CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS 19971 02. Gate NEXT REVIEW 006514 CREVIEWER: AUTH DATE







1 ¥ JUL 1950 57 TOP BONGING 24943 1339 CIA/S 2. Possible Assault on Taiwan--US Embassy Saigon transmits a US Army report that the Chinese Communist Government is planning an attack on Taiwan "around 15 July" and that the attack may coincide with an uprising on the island. As supporting evidence the report points to: (1) recent troop movements and concentrations in East China; (2) preparations of Chinese mainland airfields and the arrival of aircraft and personnel needed for airborne operations; (3) recent declarations regarding Taiwan by Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai; (4) a reported journey to Moscow by Mao Tse-tung on 4 July; (5) a recent Nationalist purge on Taiwan which source believes will strengthen opposition to Chiang Kai-shek; and (6) the extent of the US involvement in Korea, which source Decument Ne. - 1 -NO CHANGE in Class. DECLASSIFIED Class. CHANCED TO: S ΤS DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77 Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763 Date: 0 MAR 1978 By: Date:


183. Daily Summary Excerpt, 12 July 1950, Possible Assault on Taiwan

TOP SECRET feels increases prospects for the success of an early attack on Taiwan. (CIA Comment: CIA has no information regarding a second Moscow trip by Mao nor is there any available evidence supporting the report that Communist China has selected 15 July to invade Taiwan. However, an analysis of recent Chinese Communist troop movements, propaganda and press comment indicates that the Peiping regime may now be capable of launching an assault against Taiwan.) 2 -

184. Weekly Summary Excerpt, 14 July 1950, Communist China's Role








185. Special Evaluation No. 39, 27 July 1950, Possibility of Soviet Aggression Against Iran


N _ 2 SECRET POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET AGGRESSION AGAINST IRAN 27 July 1950 Conclusion Unless the Soviet Union definitely modifies what appears to have been its previous policy of abstaining from open military action by Soviet forces, it seems probable that the USSR will not attack Iran but will intensify its efforts to build up subversive forces within Iran and to weaken the country by means of propaganda, border activities, and diplomatic pressure. (NOTE: The basic question of general Soviet intentions with respect to the open military action is not discussed here.) Discussion 7 1. Recent reports of increased activity along the Iranian border have obscured the fact that, for almost four years, Soviet forces have been in a position to overrun Iran without warning. In view of the advantages that would have accrued to the USSR from the acquisition of Iran and of the means at its disposal for cloaking aggressive action in a semblance of legality, it seems reasonable to assume that the USSR has been reluctant to employ its own troops in direct aggression. Although in attacking Iran, the USSR could make initially effective use of Iranians-in-exile, Soviet Azerbaijanis, and disaffected elements within Iran, Soviet troops would also have to be used--a condition that does not apply in other sensitive areas such as Formosa, Southeast Asia, and the Balkans. 2. Soviet domination of Iran would give the USSR important advantages: a. The extension of the Soviet frontiers to Iraq and Pakistan would facilitate penetration of the Near East and the Indian subcontinent. SECRET




185. (Continued)

(:ERET 4. Past Soviet attempts to subjugate Iran through subversion and intimidation achieved little success, and the present government is firmly committed to a policy of withstanding Soviet threats and pressures and of maintaining a pro-US alignment. If, however, Iran loses confidence in the ability of the US to fulfill its commitments or comes to believe that the US has little interest in the preservation of Iranian independence, the Iranian Government may feel compelled to seek an accord with the USSR or at least to attempt a course of neutrality. In either case, the USSR would be in a greatly improved position for taking over the country without the use of force. - 3 -SECRET

186. Weekly Summary Excerpt, 28 July 1950, Soviet/Satellite Intentions






SECRET war involving the USSR, such an invasion would probably encounter much less international opposition than would Chinese Communist military operations against Korea, Hong Kong, or Southeast Asia. Moreover, in view of the fact that the Kremlin has permitted North Korean forces to become directly involved with US forces, it may be willing to permit the Chinese Communists to become similarly involved, thereby creating a further drain on US resources, - 4 -

187. Weekly Summary Excerpt, 4 August 1950, Soviet Return to the UN

SOVIET RETURN TO THE UN By returning to the UN, the USSR is seeking to reestablish maximum diplomatic and propaganda maneuverability and perhaps to lay the groundwork for a negotiated settlement in Korea if the turn of events there convinces the Kremlin of the need for such a settlement. The Soviet Union may also hope to gain support in Asia by attacking the highly vulnerable US position on Taiwan. The Soviet boycott was proving more and more disadvantageous to the USSR. Purely aside from failing to accomplish its avowed purpose -- seating the Chinese Communist representative--the boycott denied the USSR the use of the UN either as a medium through which it could obstruct world action in support of South Korea or as a sounding board for Soviet propaganda. Moreover, the Kremlin probably reasoned that by boycotting the UN it was contributing both to the potentialities of the UN to marshal non-Communist world opinion and to the growing determination of the Western world to mobilize against Soviet aggression. The vitriolic and obstructionist attitude of the USSR in the first three days following its return to the SC does not preclude a later Soviet effort to negotiate a settlement in Korea. By initially concentrating on the Chinese representation issue and procedural maneuvers, the USSR is attempting to confuse the questions of Korea and China as well as to save face by demonstrating that it has not abandoned the issue which precipitated the boycott and is therefore not returning to the UN out of weakness. Moreover, the USSR is under no immediate compulsion to seek a settlement of the Korean issue while UN forces are still suffering reverses in Korea. For the present, therefore, the Kremlin can be - 2 -ЕΤ



188. Weekly Summary Excerpt, 1 September 1950, Far Eastern Struggle: Soviet Moves

TOP SECRET FAR EASTERN STRUGGLE Soviet Moves The latest propaganda and diplomatic moves by the USSR and Communist China involving the Far East are further tactical developments in the continuing Soviet offensive in the United Nations. Chinese Communist charges before the UN of US aggression against Taiwan and accusations that the US has violated Chinese Communist territory fall into the now familiar pattern of the Soviet campaign to picture the US as the aggressor in Korea and other areas of the Far East, to divide the Western Powers on the controversial questions of Taiwan and Chinese representation in the UN, and to confuse UN discussion of the Korean situation. These latest moves offer few definite clues regarding future Soviet and Chinese Communist moves in the Far East and could be designed to pave the way for a number of widely varying Soviet actions. For example, charges that the US has violated Chinese territory in themselves are inconclusive: they may be designed merely to maintain the initiative in the SC and to promote Western fears of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea in an attempt to improve the Soviet bargaining position in any negotiations for a Korean solution. On the other hand, these accusations may actually be the propaganda build-up for Chinese Communist military aggression in Korea or elsewhere. Similarly, airing the Taiwan issue in the SC does not rule out an invasion of Taiwan, inasmuch as branding the US as the aggressor might later serve as justification for an attack. Turning the issue over to the UN, however, could serve as an excuse for the present failure to fulfill the pledge to "liberate" Taiwan. Finally, both moves may be further preparations for a later Soviet attempt to trade a North Korean withdrawal to the 38th Parallel for some concessions on Taiwan and seating the Chinese Communists in the UN. - 4 -TOP SECRET

189. Weekly Summary Excerpt, 8 September 1950, North Korean Reserves

TOP SECRET North Korean Reserves The numerous reports of a readily available strategic manpower reserve in Manchuria composed of Korean veterans (who had served with Chinese Communist forces in the Manchurian campaign of 1946-48) tend to be discounted by the non-appearance of such troops in the combat area. It is logical to assume that if such a reserve had been in existence on 25 June, it would have been committed shortly after UN forces had been committed and when its use might have proved decisive. Moreover, since mid-July the North Korean Army has been using recruits with as little as two weeks' training. In addition, even if not immediately available in concentration areas on 27 June, there has been ample time since that date to organize and equip any Korean veterans in Manchuria who would have been far more - 7 -TOP SECRET

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
189. (Continued)

TOPSECRET useful in combat than the inexperienced reinforcements being used. Thus, it is likely that the North Koreans will have to depend for further replacements on: (1) nonveteran Koreans recruited in Manchuria and that part of Korea now in Communist hands; (2) untrained Chinese Communist or Soviet manpower resources; or (3) Chinese Communist or Soviet military units, if it is decided to commit such forces in order either to defend the 38th parallel or to drive UN forces out of Korea. - 8 -TOP SECRET

190. Intelligence Memorandum 324, 8 September 1950, Probability of Direct Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea

	Sec. al	
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	*2	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
	INTELLIGENCE	MENORANDUM NO. 324 8 September 1950
•	SUBJECT: P	robability of Direct Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea
	PROBLEM:	To assess the probability of an open Commitment of Chinese Communist armed forces in Korea.
·	SCOPE:	The contitment of both regular and local Chinese Com- munist ground forces, and the use of the Chinese Com- munist Air Force in support of the North Korean invaders are considered.
	ASSUMPTIONS?	 (1.) Limited covert Chinese Communist assistance to the North Korean invaders, including the provision of individual soldiers, is assumed to be in progress at present. (2) The provision of overt assistance by the Chinese Communists would require approval by the USSR and such
	1 	approval would indicate that the USSN is prepared to accept an increased risk of precipitating general hostilities.
	1. Conclusi	078.
	the Chinese	there is no direct evidence to indicate whether or not Communists will intervene in North Korea, it is evident nese Communists or the USSR must supply trained and
	equipped com	bat replacements if the North Korean invasion is to lete control over South Korea before the end of the year.
	equipped com achieve comp Reports strength in 1 make it clear Chinese Comm accusations :	bat replacements if the North Korean invasion is to
	Reports strength in i make it clear Chinese Comm accusations : Manchurian b	bat replacements if the North Korean invasion is to lete control over South Korea before the end of the year. of an increasing Chinese Communist build-up of military Manchuria, coupled with the known potential in that area, r that intervention in Korea is well within immediate anist capabilities. Moreover, recent Chinese Communist regarding US "aggression" and "violation of the order" may be stage-setting for an imminent overt move. memorandum has not been coordinated with the intelligence izations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the
	Reports strength in 1 make it clear Chinese Comm accusations : Manchurian b Note: This : organ Air P The ma Direct Force.	bat replacements if the North Korean invasion is to lete control over South Korea before the end of the year. of an increasing Chinese Communist build-up of military Manchuria, coupled with the known potential in that area, r that intervention in Korea is well within immediate anist capabilities. Moreover, recent Chinese Communist regarding US "aggression" and "violation of the order" may be stage-setting for an imminent overt move. memorandum has not been coordinated with the intelligence izations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the

190. (Continued)




(STOCKET O œ____ of Lin Piao's 4th Field Army-totalling perhaps 100,000 combat veterans-are now in Lanchuria and are probably located along or adjacent to the Korean border, in position for rapid commitment in Korea. Approximately 210,000 Communist regulars under Nieh Jung-chen's command are presently deployed in the North China area. Some of these troops have been reported enroute to Manchuria. The Chinese Communists are believed to possess an air force totalling 200 to 250 operational combat aircraft, some units of which are reportedly deployed in Manchuria. 4. Indications of Chinese Communist Intention to Intervene. a. Propaganda. Numerous Chinese Communist propaganda attacks on the US during recent weeks, charging the US with "intervention" and "aggression" in Taiwan, have been climaxed by two new protests to the UN claiming US air attacks in violation of the Manchuria-Korea border. It is possible that these charges, besides serving a useful propaganda function, may be aimed at providing an excuse for Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. b. Military Activity. Since the fall of Hainan in April 1950, reliable reports have indicated that elements of Lin Piao's 4th Field Army were being moved northward from the Canton area.¹ Hajor elements of the 4th Field Army are now believed to be either in or enroute to Manchuria. Other reports indicate that military construction is in progress near Antung and along the Yalu River. Strengthening of Hanchurian border defenses might either be a logical security development in view of the Korean conflict or a prelude to the offensive employment of forces in the area. Reports of increased activity at Antung on the Manchuria-Korea border include the reported arrival of Chinese Communist aircraft. Antung has also been reported as the main base of the Reports of preparation for this move were received as early as February 1950, well in advance of the assault on Hainan by LIN's forces. Although these preparations may have been part of announced CCF plans for demobilization, it appears more likely that these elements were Korean troops of Lin Piao's army being released to the North Korean Army. 2. The three airfields in the Antung area could handle a total of 300 aircraft. - 3 -COLUMN T

190. (Continued)

ľ 1.1 SPORT North Korean Air Force, where that depleted force can seek refuge from UN air attacks. Mumerous reports of recent North Korean activity, including revetment construction at airfields south of the 38th Parallel have been received. These construction reports could indicate the imminent forward movement of air reinforcements for the North Koreans. Although some of this anticipated air support might be provided by the as yet untested Chinese Communist Air Force, there is no firm evidence to support such a contention. 5. Factors Militating Against Chinese Communist Intervention. The commitment of Chinese Communist armed forces in Korea would clearly transform the Korean conflict from an ostensibly "internal" dispute to an international struggle. The decision to commit Chinese Communist troops to the Korean conflict would significantly affect the Soviet position in China as well as in Korea, and Soviet influence over both Peiping and Pyongyang might be jeopardized. Other factors which might tend to deter Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean war, but which would be of minor consequence in so momentous a decision, are: (1) Chinese national and military pride might cause friction if Chinese troops were placed under Soviet or Korean command; and (2) Chinese Communist intervention would probably eliminate all prospects for China's admission to the United Nations. -4-Contraction of the

191. Weekly Summary Excerpt, 15 September 1950, Soviet/Communist Activity



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to strain rather than solidify the Chinese-Soviet alliance, partly because in the event of the conflict spreading to China, the Peiping regime would expect substantial aid beyond mere material assistance from the USSR, aid which the USSR would be reluctant to grant for fear of itself becoming involved in the conflict. The Soviet Union consequently might face serious political problems in retaining control over Peiping and Pyongyang, and prospects for Communist China's admission to the UN would be virtually eliminated.

Indirect Aid The decision to provide indirect assistance, such as the commitment of Manchurian "volunteer" units, would present some difficulties. Moreover, victory might not be assured by the maximum scale of such indirect assistance. If large numbers of non-Korean manpower were necessary, they probably could not be supplied without being recognizable as direct Chinese Communist intervention, thus inviting retaliation against China by UN forces, as would direct involvement.

Interim Considerations Although decisive Chinese Communist intervention, either direct or indirect,


is thus unlikely, both the USSR and the Peiping regime will continue their attempts to exploit Western fears of this eventuality. Charges of US border violations and aggression not only fit into the "peace" propaganda campaign but are designed by increasing Western fear of Chinese Communist military action to obtain Western political concessions for the Peiping regime as well as to create an atmosphere for obtaining a favorable settlement in Korea.

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192. Weekly Summary Excerpt, 22 September 1950, Korean Developments



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of action by North Korean forces, and the one offering the best chance of success, would be the commitment of North Korean reserves to a defensive role and a simultaneous withdrawal of as many combat units as possible over secondary lines of communication from the southeast to defensive positions along the 38th Parallel.

Soviet Plans Given this probable military development, the USSR must soon: (1) refrain from inter-


vening and rely on the North Korean forces to prevent their own military defeat by UN forces; (2) employ Chinese Communist or Soviet troops in North Korea; or (3) attempt to achieve a diplomatic settlement. The disadvantages to the Soviet Union of the two latter alternatives make the first the most likely Soviet course of action.

Both the commitment of non-Korean military units and a diplomatic solution negotiated by the Soviet Union itself would force the USSR to disavow its previous stand regarding the Korean question. Since the invasion began, the USSR has made every effort to localize the conflict and to disassociate itself completely from the North Korean action as well as from the UN action. Military action at this time would clearly undermine this position and even further weaken the current Soviet peace offensive, while Soviet diplomatic action would force the USSR to accept the legality of UN action. The USSR might, however, encourage the North Koreans or some third party to seek a settlement. In either event, the North Korean position would probably be so weak as to leave the terms of settlement largely in the hands of the UN.

Global War Soviet unwillingness to substantially increase the risk of global war and the Soviet appreciation that the employment of Soviet or Chinese Communist troops in Korea would represent such a risk are even more compelling

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SECRET $\Theta - F$ policy. The Kremlin, therefore, is more likely to seek to thwart UN efforts through its usual tactics of obstructionism in the UN, coupled with guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, and propaganda within Korea. Although the North Koreans either themselves or through a third party would also be at a disadvantage in seeking a diplomatic solution, if military developments make such an attempt advisable, neither they nor the USSR will be restrained by those considerations of prestige which would deter such action by the USSR alone. - 5 -TOP SECRET

193. Daily Summary Excerpt, 30 September 1950, Possible Chinese Intervention in Korea


14.," 43020 T FAR EAST 2. Possible Chinese Communist intervention in Korea--US CIR/S Ambassador Kirk has received reports from his] colleagues in Moscow that Chinese Communist and leaders in Peiping favor Chinese military intervention in the Korean war if UN forces cross the 38th Parallel. According to Kirk's information, reports concerning the existence of this sentiment among Chinese Communists have come []charge and the[]ambassador in Peiping.]representative is reported to have told his governfrom the The ment that a Chinese Communist decision on intervention has Decument No. _078 NO CHANGE in Class. DECLASSIFIZD ONF TORNES CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS DDA Kome, 4 Apr 77 Auth: BRA. RZE. 77/1763 Date: 3 0 MAR 1978 By:


 \mathbf{O} crystallized since mid-September and is based on the conviction that the entering of US forces into North Korea would indicate a basic US aim to carry the war to Manchuria and China in order to return Chiang Kai-shek to power in China. In commenting on this information, Kirk says he finds it difficult to accept these reports as authoritative analyses of Chinese Communist plans. He takes the line that the logical moment for Communist armed intervention came when the UN forces were desperately defending a small area in southern Korea and when the influx of an overwhelming number of Chinese ground forces would have proved a decisive factor. He warns that prudence is indicated in this situation but expresses his view that the Chinese Communists, through press propaganda and through personal contacts with foreign diplomatic personnel, have taken a strong line since the Inchon landing in the hope of bluffing the UN on the 38th Parallel issue. ION DENTIAL 2 -

194. Daily Summary Excerpt, 3 October 1950, Possible Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea

1409 48024 GENERAL 🕆 Possible Chinese Communist intervention in Korea--US CIAls Embassy London transmits a report from the UK Foreign Office that Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chou Enlai called in Indian Ambassador Panikkar in Peiping on 3 October and informed him that if UN armed forces crossed the 38th Parallel, China would send troops across the frontier to participate in the defense of North Korea. Chou En-lai reportedly added that this action would not be taken if only South Korean forces crossed the Parallel. (CIA Comment: The Chinese Communists have long had the capability for military intervention in Korea on a scale sufficient to materially affect the course of events in Korea, and they now are supporting Soviet efforts to intimidate and divide the US and its UN allies over the issue of crossing the 38th Parallel. CIA estimates, however, that the Chinese Communists would not consider it in their interests to intervene openly in Korea if, as now seems likely, they anticipate that war with the UN nations would result. The "reliability and accuracy" of the source of this report are open to question. It is also entirely possible that he is being used by the Chinese Communists to plant this information in an effort to influence US and UK policy.) - 1 -Document Ro. He that in the Gleas. GLESS CONTRACTOR C 10: IS 15. 4 Apr 77 Dute: तृ त संयस कि 1 1 2 4 2


195. Weekly Summary Excerpt, 6 October 1950, Korea and Soviet Policy; Chinese Communist Problems






TOP SECRET			
CHINESE COMMUNIST PROBLEMS			
Foreign Policy Foreign Minister Chou En-lai's recent lengthy review of Communist China's for- eign policy contains no new assertions or accusations and none of the guarded threats is sufficiently strong to indicate any major change in Peiping's foreign policy. The statement that US "intervention" in China will be repelled is an idle one, as the promise to liberate Taiwan specified no time limit; and the intention to liberate Tibet, prefer ably through negotiation, but if necessary by force of arms, has been ex- pressed before. The Foreign Minister's remarks regarding diplomatic relations with Western countries, relations with the USSR, and the hostile attitude of the US have been uttered many times in the past. Those parts of Chou's speech which have been interpreted as indicating a Chinese Communist intent to occupy North Korea or invade Indochina are in fact estimated to indicate less drastic actions. The statement that the Korean Communists can "obtain final victory" through "persistent, long-term resistance" probably implies extensive Chinese support of North Korean guerrillas and sanctuary for North Korean leaders. However, the intimation that Communist China is now prepared to rush to its neighbor's assistance was probably an attempt to bluff the UN into not crossing the 38th Parallel, rather than a forewarning of Chinese intervention. Finally, Chou's remarks on the UN suggested Peiping's interest in participating in any UN settle- ment of the Korean question.			
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196. Daily Summary Excerpt, 9 October 1950, Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea Discounted

197. ORE 58-50 Excerpt, 12 October 1950, Critical Situations in the Far East




TOP SECRET 4 avoiding its risks and disadvantages. Covert generally, without risking war with aid would enable the Chinese Communists to: the US. (1) Avoid further antagonizing of the UN and reduce risk of war with the US; IV. Probability of Chinese Communist Action. (2) Promote the China-led Asiatic peo-6. While full-scale Chinese Communist inples' "revolutionary struggle," while tervention in Korea must be regarded as a conostensibly supporting peace; tinuing possibility, a consideration of all (3) Maintain freedom of action for later known factors leads to the conclusion that choice between abandonment of aid barring a Soviet decision for global war, such or continuing such covert aid as action is not probable in 1950. During this might be appropriate to Chinese Communist needs in Korea; period, intervention will probably be confined (4) Satisfy the "aid Korea" demand in to continued covert assistance to the North Communist circles in China and Asia Koreans. TOP SICRET

198. Weekly Summary Excerpt, 13 October 1950, Korean Situation: Military Tactics

TOP SECRET KOREAN SITUATION **Military Tactics** Despite the UN peace ultimatum, the North Koreans have reiterated their determination to continue resistance throughout Korea for as long as possible. Although the North Koreans will continue to receive substantial material assistance from the USSR and Communist China, they will be forced to rely largely on their own manpower resources, except in the unlikely event of direct Chinese Communist or Soviet intervention. Some Korean units may still be transferred from Chinese armies to North Korea and Peiping may send a few Chinese troops across the Yalu River to protect its bridges and the hydroelectric plant at Suiho. The principal Chinese Communist contribution, however, probably will consist of military and other supplies, bases for reorganizing and re-equipping North Korean troops, and sanctuary for North Korean leaders charged with directing long-term guerrilla resistance. The North Koreans, meanwhile, probably now have at their disposal approximately 15 major units of division size or less, comprising approximately 140,000 men. Only 40,000 of these have seen combat in the south. the remainder being hastily trained conscripts with little combat efficiency. The entire force, while capable of stiff defensive action at key points, is estimated to lack the strength or experience to continue prolonged organized resistance. - 5 -TOP SECRET

199. ORE 29-50 Excerpt, 13 October 1950, Consequences to the US of Communist Domination of Mainland Southeast Asia



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routes between the Western Pacific and India and the Near East. The denial to the US of intermediate routes in mainland Southeast Asia would be significant because communications between the US and India and the Near East would be essential in a global war. In the event of such a war, the development of Soviet submarine and air bases in mainland Southeast Asia probably would compel the detour of US and allied shipping and air transportation in the Southeast Asia region via considerably longer alternate routes to the south. This extension of friendly lines of communication would hamper US strategic movements in this region and tend to isolate the major non-Communist bases in the Far East-the offshore island chain and Australia -- from existing bases in East Africa and the Near and Middle East, as well as from potential bases on the Indian sub-continent.

Besides disrupting established lines of communication in the area, the denial of actual military facilities in mainland Southeast Asia — in particular, the loss of the major naval operating bases at Singapore — would compel the utilization of less desirable peripheral bases. Soviet exploitation of the naval and air bases in mainland Southeast Asia probably would be limited by the difficulties of logistic support but would, nevertheless, increase the threat to existing lines of communication.

The loss of any portion of mainland Southeast Asia would increase possibilities for the extension of Communist control over the remainder. The fall of Indochina would provide the Communists with a staging area in addition to China for military operations against the rest of mainland Southeast Asia, and this threat might well inspire accommodation in both Thailand and Burma. Assuming Thailand's loss, the already considerable difficulty faced by the British in maintaining security in Malaya would be greatly aggravated. Assuming Burma's internal collapse, unfavorable trends in India would be accelerated. If Burma were overcome by external aggression, however, a stiffening of the attitude of the Government of India toward International Communism could be anticipated.

- 1 6 OCT 1950 66 1420 48037 FAR EAST Possible Chinese Communist intervention in Korea--According to US Embassy Hague,] four divisions of unidentified troops, presumed to be Chinese, have crossed the Manchurian border into North Korea. (CIA Comment: There have been numerous reports during recent weeks regarding four Chinese Communist units (variously identified as Armies and Divisions) which are alleged to have crossed into Korea from Manchuria, and the Netherlands Charge's report may be a repetition of these earlier claims. CIA continues to believe that the Chinese Communists, while continuing to assist the North Koreans, probably will not intervene openly in the present fighting in Korea.) Document, No. - 1 -Ke Giller in Gloss. production and the С 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - **TS** Com 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - **TS** S Apr 77 Date 2 A MAR 1570 By: 77/1783
- 200. Daily Summary Excerpt, 16 October 1950, Possible Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea

20 OCT 1950 66 48041 1.424 GENERAL Chinese Communist intervention in Korea -- The US Military Liaison Officer in Hong Kong transmits a report that the Peiping regime has decided to take military action in North Korea. (The report is attributed to a representative of the Γ 1) According to source, 400,000 Chinese Communist troops had been moved to the Korean border and alerted to cross on the night of 18 October or "two days later." (CIA Comment: For some time the Chinese Communists have possessed the capability for direct military intervention in the Korean conflict. CIA believes, however, that the optimum time for such action has passed. The USSR and China are not considered at this time to be willing to assume the increased risk of precipitating a third World War which gould result from direct Chinese Communist intervention in Korea.) Document No. - 1 -F0 200 17 %: 01nss. Civitation (17): TS Pato 2 4 MAR 1978 BY:


201. Daily Summary Excerpt, 20 October 1950, Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea

66 28 OCT 1950 48050 1431 GENERAL CIA/S Reports on Chinese involvement in Korea--According to a c1+15 source in Hong Kong, it was decided in early October it a conference in Peiping attended by Chinese, Soviet and North Korean leaders that if UN troops crossed the 38th Parallel and North Korean forces were unable to hold them. he main part of the North Korean forces would be withdrawn o Manchuria for future use while the balance would carry on uerrilla warfare in Korea. Meanwhile, another source n Hong Kong has learned that the Chinese Communists and he USSR regard the Korean war as virtually ended and are not planning a counteroffensive. Source added that the bulk of the Chinese Communist units had been withdrawn from Corea, leaving only skeleton forces in order to create the mpression that a large number of Chinese Communist forces vere still present, thus deceiving US intelligence so that the naximum number of US troops would be committed in Korea or the longest possible time. (CIA Comment: CIA concurs in general with these inlications of over-all Soviet and Chinese Communist intentions egarding Korea. The presence of independent organized Chinese Communist units in Korea has not yet been confirmed; he above reports concerning skeleton Chinese forces, however, ire consistent with fragmentary field reports thus far received on Chinese Communist participation in the Korean fighting. 1 -Moument No. 10 CHANGE to Class. DECTASSIETED ARCHIVAL RECORD ΤS Class. Child DD 70: PLEASE RETURN TO DOA Meno, 4 Apr 77 AGENCY ARCHIVES, BLDG. A-18 Auth: DEA ESG. 77/178 Date: 2 4 MAR 1978 By: CRET 235031

202. Daily Summary Excerpt, 28 October 1950, Reports on Chinese Involvement in Korea

203. Daily Summary Excerpt, 30 October 1950, POW Reports of Chinese Communist Forces in North Korea


66 610 all 1550 48051 rat SECRET 1432GENERAL 1. POW reports of Chinese Communist forces in North Korea-army/s The Commanding General of the US Eighth Army in Korea reports that the ten Chinese Communist prisoners of war captured as of 30 October have claimed during interrogations that the 119th and 120th divisions of the Chinese Communist 40th Army and the 117th division of the 39th Army are now in Korea. (CIA Comment: Although there are major units of Chinese Communist forces along the Manchurian-Korean border, the presence of Chinese Communist units in Korea has not been confirmed. CIA continues to believe that direct Chinese Communist intervention in Korea is unlikely at this time. However, there is a strong possibility that the Peiping regime may move troops across the border in an effort to establish a "cordon sanitaire" around the Suiho hydroelectric plant and other strategic border installations essential to the Manchur an economy. There is also the possibility that these Chinese were sent into North Korea to plant reports of Chinese Communist forces in North Korea in the hope of slowing the UN advance, and thereby providing time for North Korean forces to reorganize. Ordinarily, privates in the Chinese army do not possess the detailed order-of-battle information which these POW's passed on to US field interrogators.) Decarrie The -1-TO TO LAD. 3.1 March 19 / Eme 97 baus: 2:4 MAR 1978 My: CFCDF




204. Daily Summary Excerpt, 31 October 1950, Chinese Communist Troops in Korea

205. Daily Summary Excerpt, 2 November 1950, China: "Intervention" in Korea


3. CHINA: "Intervention" in Korea -- US Consul General Wil-CIA/S CIA/S China to "participate in the Korean war." the formal decision was made on 24 October at a meeting pre-CIA/SO/ sided over by Chinese Premier Mao Tse-tung. Jalso claims that twenty Chinese Communist armies are now in Manchuria (the strength of a Chinese Communist army ranges from 20-30,000); included in these twenty armies are eight armies of the Fourth Field Army as well as elements of the other three Field Armies of the Chinese Communist forces. Reports from US representatives in London and Rangoon and from []sources in Taiwan indicate considerable troop movement from China proper into south Manchuria during October. According to these reports, Mukden is under martial law and a state of war emergency exists with air raid precautions and other defense preparations under way. Factories in Mukden and Antung are being dismantled and moved north. Twenty jet fighters of unknown nationality have appeared over Mukden. The city is said to be in a state of panic, with many Communist officials and residents moving north. "Large numbers" of Russian troops, both in and out of uniform, have arrived, as well as materiel, including self-propelled guns and naval mines. The UK Consul in Mukden has told the British Foreign Office that . he has been ordered to leave by 3 November, ostensibly because he objected to preparation of Chinese Communist defense installations in the UK consular compound. (CIA Comment: Major units of the Chinese Communist Fourth Field Army have been moving to Manchuria for several months. Although elements of the other three Field Armies could be moving north, there is no confirmation that units of these - 2 -



206. Weekly Summary Excerpt, 3 November 1950, Chinese Communist Plans: Korean Intervention




207. Weekly Summary Excerpt, 10 November 1950, The Korean Situation: Chinese Intentions



208. Daily Summary Excerpt, 17 November 1950, Chinese Communist Intentions at the UN, in North Korea

E. 17 NOV 1950 48068 1447 GENERAL CIAS 1. Chinese Communist intentions at the UN--Indian Am-C14/3 bassador Panikkar in Peiping has informed his government that the Chinese Communist Government is anxious to secure a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue, but only on the condition that Communist China participates in such a settlement. Panikkar adds that the impression in Peiping is that the Chinese Communist representatives due soon at the UN will be agreeable to settling the Korean question through discussions outside the Security Council. Panikkar believes the Chinese representatives may also be willing to discuss informally with representatives of the US and other powers issues of a general character. In passing this report to US Ambassador Henderson in New Delhi, Secretary General Bajpai of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs said he was withholding comment because he had lost confidence in Panikkar. Bajpai explained that he did not want to give the impression that the Indian Government was trying to bring pressure on the US to come to an understanding with Peiping. According to the US delegation to the UN, the Swedish representative to Moscow (now visiting New York) is inclined to think that the Chinese military moves were of a flexible nature, designed for probing and for limited purposes generally. The Swedish representative feels the Kremlin is not now prepared to allow present activities to develop into a general war. 2. Communist China's intentions in North Korea--The L] CIA/S Ambassador in Peiping has informed his government that: (a) the Chinese Communist movements toward Korea are on a 44/3large scale; and (b) Peiping publicity points to fear and alarm C(H/c)sument No. CHANNED to State. DET. 33. 9 MAR 1978 2 3:10



Sterner . (CIA Comment: Except for the Indian Ambassador, the diplomatic community in Peiping has extremely limited contacts with Communist officials. These reports, except for troop movements and similar activities, represent personal opinions. CIA believes the Chinese Communist regime is primarily concerned with possible UN retaliatory action rather than an unprovoked US military attack. Moreover, Peiping has not yet committed itself to go "to any length" to salvage the Korean Communist regime, and maximum Chinese Communist intervention may not be necessary to achieve Peiping's objectives in Korea. CIA is convinced that, for the immediate future, Chinese Communist operations in Korea will probably continue to be defensive in nature. However, Peiping's present strategy in Korea may envisage the steady replacement of North Korean losses until the UN no longer regards the unification of all Korea as practicable.) - 3 -SECRE