

P A R T I I

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CRISIS  
OCTOBER 16-28  
1962

*Notification of high US officials . . . Formation of  
National Security Council Executive Committee (Ex Comm)  
. . . Policy debate over appropriate US response to missile  
threat . . . Continuation of Operation MONGOOSE . . .  
Discovery of intermediate-range ballistic missile sites in Cuba . . .  
Notification of Allied heads of government . . . The President's  
speech . . . Quarantine . . . Construction of missile bases continues  
at rapid pace . . . U-2 shootdown . . . Resolution of Crisis . . .*

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First memo on the Missile Sites  
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16 October 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MEMORANDUM: Probable Soviet NREMA Sites in Cuba

1. Photography of 14 October 1962 has disclosed two areas in the Sierra del Rosario mountains about 50 n.m. west southwest of Havana which appear to contain Soviet NREMA in the early stages of deployment. A third area, about five and ten miles east of the first two, respectively, appears to be a military encampment. The first site includes 14 large tents, 15 smaller tents and 75 vehicles of a number of different types. The most significant vehicles at this site are six canvas-covered trailers of 80 feet in overall length which are of the general size and configuration of those used to transport the Soviet SS-3 (700 n.m. ballistic missile) and SS-4 (1100 n.m. ballistic missile). These trailers, of which eight more are located at the second site, are believed to be larger than those required to transport the Soviet SS-2 (350 n.m. ballistic missile).

2. The second site is 5 n.m. east of the first, and in addition to the eight trailers, contains four specially configured vehicles or pieces of equipment which could be used for missile erection in a field environment. At the time of photography, one of the trailers was in juxtaposition with one of these possible erectors. This site also contains 17 large tents, 20 small tents, 10 large trucks, 16 small trucks and 12 unidentified pieces of large equipment. No other missile associated equipment, such as instrumentation or propellant storage, have been detected. No facility to store nuclear warheads can be identified at any of these three installations.

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3. The dimensions of the trailers indicate that either the SS-3 or SS-4 ballistic missile systems are involved. Both of these systems are road-mobile and can be deployed with no heavy construction work for launch pads, etc. Both the SS-3 and SS-4 are single stage vehicles which will carry a 3,000 lb. warhead to a maximum range of 700 n.m. and 1100 n.m. respectively. The SS-3 system requires liquid oxygen as an oxidant, while the SS-4 employs storable propellants. From a logistic and operational standpoint it would be more advantageous to deploy the SS-4 system to Cuba.

4. We do not have evidence from shipping coverage or other sources to indicate definitely when the missile units arrived in Cuba. From the extensiveness of the present activity, we judge that equipment may have begun to arrive during September. At the time of the 14 October photography, a column of trucks and equipment was visible on a road within one of the installations. Although we cannot be sure, it seems likely that the bulk of the personnel and equipment were shipped from the USSR as an integrated road mobile unit, suitable for field deployment. The time required to reach operational readiness could thus be quite short. Assuming that the necessary fueling and handling equipment is available, that communications are being installed, and that warheads are in Cuba or en route, an operational MRBM capability could probably exist in Cuba within the next few weeks.

5. The Soviet leaders' decision to deploy ballistic missiles to Cuba testifies to their determination to deter any active US intervention to weaken or overthrow the Castro regime, which they apparently regard as likely and imminent. This estimate of US intentions prompted Moscow's statement of 11 September which warned that an attack on Cuba would lead to a general nuclear conflict. The Soviets presumably believe that the presence of these missiles, which they expect would quickly become known to the US government, will significantly increase the costs and risks of any US action against the Cuban regime. They also probably believe that the missiles will reinforce the deterrent link between Cuba and Berlin which was implicit in the 11 September Soviet statement and in subsequent private conversations. Moscow clearly is seeking to portray Berlin as a hostage for Cuba.

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5. The Soviet leaders must have anticipated that sending missiles to Cuba would create new complications for their efforts to bring the Western powers into serious negotiations on the Berlin and German questions. Although they apparently expect a fairly prolonged period of maneuver and negotiation on Berlin after the US elections, this willingness to accept the risks involved in deploying missiles to Cuba does not in itself provide any clear indications regarding future Berlin tactics. It does, however, underscore the importance Moscow attaches to demonstrating the alleged shift in the world balance of power in favor of the bloc which, in the Soviet view, will eventually oblige the West to come to an accommodation on Berlin.

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
## ANNEX: Strategic Considerations

1. In weighing their decision to install ballistic missiles in Cuba, the Soviet leaders must have considered the military utility of these weapons with and without nuclear warheads, the targets in the US and elsewhere which they could reach, and the strategic value of deploying missile forces of various sizes in Cuba.

2. Because of their type of guidance and relative inaccuracy, ballistic missiles have utility against fixed targets of known location, and not against such targets as convoys or naval forces at sea. The Soviet 700 and 1,100 n.m. missiles, whose CEP's are estimated to be in the 1 to 1.5 n.m. range, could conceivably be employed with HE warheads against large military centers and urban areas. It is highly unlikely that the Soviets would see any advantage in deployment for this purpose, but they might regard this threat as contribution to the deterrence of Latin American support for US or Cuban refugee operations against the Castro regime.

3. Deployed 700 and 1,100 n.m. missiles with nuclear warheads would augment Soviet strategic striking power by virtue of their ability to reach a number of American targets with warheads having yields which are not significantly smaller than those of current Soviet ICBMs. From the present base area in Cuba, 700 n.m. missiles with nuclear warheads could reach eastern US targets within an arc including Savannah and New Orleans, including 7 SAC bomber and tanker bases and at least one important naval base. (The 350 n.m. missiles could reach bomber bases in Florida, of which there are only two.) The 1,100 n.m. missile would threaten a much more significant number of critical military targets, including 18 SAC bomber and tanker bases, an ICBM base, and three major naval bases. In addition, such targets as the Panama Canal and US bases as far east as Puerto Rico could be reached. Both of these missiles have ranges sufficient to reach many US population, industrial and administrative center--including, in the case of the 1,100 n.m. missile, Washington, D.C. Installations of importance to the US atomic energy and space programs also would be within range of Cuban-based 700 and 1,100 n.m. missiles.

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17 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. On Monday evening, 15 October late, I was informed that the latest readout from Cuban U-2 photography indicated initial deployment of Medium Range Ballistic Missiles. I immediately authorized the dissemination of this information on a very limited need-to-know basis to USIB members and their immediate commanders. On Tuesday morning at 11:45 I attended an NSC Meeting at the White House which included the President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary Ball, Secretary Martin, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Gilpatric, General Taylor, the Vice President, Secretary Dillon, the Attorney General, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, and myself. I made a preliminary briefing to the group as to what we thought we saw and Mr. Lundahl and Mr. Graybeal expanded thereon. At the end of the intelligence portion of the briefing, the group went into general discussion.

2. Secretary Rusk was greatly disturbed about this new development but pointed out that Mr. McCone had predicted such a possibility back in mid-August. He said that he had been thinking about courses of action and that he had a number of comments to make, along the following lines:

- a. A quick-strike surprise attack by air to wipe out these bases;
- b. Consideration to expand this into a total invasion to take over the island;
- c. We must not operate in a vacuum but must of course pre-inform our allies, at least in part;
- d. We should consider making an announcement very shortly and to determine whether or not to call up the Reserves;

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e. Perhaps we should get in touch with Castro through a third party and tell him it was now or never and that he was selling Cuba down the river by getting involved with Soviet missile bases;

f. We should try to create maximum confusion and not worry too much about the noise level. Here he was referring to infiltration and sabotage efforts;

g. We should review our policy on a provisional government and try to get all the various factions working together. In any event, we must keep Cuba isolated from the Free World although in doing so we must not isolate ourselves.

3. In the final analysis Mr. Rusk felt that we had to either make a quick surprise attack and knock out these bases or to lay on a heavy propaganda barrage in all areas which might cause a withdrawal. Rusk stated that we could not in our thinking separate Berlin and other trouble areas in the world. He seemed deeply troubled and did not seem firm in any of his proposals but appeared to have been boxing the compass as to courses of action.

4. Mr. McNamara pointed out that if we are going to take overt military action, it must at all costs be done on a 100% basis and before any of the missiles become operational. General Taylor pointed out that the element of surprise would be essential but since this would then be a one-shot operation, we should establish an immediate blockade and then look toward invasion although this latter prospect did not enthuse him. He stated that the decision to invade would be the hardest one to make because of the long-time involvements and the lack of any substitute for the Castro regime. Mr. Bundy pointed out that the Soviet decision must have been made early in the summer and that these missiles probably arrived in Cuba at about the time the President was making his policy statements. Bundy thought there was a real possibility that Khrushchev may be confused or misled as to the temper of the American people and the intimate concern we all have over Cuba.

5. The President pointed out that the missiles certainly had to be removed one way or another, and stated that he would meet again at

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six o'clock that evening with his advisers. In the meantime there was much information to be gathered and much analysis to be done as to pros and cons of all the various courses of action. He authorized as many U-2 flights as needed to get full, complete, 100% coverage of the island. He asked for a report on the latest analysis of just what the thinking toward Cuba is in Latin American countries as well as NATO as to any action the U. S. might take; some unanswered questions on whether or not to surface the fact that we were making surveillance flights and whether or not to surface this new information; also whether to precede any military action by some form of political pressure action; what would be the effect of military strikes, how long would it take to organize, how many sorties would be required, etc.

*Dictated by General Carter on 17 Oct 62.*

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48. Cline, Memorandum for the Record, "Notification of NSC  
Officials of Intelligence on Missile Bases in Cuba,"  
27 October 1962

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
27 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Notification of NSC Officials of Intelligence on Missile  
Bases in Cuba

1. At about 2100 on the evening of 25 October the President called me on the phone at a dinner party I was attending at the apartment of Mrs. Anna Ghennault, widow of the late General, at 4101 Cathedral Avenue. He said he had heard stories that CIA officers were alleging that intelligence on offensive missile bases in Cuba had been available for several days before it was called to the attention of the President. He asked me to confirm that I was responsible for the analysis of this kind of intelligence and appropriate dissemination of it to higher authorities, and to tell him the facts in the case.
2. I told the President that I was responsible in CIA for substantive analysis of intelligence and the dissemination of current intelligence to the President and the National Security Council. I said I could state categorically that the stories he had heard were untrue, since I was sure the mission with the first photography of the MRBM offensive bases was flown on 14 October and it took approximately 24 hours for the film to be returned, processed, delivered to the National Photographic Interpretation Center and scanned by PI analysts. I said I was sure the technical analysis did not turn up the evidence until late afternoon or early evening of 15 October, that I myself heard of it first at that time, and that we completed the analysis before passing the information formally to the White House on the morning of 16 October. The President seemed content with this explanation.
3. In view of concern over this period of intelligence handling of this sensitive information, I have tried to reconstruct what I know of the events of the evening of 15 October and morning of 16 October, as follows.
4. Under direct orders from the President, given to me and General Carter at the White House several weeks earlier when the possibility that the Banes coast-defense missile was a longer-range weapon, I had issued instructions to the Director, NPIC, to see that intelligence on new offensive weapons in Cuba came to me as soon as analysis had identified the type of weapon and that absolutely no dissemination of this intelligence should be made without my approval. On 15 October I spent all afternoon at the opening session of the Commonwealth-US Intelligence Methods Conference.

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When I returned to my office at 1730 I found a delegation of PI and military intelligence analysts awaiting me. I do not know how long they had been waiting to see me but it could not have been many minutes or they would have passed a message to me at the Conference Room. They were all agreed that they had just identified a missile base for missiles of a range upwards of 350 miles. I reviewed their evidence and was obliged to concur.

5. The DCI had gone to the West Coast and General Carter was then at an informal reception for the Commonwealth conferees in the Executive Dining Room at the Headquarters building in McLean. I was the host but delayed my arrival until 1815 to study this intelligence. Upon arrival I called General Carter aside and advised him in broad terms of the intelligence. I said it would take several hours to wrap up a definitive report with fully considered analysis. General Carter said he was going to dinner with General Taylor and General Carroll (DIA) and would let them know. I asked if he would notify Mr. McGeorge Bundy for the White House and he said he thought he might be at the dinner and would notify him there.

6. About 2130 that evening my intelligence officers checking out the evidence on the site reported somewhat cryptically by phone that they had agreed on a report identifying offensive missile systems probably in the 700-mile and possibly in the 1,000-mile range. I instructed them to complete a written report and stand by for action early the next morning.

7. A few minutes later I decided it was a mistake to wait until morning to alert the key officers at the White House and State Department, ~~so~~ they should insure early attention to the problem on the next day. I assumed General Carter would have alerted the Pentagon adequately via JCS and DIA but that he might have missed the White House. Accordingly I called Mr. McGeorge Bundy, found he had not seen General Carter, and double-talked the information to him in broad terms. He was very clear as to the import despite being short on facts due to the problem of security over the phone. This was about 2200. I then called Roger Hillsman of the State Department and conveyed the same information to him. I had more difficulty indicating securely to him that I really meant MRBM's rather than aircraft or other equipment we had anticipated, but the light finally dawned and he (as he later informed me) called the Secretary of State to pass on the word.

8. Early the next morning, 16 October, at about 0830, I talked again on the phone to Mr. Bundy. (I forget whether he called me or vice versa) I had by then reviewed a brief memorandum on the subject and calculated the ranges of possible missiles (by then we had settled on 700 to 1100 miles) and crudely indicated them on a map. At Mr. Bundy's invitation I went immediately to his office, having cleared this with General Carter, who had another engagement and instructed me to follow through on the White House formal notification. Sid Graybeal, my missiles expert from OSI, accompanied me. In Bundy's office I told him the story. He shortly

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brought in the Attorney General, whom I also briefed. His initial comment was one four-letter word, off the record. If I remember correctly, Alex Johnson also came in to get the briefing. At any rate Mr. Bundy said that he had arranged an 1100 meeting with the President to fill him in and consider the US policy problems involved. At 0930 General Carter arrived. I showed him the memorandum we had prepared, discussed the evidence, and advised him Graybeal could support him fully with analytical back-up. I said I felt the Acting DCI should handle the briefing of the President, with which General Carter agreed; that he probably did not need me, with which he somewhat reluctantly agreed; and that somebody had better get back to see that the DCI on the West Coast got the word, and continue research and analysis on the Cuban missile problem -- with all of which General Carter heartily agreed.

9. I presume General Carter did surface the information at 1100, the DCI returned later that afternoon, and a whirlwind of intelligence reporting and policy formulation on Cuba set in from which we have not yet recovered.

*Ray S. Cline*

RAY S. CLINE  
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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16 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: MONGOOSE Meeting with the Attorney General

1. At 2:30 this afternoon, the Attorney General convened in his office a meeting on Operation MONGOOSE consisting of General Lansdale and Colonel Patchell, General Johnson of the Joint Staff, Robert Hurwitch of State (vice Ed Martin who was unable to attend), Hewson Ryan of USIA, and the undersigned.
2. The Attorney General opened the meeting by expressing the "general dissatisfaction of the President" with Operation MONGOOSE. He pointed out that the Operation had been under way for a year, that the results were discouraging, that there had been no acts of sabotage, and that even the one which had been attempted had failed twice. He indicated that there had been noticeable improvement during the year in the collection of intelligence but that other actions had failed to influence significantly the course of events in Cuba. He spoke of the weekly meetings of top officials on this problem and again noted the small accomplishments despite the fact that Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, General Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, and he personally had all been charged by the President with finding a solution. He traced the history of General Lansdale's personal appointment by the President a year ago. The Attorney General then stated that in view of this lack of progress, he was going to give Operation MONGOOSE more personal attention. In order to do this, he will hold a meeting every morning at 0930 with the MONGOOSE operational representatives from the various agencies (Lansdale, Harvay, Hurwitch, Ryan, and General Johnson).
3. The Attorney General spoke favorably of the sabotage paper which had been presented by General Carter this morning to the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented). He obviously did not like the earlier memorandum, since he felt it showed no "push" in getting on with the acts of sabotage.
4. When asked for my comments, I stated that we were prepared to get on with the new action program and that we would execute it aggressively. I pointed out, however, that the objective of Operation MONGOOSE would have to be determined at some point since the Cubans

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with whom we have to work were seeking a reason for risking their lives in these operations. I retailed my conversation with the young Cuban from the DRE who pointed out that they were willing to commit their people only on operations which they regarded as sensible. I defined "sensible" in Cuban terminology these days as meaning an action which would contribute to the liberation of their country, another way of saying that the United States, perhaps in conjunction with other Latin countries, would bail them out militarily. My point was specifically echoed by Hewson Ryan. The Attorney General's rejoinder was a plea for new ideas of things that could be done against Cuba. In passing, he made reference to the change in atmosphere in the United States Government during the last twenty-four hours, and asked some questions about the percentage of Cubans whom we thought would fight for the regime if the country were invaded.

5. The meeting concluded with the reaffirmation by the Attorney General of his desire to hold a meeting each day, beginning tomorrow. He said that these meetings might later be changed to every other day when and if he finds a daily get-together is not necessary. The meetings are to last no more than one-half hour.

*Net*  
Richard Helms  
Deputy Director (Plans)

Distribution:

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16 October 1962  
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : Additional Information - Mission 3101

1. An examination of photography from Mission 3101 dated 14 October 1962 has revealed an MRBM Launch Site and two new military encampments located along the southern edge of the Sierra Del Rosario in west central Cuba.

2. The Launch Site and one of the encampments contains a total of at least 14 canvas-covered missile trailers measuring approximately 67 feet in length and 9 feet in width. The overall length of the trailers including the tow bar is approximately 80 feet.

3. The other encampment contains vehicles and tents with no missile trailers observed in search to date.

4. Detail and equipment for each area is as follows:

a. Area 1 - MRBM Launch Site located in a wooded area at 22-40-05N, 83-17-55W, 4.0 NM ENE of San Diego de los Banos. Site contains at least 8 canvas-covered missile trailers and 4 deployed probable missile erector/launchers (unrevetted). The probable launch positions, generally in-line, are separated by approximately 850 feet, 700 feet and 450 feet for a total distance of 2000 feet. The westernmost position has a missile tractor/trailer aligned with the erector. Other equipment includes 18 trailers/vans, approximately 60 miscellaneous vehicles, 18 large tents, 22 small tents, 4 buildings under construction and open storage.

b. Area 2 - Military Encampment (missile) located in a wooded area at 22-40-50N 83-15-00W, 5.8 NM north of Los Palacios. Equipment includes at least 6 canvas-covered missile trailers, approximately 75 vehicles and 18 tents.

c. Area 3 - Military Encampment located in a wooded area at 22-42-40N 83-08-15W, 4.2 NM West of San Cristobal. Equipment includes 35 vehicles, 15 large

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[REDACTED]

tents, 8 small tents, 7 buildings (possibly new) and  
1 building under construction.

*Arthur C. Lundaahl*

ARTHUR C. LUNDAHL  
Director  
National Photographic Interpretation Center

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] PSALM  
[REDACTED]

51. McCone meeting schedule, 17-23 October 1962

~~SECRET~~

17 October 1962 - Wednesday

8:30 a.m. Meeting of study group: DCI, Secty. Rusk, Secty. McNamara, Gen. Taylor, Secty. Gilpatric, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Amb. Bohlen, Amb. Thompson, Amb. Acheson, Secty. Ball, Mr. Sorenson, Mr. Martin, Mr. Johnson

9:30 a.m. DCI met with the President

11:30 a.m. DCI went to Gettysburg - brief Gen. Eisenhower

4:00 p.m. Meeting of study group

10:00 p.m. Meeting of study group

18 October 1962 - Thursday

10:45 a.m. Mr. McGeorge Bundy

11:00 a.m. The President and others

4:00 p.m. Meeting at State Department with study group

7:30 p.m. Meeting at State Department with study group

9:00 p.m. Meeting at State Department with study group

19 October 1962 - Friday

11:00 a.m. Meeting at State Department with study group

4:00 p.m. Meeting at State Department with study group

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~~SECRET~~

20 October 1962 - Saturday

8:30 a.m. USIB Meeting  
10:30 a.m. Meeting of study group  
1:30 p.m. Meeting of study group  
2:00 p.m. Meeting at White House

21 October 1962 - Sunday

8:30 a.m. USIB Meeting  
9:00 a.m. Meeting with Gen. Eisenhower  
10:00 a.m. Meeting at White House  
2:30 p.m. Special NSC Meeting  
8:30 p.m. Brief the Vice President

22 October 1962 - Monday

8:30 a.m. USIB Meeting  
10:30 a.m. Meeting with The President  
3:00 p.m. NSC Meeting  
5:00 p.m. Meeting with Congressional Leaders

23 October 1962 - Tuesday

10:00 a.m. Executive Committee of the NSC  
1:30 p.m. Arthur Krock  
2:00 p.m. Chairman Vinson  
2:30 p.m. Senator Hickenlooper  
3:30 p.m. Senator Russell  
5:00 p.m. David Lawrence  
6:00 p.m. Executive Com:  
of the NSC

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

M/K  
#10!

Memorandum of Meeting attended in Secretary Ball's Conference Room by Secretary McNamara, Bundy, General Taylor, Robert Kennedy, Martin and McCone at 0830, 17 October.

1. Meeting involved an inclusive exploration of alternatives open to us in connection with the Cuban matter.

Ball seemed to feel military action would throw the NATO allies in disarray and permit Britain and France to separate from us on Berlin policy. Stated Kohler discussions with Khrushchev did not fit in with Soviet action in Cuba. Suggested Cuban situation might be by inadvertance. Suggested we might give Khrushchev an "out" on the grounds that he does not know what is going on in Cuba and discussed various types of action ranging from a limited military strike to minimize losses to ~~xx~~ the calling of a Summit conference.

2. During the discussion Taylor and Ball speculated as to whether this whole thing was not a "mock up" designed to draw out action by us. and that the war heads were not there. This view was not supported.
3. McNamara urged avoiding taking a position, considering all alternatives, with meetings this afternoon and this evening in preparation of final discussion with the President tomorrow.
4. Urged exploration of all facts and listed the following:

About 50 or 60 MIG 17s and 19s now in Cuba and these apparently have no offensive capability.

One MIG 21 has been seen and a number of suspicious crates also seen indicating some MIG 21 capability and we do not know whether the MIG 21 has an offensive capability.

IL 28's have been delivered

Three MRBM sites under construction and can be ready in two weeks

Warhead locations unknown; also unknown whether MRBM's are nuclear or conventional. Also feels that if nuclear warheads supplied them Soviet will also supply nuclear bombs for bombers with offensive capability

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

Shiploads of boxes of unknown purpose reported by Lundahl to DCI on October 14th.

28 Soviet ships en route to Cuba at the present time.

Sited at Havana, mysterious excavations, revetments, covered buildings, railroad tracks through tunnels, etc., might be nuclear storage site.

Other facts should be developed today.

Note: McCone responded by reading numbered paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of attached memorandum dated October 17th.

5. General Taylor and Thompson discussed political nature of problem including possibility of forcing settlement in Berlin and elsewhere - Khrushchev wished show down on Berlin and this gives a show down issue. Believes Khrushchev would be surprised to find we know about MRBM's. Thompson emphasized Khrushchev wants Berlin settlement but on his terms. And will probably deny knowledge of Cuban situation but at any event would justify actions because of our missiles in Italy and Turkey. Also Khrushchev recognizes that action by us would be divisive among our allies.
6. McCone emphasized his views on political objectives as stated in paragraph 5 of the attached memorandum, and also repeated paragraph 2-C. Also made the point in paragraph 6.
7. McNamara discussed many operational questions concerning the use of Soviet nuclear warheads in Cuba; how communications could be arranged; what authority was in the field. Thompson believes Soviet nuclear warheads was under very tight control. McCone reviewed recent Chicadee reports, indicated considerable autonomy in hands of field commanders much more so than we have.
8. Bundy and McCone left for meeting with the President.

~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

October 17, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION TODAY, OCTOBER 17, 1962.

SUBJECT: The Cuban Situation.

1. The establishment of medium range strike capability in Cuba by the Soviets was predicted by me in at least a dozen reports since the Soviet buildup was noted in early August.

2. Purposes are to:

(a) Provide Cuba with an offensive or retaliatory power for use if attacked.

(b) Enhance Soviet strike capability against the United States.

(c) Establish a "hall mark" of accomplishment by other Latin American countries, most particularly Mexico, and other Central American countries within strike range of the United States.

3. The MRBM capability we have witnessed will expand and the defensive establishments to protect this capability likewise will be expanded. There appears to me to be no other explanation for the extensive and elaborate air defense establishment.

4. In my opinion the missiles are Soviet, they will remain under Soviet operational control as do ours, they will be equipped with nuclear warheads under Soviet control (because conventional warheads would be absolutely ineffective), Cubans will supply most of the manpower needs with the Soviets permanently exercising operational command and control. Nevertheless, there will be a substantial number of Soviets on site at all times.

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~


~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

5. Soviet political objectives appear to me to be:

(a) The establishment of a "trading position" to force removal of U.S. overseas bases, *such as Pearl Harbor*.

(b) To satisfy their ambitions in Latin America by this show of determination and courage against the American Imperialist.

6. Consequences of action by the United States will be the inevitable "spilling of blood" of Soviet military personnel. This will increase tension everywhere and undoubtedly bring retaliation against U.S. foreign military installations, where substantial U.S. casualties would result.



7. The situation cannot be tolerated. However, the United States should not act without warning and thus be forced to live with a "Pearl Harbor indictment" for the indefinite future. I would therefore:

(a) Notify Gromyko and Castro that we know all about this.

(b) Give them 24 hours to commence dismantling and removal of MRBMs, coastal defense missiles, surface to air missiles, IL 28s and all other aircraft which have a dual defensive-offensive capability, including MIG 21s.

(c) Notify the American public and the world of the situation created by the Soviets.

(d) If Khrushchev and Castro fail to act at once, we should make a massive surprise strike at air fields, MRBM sites and SAM sites concurrently.

John A. McCone  
Director

- 2 -

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

October 17, 1962

Several alternatives indicated below were posed for consideration at the close of meeting covered by memorandum dated October 17th.

All dealt with the specific actions U.S. Government should take against Cuba at this time. The discussions centered around:

- (a) Whether military action should be taken prior to a warning to, or discussions with, Khrushchev and Castro.
- (b) Notification to or consultation with our allies, including NATO, OAS, and others.
- (c) Referral to the United Nations.
- (d) Effect on the "balance of nuclear power equation" of the MRBM installations in Cuba.

Three principal courses of action are open to us, and of course there are variations of each.

(1) Do nothing and live with the situation. It was pointed out clearly that Western Europe, Greece, Turkey, and other countries had lived under the Soviet MRBMs for years; therefore, why should the United States be so concerned.

(2) Resort to an all-out blockade which would probably require a declaration of war and to be effective would mean the interruption of all incoming shipping. This was discussed as a slow strangulation process, but it was stated that "intelligence reports" indicated that a blockade would bring Castro down in four months. (I have seen no such estimate).

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

(3) Military action which was considered at several levels. The following alternatives are:

- (a) Strafing identified MRBM installations.
- (b) Strafing MRBM installations and air fields with MIGs.
- (c) (a) and (b) plus all SAM sites and coastal missile sites.
- (d) (a), (b), and (c) above plus all other significant military installations, none of which were identified.

Discussions of all of the above were inconclusive and it was asked that the group reassemble, and develop their views on the advantages and disadvantages and the effects of the following:

- (1) Warning to Khrushchev and Castro.
  - (a) If the response is unsatisfactory, pursuing a course of military action.
  - (b) If the response is unsatisfactory, referring to the OAS and the United Nations prior to taking military action.
- (2) Warning to Khrushchev and Castro and if the response is unsatisfactory, convening Congress, seeking a declaration of war, and proceeding with an all-out blockade.
- (3) Strike militarily with no warning, the level of the military effort being dependent upon evolving circumstances. In all probability this type of action would escalate into invasion and occupation, although the meeting was not agreed on this point.
- (4) Blockade with no warning and no advance notice such as a declaration of war, with the President depending upon existing Congressional resolutions for authority.

John A. McCone  
Director

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

~~EYES ONLY~~

55. McCone memorandum, "Brief Discussion with the President—9:30 a.m.—17 October 1962"

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

#40

Brief Discussion with the President - 9:30 a.m. - 17 October 1962

Confirmed the situation and explored possible actions. McCone referred to but did not recommend warnings as outlined in paragraph 7. (This paragraph was not discussed in the earlier meeting in Ball's office).

President seemed inclined to act promptly if at all, without warning, targetting on MRBM's and possibly airfields. Stated Congressional Resolution gave him all authority he needed and this was confirmed by Bundy, and therefore seemed inclined to act.

President asked McCone to see Eisenhower promptly.

JOHN A. McCONE  
Director

JAM/jh

1 cc - DDCI

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET, EYES ONLY~~

17 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Conversation with General Eisenhower - Wednesday,  
17 October 1962

At President Kennedy's request I called on General Eisenhower today at 12:00 o'clock. Reviewed the Cuban developments. President Kennedy had asked that I carefully avoid indicating any particular line of action as none had been agreed upon, and this was observed.

I briefed Eisenhower on all aspects of the recent Cuban-Soviet build-up and showed him the U-2 pictures of three MRBM missile sites under development. Eisenhower expressed no particular surprise indicating that he felt this offensive build-up would probably occur.

He then expressed criticism of the Bay of Pigs failure and also the fact that we did not respond more energetically when Castro publicly embraced Communism.

With respect to the current situation, Eisenhower felt that it would prove to be intolerable, that its purposes can not be clearly defined, and that ~~the~~ discussions ~~are~~ <sup>of</sup> adamant demands to either Khrushchev or Castro or both, would be of no avail.

In discussing blockades, he mentioned the difficulty of type of action we would take if and when a Soviet ship, laden with military hardware and personnel, is stopped on the high seas. The question he raised, as do I, is "What would we do with the ship then?"

Eisenhower questioned limited military action as being indecisive, irritating world opinion, creating fear in all areas where the Soviets could retaliate with limited action and therefore would be ~~indecisive~~. <sup>inadvisable</sup> He recalled that when President Truman ordered limited air support in the first two or three days of the Korean war, he, Eisenhower, told the President that from a military standpoint this would not work and more decisive action was required.

~~SECRET, EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

Throughout the conversation Eisenhower seemed to lean toward (but did not specifically recommend) military action which would cut off Havana and therefore take over the heart of the government. He thought this might be done by airborne divisions but was not familiar with the size of the Cuban forces in the immediate area, nor the equipment. Eisenhower seemed to feel that such a plan would be more decisive, would mean less bloodshed, could be accomplished more quickly than a landing and a conventional type of slow invasion.

I told General Eisenhower that I did not expect an answer but both the President and I wished him to be fully informed and that I would like to consult with him from time to time. He agreed to be available personally or by telephone at any time.

JOHN A. McCONE  
Director

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

57. McCone, Memorandum for the File, "Memorandum of Meeting, Wednesday, October 17th, at 8:30 a.m., and again at 4:00 p.m.," 19 October 1962

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October 19, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

Memorandum of Meeting, Wednesday, October 17th, at 8:30 a.m., and again at 4:00 p.m., attended by Rusk, Ball (each part of the time) Martin, Johnson, McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, McCone, Bohlen, Thompson, Bundy, Sorenson, Dean Acheson (for a short time).

Note: The 4:00 o'clock meeting adjourned at about 7:00, and re-assembled at 10:00 p.m., in Secretary Ball's conference room, adjourning at 11:45 p.m.

Note: At 9:30 a.m. <sup>on 17 Oct 62</sup> DCI went to see the President, then went to Gettysburg to see General Eisenhower.

The purpose of the discussion was to develop a plan of action in connection with Cuba, and the alternatives are summarized in my memorandum of October 18th addressed to USIB, copy of which is attached.

This memorandum will record views as they were expressed and developed throughout the meetings.

Ambassador Bohlen warned against any action against Cuba, particularly an air strike without warning, stating such would be divisive with all Allies and subject us to criticism throughout the world. He advocated writing both Khrushchev and Castro; if their response was negative or unsatisfactory then we should plan action; advise our principal allies, seek a two-thirds vote from the OAS and then act. The Attorney General and Bohlen exchanged views as to just what type of an answer we could expect from Khrushchev and what he might do if we threatened an attack. During this discussion Secretary Rusk seemed to favor asking Congress for a declaration of a state of war against Cuba and then proceed with OAS, NATO, etc., but always preserve flexibility as to the type of action. Bohlen consistently warned that world opinion would be against us if we carried out a military strike. Secretary Ball emphasized the importance of time, stating that if action was over quickly, the repercussions would not be too serious.

No Change in Class.   
Declassified  
Class. Changed to: TS(S) C  
Next Review Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
Auth: HQ 70-3  
Date: 10-27-91 By: 253768

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The Attorney General raised the question of the attitude of Turkey, Italy, Western European countries, all of which have been "under the gun" for years, and would take the position that now that the U.S. has a few missiles in their backyard, they become hysterical. This point was discussed back and forth by various people throughout both days of discussion.

Secretary McNamara made the point that missiles in Cuba had no great military consequence because of the stalemate mentioned in my October 18th memorandum. General Taylor supported this view in the early parts of the discussion, but in the later meetings expressed increasing concern over the importance of the missile threat from Cuba. Gilpatric supported McNamara's position. McCone doubted it, stating that McNamara's facts were not new as they had appeared in estimates months ago (which McNamara questioned). Nevertheless, he and McCone felt that a complex of MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba would have very important military significance. McNamara took issue claiming that the military equation would not be changed by the appearance of these missiles.

Bohlen and Thompson questioned the real purpose of the Soviet's actions in Cuba and seemed to feel that their acts may be in preparation for a confrontation with President Kennedy at which time they would seek to settle the entire subject of overseas bases as well as the Berlin question. McCone indicated this might be one of several objectives and undoubtedly would be the subject of discussion at the time of confrontation; however, McCone doubted that this was the prime purpose of such an elaborate and expensive installation as the Soviets were going forward with in Cuba. Bohlen seemed to favor precipitating talks, and was supported by Thompson.

SecDef and Taylor both objected to political talks because it would give time for threatening missiles to become operational and also give the Soviets an opportunity to camouflage the missiles. McCone presented most recent photographs and indicated CIA opinion that the first missiles will be operational within one or two weeks.

Bohlen again raised the question of opening up discussions. McNamara agreed that ~~was desirable~~ this would be desirable but emphasized the importance of developing sequence of events which would lead to military action.

- 2 -

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~~SECRET~~

There followed an extensive discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of a military blockade, total or partial.

It was at this point that McNamara and Taylor presented their schedule of alternative military strikes, copy of which is attached, and which was the subject of continual discussion in the ensuing meetings.

Dean Acheson then expressed his views as follows:

We should proceed at once with the necessary military actions and should do no talking. The Soviets will react some place. We must expect this; take the consequences and manage the situations as they evolve. We should have no consultations with Khrushchev, Castro, or our allies, but should fully alert our allies in the most persuasive manner by high level people. This would include all NATO partners, and the OAS. The President should forget about the elections and should cancel all future campaign speeches.

As an alternate to military action, a plan was discussed involving a declaration of war and the creation of an all-out blockade. Thompson spoke strongly in favor of a blockade. General Taylor at this point indicated that he favored a blockade although in subsequent meetings he seemed inclined towards a military strike. McCone gave an intelligence estimate on the effects of a blockade, indicating its seriousness would depend upon how "hard" a blockade it turned out to be, and finally stated that the main objective of taking Cuba away from Castro had been lost and we have been overly consumed with the missile problem. McCone stated that we must all bear in mind that we have two objectives, one, disposing of the missile sites, and the other, getting rid of Castro's communism in the Western Hemisphere.

The meeting adjourned for dinner and in the evening Secretary Rusk came forward with the following plan.

The United States cannot accept operational MRBMs in Cuba. There is not much profit in preliminary exchanges with Khrushchev and Castro because the President has said that the establishment of

- 3 -

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Soviet bases and offensive weapons in the Western Hemisphere would raise serious problems and therefore on September 5th and 13th the President has in effect warned both Khrushchev and Castro.

would result

Rusk continued that more talks with Khrushchev/in extended parlays and therefore he recommended against such an approach. Rusk then proposed that we hold until the middle of next week and then follow the OD course No. 1 (52 sorties against MRBMs). Prior, we inform key allies probably on Tuesday (Macmillan, de Gaulle, Adenauer, possibly the Turks and a few Latin American Presidents). On Wednesday, we strike with missiles and simultaneously send a message to Khrushchev, NATO, OAS, etc. We should be alert for an attack on Turkey and be prepared for the consequences in Berlin, Quemoy, Matsu, Korea, etc. Rusk made the estimate that world opinion would go along, 42 allies would go along and some neutrals would be favorable. Latin Americans must be told that we are acting in the interests of the Western Hemisphere. Rusk advocated that the first step -- we take out the missiles and thus remove the immediate problem of the establishment of an offensive capability, but that we be prepared for subsequent steps. He emphasized the United States cannot accept missiles in our security interests and in view of statements made by the President and others and our various policy declarations. Bohlen continued to persist for diplomatic approach but Rusk and several others were not at this point persuaded. McNamara raised innumerable questions concerning military operations; the manner in which the strike could be properly covered with protective air and how it might be restricted and also the advisability of case one, as contrasted with case one, two and/or three.

Both Ambassador Thompson and Secretary Martin in discussing the Rusk proposal favored a blockade, coupled with a declaration of war.

General Taylor at this point spoke in favor of a military strike taking out the MRBMs and the planes as well, and was supported by McCone, who took the opportunity to cover the points set forth in "talking paper for principals, October 17, 1962", attached. Also during the course of these meetings, McCone reported to the group and later to the President the results of his discussions with General Eisenhower, as covered in the attached memorandum of October 17th, this subject.

- 4 -

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In addition to the attached papers, State tabled during the day's meetings the following:

- (a) Possible course of action (undated) in 14 pages.
- (b) Possible world consequences in military action, undated, 5 pages.
- (c) Political actions (undated) 4 pages.
- (d) Political actions in support of major military action (undated) 3 pages.

These were all referred to as State papers (draft) and some were revised the following day.

Also State tabled the following papers:

Limited one-time strike against MRBM sites, undated, 6 pages.

Plan of blockade (undated) 4 pages.

Paper labeled "Attack Three - Invasion" 5 pages with an attached scenario of 4 pages.

Possible Soviet Reactions to the following alternatives, C. E. Bohlen, October 17th, 2 pages.

Also, proposed letter to Khrushchev was tabled, paper dealing with probable Castro response to U.S. appeal and a proposed letter to Fidel Castro, marked "To Mr. F. C.", all included in State papers.

At the conclusion of the meetings which served the purpose of airing the views of all parties responsible for giving advice to the President, the alternatives open to us were summarized by the Attorney General and are covered in my memorandum to USIB, dated October 18th.

John A. McCone  
Director

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- 5 -

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58. Albert D. Wheelon, Memorandum for Chairman, United States Intelligence Board, "Evaluation of Offensive Missile Threat in Cuba," 17 October 1962

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IRONBARK

17 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Offensive Missile Threat in Cuba

The following report was prepared by the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) in collaboration with the NPIG. It is based on relatively complete photointerpretation of Mission No. 3101 flown on 14 October 1962, and the most preliminary results of Mission No. 3102, flown on 15 October 1962. Mission 3103, also flown on 15 October 1962 did not cover this area of missile deployment. The following conclusions were developed from data available as of 1700 hours on 17 October 1962.

1. The missiles observed in Western Cuba are medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) were reported moving into this area during September. These missiles are of Soviet origin and are not by Soviet personnel.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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GALM [REDACTED]

IRONBARK

2. At least some of the missiles observed in photography are 1020 nm, SS-4 missiles. Detailed photointerpretation shows that the missiles are canvas covered, have blunt nose, and are 56 feet, plus or minus two feet in length. This agrees well with the length of the SS-4 missile tankage (64 feet) without its nose cone, and is different from the tankage length (56 feet) of the 630 nm SS-3. However, there are less certain length measurements which range from 55 to 68 feet on missiles in another area, so that one cannot rule out the possibility of a mixed force including some 630 nm missiles. The general missile lengths provided in the clandestine reports are compatible with either the SS-3 or SS-4. The missile measurements, site configuration and ground support equipment mitigate against the SS-2 (350 nm), the SS-5 (2200 nm) and cruise type missiles.

3. Based on analysis of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] there is agreement that the best 630 nm missile was produced in early 1959 and that the present surplus of these missiles over those expended is between 70 and 80 missiles.

- 1 -

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GALM [REDACTED]

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PSALM [REDACTED]

IRONEARK

On the other hand, 1020 nm missiles are still being produced and there is probably a Soviet inventory of 650 to 850 such missiles. There have been no training firings of the 630 nm missile since October 1961, whereas thirty 1020 nm missiles have been launched already this year (1962). Considering these aspects we believe the 630 nm missile program is relatively inactive and that the more modern 1020 nm missile is more likely for this venture.

4. The greater range capability of the 1020 nm missile provides significant US target coverage advantage over the 630 nm missile. (See Figure)

5. There are now two confirmed MRBM launch sites in Western Cuba at San Diego & Los Baños and Los Palacios. A third site at San Cristobal is connected with this deployment and a third launch site. We cannot preclude the possibility that other sites will appear which would follow the usual Soviet practice of organizing two battalions into a missile regiment, which is the operating unit of strategic defense. However, such regiments usually include a technical support unit, and the third site could be the location

-3-

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PSALM [REDACTED]

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PSALM [REDACTED]

IRONBARK

of this unit.

6. There are eight missiles and four launchers visible at the most advanced site (San Diego de Los Banos). It is probable that eight missiles will be deployed to each such site, apparently for a refire capability. The total force structure depends upon the interpretation of the third site and possibilities of a fourth site. The best current estimate is that at least 16 and possibly as many as 32 missiles will be operational in Cuba in the next week or so.

7. The sites being deployed in Cuba are field type launchers which rely on mobile erection, checkout, and support equipment. The four-in-line deployment of launchers, at sites which are themselves five miles apart is representative of MRBM deployment in the Soviet Union. None of the sites are revetted, but this feature could be added at any time.

8. We are having difficulty in distinguishing between the 630 and 1029 mm systems on the basis of site characteristics, since neither can be ruled out on the basis of those physical measurements which have been made from the U-2 photography obtained to

-4-

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

PSALM [REDACTED]

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PSALM

IRONBARY

date. The problem results from resolution limitations of satellite photography and has precluded identification of similar field type launchers in the Soviet Union or European satellites. From valid clandestine sources, we gather that the 1020 nm missile can be readily deployed to presurveyed alternate sites in a matter of 6 hours plus transit time. The possibility that launch sites can be relocated must not be overlooked.

9. There is significant change detectable in the sites between the two overflights one day apart. Fencing of two areas is evident on the second day, and substantial progress is being made on erecting temporary buildings. Fifty vehicles (an increase of 15) and the possible appearance of erectors are noted at the third area.

10. The question of earliest operational capability with these sites depends critically on the type of missile being deployed. If we are correct in identifying these as 1020 nm missiles, with storable propellants and self-contained (inertial) guidance, the first site could be available almost immediately for emergency use. However, we do not see missile nose cones nor do we know of

-5-

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PSALM [REDACTED]

BROADBARK

nuclear supply or storage. (See JAEIC Statement re nuclear weapons.)

11. If the 630 nm missile is being deployed, we would expect to find radio guidance equipment to the rear of the launchers and cryogenic generators to supply the liquid oxygen for this missile. Photographic search thus far has not revealed either type of equipment, although we cannot yet say that our search is exhaustive.

12. The evidence favors the 1020 nm missile system, and indicates that this system will become operational in a matter of days.

*Albert D. Wheelon*

ALBERT D. WHEELON  
Chairman

Guided Missile & Astronautics  
Intelligence Committee

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]  
18 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Additional Information - Mission 3102

1. An examination of photography from Mission 3102 dated 15 October 1962 has revealed a probable NERH/IRHM Launch Complex, a confirmed NERH site and a probable IRHM site. The latter two sites were previously reported as military encampments on Mission 3101.

2. A probable NERH/IRHM Launch Complex consisting of two probable launch sites under construction, has been identified approximately 21 nm southwest of Havana. The launch sites are approximately 2.5 nm apart and are situated on a flat-topped ridge line.

Launch Site No 1 is located at 22-56-50N 82-39-80W and 2.4 nm northeast of Guanajay. It is of the offset inline configuration and consists of four elongated launch pad areas oriented at 315 degrees and separated by approximately 750 feet. A central bunker, 60 by 50 feet, is situated between the pads of each pair. This is connected by cable scar to a structure located inboard of each pad. The launch site is in an early stage of construction and is enclosed by fence.

Launch Site No 2 is located at 22-57-00N 82-37-05W and 4.3 nm northeast of Guanajay. This launch site also has an inline configuration, and consists of three launch pad areas, with indications of a fourth. The separation of the pad clearings of one pair and their orientation is the same as that at Site No 1. The launch site appears to be in a very early stage of construction and is secured by fence. Photography of 29 August 1962 indicates that initial construction had begun at Site No 1, and that Site No 2 did not exist.

3. Additional information from Mission 3102 on the previously reported NERH area is as follows:

a. Site No 1 - NERH Launch Site located 4 nm NE of San Diego de los Baños at 22-40-05N 83-17-15W. Only the support area is visible through clouds and haze. Changes from Mission 3101 in area seen include 3 large tents and the completion of a building in early stages of construction on Mission 3101. A security fence under construction is present on the south side of the installation.

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b. Site No 2 - A reanalysis of Site No 2 near Los Palacios, (previously identified as a military encampment) on photography of 15 October 1962, permits its upgrading to a confirmed MRM launch site. Changes noted since Mission 1101 include the identification of an erector in the area where the 6 missiles are parked and the absence of a 60 foot unidentified object in the tent area.

c. Site No 3 - Previously identified as a military encampment is now considered to be a probable MRM launch area and is located 3 km west of San Cristobal at 22-42-50N 83-08-15W. The site is situated on the south side of and adjacent to the foothills of a mountain range. The area is under construction and contains the following elements: 2 missile erectors, 2 probable missile trailers, 2 structures, 100 by 18 feet, 1 building under construction, 70 by 35 feet with concrete arches lying nearby, 8 buildings, 70 by 30 feet under construction, at least 40 tents, and approximately 50 miscellaneous unidentified vehicles. Additional equipment may be parked beneath the trees, or hidden by shadows.

ARTHUR C. LINDAHL  
Director  
National Photographic Interpretation Center

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#41

19 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE *11:00 AM - 10-18-62 w/ The President, et al*

Early in the morning of October 18th, Secretary McNamara called Mr. McCone at his residence expressing great concern over the reports from NPIC as a result of their examination of the two flights run on October 15th. Lundahl was at the house with the enlargements which indicated that, in addition to the three mobile MRBM sites detected on flight October 14th, there appeared to be now two IRBM sites with fixed launchers zeroed in on the Eastern United States. McNamara felt that this development demanded more prompt and decisive action.

*McCone did not attend 16th meeting*  
The group which had been meeting on Tuesday met in the Cabinet Room at 11:00 a.m. on Wednesday with the President. State tabled revisions in their papers on covering a limited one-time strike and blockade, most of which are dated 10/18 - 11:00 a.m.

*McCone did not attend 16th meeting*

At the opening of the meeting, McCone gave a brief resume of current intelligence and Lundahl presented the most recent photography. President questioned Lundahl further if the uninitiated could be persuaded that the photographs presented offensive MRBM missiles. Lundahl stated probably not and that we must have low-level photography for public consumption.

Secretary Rusk then stated that developments in the last 24 hours had substantially changed his thinking. He first questioned whether, if it is necessary to move against Cuba, and then concluded that it was because Cuba can become a formidable military threat. He also referred to the President's recent public statements and indicated a feeling that if no action was taken, we would free the Soviets to act any place they wished and at their own will. Also, Rusk stated the failure on our part to act would make our situation unmanageable elsewhere in the world. He furthermore indicated that this would be an indication of weakness which would have serious effect on our Allies. Secretary pointed out to the President that action would involve risks. We could expect counter action and the cost may be heavy. The President must expect action in Berlin, Korea and possibly against the United States itself. Rusk felt a quick strike would minimize the risk of counter action. He raised the question of solidarity of the Alliance and seemed to dismiss this question, feeling that the Alliance would hold together. Rusk stated that if we enter upon positive action, we can not say for sure what the final Soviet response will be and therefore what the final outcome will be. However he felt that the American people will accept danger and suffering if they are convinced doing so is necessary and that they have a clear conscience. The Secretary reviewed the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of World War I, World War II, and the Korean war. These factors militated in favor of consulting with Khrushchev

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and depending on the Rio pact. This, he indicated, might have the possibility of prevention of action and settlement by political means. The other course open was the declaration of war. Rusk expressed himself in favor of leaning upon the Rio pact, but does not dismiss the alternative of a unilateral declaration of war as the ultimate action we must take. The alternate is a quick strike.

Ambassador Bohlen was not present but his views were expressed in a message which was read in which he strongly advocated diplomatic effort and stated that military action prior to this would be wrong. He urged against action first and then decisive value of discussion. He also stated that limited quick military action was an illusion and that any military action would rapidly escalate into an invasion. McNamara at this point presented the alternatives referred to the previous day, stating that alternatives one and two were not conclusive and that we would have to resort to alternative 3 and in fact this would lead us ultimately into an invasion.

General Taylor generally reviewed the situation stating that the Chiefs looked upon Cuba as a forward base of serious proportions, that it cannot be taken out totally by air; that the military operation would be sizeable, nevertheless necessary.

Ambassador Thompson urged that any action be preceded by a declaration of war; he strongly advocated that we institute a blockade and not resort to military action unless and until it is determined that Castro and Khrushchev refuse to reverse their activities and actually remove the missiles which are now in place.

Secretary Dillon questioned what would be accomplished by talking to Khrushchev. He pointed out that we would probably become engaged in discussions from which we could not extract ourselves and therefore our freedom of action would be frustrated. Dillon was very positive that whatever action we take should be done without consultation with Khrushchev. Rusk seemed to disagree indicating there was a possibility that Khrushchev might be persuaded to reduce his efforts but he admitted also that he might step them up as a result of discussions.

President Kennedy was non-committal, however he seemed to continually raise questions of reactions of our allies, NATO, South America, public opinion and others. Raised the question whether we should not move the missiles out of Turkey. All readily agreed they were not much use but a political question was involved. Bundy thought this a good idea either under conditions of a strike or during a preliminary talk.

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McNamara discussed in some detail the effects of a strike indicating that we could expect several hundred Soviet citizens to be killed; he pointed out that all of the Sam sites were manned exclusively by Soviets and a great many Soviet technicians were working on the MRBMs and at the air fields. He agreed that we could move out of Turkey and Italy; pointed out the political complications. At this point McNamara seemed to be reconsidering his prior position of advocating military action and laid special emphasis on the fact that the price of Soviet retaliation, whether in Berlin or elsewhere, would be very high and we would not be able to control it.

Secretary Ball throughout the conversation maintained the position that strike without warning was not acceptable and that we should not proceed without discussion with Khrushchev. President Kennedy then said that he thought at some point Khrushchev would say that if we made a move against Cuba, he would take Berlin. McNamara surmised perhaps that was the price we must pay and perhaps we'd lose Berlin anyway. There followed an exchange of view on the possibility of the Soviets taking Berlin and our prospect of retaining it.

President Kennedy rather summed up the dilemma stating that action of a type contemplated would be opposed by the alliance - on the other hand, lack of action will create disunity, lack of confidence and disintegration of our several alliances and friendly relations with countries who have confidence in us.

As a result of discussions of the "price" of a strike, there followed a long discussion of the possibilities of a blockade, the advantages of it, and manner in which it would be carried out, etc. There seemed to be differences of opinion as to whether the blockade should be total, or should only involve military equipment which would mean blockading Soviet ships. Also there were continued references to blockading ships carrying offensive weapons and there seemed to be a differentiation in the minds of some in the policy of blockading offensive weapons as contrasted to blockading all weapons.

There followed discussion as to policies the President should follow with respect to calling Congress into session, asking for a declaration of war, advising the country and authorizing action. Thompson continued to insist that we must communicate with Khrushchev. There was a discussion concerning the President's meeting with Gromyko and the position he should take should the Cuban question come up. The President was advised to draw Gromyko out and it was indicated he probably would receive a flat denial that there were any offensive weapons in Cuba.

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Meeting adjourned with the President requesting that we organize into two groups. One to study the advantages of what might be called a slow course of action which would involve a blockade to be followed by such further actions as appeared necessary as the situation evolved. Second would be referred to as a fast dynamic action which would involve the strike of substantial proportions with or without notice.

JOHN A. McCONE  
Director

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JOINT EVALUATION  
OF  
SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA

PREPARED BY

Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee  
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee  
National Photographic Interpretation Center

2100 HOURS

18 OCTOBER 1962

This report is based on relatively complete photo interpretation of U-2 photography made on:

14 October 1962 Mission 3101  
15 October 1962 Missions 3102 & 3103

Very preliminary and incomplete readout of coverage of the six U-2 Missions flown on 17 October 1962 are also reflected in this report.

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## CONCLUSIONS IN BRIEF

### Offensive Missiles

1. At least one Soviet regiment consisting of eight launchers and sixteen 1020-nm (SS-4) medium range ballistic missiles is now deployed in western Cuba at two launch sites. These sites presently contain un-revetted, field-type launchers which rely on mobile erection, checkout, and support equipment. These missiles are probably those reported moving into this area during September. Although there is continuing improvement of these sites, these mobile missiles must be considered operational now and could be launched within 18 hours after the decision to launch. A refire from each launcher could be accomplished within 5 hours after the initial firing.

2. Fixed, soft sites which could achieve initial operational capability during December 1962 are now being developed near Havana. We believe that the 2200-nm (SS-5) intermediate range ballistic missile is probably intended for these sites. Photography of these sites show eight, fixed launch pads under construction which probably equate to an additional missile regiment with eight ready missiles and eight for refire.

3. All of these offensive missile systems are Soviet manned and controlled. We believe that offensive action by these systems would be commanded from the Soviet Union but have not yet found the command and control communication links.

### Nuclear Warheads for Offensive Missiles

4. There is no positive evidence of the presence of nuclear warheads in Cuba, nor have weapons storage facilities of the standard, highly secure Soviet type been identified. However, there are seven, large Cuban

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munitions' storage areas south of Havana which could be converted to Soviet needs in a relatively short time. Temporary storage could be provided in ships or field sites which might not be identified.

5. Nevertheless, one must assume that nuclear warheads could now be available in Cuba to support the offensive missile capability as it becomes operational. The warheads expected for these missiles weigh approximately 3,000 pounds and have yields in the low megaton range.

#### Coastal Defense Missiles

6. Three coastal defense missile sites have now been identified in Cuba, two of which must now be considered operational (Banes and Santa Cruz del Norte). In an alert status, these cruise missiles can be fired in about 10 minutes, with subsequent firings from each launcher at 5 minute intervals.

#### Air Defense Missiles

7. There are now 22 surface-to-air missiles (SA-2) sites located in Cuba, nine of which are believed to be individually operational at the present time. The remaining SA-2 sites could be operational in two to three weeks. Each site contains six missiles with six additional missiles in an adjacent hold area. The initial firing can take place anytime after an alert, providing the site has reached readiness. Refire from a single launcher will take approximately 3 to 5 minutes.

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Force Levels

9. There are now at least sixteen 1020-nm Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba which are in such a state of readiness that they could be fired within 18 hours of a decision to launch. It is likely that other installations now being examined in photography will raise the number to 32, all of which could be ready in the next week. Furthermore, 8 launchers with sixteen 2200-nm missiles will probably be operational in Cuba during December 1962. We must emphasize that this is the visible threat, and that additional missiles may be discovered as additional photography is analyzed.

Support and Supply

10. Offensive missiles systems are being introduced into Cuba primarily through the Port of Mariel. Possible central missile checkout, storage and repair bases have been tentatively located at Soroa near the western deployment sites and at Managua south of Havana. It is significant that all three of the Soviet missiles now being deployed in Cuba (SS-4, SS-5, SA-2) probably use red fuming nitric acid as an oxidizer so that a common propellant supply and storage could be used.

Significance

11. The magnitude of the total Soviet missile force being deployed indicates that the USSR intends to develop Cuba into a prime strategic base, rather than as a token show of strength.

12. A mixed force of 1020- and 2200-nm missiles would give the USSR a significant strategic strike capability against almost all targets in the U.S. (see map). By deploying stockpiled shorter range ballistic missiles at overseas bases against which we have no BMEWS warning capability, the

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Soviet Union will supplement its ICBM home force in a significant way. This overseas strategic force is protected by an extensive SA-2 deployment in Cuba.

13. This same offensive force also poses a common threat to the U.S. and a large portion of Latin America for the first time.

14. The USSR is making a major military investment in Cuba with some of their most effective guided missile systems. The planning for this operation must have started at least one year ago and put into motion last spring.

#### ADDENDUM

Two additional launch sites have just been found north of Santa Clara (Mission 3107). Neither site was present on 5 September 1962. Analysis is still underway; only preliminary views can be expressed. One site is similar to the fixed soft site described in paragraph 2. This site is in a more advanced state of readiness and could have the essential features for an operational capability within one month. The other site is similar to the field-type installation described in paragraph 1. These new sites are not included in the numbers appearing elsewhere in this paper.

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October 19, 1962

MEMORANDUM TO USIB MEMBERS:

A discussion among the principals on October 18th indicated a probable decision, if any action is taken against Cuba, to initiate a limited blockade designed to prevent the importation into Cuba of additional arms. To do this the United States would make such statements concerning a condition of war as is necessary to meet the legal requirements of such a blockade, but a formal "declaration of war against Cuba" would be avoided if possible and resorted to only if absolutely necessary.

The blockade could be extended at our discretion to include POL and possibly a total blockade if Castro persisted in the offensive build-up.

Continued surveillance would go forward so that we would know of the situation within Cuba as it evolved.

The blockade would start possibly on Monday, following a public announcement by the President which would include a display of photographic intelligence, persuasive notification to our Allies among the Soviets and the Cubans, but with no prior consultations with our Allies or any Latin Americans unless it proved necessary for legal reasons to assemble the OAS and secure the necessary approval to invoke the Rio Pact.

More extreme steps such as limited air strike, comprehensive air strike, or military invasion would be withheld awaiting developments. The possibility of more extreme actions has not been dismissed, however initiating such actions was considered unwise.

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The argument in favor of the blockade was principally that it initiated a positive action which could be intensified at our will or could be relaxed depending upon evolving circumstances. Soviet reactions are expected to be severe and very probably involve a blockade of Berlin and a widespread propaganda effort, however it was considered that we could have some control over the extent of Soviet reaction and in the event of a confrontation, would be negotiating from a position of positive action which would be intensified at our own direction.

The obvious disadvantages are the protracted nature of the operation, the difficulties of sustaining our position in world opinion because of our own complex of foreign bases and our deployment of offensive missiles and nuclear weapons and finally, the action does not reverse the present trend of building an offensive capability within Cuba nor does it dispose of the existing missiles, planes, and nuclear weapons if the latter now exist there.

Positive military action initiated now appeared <sup>un</sup>desirable because of the impact of current and future world opinion, the spectacle of a powerful nation attacking by surprise attack a weak and insignificant neighbor, engagement by the United States in a "surprise attack" thus giving license to others to do the same, the indefensible position we would be in with our allies, and finally, the price to us of extreme actions of which the Soviets appear capable of executing.

The above course of action is by no means unanimous. The opinions range from doing nothing on the one hand, to immediate military action on the other. There exist differences of opinion as to the handling of Khrushchev, Castro, NATO, the OAS and Latin American states; and finally, a question of the "declaration of war" awaits legal opinion; also differences exist concerning the intensity of the blockade with some advocating a more comprehensive blockade which would include POL at the very start.

I would like guidance from USIB members for my use in further discussions which are to take place commencing at 11:00 a.m., October 19th, and will probably continue throughout the week end.

John A. McCone

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October 19, 1962

Steps which would make air strike more acceptable to blockade group.

1. Prior notice to Khrushchev by message from the President giving Soviets possibility of backing down and strengthening our case with our Allies and world opinion in the event that Khrushchev takes such action as blockading Berlin.
2. Some effort to try to minimize number of Soviets killed, or at least show we wanted to avoid this. Messages to Khrushchev might urge him to remove Soviet technicians immediately.
3. Prior notice to our principal Allies, and particularly Turkey and Italy (because of our missile bases there).
4. Prior ultimatum to Castro giving him chance to fold.
5. Prior notification to certain Latin American Governments to allow them to take steps to prevent their being overthrown.

(All these notifications could be short but should be maximum military considerations would allow. None of them need spell out our proposed actions, but should indicate it will be extremely serious.)

6. Some improvement in our position before world opinion. Example -- President might make reference to Soviet construction of "Fishing Port" in Cuba, saying that in view of other Soviet actions we are convinced Soviets were constructing Naval base.
7. No attack on Havana to avoid killing foreign diplomats and thus arousing public opinion against us in those countries.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

19 October 1962

SUBJECT: SNIE 11-18-62: SOVIET REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION ON CUBA

THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable Soviet reactions to certain US courses of action with respect to Cuba.

THE ESTIMATE

1. A major Soviet objective in their military buildup in Cuba is to demonstrate that the world balance of forces has shifted so far in their favor that the US can no longer prevent the advance of Soviet offensive power even into its own hemisphere. In this connection they assume, of course, that these deployments sooner or later will become publicly known.

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GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

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2. It is possible that the USSR is installing these missiles primarily in order to use them in bargaining for US concessions elsewhere. We think this unlikely, however. The public withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba would create serious problems in the USSR's relations with Castro; it would cast doubt on the firmness of the Soviet intention to protect the Castro regime and perhaps on their commitments elsewhere.

3. If the US accepts the strategic missile buildup in Cuba, the Soviets would continue the buildup of strategic weapons in Cuba. We have no basis for estimating the force level which they would wish to reach, but it seems clear already that they intend to go beyond a token capability. They would probably expect their missile forces in Cuba to make some contribution to their total strategic capability vis-a-vis the US. We consider in Annex B the possible effects of a missile buildup in Cuba upon the overall relationship of strategic military power.

4. US acceptance of the strategic missile buildup would provide strong encouragement to Communists, pro-Communists, and the more anti-American sectors of opinion in Latin America and elsewhere. Conversely, anti-Communists and those who relate their own interests

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to those of the US would be strongly discouraged. It seems clear that, especially over the long run, there would be a loss of confidence in US power and determination and a serious decline of US influence generally.

EFFECT OF WARNING

5. If the US confronts Khrushchev with its knowledge of the NREM deployment and presses for a withdrawal, we do not believe the Soviets would halt the deployment. Instead, they would propose negotiations on the general question of foreign bases, claiming equal right to establish Soviet bases and assuring the US of tight control over the missiles. They would probably link Cuba with the Berlin situation and emphasize their patience and preference for negotiations, implying that Berlin was held hostage to US actions in Cuba.

6. There is some slight chance that a warning to Castro might make a difference, since the Soviets could regard this as a chance to stand aside, but it also would give time for offers to negotiate, continued buildup, and counterpressures, and we think the result in the end would be the same.

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7. Any warning would of course degrade the element of surprise in a subsequent US attack.

## EFFECT OF BLOCKADE

8. While the effectiveness of Castro's military machine might be impaired by a total US blockade, Castro would be certain to tighten internal security and would take ruthless action against any attempts at revolt. There is no reason to believe that a blockade of itself would bring down the Castro regime. The Soviets would almost certainly exert strong direct pressures elsewhere to end the blockade. The attitudes of other states toward a blockade action are not considered in this paper. It is obvious that the Soviets would heavily exploit all adverse reactions.

SOVIET REACTION TO USE OF MILITARY FORCE<sup>1/</sup>

9. If the US takes direct military action against Cuba, the Soviets would be placed automatically under great pressure to respond in ways which, if they could not save Cuba, would inflict

<sup>1/</sup> For a further comment on differences between reaction to a blockade and to US measures of force against Cuba, see Annex A.

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an offsetting injury to US interests. This would be true whether the action was limited to an effort to neutralize the strategic missiles, or these missiles plus airfields, surface-to-air missile sites, or cruise missile sites, or in fact an outright invasion designed to destroy the Castro regime.

10. In reaction to any of the various forms of US action, the Soviets would be alarmed and agitated, since they have to date estimated that the US would not take military action in the face of Soviet warnings of the danger of nuclear war. They would recognize that US military action posed a major challenge to the prestige of the USSR. We must of course recognize the possibility that the Soviets, under pressure to respond, would again miscalculate and respond in a way which, through a series of actions and reactions, could escalate to general war.

11. On the other hand, the Soviets have no public treaty with Cuba and have not acknowledged that Soviet bases are on the island. This situation provides them with a pretext for treating US military action against Cuba as an affair which does not directly involve them, and thereby avoiding the risks of a strong response. We do not believe that the USSR would attack the US, either from

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Soviet bases or with its missiles in Cuba, even if the latter were operational and not put out of action before they could be readied for firing.


12. Since the USSR would not dare to resort to general war and could not hope to prevail locally, the Soviets would almost certainly consider retaliatory actions outside Cuba. The timing and selection of such moves would depend heavily upon the immediate context of events and the USSR's appreciation of US attitudes. The most likely location for broad retaliation outside Cuba appears to be Berlin. They might react here with major harassments, interruptions of access to the city or even a blockade, with or without the signing of a separate peace treaty.

13. We believe that whatever course of retaliation the USSR elected, the Soviet leaders would not deliberately initiate general war or take military measures, which in their calculation, would run the gravest risks of general war.

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JOINT EVALUATION  
OF  
SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA

PREPARED BY

Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee  
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee  
National Photographic Interpretation Center


2000 HOURS

19 OCTOBER 1962

This report is based on relatively complete photo interpretation of U-2 photography made on:

14 October 1962 Mission 3101  
15 October 1962 Missions 3102 & 3103

17 October 1962 Missions 3104, 3105, 3106, 3109 and part of 3107 and 3108.



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## CONCLUSION

Offensive Missile Deployment\*

1. At least one Soviet regiment of 1020-nm (SS-4) medium range ballistic missiles is now deployed in western Cuba at two launch sites near San Cristobal. Each of these sites presently contains eight missiles and four unrevetted, field-type launchers which rely on mobile erection, check-out, and support equipment. These missiles are probably those reported moving into this area during September. Although there is continuing improvement of these sites, this regiment must be considered operational now. The presence of eight missiles at each site indicates a refire capability from each of the four launchers. Refire could be accomplished in 4 to 6 hours after the initial firing. A third facility in this area, previously identified as Launch Site 3, could be either a technical support area for this regiment or a third launch site; however, the early stage of development precludes a positive identification of this activity.

2. An additional regiment of Soviet 1020-nm (SS-4) missiles is now deployed at two sites east of Havana in the Sagua La Grande area, nine miles apart. These sites closely resemble the sites at San Cristobal but appear to be more permanent in nature. Terrain features have dictated considerable clearing and grading for deployment of the system. Also, there are permanent structures at the launch pad areas which are not found at the San Cristobal sites. There are four launch positions at each site and we estimate an operational capability for each site within one week. The sizes of the missiles, associated equipment, and buildings found at the San Cristobal and Sagua La Grande sites are almost identical and are compatible with the 1020-nm MRBM system.

3. Two fixed sites are under construction in the Guanajay area near Havana. Four launchers, two blockhouses, and underground propellant storage are being built at each site. We believe that the 2200-nm (SS-5)

\*See Figures 1-9.

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IRBM is probably intended for these sites because they closely resemble Soviet sites believed to be associated with testing and deployment of this missile system. Site 1 is considered to be in a mid- to late-stage of construction and should be operational within six weeks. Site 2 is in an earlier stage of construction and could be operational between 15 and 30 December 1962. There are no missiles or support equipment detectable within the Guanajay Area at the present time.

Command and Control

4. All of the offensive missile systems in Cuba are Soviet manned and controlled. We believe that offensive action by these systems would be commanded from the Soviet Union, but have not yet identified the communication link.

Nuclear Warheads for Offensive Missiles

5. We believe that a nuclear warhead storage site is under construction adjacent to the most complete of the fixed missile launch sites near Guanajay (see Figure 6). This site could become operational at about the same time as the associated Launch Site 1. Construction of similar facilities has not yet been identified at other sites.

6. An especially secure port facility located at Punta Gerardo may be used for nuclear weapons offloading (see Figure 10).

7. There is still no evidence of currently operational nuclear storage facilities in Cuba. Nevertheless, one must assume that nuclear weapons could now be in Cuba to support the operational missile capability as it becomes available.

8. The 1020-nm missiles would probably be equipped with nuclear warheads yielding 2 to 3 megatons. The 2200-nm IRBMs could have 3- to

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5-megaton warheads, if our planning estimate for the payload weight is correct.

#### Offensive Force Levels

9. We believe that there are now at least two regiments equipped with 1020-nm MRBM's in Cuba. One is located in the San Cristobal area and the other in the Sagua La Grande area. In addition, we believe a regiment equipped with 2200-nm IRBM's is being deployed to the Guanajay area. When operational, present MRBM and IRBM units will have an aggregate total of 24 launchers. An estimated schedule of site activation is presented in Table 1. Each launcher will have a refire capability. A summary of the MRBM and IRBM threat, including the projected number of operational ready missiles for each site, is presented in Table 2. The corresponding nuclear yield deliverable from each site is shown in Table 3. The technical characteristics of the two offensive missile weapons systems are summarized in Table 4.

#### Support and Supply


10. Offensive missile systems are being introduced into Cuba, probably through the Port of Mariel. A new Soviet ship, the Poltava, possibly designed as a ballistic missile transport, has been noted making frequent trips between the USSR and Cuba. This ship has made two trips to Cuba since 17 July, and is next estimated to arrive in Cuba on or about 2 November 1962. See Figures 11 and 12.

11. Possible central missile checkout, storage, and repair bases have been located at Soroa, between the two eastern deployment areas, and at Managua, south of Havana.

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12. It is significant that three of the Soviet missiles now being deployed in Cuba (SS-4, SS-5, SA-2) probably use red fuming nitric acid as the oxidizer, permitting exploitation of a common system for propellant supply and storage.


Coastal Defense Missiles

13. Three coastal defense missile sites have now been identified in Cuba, two of which must now be considered operational (Banes and Santa Cruz del Norte). These cruise missiles have a range of 35 to 40 miles and are probably derived from the AS-1. They can be fired in about 10 minutes in an alert status, with subsequent firings from each launcher at 5 minute intervals.

Air Defense Missiles

14. There are now 26 surface-to-air missile (SA-2) sites located in Cuba, two of which appear to be alternate sites. See Figure 13. Of these, 16 are believed to be individually operational at the present time. The remaining SA-2 sites could be operational in two to three weeks. The list of sites considered to be operational is presented in Table 5.

15. Such SA-2 sites provide for six launchers with missiles, and an additional six missiles in an adjacent hold area. The initial firing can take place anytime after an alert, providing the site has reached readiness status. Reload and refire from a single launcher will take approximately 3 to 5 minutes.



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Tactical Missiles

17. There are several refugee reports indicating the presence of tactical (FROG) missiles in Cuba, although there is no photographic confirmation thus far.

Significance

18. The magnitude of the total Soviet missile force being deployed indicates that the USSR intends to develop Cuba into a prime strategic base, rather than as a token show of strength. Some of the deployment characteristics include permanent elements which suggests that provision is being made for Soviet presence of long duration.

19. The rate of deployment to date, as well as the speed and variety of construction, indicates that the Soviet military build up in Cuba is being carried out on an urgent basis. This build-up has proceeded by deploying defensive weapons first, followed by deployment of offensive weapons. The pattern of missile deployment appears calculated to achieve quick operational status and then to complete site construction.

20. A mixed force of 1020- and 2200-nm missiles would give the USSR a significant strategic strike capability against almost all targets in the U.S. (see Figure 2). By deploying stockpiled MRBM/IRBMs at overseas bases, the Soviet Union will supplement its ICBM home force in a significant way.

21. This same offensive force also poses a common threat to the U.S. and a large portion of Latin America for the first time.

22. The USSR is making a major military investment in Cuba with some of their most effective guided missile systems. The planning for this operation must have started at least one year ago and the operation itself begun last spring.

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19 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : Additional Information - Mission 3107

1. An NREB/IREB Launch Site has been identified in a wooded area along a ridge line 1.7 nm east-northeast of Calabazar De Sagua and 10 nm southeast of the Sagua La Grande NREB Launch Site. The launch site is connected directly by road with the rail-served town of Calabazar De Sagua and a branch rail line serving a nearby sugar mill passes within a mile of the site. The launch site is comprised of four elongated pads, 190 by 90, arranged in a linear pattern and oriented on a 315 degree azimuth. The northern pair of pads are separated by approximately 750 feet and the southern pair by about 900 feet. A transporter/erector approximately 60 feet in length is in position on each of the two southern pads. A third transporter/erector is observed in a motor pool and a fourth is observed on the site service road. Additional facilities include at least 100 vehicles, 45 tents, 27 buildings and several open storage areas. The launch site appears to be in a late stage of completion or complete. No security fence is apparent. There was no evidence that site construction had begun on photography of 5 September 1962.

2. An NREB Launch Site has been identified 5 nm south-east of Sagua La Grande at 22-42-42N 80-01-15W. It is situated in a level wooded area and contains the following elements: 4 launch positions, 2 missile erectors and 1 probable missile erector; 6 missile transporters with missiles, 1 building B/C with prefabricated arches, 3 buildings 100' x 18', numerous tents and vehicles. There was no evidence of this site on 5 September 1962 photography.

ARTHUR C. LUNDHAL  
Director


National Photographic Interpretation Center

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

20 October 1962

SUBJECT: SNIE 11-19-62: MAJOR CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN US COURSES OF  
ACTION ON CUBA

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the major consequences of certain US courses of action  
with respect to Cuba

THE ESTIMATE

STATUS OF SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA

1. Firm evidence indicates the presence in Cuba of four MRBM and  
two IRBM launch sites in various stages of construction and organized  
into at least three regiments. Of these, two regiments of eight  
launchers each are mobile and designed to launch MRBMs with a range of  
about 1,100 n.m., while one regiment of eight fixed launchers may be  
designed for IRBMs with a range of about 2,200 n.m.

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GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

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2. The 16 launchers for 1,100 n.m. MRBMs must be considered operational now. Four of the fixed launchers for the 2,200 n.m. IRBMs could probably become operational within the next six weeks. The other four would become operational in 8 to 10 weeks. We have no direct evidence that nuclear weapons are now present in Cuba, and it is unlikely that we would be able to obtain such evidence. However, the construction of at least one probable nuclear storage facility is a strong indication of the Soviet intent to provide nuclear warheads. In any case, it is prudent to assume that when the missiles are otherwise operational, nuclear warheads will be available. These could be brought in by air, submarine, or surface ship.

3. We estimate that operational MRBM missiles can be fired in eight hours or less after a decision to launch, depending on the condition of readiness. After the IRBM sites are completed and missiles are on launcher, a state of readiness of five hours may be maintained. Both systems are believed to be provided with two missiles per launcher, providing a refire capability from each launcher after about four to six additional hours for the MRBMs and six to eight hours for the IRBMs.

4. It is possible that further evidence will uncover additional launch sites which are presently undetected, but the extent of our coverage leads us to believe that such evidence would not drastically

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increase the total now deployed. On the other hand, new deployments could be started at any time.

5. The inventory of other major Soviet weapons now identified in Cuba includes:

- a. 22 IL-28 jet light bombers, of which one is assembled and three others have been uncrated;
- b. 39 MIG-21 jet fighters, of which 35 are assembled and four are still crates, and 62 other jet fighters of less advanced types;
- c. 24 SA-2 sites, of which 16 are believed to be individually operational with some missiles on launcher;
- d. 3 cruise missile sites for coastal defense, of which 2 are now operational;
- e. 12 Komar cruise missile patrol boats, all probably operational or nearly so.

6. Cuban-based MRBMs and IRBMs with nuclear warheads would augment the present limited Soviet ICBM capability by virtue of their ability to strike at similar types of targets with warheads of generally similar yields. In the near future, therefore, Soviet gross capabilities for initial attack on US military and civilian targets can be increased considerably by Cuban-based missiles. However, the deployment of these missiles in Cuba will probably not, in the Soviet judgment, insure destruction of the US second strike capability to a degree which would

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eliminate an unacceptably heavy retaliatory attack on the USSR. If the missile buildup in Cuba continues, the Soviet capability to blunt a retaliatory attack will be progressively enhanced.

## PURPOSE OF SOVIET BUILDUP

7. A major Soviet objective in their military buildup in Cuba is to demonstrate that the world balance of forces has shifted so far in their favor that the US can no longer prevent the advance of Soviet offensive power even into its own hemisphere. In this connection they assume, of course, that these deployments sooner or later will become publicly known. At the same time, they expect their missile forces in Cuba to make an important contribution to their total strategic capability vis-a-vis the US.

8. Consequently, it is unlikely that the USSR is installing these missiles primarily in order to use them in bargaining for US concessions elsewhere. Moreover, the public withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba would create serious problems in the USSR's relations with Castro; it would cast doubt on the firmness of the Soviet intention to protect the Castro regime and perhaps on their commitments elsewhere.

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US ACQUIESCENCE IN THE BUILDUP

9. If the US acquiesces to the presence of strategic missiles in Cuba, we believe that the Soviets will continue the buildup. We have no basis for estimating the force level which they would wish to reach, but it seems entirely clear now that they are going well beyond a token capability.

10. This course of US action would provide strong encouragement to Communists, pro-Communists, and the more anti-American sectors of opinion in Latin America. We believe that, especially over the long run, there would be loss of confidence in US power and determination and a serious decline of US influence, particularly in Latin America. Should any additional Latin American government fall to the Communists the Soviets would feel free to establish bases in the country in question if they chose. A major immediate consequence would be that the Soviets would probably estimate lower risks in pressing the US hard in other confrontations, such as Berlin.

EFFECT OF WARNING

11. If the US confronts Khrushchev with its knowledge of the MRBM deployment and presses for a withdrawal, we do not believe the Soviets would halt the deployment. Instead, they would propose negotiations on the general question of foreign bases, claiming equal right to establish Soviet bases and assuring the US of tight control over the missiles.

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They would probably link Cuba with the Berlin situation and emphasize their patience and preference for negotiations, implying that Berlin was held hostage to US actions in Cuba.

12. There is some slight chance that a warning to Castro might make a difference, since the Soviets could regard this as a chance to stand aside, but it also would give time for offers to negotiate, continued buildup, and counterpressures, and we think the result in the end would be the same.

13. Any warning would of course degrade the element of surprise in a subsequent US attack.

#### A US BLOCKADE

14. Two basic modes of blockade could be considered: total and selective. We believe that even under a total blockade individual aircraft and submarines might get through to deliver vital military items, e.g., nuclear warheads. Even the most severe blockade would not deprive the Soviets of the use of missiles already in Cuba for a nuclear strike on the US.

15. Under any form of blockade, the Soviets would concentrate on political exploitation, especially in the UN. They might risk violent encounters in attempts to penetrate the blockade, but they would not resort to major force in the area of Cuba or forceful retaliation elsewhere,

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at least initially. If US enforcement of the blockade involved use of force by the US, the Soviets might respond on an equivalent level, but would seek to avoid escalation.

16. Thus any blockade situation would place the Soviets under no immediate pressure to choose a response with force. They could rely on political means to compel the US to desist, and reserve a resort to force until the US had actually used force. They would estimate that the inherent difficulties of enforcing the blockade and the generally adverse reactions, including those of US allies to it, would result in enormous pressures on the US to desist. They could heighten these pressures by threatening retaliation in Berlin or actually undertaking major harassments on the access routes, which could become tantamount to a blockade, and would probably do so at some stage.

17. We do not believe that even a severe blockade, of itself, would bring down the Cuban regime. Castro would tighten internal security and, unless action against the regime subsequently developed on Cuban soil, the Cuban population would be increasingly reluctant to oppose the regime. Direct action would still be required to bring down the Castro regime.

#### SOVIET REACTION TO USE OF MILITARY FORCE

18. In the case of US use of force against Cuban territory, the likelihood of a Soviet response by force, either locally or for retaliation elsewhere, would be greater than in the case of blockade. The

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Soviets would be placed automatically under great pressure to respond in ways which, if they could not save Cuba, would inflict an offsetting injury to US interests. This would be true whether the action was limited to an effort to neutralize the strategic missiles, or these missiles plus airfields, surface-to-air missile sites, or cruise missile sites, or in fact an outright invasion designed to destroy the Castro regime.

19. In reaction to any of the various forms of US action, the Soviets would be surprised and probably alarmed, since they appear to have estimated that the US would probably not take military action in the face of Soviet warnings of the danger of nuclear war. They would recognize that US military action posed a major challenge to the prestige of the USSR. We must of course recognize the possibility that the Soviets, under pressure to respond, would again miscalculate and respond in a way which, through a series of actions and reactions, could escalate to general war.

20. On the other hand, the Soviets have no public treaty with Cuba and have not acknowledged that Soviet bases are on the island. This situation provides them with a pretext for treating US military action against Cuba as an affair which does not directly involve them, and thereby avoiding the risks of a strong response. We do not believe that the USSR would attack the US, either from Soviet bases or with its missiles in Cuba, even if the latter were operational and not put out of action before they could be readied for firing.

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21. Since the USSR would almost certainly not resort to general war and could not hope to prevail locally, we believe that the Soviets would consider retaliatory actions outside Cuba. The timing and selection of such moves would depend heavily upon the immediate context of events and the USSR's appreciation of US attitude. The most likely location for broad retaliation outside Cuba appears to be Berlin. They would probably react here with major harassments, interruptions of access to the city or even a blockade, with or without the signing of a separate peace treaty. Retaliation against some US installation overseas is possible but in our view unlikely.

22. We believe that there would probably be a difference between Soviet reaction to all-out invasion and Soviet reaction to more limited US use of force against selected objectives in Cuba. We believe that the Soviets would be somewhat less likely to retaliate with military force in areas outside Cuba in response to speedy, effective invasion than in response to more limited forms of military action against Cuba. We recognize that such an estimate cannot be made with very great assurance and do not rule out the possibility of Soviet retaliation outside Cuba in case of invasion. But we believe that a rapid occupation of Cuba would be more likely to make the Soviets pause in opening new theaters of conflict than limited action or action which drags out.

23. Finally, we believe that, whatever course of retaliation the USSR elected, the Soviet leaders would not deliberately initiate general

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67. (Continued)

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war or take military measures, which in their calculation, would run grave risks of general war.

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DDI Briefing  
20 October  
White House  
OVAL Room  
1430-1500

Mr. President:


We want to bring you up to date <sup>very briefly</sup> on the deployment of Soviet military weapons systems to Cuba. You have been briefed many times on the major buildup of equipment in Cuba prior to mid-October. ~~Just about one week ago.~~


In the past week, ~~in intensive photo reconnaissance coverage beginning 14 October,~~ we have discovered unraistakable evidence of the deployment to Cuba of medium range ballistic missiles (i. e. 1020 NM range ~~SS-4~~) and intermediate range ballistic missiles (i. e. 2200 NM range ~~SS-5~~). These ranges imply coverage of targets ~~in the SE~~ United States <sup>from</sup> inside an arc running ~~roughly from~~ Dallas through Cincinnati and Washington, D. C. (on the part <sup>by</sup> of MRBMs) and practically all of the continental United States (on the part of ~~by~~ IRBMs).

There are at least <sup>four</sup> ~~two~~ and possibly five MRBM sites  
deployed in field-<sup>type</sup> ~~mobile~~ installations, ~~two (or possibly three)~~  
in Western Cuba, i. e. nearest the United States, and two  
somewhat more permanent looking, improved sites well to the  
East of Havana. <sup>would be</sup> There are, ~~in accordance with standard Soviet~~  
~~military practice and what we see developing in Cuba,~~ 4 launchers  
at each site. Two of these sites probably are in a state of at least  
limited operational readiness at this time, ~~since the photography~~  
~~shows field-type launchers in place and missiles (eight at each site~~  
~~for a total of 16) on the ground -- not on-launcher -- at the sites as~~  
~~of 14 and 17 October.~~ All of the sites are in a state of continuous  
construction and improvement and we would expect the remaining  
~~two (or three)~~ MRBM sites to become operational in about one week's time.

3

In addition ~~to these MRBM sites~~, two fixed IRBM sites (with four launch pads and permanent storage facilities) at each site are being constructed near Havana. One of these sites appears to be in a stage of construction that ~~would~~ lead to an estimate of operational readiness <sup>of</sup> ~~within~~ six weeks from now, i. e. about 1 December and the other in a stage indicating operational readiness between 15 December and the end of the year.

We have not seen nuclear warheads for any of these missiles, but we do not rely on ever seeing them in our photography 

 We have found what appears to be a nuclear warhead storage facility at one of the IRBM sites at Guanajay, near Havana. It will probably be completed about 1 December along with the missile site itself. We also note a port nearby with very special security protection facilities that would be suitable for offloading nuclear weapons.

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I should like to repeat that we do not have evidence of nuclear warheads in Cuba, but our estimate is that since the missile systems in question are relatively ineffective without them, <sup>we believe</sup> warheads either are or will be available. They could be in temporary storage prior to completion of the storage facility we have seen. The Poltava, a Soviet ship; which we think is the most likely carrier of security-sensitive military cargoes into the tightly guarded port of Mariel has made two trips to Cuba and is due back in about ten days.


In summary, we believe the evidence indicates the probability that eight MRBM missiles can be fired from Cuba today. Naturally operational readiness is likely to be degraded by many factors, but if all eight missiles could be launched with nuclear warheads, they could deliver a total load of 16-24 Megatons (2 to 3 MT per warhead). If able to refire, they could theoretically deliver the same load approximately five hours later.

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When the full installation of missile sites we now see under construction is completed at the end of the year, the initial salvo

(if all missiles or launchers were to reach target)  
capability would be 56 - 88 MT.





SUPPLEMENT 1  
TO  
JOINT EVALUATION OF  
SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA

PREPARED BY

Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee  
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee  
National Photographic Interpretation Center

2200 HOURS

20 OCTOBER 1962

This report is based on relatively complete photo interpretation of U-2 photography made on:

14 October 1962 Mission 3101  
15 October 1962 Missions 3102 & 3103  
17 October 1962 Missions 3104, 3105, 3106,  
3107, 3108, and 3109;

and preliminary analysis of 18 October 1962 Mission 3111.



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NOTICE

This supplement up-dates and amplifies [REDACTED] dated 2000 hours, 19 October 1962. Emphasis is on the READINESS status of the offensive missiles in Cuba.

Offensive Missile Readiness

General

1. Analysis of the comparative photographic coverage of the offensive-missile sites in Cuba now leads us to conclude that the Soviets did not have as their main objective an immediate operational capability at any of the identified sites. An emergency operational capability to launch some of the missiles on hand within about 8 hours could now exist at the four MRBM sites. They appear to be pursuing an urgent but systematic plan to achieve an operational capability which will maximize the effectiveness of the missile regiments. Within the sites the steps necessary to achieve an immediate operational capability have not occurred. For example, at San Cristobal Site 2 the three launchers and five missiles present continue to be bunched together in a field. Were an immediate launch capability intended one would expect deployment of the launcher to the vicinity of the intended launch positions.

San Cristobal Area

2. Activity in Site 1 and Site 2 continues to indicate an urgent effort to achieve full operational readiness. The launch crews, missiles and associated equipment are in the immediate area. From the status of the sites as of our last coverage (Mission 3111 on 18 October), we estimate that Site 1 could now have full operational readiness and that Site 2 could achieve

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this status by 25 October. By full operational readiness we mean the ability to launch in salvo four missiles per site with a refire capability of four missiles per site within 4 to 6 hours.


Sagua La Grande Area


3. The MRBM sites at Sagua La Grande were first identified on 17 October and were covered by photography twice that day. (The last previous coverage was on 7 July and showed no evidence of missile activity.) The status of preparation at the two sites on 17 October was approximately the same. It is believed that the missile regiment was moving into the area on 17 October, inasmuch as 35 vehicles arrived in a support area at Site 1 within the 1 3/4 hour period between two photographic coverages.

4. Construction activity and random location of missile support equipment indicate that development of the area was not complete. The presence of missiles and launchers indicates that the sites have an emergency operational capability. However, the regiment could reach full operational readiness at these sites by 1 November.



Guanajay Area


5. A detailed reexamination of the evidence available at this time indicates that the operational date for these launch sites may be somewhat earlier than our previous estimate. Construction activity appears to be progressing at a more rapid pace than that observed in the USSR at similar facilities. Several features of the sites such as the control bunkers, excavations for fuel tanks, and blast walls for component protection are several days more advanced than previously determined. Mission 3111 on 18 October indicates that concrete is being installed at all four pads at Site 1.





6. Although we are unable to determine a precise date for an operational capability, we believe these sites may be ready to launch missiles between 1 December and 15 December.





Nuclear Warheads for Offensive Missiles

9. At the probable nuclear storage site under construction adjacent to the Guanajay IRBM fixed missile launch Site 1, earth-moving activity at the 114 by 60 foot drive-through building continues at an apparent high rate.

10. A curved-roof building similar to that at Guanajay Site 1, but only about 35 by 67 feet has been observed at the newly identified possible missile site near Remedios.

11. Foundations of structures (approximately 60 by 35 feet) which might be intended to be future nuclear warhead storage facilities have been observed at the San Cristobal Sites 1 and 3 and at Sagua La Grande Site 1. The appearance of concrete arches nearby indicates that these buildings will be earth-covered.

12. The tank trailers observed in the quay area of the Punta Gerardo port facility are similar to those seen in 22 May 1962 photography taken before security fences were erected. This strongly suggests that these trucks have no nuclear association.

13. Search of the major airfields in Cuba has not as yet revealed any structures that can be identified as intended for nuclear storage.

Offensive Force Levels

See Table 2.

Support and Supply

No change.






Coastal Defense Missiles

No change.

Air Defense Missiles

14. There are now 24 primary surface-to-air missile (SA-2) sites located in Cuba (see Figure 2). Two of these sites, Santa Lucia and Deleite, each have an alternate site located 3 to 5 nm from the primary site. These alternate sites are pre-surveyed, have no equipment and could possibly be used for mobility training exercises. Of the 24 primary sites, 20 are individually operational at the present time. The remaining primary SA-2 sites could be operational sites in approximately one week.


15. There are 6 surface-to-air missile assembly and support areas. Photography shows large quantities of surface-to-air missile cannisters and missile transporters. See Table 3 for a list of surface-to-air missile sites, missile assembly areas and associated equipment.



Guided Missile Patrol Craft

17. There are now a total of 12 KOMAR class patrol craft in Cuba. Each KOMAR craft carries two homing missiles which have an effective range of 10 to 15 nm and carry 2000 pound HE warheads. The KOMARs





must return to base or to a tender for reloading. Tenders for these craft have not yet been identified in Cuba. All KOMARs in Cuba are considered to be operational. At least six are based at Havana and four at Banes. The remaining two have been observed operating in the Mariel area, but it is not known whether they are based there or were operating from the Havana base.


18. The KOMARs have all been transported to Cuba as deck cargo on Soviet ships, two and four per shipload. The first shipment arrived in Havana on 14 August 1962. Whereas it probably took several weeks to establish base and logistic support for the first KOMARs to become integrated fully operational units, additional units can probably become operational within one week after offloading.

Tactical Missiles

No change.

Significance

19. The apparent Soviet objective to rapidly achieve full operational status for their MRBM and IRBM regiments rather than to achieve an <sup>immediate</sup> ~~immediate~~ operational capability at each site as the missiles and equipment arrive, may be very significant to the planners judging various Soviet courses of action.



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[REDACTED]

Addendum

Preliminary analysis of photography of 18 October reveals an unidentified secured installation in an early stage of construction 5 nm southwest of the town of REMEDIOS. It consists of 4 large excavations in a symmetrical pattern; however, their function cannot be determined at this time. This installation is, however, considered to be a suspected surface-to-surface missile site.

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OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE


21 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Members of the United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT : Evaluation of Offensive Threat in Cuba

1. The attached copy of the subject intelligence memorandum is forwarded for your information, guidance, and appropriate action. As agreed by the USIB, it is to be used as background material for oral briefings to authorized personnel only. Reproduction is not authorized.

2. It is believed that sufficient copies have been forwarded to you to meet the immediate operational requirement for preparation of briefings. Requests for additional copies or for initial distribution from offices not under your immediate control, but in your department of the Government, will be referred to you for action.

  
Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

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## EVALUATION OF OFFENSIVE THREAT IN CUBA

### Significance

1. A significant deployment of guided missiles to Cuba is already well advanced, and has proceeded by first deploying a large force of defensive weapons, followed quickly by long-range offensive guided missiles and aircraft. (See Figure 1.) A mixed force of 1000- and 2200-nm ballistic missiles in Cuba provides for the first time a significant strategic strike capability against almost all targets in the U. S., and against a large portion of Canada and Latin America. (See Figure 2.) The planning for this operation must have started at least one year ago and the actual deployment itself began last spring.

### Offensive Deployment

2. The equipment for 1000-nm ballistic missiles is now being deployed in Western Cuba at four launch sites near San Cristobal. (See Figures 3-5.) Two of these are now operational and the other two are proceeding to this status on an accelerated basis. The missiles are probably those reported moving into this area during September. Each of the four sites contains eight missiles and four unrevetted, field type launchers which rely on mobile erection, checkout, and support equipment. This implies a refire capability from each unit.

3. Other 1000-nm ballistic missiles are also deployed at two sites nine miles apart, east of Havana in the Sagua La Grande area. (See Figures 8-9.) These sites closely resemble the sites at San Cristobal but appear to be more permanent in nature. Terrain features have dictated considerable clearing and grading for deployment of the system. Also, there are permanent structures at the launch positions at each site and we estimate an operational capability for each site within one week. The sizes of the missiles, associated equipment, and buildings found at the San Cristobal and Sagua La Grande sites are almost identical and are compatible with the 1000-nm missile system.

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4. Two fixed sites for 2200-nm, ballistic missiles are under construction in the Guanajay area near Havana. (See Figures 6-7.) Four launchers, two blockhouses, and underground propellant storage are being built at each site. Site 1 is considered to be in a mid-to-late stage of construction and should be operational within six weeks. Site 2 is in an earlier stage of construction and could be operational between 15 and 30 December 1962. There are no missiles or support equipment detectable within the Guanajay Area at the present time.

5. An additional fixed site has been observed at Remedios in Eastern Cuba which is similar to those at Guanajay. This is probably a valid indicator of deployment of a second grouping of 2200-nm ballistic missiles.

6. In addition to missiles, IL-28 light bomber aircraft with a combat radius of about 750 miles are also arriving in Cuba. Approximately 22 of these bombers, most still in crates, are now present. These are in addition to the force of about 40 MIG-21 fighters there.

#### Nuclear Warheads

7. We believe that a nuclear warhead storage site is under construction adjacent to the more complete of the fixed missile launch sites near Guanajay. (See Figure 6.) Construction is proceeding at a high rate. This site could become operational at about the same time as the associated Launch Site 1.

8. A curved-roof building similar to that at Guanajay Site 1, but only about 35 by 67 feet has been observed at the newly identified possible missile site near Remedios.

9. Foundations of structures (approximately 60 by 35 feet) which may be intended to be future nuclear warhead storage facilities have been observed at the San Cristobal Sites 1 and 3 and at Sagua La Grande Site 1. The appearance of concrete arches nearby indicates that these buildings will be earth-covered.

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10. Search of the major airfields in Cuba has not as yet revealed any structures that can be identified as intended for nuclear storage.

11. There is still no evidence of currently operational nuclear storage facilities in Cuba. Nevertheless, one must assume that nuclear weapons could now be in Cuba to support the operational missile capability as it becomes available. The missiles would probably be equipped with thermo-nuclear warheads.

#### Support and Supply

12. Offensive missile systems are being introduced into Cuba through the Port of Mariel and perhaps other ports. A new Soviet ship, the Poltava, possibly designed as a ballistic missile transport, has been noted making frequent trips between the USSR and Cuba. (See Figure 11.) This ship has made two trips to Cuba since 17 July, and is next estimated to arrive in Cuba on or about 2 November 1962.

13. Possible central missile checkout, storage, and repair bases have been located at Soroa, between the two eastern deployment areas, and at Managua, south of Havana.

14. It is significant that all of the ballistic and air defense missiles now being deployed in Cuba probably use a common oxidizer, permitting exploitation of a common system for propellant supply and storage.

#### Coastal Defense Missiles

15. Three coastal defense missile sites have now been identified in Cuba, two of which must now be considered operational (Banes and Santa Cruz del Norte). (See Figure 10.) These cruise missiles have a range of 35 to 40 miles.

#### Air Defense Missiles

16. There are now 24 primary surface-to-air missile sites located in Cuba. (See Figure 10.) Two of these sites, Santa Lucia and Deleite,

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each have an alternate site located 3 to 5 nm from the primary site. These alternate sites are pre-surveyed, have no equipment and could possibly be used for mobility training exercises. Of the 24 primary sites, 20 are individually operational at the present time. The remaining primary surface-to-air missile sites could be operational in approximately one week.

17. There are 6 surface-to-air missile assembly and support areas. Photography shows large quantities of surface-to-air missile cannisters and missile transporters.

#### Guided Missile Patrol Craft

18. There are now a total of 12 missile-launching patrol craft in Cuba. Each craft carries two homing missiles which have an effective range of 10 to 15 nm and carry 2000-pound, high-explosive warheads. They must return to base or to a tender for reloading, although tenders for these craft have not yet been identified in Cuba. All of these missile launching patrol craft in Cuba are considered to be operational. All have been recently observed operating in the Mariel area, but it is not known whether they are based there or were operating from other bases.

19. These craft have all been transported to Cuba as deck cargo on Soviet ships, two and four per shipload. The first shipment arrived in Havana on 14 August 1962. Whereas it probably took several weeks to establish base and logistic support for the first craft to become integrated fully operational units, additional units can probably become operational within one week after offloading.

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#43

October 21, 1962

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, ATTORNEY  
GENERAL, SECRETARY McNAMARA, GENERAL TAYLOR, AND  
MR. McCONE. 10:00 A.M. - 10/21/62

1. General Sweeney reviewed in considerable detail the plans for an air strike against the missile bases, the air fields, a few SAM sites in critical locations and finally the plans for invasion.
2. It was decided that at a minimum an air strike must include both the missile sites and the air fields and such SAM sites as are necessary, and General Taylor was instructed to plan accordingly.
3. There was complete agreement that military action must include an invasion and occupation of Cuba.
4. Secretary McNamara and General Taylor told the President that an air strike could not provide absolute assurance that all missiles were destroyed; they indicated a 90 per cent probability. They also stated that any warning would very possibly cause the movement of missiles to obscure unknown locations from which they could become operational. General Taylor therefore recommended, on the basis of military grounds, that the air strike be conducted immediately, suggesting tomorrow morning, and that it be without warning. Secretary McNamara confirmed the military appraisal expressed above but made no recommendation as to policy.
5. In response to direct questioning from the President, the Attorney General and McCone advised against surprise attack for the reasons discussed at previous meetings. The Attorney General failed to make an absolute recommendation with respect to future military actions, indicating this question could be decided as the situation developed from day to day, and that only preparatory

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steps should be taken now. McCone urged on the other hand that the President in a public statement indicate an intention to remove the missiles and other potential weapons by means and at a time of his own choosing if surveillance did not prove conclusively that the Soviets and the Cubans were removing them.

6. The meeting adjourned to be reconvened at 2:30, with additional principals in attendance.

John A. McCone  
Director

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#44

October 21, 1962

MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT ALONE,  
OCTOBER 21, 1962. (Approx. 4:30 p.m.)

On my report of my discussion with General Eisenhower at my residence this morning, the following information was given later to the Attorney General. It is not to be given to anyone else.

After briefing by Lundahl, General Eisenhower and I engaged in a long discussion concerning the proper procedure to be followed. Eisenhower's conclusions are as follows:

1. Any military action would be inconclusive and therefore inadvisable unless it employed invasion and occupation of Cuba. Eisenhower gave this opinion on a basis of his experience in war in countless examples of air strikes which though most effective, were never completely conclusive.
2. From a military point of view a surprise attack would be most effective and most desirable if followed in a minimum time by invasion.
3. However, from a broader point of view, he opposed surprise attack because of the indictment, the resulting tensions, and the fact that such action by the United States would license other countries to resort to violent military action without notice.
4. Therefore Eisenhower would accept the handicaps from a military point of view, of warning or notice, and therefore would follow the suggested plan of initiating a blockade, conducting intense surveillance, and announcing the intention of taking military action if the Soviets and the Cubans either maintained the status quo of their missile installations or continued the construction of their missile bases. The military action he envisaged would be air strikes and invasion.

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5. General Eisenhower emphasized he was giving his opinion based solely on intelligence and without the benefit of a study of the war plans or the most recent diplomatic exchanges with Castro, Khrushchev, our allies, etc. It seemed fair to conclude that his views as expressed above represent a flash judgment rather than a considered judgment arrived at with all facets of the problem laid before him.

John A. McCone  
Director

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mk #102

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22 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting with the Vice President on 21 October 1962

On Sunday night, October 21 at 8:30 I briefed Vice President Lyndon Johnson at the request of the President, conveyed through McGeorge Bundy.

The briefing involved a review of photography by Lundahl paralleling briefings given to General Eisenhower and others.

We then discussed policy and details of the proposed speech by the President in considerable detail.

The thrust of the Vice President's thinking was that he favored an unannounced strike rather than the agreed plan which involved blockade and strike and invasion later if conditions warranted. He expressed displeasure at "telegraphing our punch" and also commented the blockade would be ineffective because we in effect are "locking the barn after the horse was gone".

I followed the position and the arguments used in my briefing paper of 20 October. The Vice President finally agreed reluctantly but only after learning among other things the support indicated by General Eisenhower.

JOHN A. McCONE

TMLee/mfb

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74. "Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba," 21 October 1962  
[briefing notes for Heads of Government]

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*Sanitized version  
of Briefing notes  
for Heads of  
Government*

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0, 21 Oct 62

SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP  
IN CUBA

- I. Now clear to US that Khrushchev last spring made foreign policy decision on Cuba which involved unprecedented risks and which made it undeniable that Soviets are playing for very high stakes indeed.
  - A. Soviets believed decisive action necessary because:
    1. Cuban economy was deteriorating;
    2. There seemed to be mounting pressure in the US for intervention.
  - B. Soviets also saw opportunity to:
    1. Demonstrate that the US can no longer prevent advance of Soviet offensive power even in its own hemisphere;
    2. Significantly expand Soviet capabilities for initial attack on US targets;
    3. Thus weaken Western resolve and unity in countering Soviet moves in the East-West global contest, particularly over Berlin and Germany.
- II. The Soviet decision has since been implemented in two phases:
  - A. First, the build-up during the summer of defensive capabilities;

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400, 21 Oct 62

- B. Second, the establishment this fall of a major Soviet base in Cuba for strategic attack on the US.
- III. What we know about what the Soviets are actually doing in Cuba is based on hard intelligence from many sources:
- A. Repeated aerial photography of Cuba, which has been compared with a mass of aerial photography of the USSR;
  - B. Photography of Soviet ships en route to Cuba from low-altitude aircraft and by surface observers in various locations;
  - C. A firm knowledge, developed from many sources over the years, of Soviet military doctrine and practice;
  - D. Interrogation in detail of the 1,500-2,000 refugees a week coming into Florida from Cuba;
  - E. Agent operations.
- IV. The first indication that the USSR had taken a decision on Cuba came in late July.
- A. At that time, 4 Soviet passenger ships after a voyage under secrecy conditions arrived at the western Cuban naval base, Mariel. As of 20 October, fifteen such unpublicized passenger voyages have been counted.

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- B. In early August, dry cargo vessels began arriving in unprecedented numbers.
1. Since then about 140 voyages--including the largest and newest of the Soviet merchant fleet--have been made or are in progress.
  2. Of these, only about 15 were clearly not involved in delivering military cargo. About 100 have carried military equipment and the cargoes of the other twenty-five have not yet been established. (Soviet vessels carrying arms normally make false declarations of destination when passing the Bosphorus.)
  3. Most of the Bloc cargoes supporting the Cuban civilian economy--which now requires assistance ranging from baby food and grain to machinery parts--is now moving in Western flag vessels.
- C. The earlier deliveries, up to about 1 September, appeared to consist largely of military construction, transportation, and electronics equipment, and led to speculation that the Soviets might be deploying a SAM system.

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130, 21 Oct 62

1. Photography of 29 August and 5 September confirmed that a SAM system was being deployed. Twelve sites were identified. One MIG-21 was seen, as were eight Komar-class missile boats and one land-based anti-shiping cruise missile site. During September the known number of each of these systems increased.
- D. In early September, consequently, we had ample evidence of a significant buildup. All confirmed deliveries, however, fitted into a pattern of weapons which are essentially defensive in design and in normal operational employment. On basis of such evidence President issued his statements of 4 and 13 September that Soviet activity in Cuba was defensive in nature.
- V. Our present knowledge of the state of these weapons in Cuba is as follows:
  - A. SAM sites (These are the standard Soviet six-launcher second-generation-type called in NATO terminology GUIDELINE).
    1. At least 24 sites, with alternate positions for several. These sites cover most of the island. Three or four more will cover the entire island.

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0400, 21 Oct 62

2. Support sites--six presently identified, still field-type, but signs of permanent-type installation appearing.
  3. Readiness--as of 17 October, 17 sites appeared--in photography--to have both missiles on launchers and the essential radar in position. Only one, however, has emplaced around it the radar-controlled guns which normally are installed to provide some defense against low-flying aircraft. Known radar emissions have thus far been very few. However, at least one site has the C-band radar--the latest Soviet model now being widely deployed in the USSR and East Germany. The sites were installed with haste. Revetments were built at most sites only after setting up.
- B. There are now about 100 MIG fighters in Cuba. About 60 15's, 17's and 19's arrived prior to 1 January '62, and there are now at least 39 MIG-21s.
1. Standard Soviet GCI units (one identified this far through photography) will control these fighters.
  2. While there is no direct evidence of air-to-air missiles in Cuba, such equipment is

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430, 21 Oct 62

being supplied to Indonesia, Egypt, and probably to Iraq. We think it likely that Cuba will get at least equal treatment.

3. The MIG-21's have only recently become available. On 5 September we know that only one had been assembled. By 17 October, 35 had been assembled.

C. Coastal Defense.

1. We have identified 12 Komar-class patrol craft. Each carries two homing missiles, with a range of 10-15 n.m. and carrying 2,000-pound HE warheads. The first arrived in mid-August. All are now operational.
2. There are three coastal defense missile sites--two now operational. These anti-shiping missiles have a range of 35-40 miles and carry HE warheads.

VI. Soviet diplomacy and pronouncements have been carefully geared to military build-up; amounts to well-thought-out deception plan.

- A. Soviets wanted to keep international tensions down until build-up completed;

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1430, 21 Oct 62

- B. Have tried to keep attention focussed on Berlin - but with emphasis on lull till after US elections;
  - C. Emphasized defensive nature of Soviet support for Cuba as justified by provocative US threat;
  - D. Made connection between Berlin and Cuba as part of effort to demonstrate seriousness of Soviet commitment to Castro, but discreetly enough to avoid Western counteraction.
- VII. In early October we obtained our first hard information on the delivery of Soviet offensive weapons to Cuba.
- A. We photographed 10 crates on a ship bound for Cuba of a kind especially designed to contain the fuselage of an IL-28 jet light bomber.
  - B. 21 of these crates were later photographed at San Julian airfield in the extreme west of Cuba.
  - C. As of 17 October, four aircraft had been uncrated, of which one is partially assembled.

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NO, 21 Oct 62

VIII. The observation of IL-28 crates led us to mount an intensive reconnaissance effort, beginning on 15 October. The photography showed, for the first time, the deployment of surface-to-surface ballistic missile systems.

A. We have identified four and possibly six sites for the 1,100-n.m. missile and two fixed sites for the 2,200-n.m. missile.

IX. 1,100-n.m. Missile:

A. Two launch sites are near San Cristobal in Western Cuba. Each site normally has four launchers, of which we have seen seven. Each launcher in turn normally has two missiles assigned it, all sixteen of which we have identified at the site.

B. Another two sites are near Sagua La Grande just east of Havana. We have identified six of the eight launchers and seven of the sixteen missiles.

C. There is preliminary evidence of two additional sites near San Cristobal. They are either launch sites or a service facility.

D. The keys to these identifications are the size of the missile body, the unique erector-launcher equipment, and the position and spacing of equipment.

1. The missile corresponds exactly in length to those observed in parades in Moscow.

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2. The handling equipment is similar to that photographed in the USSR.
  3. The spacing of launchers corresponds to that discussed in secret Soviet military documents and to that observed in known missile sites in the USSR.
- E. The 1,020-mile-range missile is a single-stage ballistic missile using storable liquid fuels.
1. It has an autonomous (i.e., all-inertial) guidance system giving a CEP of 1, to 1 1/2 nautical miles. It carries a warhead of 2,500-3,500 pounds, yielding 2-3 megatons.
- F. Photography alone cannot permit us to be very precise about the operational readiness of these missiles.
1. The sites at San Cristobal are the nearest to completion. We are inclined to believe that one of them could now have full operational readiness -- i.e.: an ability to launch four missiles with a refire capability within 4 to 6 hours --and that the other could achieve this status in about two days.
  2. The sites at Sagua La Grande will probably not achieve the same stage of construction until 1 November or later.

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30, 21 Oct 62

X. 2,200-n.m. Missile:

- A. These sites are located at Guanajay, just west of Havana. They are fixed sites, and we have identified the eight launching pads normally associated with similar sites in the USSR. We have not yet seen the missiles.
- B. These sites are still in fairly early stage of construction which we do not expect to be completed until some time in December.
- C. We know less about the 2,200-mile missile, but believe it to be also single-stage, using storable liquid fuels and with an autonomous guidance system. We estimate CEP at 1 1/2 nautical miles. Warhead will probably yield 3-5 megatons.
- D. There is new evidence of the beginning of construction of what may be a new fixed four-pad MRBM or IRBM missile site at Remedias, East of Havana.

XI. We have no direct evidence that nuclear weapons are now in Cuba -- and we are not likely to get any.

- A. However, we are pretty sure that a facility being constructed near the IRBM site at Guanajay is a nuclear storage facility.

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30, 21 Oct 62

- B. In any case it is prudent to assume that when the missiles are otherwise operational, nuclear warheads will be available.
- XII. Based on known voyages of ships, we believe: at least 8,000 Soviet military and about 3,000 non-military personnel are now in Cuba.
  - A. This matches fairly well with our estimate that the Soviets would need about 10,000 military for the assembly activity now going on.
  - B. We think this total will rise to about 14,000 when all weapons systems now in Cuba are operational.
  - C. In addition, there are upward of 500 Soviet military advisers and technicians with the Cuban armed forces.
- XIII. In summary, Cuban-based missiles give the USSR a significantly increased capability for attack on targets in the U.S.
  - A. For retaliatory or second-strike purposes, Cuban-based missiles suffer by virtue of their soft configuration, being easily targeted, and being easily eliminated without reducing US forces now programmed against the USSR.
  - B. For pre-emptive or first strike purposes, Cuban missiles have an advantage over Soviet-

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430, 21 Oct 62

based ICBM's -- shorter flight times and no  
BMEWS detection.

- C. Sites now identified will, when completed, give  
Soviets total of 36 launchers and 72 missiles.  
This compares with 60-65 ICBM launchers we now  
estimate to be operational in the USSR.

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75. Supplement 2 to Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile  
Threat in Cuba, 21 October 1962 (Excerpt)

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SUPPLEMENT 2  
TO  
JOINT EVALUATION OF  
SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA

PREPARED BY

Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee  
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee  
National Photographic Interpretation Center

2200 HOURS

21 OCTOBER 1962

This report is based on relatively complete photo interpretation of U-2 photography made on:

14 October 1962 Mission 3101  
15 October 1962 Missions 3102 & 3103  
17 October 1962 Missions 3104, 3105, 3106,  
3107, 3108, & 3109  
18 October 1962 Mission 3111  
19 October 1962 Mission 3113

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NOTICE

This supplement up-dates and amplifies previous reports. Emphasis is on the READINESS status of the offensive missiles in Cuba.

DEFINITIONS

An Emergency Operational Capability exists when a site could launch some missiles should a decision be made to do so.

A Full Operational Capability is achieved when a site has reached a steady state of readiness with the ability to salvo its first missile load within about 6 to 8 hours and with the ability to refire within 4 to 6 hours.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The comparative photographic coverage indicates that, while an emergency operational capability could exist at several offensive missile sites, the Soviet objective in Cuba is to attain full operational capability at all sites as soon as possible, rather than to prepare each site for an emergency launch capability as soon as the missiles and equipment arrive in the area. (See Figure 1.)

2. There are clear indications that at least five Soviet offensive missile regiments, each with eight launchers and at least sixteen missiles, will become operational in Cuba. (See Table 1.) This will represent a first salvo potential of 40 missiles with a refire capability of an additional 40 missiles. It should be noted that this threat against the U.S. is approximately one-half the currently estimated ICBM missile threat from the USSR.

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21 October 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Additional Information - Missions  
3111 and 3113

1. A newly identified possible ██████████ launch site, five previously reported MRBM launch sites and two IRBM launch sites were observed on Mission 3111. A newly identified confirmed MRBM launch site was located on Mission 3113.
2. The newly identified unimproved field type MRBM launch site is located 2.7 nm NNW of Candelaria at 22°47'45"N 82°58'40"W in the San Cristobal area. The site contains two tent areas totalling 26 tents and at least 60 vehicles. Seven missile trailers and two missile erectors were identified at the site.
3. The possible launch site under construction is located 5 nm SW of Remedios at 22°25'N 79°35'E. It consists of paired trench-like excavations 450 feet apart, clearing for a possible control bunker, an arched building, a tent camp and motor pool and a concrete batch plant. At three of the four excavations there are 10 to 12 precast hollow concrete objects.
4. A description of the three MR site areas in the San Cristobal area follows: MR Site 1 - The seven canvas covered missiles are now draped with netting and three of the four erectors are canvas covered. MR Site 2 - The six missiles and three erectors are parked in a common area. MR Site 3 - Cloud cover prevents a complete analysis; however, one erector and possibly two others are observed.
5. The Sauga La Grande area MR Site 4 consists of four launch positions, two containing erectors and six canvas covered missiles on trailers and MR Site 5 consists of four erectors on pads and four canvas covered missiles on trailers.

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[REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
21 October 1962  
Page 2

6. Construction activity continues on IR sites 1 and 2  
in the Guanajay area.

*David Paulson*

ARTHUR C. LUNDAHL  
Director  
National Photographic Interpretation Center

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77. THK [Thomas H. Karamessines] to [Walter] Elder, 22 October 1962, with copies of two cables sent to all Chiefs of Station

CK

22 October 1962

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

Executive Registry

EO 62-7738

Mr. Elder:

Attached are copies of the cables  
Mr. Karamessines discussed with you  
yesterday. They have been sent to all Chiefs  
of Stations with some minor variations to  
cover local conditions.

THK (JVA)  
THK

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

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IN CONNECTION WITH CERTAIN INSTRUCTIONS WHICH  
STATE'S  
[REDACTED] CHIEF OF MISSION YOUR AREA MAY RECEIVE SUNDAY  
21 OCTOBER OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER, YOU ARE REQUESTED  
TO BE STANDING BY AS OF THAT TIME. CANCEL ANY OTHER  
PLANS FOR BEING ABSENT FROM STATION.

NATURE AND DETAILS OF STATE'S  
[REDACTED] INSTRUCTION NOT  
YET AVAILABLE BUT OBVIOUSLY WOULD DEAL WITH MATTER  
OF URGENCY. THEREFORE DO NOT DISCUSS THIS REQUEST  
WITH ANYONE OTHER THAN YOUR CHIEF OF MISSION.

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[REDACTED] FOR CHIEF OF STATION ONLY

REF

1. FURTHER TO REFERENCE IT IS EXPECTED THAT [REDACTED] <sup>STATE'S</sup>  
CHIEF OF MISSION YOUR AREA WILL RECEIVE (OR HAS RECEIVED)  
COMMUNICATION FROM [REDACTED] <sup>STATE'S</sup> HQS PERTAINING TO RECENT  
CRITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA AND SETTING FORTH OUTLINE  
OF ACTIONS CONTEMPLATED BY [REDACTED] <sup>V.S GOVT</sup> EXPECT THAT UPON  
RECEIPT THIS COMMUNICATION, [REDACTED] <sup>STATE'S</sup> CHIEF OF MISSION WILL  
FAMILIARIZE YOU WITH ITS CONTENT AND WITH ANY ACTIONS  
HE MAY BE INSTRUCTED TO TAKE. YOU ARE TO OFFER ALL  
POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE. ADVISE CHIEF OF YOUR LOCAL LIAISON  
APPROPRIATELY, AFTER GETTING CONCURRENCE [REDACTED] <sup>STATE'S</sup>  
CHIEF YOUR AREA.  
2. UNLESS [REDACTED] <sup>STATE'S</sup> CHIEF OF MISSION RAISES WITH YOU,  
DO NOT TAKE INITIATIVE IN SEEING HIM UNTIL FOUR HOURS  
PRIOR TO SPEECH BY PRESIDENT CURRENTLY SCHEDULED FOR  
1900 HRS EASTERN DAYLIGHT TIME.  
3. TO ANTICIPATE EVERY CONTINGENCY, REQUEST THAT  
YOU IMMEDIATELY AND QUIETLY TAKE NECESSARY ACTION  
PLACE YOUR STATION IN POSITION FOR POSSIBLE EMERGENCY  
SITUATION. IMPERATIVE ACTION YOU TAKE NOT CAUSE  
UNDUE ATTENTION. MORE SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS WILL FOLLOW  
AS APPROPRIATE.

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[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Office of Current Intelligence  
22 October 1962

6

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Timing of the Soviet Military Buildup in  
Cuba

1. The Soviet decision to embark on the current military buildup in Cuba probably was made in April 1962. The decision paralleled political and economic moves which greatly strengthened the Soviet-Cuban relationship. The program probably was planned and set in motion during the period April through June. In the second week of July the first shipments of materiel began to leave Soviet ports, accompanied by passenger ships carrying military personnel. These units arrived in Cuba during the last week in July and by 1 August work had begun at several locations in Cuba.

2. Prior to April 1962 the USSR's policy toward Castro's self-proclaimed adherence to Communism was still unclear and its support of Cuba was within the bounds of "normal" Soviet trade and aid policy, i.e., ties governed by long-term credit agreements and Cuba's ability to pay. In early April, however, Moscow chose to acquiesce in Castro's assertion of his authority over the so-called "old Communists" and to acknowledge the "socialist" character of the Cuban regime. Shortly thereafter, negotiations for the bloc to come to the aid of Cuba's faltering economy were initiated, and in early May agreements were signed for the bloc to provide additional amounts of foodstuffs, consumer goods, raw materials, and other badly needed imports. A decision to undertake the current military buildup probably was made along with these economic and political moves. In return, agreement evidently was reached for stationing Soviet strategic forces on the island.

[REDACTED]  
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PSALM

3. The buildup in Cuba has been taking place in stages which can be distinguished reasonably well. The first deliveries of men and equipment arrived in late July, and through most of August they appear to have been primarily of equipment for SAM and coastal defense missile installations. Work started first in western Cuba and gradually spread throughout the island. Eight of the 12 Komar guided-missile boats were delivered in August, as well as some land armaments. We cannot determine precisely when the first equipment for MRBM/IRBM installations arrived, but available information suggests work on the first site began about 29 August and the first missiles of this kind probably arrived in the first half of September. Two top-level meetings between the Cubans and Khrushchev were held in this period; one when Raul Castro visited Moscow in July at the start of the shipments and one in late August - early September when Che Guevara traveled to the USSR.

4. Since early September, military shipments probably have included equipment for all the missile installations as well as aircraft and land armaments. Most of the 39 or more MIG-21s arrived during the first week of September. Two shipments of IL-28 bombers--22 aircraft in all--appear to have arrived in late September, and a third shipment may be en route. There is no sign of a slowdown in the military shipments; about 20 Soviet vessels are en route with probable military cargoes, and one or two are leaving Soviet ports almost daily.

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DDI notes for  
DCI for NSC Briefing  
at 3 PM in Cabinet  
Room  
22 October 1962

Mr. President,

We have now read out the film from all missions flown over  
Cuba through Saturday 20 October (this means 17 missions between  
14 and 20 October).

There is no evidence of new missile sites in Cuba since  
the report given to you at 2:30 p.m. yesterday.

Thus what we have seen to date completed or underway is still  
24 launcher positions for Medium Range Ballistic Missiles  
(1,020 mile range) located at six base complexes, and 12 launch pads  
for Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (2,200 mile range),  
located at three bases -- a total of 36 launchers at nine  
separate bases.

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

As explained, we expect deployment of 2 missiles per launch position, but to date what we have actually seen are 30 and possibly 32 Medium Range Missiles. (We have not yet seen any Intermediate Range Missiles, although they may be in Cuba under cover or on the Soviet ship POLTAVA, which is due to arrive in Cuba in about five days, and is peculiarly arranged to carry long cylindrical items of cargo.)

The sites are in varying degrees of operational readiness. On the basis of latest evidence we now believe 4 MRBM sites (containing 16 launchers) are in full operational readiness as of today (22 October). We now estimate the remaining 2 MRBM sites (containing 8 additional launchers) will come into full operational readiness on 25 October <sup>and 29 October</sup> /respectively.

These MRBM's are considered mobile; they are fired from a trailer bed type of launcher, and their location as now established

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might suddenly shift to a new location difficult to determine by surveillance.

The 3 IREM sites (containing 12 launch pads) still seem likely to reach full operational readiness in December. However, emergency operational readiness of some of the IREMs might be reached somewhat earlier.

Of the 24 primary surface-to-air missile sites in Cuba, we believe 22 are now operational.

The Soviet fleet support vessel, TEREK, is now in the Atlantic on a high-speed run from the Kola Inlet Northern Fleet Base near Murmansk in Russia. It could reach Cuba in four or five days. Its mission is unknown.

- 3 -

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~~EYES ONLY~~

# Ho

24 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Leadership meeting on October 22nd at 5:00 p. m.

ATTENDED BY: The Leadership, except for Senator Hayden,  
The President, Rusk, McNamara, McCone and  
Ambassador Thompson

McCone read a summary of the situation, copy of which is attached. This statement had been discussed with the President, Attorney General and Bundy and had been modified to conform to their views.

There were a few questions of a substantive nature, Hickenlooper asking when missiles would be in operational status. McCone replied with the existing figures as reported in the morning report. Hickenlooper then asked if the Cuban situation is tied in to the China/India confrontation. McCone replied that we have no information one way or the other. Thompson then <sup>indicated</sup> it was more probable that Cuba may force a showdown on Berlin.

Secretary Rusk then reviewed his current appraisal of the Soviet Union indicating there had been some radical moves within the USSR which were indicating a tougher line. It appeared the hard-liners are coming in to ascendancy and the soft co-existent line seems to be disappearing. Peiping seems somewhat more satisfied with Moscow now. Rusk stated that he did not wish to underestimate the gravity of the situation; the Soviets were taking a very serious risk, but this in his opinion represents the philosophy of the "hard-liners". Russell questioned the Secretary as to whether things will get better in the future, whether we will have a more propitious time to act than now, the thrust of his questioning being, "Why wait". Rusk answered that he saw no opportunity for improvement.

The President then reviewed the chronology of the situation, starting on Tuesday, October 16th, when the first information was received from the photographic flight of October 14th. He stated

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that he immediately ordered extensive overflights; that McCone briefed President Eisenhower; that we must recognize that these missiles might be operational and therefore military action on our part might cause the firing of many of them with serious consequences to the United States; furthermore the actions taken, and further actions which might be required, might cause the Soviets to react in various areas, most particularly Berlin, which they could easily grab and if they do, our European Allies would lay the blame in our lap. The President concluded whatever we do involves a risk; however we must make careful calculations and take a chance. To do nothing would be a great mistake. The blockade of Cuba on the importation of offensive weapons was to be undertaken, all ships would be stopped and those containing offensive weapons would not be permitted to proceed. We have no idea how the Bloc will react but the indications are, from unconfirmed sources, they will attempt to run the blockade. Initially the blockade would not extend to petroleum. This might be a further step. We are taking all military preparations for either an air strike or an invasion. It was the President's considered judgment that if we have to resort to active military actions, then this would involve an invasion. Rusk then stated that our proposed action gave the other side a chance to pause. They may pull back or they may rapidly intensify the entire situation existing between the Soviet Union and the United States.


Senator Russell then demanded stronger steps, stated he did not think we needed time to pause. The President had warned them in September and no further warning was necessary. We must not take a gamble and must not temporize; Khrushchev has once again rattled his missiles; he can become firmer and firmer, and we must react. If we delay, if we give notification, if we telegraph our punches, the result will be more a difficult military action and more American lives will be sacrificed. The thrust of Senator Russell's remarks were to demand military action. He did not specifically say by surprise attack; however he did not advocate warning.

- 2 -

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~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

McNamara then described the blockade, indicating that this might lead to some form of military action; that there would be many alternative courses open to us. The President then reviewed in some detail time required



Vinson then asked if the Joint Chiefs of Staff actually approved the plans for the invasion. McNamara answered, "Yes." The plans had been developed over a 10-month period and had been submitted to the President by the JCS on a number of occasions.

NOTE: This question did not refer to whether the JCS did or did not approve the proposed actions of blockade against Cuba.

The President then reviewed matters again, read an intelligence note from a United Nations source which indicated Soviet intention to grab Berlin. Russell promptly replied that Berlin will always be a hostage. He then criticized the decision, stated we should go now and not wait.

Halleck questioned whether we were absolutely sure these weapons were offensive. The President answered affirmatively. McNamara then made a most unusual statement. He said, "One might question whether the missiles are or are not offensive. However there is no question about the IL 28s." NOTE: This was the first time anyone has raised doubt as to whether the MRBMs and the IRBMs are offensive missiles.

- 3 -

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

Questions were then raised concerning the attitude of our Allies. The President advised steps taken to inform our major Allies. He then read the message received from the Prime Minister which in effect agreed to support us in the United Nations and then raised many warnings including the dangers to Berlin, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, etc., etc.

Senator Saltonstall brought up the question of the legality of the blockade. A great many Senators expressed concern over the proposed action with the OAS, indicating that they felt the OAS would delay rather than act. Saltonstall then asked whether a blockade would be legal if the OAS did not support it. The President answered that it probably would not; however we would proceed anyway.

Fulbright then stated that in his opinion the blockade was the worst of the alternatives open to us and it was a definite affront to Russia and that the moment that we had to damage or sink a Soviet ship because of their failure to recognize or respect the blockade we would be at war with Russia and the war would be caused because of our own initiative. The President disagreed with this thinking. Fulbright then repeated his position and stated in his opinion it would be far better to launch an attack and to take out the bases from Cuba. McNamara stated that this would involve the spilling of Russian blood since there were so many thousand Russians manning these bases. Fulbright responded that this made no difference because they were there in Cuba to help on Cuban bases. These were not Soviet bases. There was no mutual defense pact between the USSR and Cuba. Cuba was not a member of the Warsaw Pact. Therefore he felt the Soviets would not react if some Russians got killed in Cuba. The Russians in the final analysis placed little value on human life. The time has come for an invasion under the President's statement of February 13th. Fulbright repeated that an act on Russian ships is an act of war against Russia and on the other hand, an attack or an invasion of Cuba was an act against Cuba, not Russia. Fulbright also expressed reservations concerning the possible OAS action.

The President took issue with Fulbright, stating that he felt that an attack on these bases, which we knew were manned by Soviet personnel, would involve large numbers of Soviet casualties and this would be more provocative than a confrontation with a Soviet ship.

- 4 -

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

Vinson urged that if we strike, we strike with maximum force and wind the matter up quickly as this would involve the minimum of American losses and insure the maximum support by the Cuban people at large who, he reasoned, would very quickly go over to the side of the winner.

The meeting was concluded at 6:35 to permit the President to prepare for his 7:00 o'clock talk to the nation.

It was decided to hold a meeting on Wednesday, October 24th. During this meeting Senator Hickenlooper expressed himself as opposed to the action and in favor of direct military action. He stated that in his opinion ships which were accosted on the high sea and turned back would be a more humiliating blow to the Soviets and a more serious involvement to their pride than the losing of as many as 5,000 Soviet military personnel illegally and secretly stationed in Cuba.

JOHN A. McCONE  
Director

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- 5 -

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

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IRONBARK

SUPPLEMENT 3

TO

JOINT EVALUATION OF  
SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA

PREPARED BY

Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee  
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee  
National Photographic Interpretation Center

2200 HOURS

22 OCTOBER 1962

This report is based on relatively complete photo interpretation of U-2 photography made on:

14 October 1962 Mission 3101  
15 October 1962 Missions 3102 & 3103  
17 October 1962 Missions 3104, 3105, 3106,  
3107, 3108, & 3109  
18 October 1962 Mission 3111  
19 October 1962 Mission 3113 & 3114  
20 October 1962 Mission 3115, 3116 & 3117

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IRONBARK

NOTICE

This supplement up-dates and amplifies previous reports. Emphasis continues to be placed on the READINESS status of the offensive missiles in Cuba. This report is based on photographic coverage through Mission 3117 of 20 October 1962. (See Figure 1)

SUMMARY

1. There are no changes in the estimates of operational readiness for the nine offensive missile sites. (See Figure 2)
2. No new missile sites have been identified.
3. The observed missile and launcher count is increasing as estimated. Three additional MRBMs and four additional MRBM launchers raise the totals to 33 missiles and 23 launchers. No IRBMs have been identified. (See Table 1)
4. One additional SAM site is now considered operational, bringing the total individually operational sites to 23 of the 24 active sites so far identified. (See Table 2)
5. No new intelligence information has been received which modifies the nuclear storage situation since the last joint supplement.

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23 October 1962

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NSC.  
10:00 a.m., October 23, 1962

PRESENT: The President, Vice President, Secty. McNamara,  
Secty. Gilpatric, Gen. Taylor, Mr. Bundy, Secty. Ball,  
Secty. Johnson, Amb. Thompson, Attorney General, DCI

1. McCone gave a brief intelligence report as covered by the attached documents. (Descriptive notes attached). Lundahl displayed the most recent photographs and a map showing 97 per cent coverage of the island.

2. Robert Kennedy stated that the question had been raised as to why the situation was not reported earlier, what was wrong with our intelligence. It was agreed that the rapidity with which the MRBM site construction took place, and other events took place, accounted for the suddenness of the findings and that the leadership and selected press should be contacted privately.

Action: DCI was requested to contact Fulbright, Russell, Vinson, Halleck, Dirksen, and Hickenlooper, and for the press, Alsop, Krock and David Lawrence.

3. McNamara raised questions of when blockade proclamation will be issued, become effective, and discussed plans for the intercept of the first ship which would be the Kimovsk. It was decided that if OAS acted on Tuesday, the proclamation would be issued, effective Wednesday morning, October 24. Probably the first intercept would be made on that day.

4. The President discussed the program, defending the steps taken, stated earlier action would not have been supported and would not have shut off the possibility of missiles, emphasized that mobile missiles ca. come in at any time and be set up rapidly.

5. McNamara discussed several military actions, including extension of tours of duty of Navy and Marine Corps personnel, and these were approved.

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6. McNamara then raised question of reaction to firing on a U-2, indicated pilots instructed to take evasive action. It was decided that we would be immediately informed through JCS to the Secretary of Defense and a prompt decision for retaliation would then be made by the President. Taylor reported eight attack aircraft are maintained in hot alert and can destroy SAM sites within two hours or approximately the time that the U-2 would get back if the attack on it failed. McNamara confirmed that air-sea rescue was continuing. It was decided that if the President was not available, McNamara would have authority to act.

Action: General Taylor agreed that he would take up and confirm today CIA request that our representatives be stationed with JCS planning staff and in the Flag Plot and in the JCS War Room. If there is any delay on this please inform me so that I can again communicate with Taylor.

7. McNamara noted that they had no air intercept capability and would not attempt at this time to develop their plan of air intercept.

Action: It was requested that CIA and Defense carefully analyze air traffic and report currently so that if there is a marked build-up, the Committee will be advised and appropriate action can be taken.

8. McNamara then presented the need for shipping, indicating between 125 and 130 Merchant ships were needed to support an invasion and that a few had been chartered as of yesterday. He felt perhaps 20 more could be secured promptly, but this would leave about 100 short, and this would involve extensive requisitioning. McCone pointed out the serious consequences to American business, inter-coastal and coast-wise shipping, the Northwest lumber industry, et cetera, et cetera. McCone suggested consideration be given to taking foreign flag ships on a bare boat basis. Defense was asked to explore the possibility of temporary waiver of laws regulating operation of foreign flag ships, et cetera, et cetera.

9. McCone and McNamara raised the question of low level flights.

Action: Six flights were approved and General Taylor ordered them off immediately. It was presumed that they will return not later than 1:00 o'clock today.

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Action: It is very important that NPIC and DCI's office receive prints at earliest moment. DDCI to follow. Also important that if the photography is productive of new and more convincing information, prints should be sent to Governor Stevenson at once.

10. The President raised question of security of our own air fields in Florida during surprise strafing, etc. McNamara and Gilpatric assumed responsibility.

11. After a brief discussion of communications Bundy stated that subject under study by Dr. Wiesner, and urged State, Defense and CIA communications specialists to contact Wiesner.

Action: Following meeting McCone, Wiesner, Smith and Edwards met and reviewed the CIA Latin American communication system. Subject left for further discussion today.

Action: This whole communication problem is to be followed up energetically by CIA with Wiesner and all appropriate actions taken.

12. Secretary Ball reported Governor Stevenson and Mr. McCloy felt they did not have enough information to make a convincing case before the UN Security Council. They requested (1) a large map marked in color, showing the actual locations of a few of the sites, possibly one MRBM site, one IRBM site and one or two air fields; (2) pictures of the sites showing progressive construction with dates indicated; (3) indication, but not necessarily the numbers, of all of the sites; (4) a pre-May 1, 1960 U-2 picture of the Soviet MRBM/IRBM site to show similarity.

Action: The Committee left matter of disclosure to McCone, despatch of Lundahl and Cline to New York for discussions, and assistance in developing Stevenson's scenario. McCone authorized items one, two and three above but refused item 4. Also agreed transmit low-level product to Stevenson if same useful.

13. Bundy explained idea of creating a staff to support the Committee indicating each member should have a working staff member, details to be worked out later.

Action: DDCI should consider appropriate assignment after conferring with State and Defense and determining their nominees. This will be more or less full time and this staff man can handle Agency representation and also support me.

JAM/at/mfb

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- 3 -  
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John A. McCone  
Director

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n/r 104

October 23, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meetings with Mr. Krock, Mr. David Lawrence, and Mr. Scott

At 12:40 Mr. Arthur Krock called at my office at my invitation. I reviewed the situation generally with him, answering questions concerning the background of the decisions, the arguments in favor of the course of action versus a blockade coupled with the political debate on the one hand and surprise military action on the other. Krock seemed in general agreement with the course of action.

At 5:00 o'clock at my invitation Mr. David Lawrence and Mr. Scott called at my office and I reviewed the situation with them. They questioned me concerning the evidence and I showed them several pictures which they accepted as convincing evidence. They questioned me in considerable detail as to why we did not know this sooner, how Keating got his information and the penetration of intelligence activities during the months of August and September. I explained the situation substantially as outlined to the leadership at their meeting. I felt that neither was convinced and that both attached some "other motive" to the timing. However, they did recognize that MRBM sites can be installed quickly and with very little advanced preparation which can be detected. Both gentlemen questioned me at considerable length as to why Administration spokesmen spoke so categorically that the build-up was purely defensive and that no offensive capability was being installed. They were concerned about repeated statements by the President, Chester Bowles, the Vice President and other Administration spokesmen, but most particularly the State Department briefing held on Thursday, October 18th, which was two or three days after the original data was in our hands, at which time the briefers again repeated the statement that the "build-up involved defensive and no offensive weapons." They said they thought this briefing was a deceptive mistake and wondered why the briefing was carried on.

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I inadvertently met with Mr. Scott of the Scott/Allen combination who accosted me as I headed Senate Office Building. He said, "McCone, I guess we're going to have to blow you out of this (waters) for not reorganizing your estimating processes, most particularly your Board of National Estimates. In answer to my question as to why, he said, "On October the 4th, the Board put out a National Estimate which has served to guide our government in its policy and this Estimate stated that the Soviets would not install offensive missiles in Cuba as doing so would constitute a change in policy on their part and would confront them with problems all over the world which they, the Soviets did not wish to face at this time." Scott said that he felt that such an Estimate was reckless, it did not serve the Government in establishing policy, and it was a frightful disservice to the people of the United States. He said this was just another example of how the CIA estimating processes were not objective and served special interests. Hence, he said, they were going to prepare an article and expose the whole situation to the public. I merely stated I knew nothing about any such estimate.

ACTION: Scott apparently has read the latest Cuban estimate published about September 20th, which contains wording as quoted above. Source of his information is unknown. I feel Grogan should talk with him and perhaps I should talk with him also.

NOTE: In my discussions with all the above people, Congressional and Press, I have been forced to defend the Executive Branch of the Government and CIA against the questions (1) why did we not know about this sooner and (2) did we not estimate or forecast this eventuality.

JOHN A. MCCONE

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October 23rd, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meetings with Senator Russell, Senator Hickenlooper,  
and Chairman Vinson

1. At the President's request I contacted several members of the leadership of the Congress with the following results. In a meeting on <sup>OCTOBER</sup> August 23rd, Senator Russell indicated a less critical attitude toward Administration policy than was evident at the leadership meeting the night before. He in general approved the plan of actions, indicating strong reservations concerning the effectiveness and the utility of the blockade, expressed serious concern over the Soviet/U.S. confrontation which would result from the blockade, and accepted the course of action only because it would lead to the next phase which would be that of taking the missiles and offensive weapons out of Cuba at a time and by means of our own determination. Russell favored more positive action against Cuba which would involve not only air strike but invasion. In the initial part of the discussion he felt the President's speech had not established a clear-cut right for military action; however, by careful reference to the speech (a copy of which I had with me) he agreed that the wording did give the President right of action without further notification. In general, Russell's attitude was considerably different than the leadership meeting and might be summed up as reserved approval.

During the conversation, I outlined my feelings that our purposes must be to remove the missiles and also to remove Castro as is outlined in a separate memorandum,

2. Senator Hickenlooper approved the speech, the action, and the anticipated further action without reservation. He expressed confidence in the President as did Senator Russell but serious reservations concerning some of the President's advisors who he felt would influence the President to follow a very weak and compromising line. However, it appeared to me that Hickenlooper was greatly relieved by the speech and more satisfied with our Cuban policy than was evident at the leadership meeting.

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3. Chairman Vinson stated that he thought the speech was good. He approved it but he had concluded that military action would be necessary and this he heartily approved. Vinson feels that we must dispose of the Castro problem as well as the missiles. In this regard, I outlined my feelings as covered by separate memorandum. Vinson tended to review the activities of the Navy with Admiral Anderson and others, insisting that we must be sure that we are going to do enough, that our blockade is going to be effective, and that if we invade, we must invade with great force, an assured victory, quick victory, otherwise Cuban resistance will be rallied and our casualties will be great. He stated that 250,000 men would be not enough, that it would take 500,000 men; that we should land at least 10 or more points in Cuba at one time, and if we did this, the entire Cuban population would come to our side.

Note: Both Vinson and Russell were very inquisitive as to the position of the Joint Chiefs. I explained this as expressed by Taylor, pointing out that their position of a sudden unannounced military strike was reasonable in view of their responsibilities, however, it must also be recognized that civilians with broader responsibilities, i.e. military and political as well, necessarily had to moderate the JCS view. I stated that I felt the JCS view would insure the most successful military operations with the least American losses but that I opposed it and felt that the military handicaps resulting from our course of action (in military operations) must be reverted to, can be overcome by increase in the weight of the military operation. None of the three felt that we should have undertaken a surprise attack; however, Russell in particular felt that a warning and a following military operation might have been preferable to the blockade. I pointed out that the warning now had been given and action could be taken now "at a time of our own choosing and by means of our own determination" and after again reviewing the wording of the speech, Russell agreed this was correct.

JOHN A. MC CONE

JAM/mfb

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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23 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Executive Committee Meeting on 23 October 1962  
6:00 p.m. All members present plus Counsel  
for Defense Department

1. Committee reviewed the blockade proclamation and approved it. It was signed by the President at 6:00 p.m.
2. The President instructed McNamara to review all details of instructions to the Fleet Commanders regarding procedures to be followed in the blockade. There was an extended discussion of actions to be taken under various assumed Soviet resistance activities such as (a) failing to stop, (b) refusing right to board, (c) ships turning around, heading in another direction, etc.
3. Discussion of the effect on U.S. industry by chartering and preempting the use of 20 or 30 American ships. Gilpatric reported that this would have little or no effect on the American economy. McCone questioned these findings; however Gilpatric said that this had been thoroughly studied and McCone's concerns as expressed at the morning meeting were unfounded. The Attorney General stated that it was within the law to use foreign bottoms, however decision was made to preempt U.S. bottoms and not worry about the consequences because they would not be serious.
4. The President urged that Norstad be retained at SHAPE during the period of crisis, perhaps until 1 February 63. He indicated Lemnitzer might be used as CINCEUR with Norstad remaining as SACEUR. Bundy stated that this is complicated as the two posts are so co-mingled that they really must be held by one man. Taylor raised question that if this was done it would hurt Lemnitzer's prestige. The President said that he felt that Norstad was so experienced and so capable and his judgment so sound, as evidenced by today's cable, copy of which I have not seen, that he would take the risk of NATO country criticisms, he did not think that Lemnitzer would be hurt, and he wished Norstad to remain. Defense to take under advisement and report within 24 hours.
4. In the prolonged discussion of report on Civil Defense problems, the President seemed particularly concerned over the situation if we should launch attacks which might result in four or five missiles being delivered on the United States. DOD spokesman stated that the area covered by the 1100 mile missiles involved 92 million people. They felt that fall-out space was available though


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~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

not equipped for about 40 million. The President asked what emergency steps could be taken. Replied that many arrangements could be made without too much publicity, such as repositioning food, actually obtaining space, putting up shelter signs, etc. I got the conclusion that not very much could or would be done; that whatever was done would involve a great deal of publicity and public alarm.

Prior to the departure of Secretary McNamara at approximately 7:00 o'clock, McCone (who had not been called upon for an intelligence appraisal) stated to the President that he felt certain intelligence should be reported to the meeting prior to the departure of Secretary McNamara as some items observed by the Intelligence Community might prove of great significance.



JOHN A. McCONE  
Director

JAM/mfb

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IRONBARK

SUPPLEMENT 4  
TO  
JOINT EVALUATION OF  
SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA

PREPARED BY

Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee  
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee  
National Photographic Interpretation Center

0100 HOURS

24 OCTOBER 1962

This report is based on relatively complete photo interpretation of U-2 photography made on:

14 October 1962 Mission 3101  
15 October 1962 Missions 3102 & 3103  
17 October 1962 Missions 3104, 3105, 3106,  
3107, 3108, & 3109  
18 October 1962 Mission 3111  
19 October 1962 Mission 3113 & 3114  
20 October 1962 Mission 3115, 3116 & 3117  
22 October 1962 Mission 3118 & 3119  
and a very preliminary analysis of Mission 5002 of 23 October  
1962 has been included.

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IRONBARK

NOTICE

This supplement updates and amplifies previous reports. Emphasis continues to be placed on the READINESS status of the offensive missiles in Cuba. This report is based on U-2 photographic coverage through Mission 3119 of 22 October 1962 (see Figure 1). Some of Mission 5002, the low altitude photographic coverage of 23 October 1962, arrived during the preparation of this report and preliminary comments have been incorporated in the discussion of the Guanajay IRBM sites. Analysis has just started and will require many hours for completion.

SUMMARY

1. There are two changes in the estimated dates of full operational capability. San Cristobal MRBM Site 2 and Sagua La Grande MRBM Site 1 are now estimated to achieve this status on 25 October instead of 22 October as previously estimated.
2. No new missile sites have been identified (See Table 1).
3. No IRBMs per se have yet been identified.
4. Seven Soviet ships with cargo hatch openings of 75 feet or longer have now been identified as possible ballistic missile carriers. They have made 13 trips to Cuba to date, and three are currently enroute to Cuba.
5. No new intelligence information has been received which modifies the nuclear storage situation.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

*Memorandum*



THE CRISIS  
USSR/CUBA

24 October 1962

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
24 October 1962

SUMMARY CONTENTS

1. We do not believe the measures to achieve a higher degree of action readiness for Soviet and bloc forces are being taken on a crash basis. Communist reaction to the US quarantine action against Cuba has not gone beyond the highly critical but uncommitting statement issued yesterday by the Soviet government.

2. Surveillance of Cuba indicates continued rapid progress in completion of IRBM and MRBM missile sites. No new sites have been discovered. Buildings believed to afford nuclear storage are being assembled with great rapidity. Cuban naval units have been ordered to blocking positions at Banes and Santiago Bays.

3. Survey of Soviet shipping shows 16 dry cargo and 6 tanker ships en route to Cuba. Of these 22, nine are in positions which would permit arrival by the end of October. Three ships have hatches suitable for missile handling [REDACTED]

4. Official world reaction shows a generally favorable response to the US action, particularly in Latin America. The OAS representatives approved a resolution endorsing the quarantine without opposition, one abstention was due to lack of instructions.

5. There are no indications of any Soviet aircraft movements to Cuba.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~ONLY~~

October 25, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Notes on Leadership Meeting on October 24th, 1962, at 5:00 p. m.

Attended by: Congressional Leadership (except Senator Hayden), the President, Rusk, McNamara, McCone and Robert Lovett.

McCone gave a brief intelligence summary, copy attached.

Secretary Rusk reported on the United Nations, stated there is no confirmed Soviet reaction or statement of intentions but discussed exchange with Bertrand Russell and dismissed this as unofficial. The President categorically stated on several occasions through the meeting there was no formal or informal direct approach for a Kennedy/Khrushchev meeting and no negotiations toward that end.

McNamara reported on military operations, stated that as of this hour there had been "no interceptions of Soviet ships; none were necessary." McNamara very carefully avoided any statements that ships had turned around. (Note: McNamara's statements were not consistent with reports that an intercept had been attempted at 10:35 a. m. with the KIMOVSK, and that the ship had turned around when confronted by a Navy vessel).

Mansfield spoke of the importance of confidential nature of the meeting, referring to Roland Evans' article in the Herald Tribune which summarized in accurate detail views of all who attended the prior meeting. It was the consensus that the discussions at leadership meetings must be kept most confidential.

Russell complimented Secretary Rusk on the unanimous OAS action and his unusually complimentary remarks were strongly supported by Dirksen, Hickenlooper and Mansfield.

Rusk then reported that Secretary General U Thant would issue a statement calling for a two-week moratorium. There was no conclusion as to the United States answer.

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~~SECRET~~  
~~ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

Dirksen then brought up the question of a Summit meeting, stating that he felt such a confrontation between Khrushchav and Kennedy at this moment would be useless unless ground rules were established indicating that constructive results would develop. The President agreed; stated that we must now wait until the confrontation of the ships and that the next 24 hours will bring out important developments.

McCone was then questioned concerning certain intelligence matters.

[REDACTED] Smathers questioned about reported Cuban orders not to shoot unless attacked. McCone stated that this information had come through intelligence channels and seemed to be correct. Smathers then asked regarding Cuban known missile sites. McCone replied the Cubans were excluded except for camp construction and then it was reported they were kept under careful surveillance.

Fulbright questioned McNamara at some length concerning his preparations for invasion and asked specifically whether all steps were taken so that an invasion could be initiated in a minimum time.

McNamara stated that all preliminary steps were being taken, outlining some of the details, but not many of them; that preparations were being made so that an invasion could be accomplished with the 7-day lead time discussed at previous meetings.

Meeting adjourned, the President seeking agreement that the leadership would remain on 8-hour alert.

John A. McCone  
Director

JAM:mfb:at

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUPPLEMENT 5  
TO  
JOINT EVALUATION OF  
SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA

PREPARED BY

Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee  
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee  
National Photographic Interpretation Center

2200 HOURS

24 OCTOBER 1962

This report is based on relatively complete photo interpretation of U-2 photography made on:

14 October 1962 Mission 3101  
15 October 1962 Missions 3102 & 3103  
17 October 1962 Missions 3104, 3105, 3106,  
3107, 3108, & 3109  
18 October 1962 Mission 3111  
19 October 1962 Mission 3113 & 3114  
20 October 1962 Mission 3115, 3116 & 3117  
22 October 1962 Mission 3118 & 3119

and on relatively complete photo interpretation of low-level photography of Missions 5001 through 5006 of 23 October 1962.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

NOTICE

This supplement updates and amplifies previous reports. Emphasis continues to be placed on the READINESS status, or changes therein, of the offensive missiles in Cuba. This report is based on photographic coverage through Mission 5005 of Tuesday, 23 October 1962 (see Figure 1). The quality of the recent, low-altitude photography permits positive identification of many types of missile associated equipment.

SUMMARY

1. As yet there is no evidence of change in the pace of construction activities.
2. There are no changes in the estimated dates of operational capability for the MRBM and IRBM sites (see Figure 2).
3. No additional missiles, missile transporters, or erectors have been identified (see Table 1).
4. No new missile sites have been identified.
5. No IREMs per se have yet been identified. [REDACTED]
6. There is increasing evidence of the use of camouflage at several sites.
7. Three of the Soviet ships suspected of being possible ballistic missile carriers enroute to Cuba are reportedly altering their course.

- 1 -

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

8. We have analyzed the capability of the Soviets to transport nuclear warheads for these missiles from the USSR to Cuba using submarines and aircraft. While submarine transport is possible, air transport is more likely. A TU-114 can fly non-stop from Olenya in the Soviet Union to Cuba with up to 10 nuclear warheads on an approximate great circle route which would not pass over any other country.

9. New, low-altitude photography of 23 October confirms previous estimates of the general characteristics and rate of construction of the probable nuclear warhead bunkers at several sites. We are at this time unable to determine whether these bunkers are for storage or checkout of nuclear warheads, or for both of these functions.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

*Diss*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

*Memorandum*



THE CRISIS  
USSR/CUBA

Information as of 0600  
25 October 1962

PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE  
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION  
CONTAINED ~~HEREIN~~ IS NOT AUTHORIZED.

(THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL)

~~TOP SECRET~~

84

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

25 October 1962  
[REDACTED]

SUMMARY CONTENTS

I. No change has been noted in the scope or pace of the construction at the IRBM and MRBM missile sites in Cuba. Cuban armed forces continue their alert, with military aircraft on standdown since the morning of 23 October. There are indications that known and suspected dissidents are being rounded up.

II. As of 0600 EDT at least 14 of the 22 Soviet ships which were known to be en route to Cuba had turned back. Five of the remaining eight are tankers. Two of the dry cargo ships not known to have reversed course may be carrying non-military cargo, but the BELOVODSK [REDACTED] has 12 HOUND helicopters. Changes in course appear to have been executed in midday on 23 October, before the President signed the proclamation establishing the quarantine.

III. We still see no signs of any crash procedure in measures to increase the readiness of Soviet armed forces. Bloc media are playing up Khrushchev's 24 October statement that he would consider a top-level meeting "useful."

IV. There is as yet no reaction to the turn-around of Soviet shipping, which had not become publicly apparent. Attention remains centered on neutralist efforts in the UN to find machinery for easing tension. Canada has searched a Cubana airliner flying from Prague to Havana. Latin American countries are beginning to offer military units for the quarantine, and there is generally little adverse reaction in the hemisphere.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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#50

October 25, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Executive Committee Meeting 10/25/62 -- 10:00 a.m.  
All Members present.


McCone reported on intelligence, reviewing summary of 25 October, including penciled memorandums as indicated, plus Cline memorandum of 25 October on talks with Sir Kenneth Strong, and the Watch Report of same date.

I called special attention to the BELOVODSK and reported on Page II-5 and the searching of the Cubana airplane by Canadians as reported on page IV-2. Also the shipping schedule.

McNamara reported that at 7:00 o'clock a destroyer intercepted the tanker BUCHAREST which responded destination was Havana, cargo was petroleum and the BUCHAREST was permitted to proceed under surveillance. He stated that no United States Navy ships had orders to board. He recommended orders be issued to immediately board Bloc ships and then the BUCHAREST be boarded. Decision was reached that Navy be instructed to board the next Soviet ship contacted which would be the GROZNY, a tanker but which was carrying a deck load which might be missile field tanks. Later in the meeting decision was reached not to board the BUCHAREST. Contact was to be made with the GROZNY as early as possible and that was estimated to be about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Friday, October 26th.



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McCone then noted the number of ships in the Eastern Atlantic and in the Baltic and Mediterranean which had turned back. Dillon asked about ships in the Pacific. The President asked whether Soviet ships bound elsewhere than Cuba had changed course. McCone said he would report on this in the afternoon.

There was a further discussion of the policy of stopping or hailing non-Bloc ships. It was decided that all ships must be hailed.

Rusk raised the question of discussions with the United Nations. Draft of U.S. reply to the U Thant letter was approved with modifications. It was agreed at the meeting that we must insist upon the removal of missiles from Cuba in addition to demands that construction be stopped and that UN inspectors be permitted at once.

Bundy reviewed Khrushchev letter to the President of the 24th of October and the Kennedy reply. McNamara raised the question of accelerating or raising the escalation of the actions we have so far taken, expressing concern over the plateau, indicating determination to meet our ultimate objective of taking out the missile sites.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Rusk then asked certain actions on the part of CIA as follows:  
(1) An answer to questions of the effect on Cuba because ships were turned about as indicated in recent reports; (2) What had happened to Soviet ships which were bound elsewhere than Cuba; (3) The general Cuban reaction to our actions to date:

- (a) Do they know about Soviet missiles?
- (b) Have they heard the President's speech?
- (c) What is the morale in Cuba?

McCone promised answers.

John A. McCone  
Director

JAM:mf:at

- 3 -

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

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Chono

26 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting of the NSC Executive Committee, 25 October,  
5:00 P.M.

ALL MEMBERS PRESENT

McCone gave intelligence briefing covered by Situation Report of 10/25 and followed with resume of Bloc shipping (SC 11064/62) dated 10/25 and summarized answers to specific questions as indicated on the third page; also referred briefly to [redacted] reaction to the Soviet government statement.

There followed a long discussion of policy matters, notes of which are covered in the attached.

The meeting considered three drafts of scenarios of three possible courses of action, that is, air strike, the political path and progressive economic blockade, all of which are attached.

JOHN A. McCONE  
Director

Attached:

Two pages of notes on small White House note paper  
Situation Report 10/25 - 3 pages  
SC 11064/62  
Canadian Reaction (OCI 3569/62  
Draft: Scenario for Airstrike; Political Path; Progressive  
Economic Blockade

JAM/msb

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~~SECRET~~

25 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: MONGOOSE Operations and General Lansdale's Problems

1. You asked me to give you a paper by 5:00 p.m. today on the San Roman/Attorney General/Harvey/Lansdale/MONGOOSE problem in connection with submarines and the 50-Cuban project. I have talked only to Bill Harvey but in the light of my prior knowledge of Special Group/MONGOOSE/Lansdale/voice level, etc., it is my clear opinion that this whole problem is centered around jurisdictional bureaucracy not unlike the tangle I had with Gilpatric and the Air Forces.

2. Lansdale feels badly cut out of the picture and appears to be seeking to reconstitute the MONGOOSE Special Group operations during this period of impending crisis. I need not tell you that Lansdale's organization and the MONGOOSE concept of clearing actions through Special Group is an impossible procedure under current circumstances.

3. The deliberative MONGOOSE system was not utilized for this particular project. Harvey rightly realized that intelligence collection was essential and that it should be geared to a turnover of the assets to the military in place in the event military operations took place. It was this requirement that generated the need for submarines and the need for the 50-odd Cubans. General Johnson of the JCS Staff was knowledgeable and General Lansdale was subsequently informed and assisted in obtaining the submarines. The detailed planning is still going on but cannot be firm until the submarine commanders are available. The Cubans are not owned by San Roman but have been recruited and checked out by CIA and in a number of cases have been CIA agents for a long time. Unfortunately San Roman, like other exile group leaders, is looking out for the future of San Roman.

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- 2 -

4. The targets planned for this operation as have been previously indicated to you, are to include the MRBM and IRBM sites. This is pure intelligence collection and the establishment of intelligence assets in place. It is being closely coordinated with the JCS Planning Staff and Lansdale knows about it. It obviously cannot be planned, controlled, and operated through the cumbersome procedures of MONGOOSE and therefore it is not in MONGOOSE channels.

5. I am convinced that if we are to have military operations in Cuba, and even now during this doubtful period of heavy military involvement in planning for such operations, the direct CIA-JCS coordinated liaison and control must be effected -- the time has long since passed for MONGOOSE-type, Special Group-type consideration.

  
MSC

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SUPPLEMENT 6  
TO  
JOINT EVALUATION OF  
SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA

PREPARED BY

Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee  
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee  
National Photographic Interpretation Center

0200 HOURS

26 OCTOBER 1962

This report is based on relatively complete photo interpretation of U-2 photography made on:

14 October 1962 Mission 3101  
15 October 1962 Missions 3102 & 3103  
17 October 1962 Missions 3104, 3105, 3106,  
3107, 3108 & 3109  
18 October 1962 Mission 3111  
19 October 1962 Missions 3113 & 3114  
20 October 1962 Missions 3115, 3116 & 3117  
22 October 1962 Missions 3118, 3119 & 3120  
23 October 1962 Missions 3121, 3122, 3123, &  
5002, 5003, 5004, 5005 & 5006  
25 October 1962 Mission 3125  
and preliminary analysis of low-altitude photography of  
Missions 5007, 5008, 5009, 5011, 5012, 5013, 5014, 5015 &  
5016.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

#### NOTICE

This supplement updates and amplifies previous reports. Emphasis is placed on the READINESS status, construction pace and any significant changes at the offensive missile sites in Cuba. This report is based primarily on preliminary analysis of the 25 October low-altitude photography, portions of which arrived during the preparation of this report (see Figure 1).

#### SUMMARY

1. The 25 October photography of four MRBM sites shows continued rapid construction activity at each site. This activity apparently continues to be directed toward achieving a full operational capability as soon as possible. Camouflage and canvas covering of critical equipment is also continuing. As yet there is no evidence indicating any intention to move or dismantle these sites.

2. There is one change in the estimated dates of operational capability. San Cristobal MRBM Site 2 is estimated to achieve a full operational capability on 26 October instead of 25 October, probably as a result of the heavy rain that has recently hit this site (see Figure 2).

3. No additional missiles, missile transporters, or erectors have been identified (see Table 1).

4. No new missile sites have been identified, although continued analysis of previous photography has revealed some road improvement activity in the Remedios area which is considered indicative of plans for the second IRBM site estimated for this area.

5. The three Soviet ships suspected of being possible ballistic missile carriers continue their eastward course towards the USSR.

- 1 -

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

*Memorandum*



THE CRISIS  
USSR/CUBA

Information as of 0600

26 October 1962

PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE  
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION  
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED.~~

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL

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93

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]26 October 1962  
[REDACTED]SUMMARY CONTENTS

I. Surveillance of 25 October shows that the construction of IRBM and MRBM bases in Cuba is proceeding largely on schedule; now level photography confirms that the MRBM bases will use the 1,020-nautical-mile SS-4 missile. No additional sites, launchers or missiles have been located, but there is road construction around Remedios which suggests the fourth IRBM site we have been expecting there. We estimate that it would cost the USSR more than twice as much and take considerably longer to add to its ICBM strike capability from the USSR as great an increment as the potential salvo from Cuban launching sites.

II. Only two Soviet freighters--and five tankers, one of them already past the quarantine line--still are headed for Cuba. The BELOVODSK, with twelve MI-4 helicopters, is in the North Atlantic; the PUGACHEV appears to have slowed or stopped several days west of the Panama Canal. A total of 16 dry cargo ships now are carried as having turned back toward the USSR on 23 October.

Two Soviet civil air flights are scheduled for Havana with passengers; cargo, if any, is not known. One may be turned back by Guinea today. A TU-114 is scheduled via Senegal to reach Havana 1 November.

III. There are further indications that some Soviet and satellite elements, particularly air and ground elements in Eastern Europe and European Russia, are on an alert or readiness status. No major deployments have been detected, however.

[REDACTED] there is some evidence that additional tactical aircraft have been placed on five-minute alert in East Germany, where two areas along the West German border have been closed off for exercises.

Moscow highlights Khrushchev's acceptance of U Thant's appeal in a bid to start US-Soviet negotiations. Peiping, however, is irritated that the Soviet response to US action is not stronger. The Communists still deny there are any offensive weapons in Cuba.

IV. There is no major change or significant new development in non-bloc reaction to the crisis. Most of the OAS nations have offered to participate in some form in the quarantine, and NATO members have agreed with minor reservations to deny landing and overflight rights to Soviet planes bound for Cuba.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

26 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting of the NSC Executive Committee, 26 October, 1962  
10:00 A.M.

IN ATTENDANCE: All members plus Governor Stevenson and Mr. McCloy

McCone gave an intelligence briefing which included reading the Watch Committee report of 10/26, distributing and highlighting an Intelligence Agency Memorandum of 10/26, copy of which was distributed; reviewing summary conclusions of GMAIC, JAEIC, NPIC Supplement #6; summarizing Miskovsky's report on the prisoner exchange (OGC 62-2597); summarized CIA report on non-Bloc ships enroute to Cuba 10/26; and pointed out that non-Bloc ships could quite possibly carry Soviet arms and they would be just as secure as Soviet or Bloc ships if engaged on bare-boat charter; reviewed briefly Cuban internal reaction to the U.S. quarantine as contained in report of 10/26.

McCone then posed two operational problems. One, the CIA plan to have ten teams go into Cuba by submarine to gather intelligence on missile bases and other points of interest. McCone stated that CIA was prepared to use its assets to support MONGOOSE operations under Lansdale's direction; that the objective was to take Cuba from Castro and turn it over to the Cuban people or alternatively to secure intelligence in support of possible military activities and, in this instance, the requirement should be established by SecDef and JCS.

McCone stated there was an organizational problem with Lansdale under current conditions and a meeting had been called for this afternoon to resolve this problem and to establish a course of action on the Lansdale MONGOOSE organization. The President stated that he felt the Lansdale organization should be used and suggested it might serve as a Subcommittee of the NSC Executive Committee.

McCone also advised the President that plan for political organization of Cuba in event of an invasion was under study and would be considered at the 2:30 meeting.

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There followed an extended discussion of operational matters,  
details of which are covered in the attached notes.



JOHN A. McCONE  
Director

Attachment to original:  
DCI's notes - 3 small sheets on  
White House note paper

JAM/mfb

~~TOP SECRET~~

97. McCone, "Memorandum of MONGOOSE Meeting in the  
JCS Operations Room, October 26, 1962, at 2:30 p.m.,"  
29 October 1962

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

B-28

October 29, 1962

MEMORANDUM OF MONGOOSE MEETING IN THE JCS OPERATIONS  
ROOM, OCTOBER 26, 1962, AT 2:30 p.m.

Attended by: McNamara, Gilpatric, General Taylor, Johnson, Ed  
Martin, Don Wilson, the Attorney General, McCone, Lansdale, Harvey,  
and Parrott.

The purpose of the meeting was to give guidance to operation  
MONGOOSE. It became immediately apparent that Lansdale felt him-  
self lacking in authority and not in channel of either operations or  
information with JCS or SecDef's office. There was considerable  
criticism by innuendo of the CIA/Lansdale relationship.


McCone stated that he understood the MONGOOSE goal was  
to encourage the Cuban people to take Cuba away from Castro and to  
set up a proper form of government. He said CIA had, and would  
continue to support Lansdale whom we recognized as the director of  
this operation. He felt that any indication that CIA was not affording  
such support to Lansdale was completely erroneous.

On the other hand, CIA by long-standing arrangements, details  
of which were most recently confirmed, are obligated to support the  
military to the extent desired by the JCS in any combat theatre, and  
therefore probably some CIA moves made for the purpose of meeting  
this objective had been misunderstood by Lansdale. Lansdale had  
distributed the attached paper headed "Main Points to be Considered,  
10/26."



~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~



Item 2N was approved and Mr. Gilpatric undertook to expedite the construction work necessary to establish the 50 KW radio transmitters in the Florida Keys. (DonWilson has charge of this project).

Item 2L was removed from MONGOOSE responsibility. It was decided that a new Cuban political office to plan for the post-invasion government of Cuba would be secretly set up by the State Department. All other items in the Lansdale paper were held in abeyance.

The group reaffirmed that Lansdale is to be in charge of the MONGOOSE operations which will cover all covert activities of any department of government, including State, CIA, USIA, etc. The infiltration of agents is to be held up pending a determination by the Department of Defense through General Carroll, as to just what military information is desired and determination by State, through

- 2 -

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

Alexis Johnson, as to just what political information is desired. General Lansdale is then to determine <sup>if</sup> assets available in the government (all of which rest in CIA) can produce the information desired by Defense and State, and then program a procedure to be followed.

It is expected that Lansdale will make these determinations at the earliest moment and confer further with the committee or individual representative s thereof.

John A. McCone  
Director

JAM:at

- 3 -

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~



SUPPLEMENT 7  
TO  
JOINT EVALUATION OF  
SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA

PREPARED BY

Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee  
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee  
National Photographic Interpretation Center

0200 HOURS  
27 OCTOBER 1962

This report is based on relatively complete photo interpretation of photography made on:

14 October 1962 Mission 3101  
15 October 1962 Missions 3102 & 3103  
17 October 1962 Missions 3104, 3105, 3106,  
3107, 3108 & 3109  
18 October 1962 Mission 3111  
19 October 1962 Missions 3113 & 3114  
20 October 1962 Missions 3115, 3116 & 3117  
22 October 1962 Missions 3118, 3119 & 3120  
23 October 1962 Missions 3121, 3122, 3123, &  
5002, 5003, 5004, 5005 & 5006  
25 October 1962 Missions 3125, 5007, 5008,  
5009, 5011, 5012, 5013, 5014, 5015 & 5016  
and preliminary analysis of photography of 26 October 1962,  
Missions 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625 & 2626.



~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

IRONBARK

#### NOTICE

Emphasis continues to be placed on the READINESS status, pace of construction and any significant changes at the offensive missile sites in Cuba. This report is based primarily upon detailed analysis of the 25 October low-altitude coverage (see Figure 1).

#### SUMMARY

1. Detailed analysis confirms the rapid pace of construction reported in our last supplement. As of 25 October there was no evidence indicating any intention to halt construction, dismantle or move these sites.

2. There are no changes in the dates of estimated operational capability for the MRBM and IRBM sites. Five of the six MRBM sites are now believed to have a full operational capability and the sixth is estimated to achieve this status tomorrow--28 October (see Figure 2). This means a capability to launch up to 24 MRBM (1020 nm) missiles within 6 to 8 hours of a decision to do so, and a refire capability of up to 24 additional MRBMs within 4 to 6 hours (see Table 1). within

3. No additional MRBM missiles, missile transporters, or erectors have been identified (see Table 1). To date, we have observed a total of 33 MRBM missiles.

4. No IRBM missiles, missile transporters, erectors or associated equipment have been observed to date.

5. No new missile sites have been identified; there has been no high-altitude coverage suitable for searching the Remedios area for the suspect second IRBM site since Mission 3118 of 22 October (see Table 1 and Figure 1).

- 1 -

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

IRONBARK



7. Photography (Mission 5012 of 25 October) confirmed the presence of a FROG missile launcher in a vehicle park near Remedios. (The FROG is a tactical unguided rocket of 40,000 to 50,000 yard range, and is similar to the U.S. Honest John).

8. There has been no [REDACTED] evidence of attempts at interdiction of U.S. reconnaissance aircraft.

9. Despite Krushchev's statement to Mr. Knox of 24 October, we still lack positive evidence that nuclear weapons are deployed in Cuba.

10. The probable nuclear bunkers adjacent to the MRBM sites are not yet ready for storage, assembly or checkout.

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

*Memorandum*



THE CRISIS  
USSR/CUBA

Information as of 0600

27 October 1962

PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE  
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION  
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED.~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

27 October 1962  
[REDACTED]

SUMMARY CONTENTS

I. Based on the latest low-level reconnaissance mission, three of the four MRBM sites at San Cristobal and the two sites at Sagua La Grande appear to be fully operational. No further sites or missiles have been identified.

The mobilization of Cuban military forces continues at a high rate. However, they remain under orders not to take any hostile action unless attacked.

Steps toward establishing an integrated air defense system are under way. On the diplomatic front, Cuban representatives are trying to plant the idea that Havana would be receptive to UN mediation. They indicate, however, that a prerequisite must be "proof" that the US does not intend to attack Cuba.

II. Despite Khrushchev's declaration to U Thant that Soviet ships would temporarily avoid the quarantine area, we have no information as yet that the six Soviet and three satellite ships en route have changed course. A Swedish vessel, believed to be under charter to the USSR, refused to stop yesterday when intercepted by a US destroyer and was allowed to continue to Havana.

III. No significant redeployment of Soviet ground, air or naval forces have been noted. However, there are continuing indications of increased readiness among some units. Three F-class submarines have been identified on the surface inside or near the quarantine line.

IV. There has been no distinct shift in the pattern of reaction. In Western Europe, further support for the US has come from several quarters and unfavorable reactions are decidedly in the minority.

Official London seems intent on checking premature optimism which is showing up in widely scattered parts of the world, particularly among the neutrals. French support for the US is hardening.

There are reports that anti-US demonstrations have broken out in several Latin American capitals, including Buenos Aires, Caracas, and La Paz.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]



THE WHITE HOUSE

10/27 10 AM all

McCone - Brief Intelligence briefing

M-N - Report on ground equipment

authorized - 2 daily flights

of 8 planes each - 1 night flight  
planned - to be released at 4 PM  
if to be seen -

Bull and Nitz - discussed the removal  
of Jupiter to Turkey because of  
press report that we have offered  
to exchange Turk missiles for Cuban  
missiles. This report is different  
from the private letter to  
Kennedy of 10/26.

R Kennedy - Cuban bases must be  
removed promptly and negotiations  
cannot delay this - Turkey relates  
to security of Europe and USSR  
and this we can suggest

THE WHITE HOUSE

2) 10/27 -

This followed a long discussion  
of this communication from Kim-  
D) to U Thant 2) To Kennedy 10/27

2) Kennedy 10/27 - all contradictory  
The latter formally proposes the  
Turkish - Cuban joint program.  
Kennedy position we must insist  
work be stopped and this is  
pre requisite to any talks.

THE WHITE HOUSE

10/27 - 4:00 PM - Ex Comm. all present

No intelligence developments to report

Reviewed state letter <sup>draft</sup> to Kennedy to K. -

Taylor reported that 8 planes were heard  
took off at 2 PM - 1 pair aborted  
because of mechanical trouble, 1 pair  
aborted because of AA fire - 2 pairs  
completed and are due back about  
5 PM.

Rusk reported results of U2 flight of  
Russia - 100 miles off R-rail -  
Instrument failure caused plane to  
go over sea. Territory. Decided  
not to announce incident,

meeting resumed and approved draft  
reply to K's letter to Pres, 10/26 and  
inclusion to U threat at the WH.

McN raised question of recon or Sunday  
agreed to send in flights with  
no recon - if ~~needed~~ <sup>needed</sup> reply.  
we will then decide on action  
to be taken.

2/ 10/27

THE WHITE HOUSE

Taylor reported that a ~~16-2~~ was  
shot down over Bama -

Turkey and Mexico Italy united  
to be made independent  
power to further action in Cuba

10/27 9<sup>00</sup> P<sup>m</sup>

THE WHITE HOUSE All present

Paul - Castro broadcast at 21<sup>00</sup> this evening did not bring up T-28 basis. Try to get K back on last night's text.

Taylor - Plans today encountered ask-ask on low level operations against missile sites.

Paul read message of even date from Moscow advising procedure to be followed in N.A. meeting on SW HW.

consideration of draft of TWA to K -  
Decided not to send the message in view of several messages and statements and U Thant proposed trip to Havana. - Therefore McCone message (attached) not sent.

ExCom 10/27/62 9:00 p.m. - No other info/No M/R



SUPPLEMENT 8  
TO  
JOINT EVALUATION OF  
SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA

PREPARED BY  
Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee  
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee  
National Photographic Interpretation Center

0200 HOURS

28 OCTOBER 1962






#### NOTICE

This report is based primarily on detailed analysis of low-altitude photography taken on Friday, 26 October, as well as preliminary evaluation of the results of similar missions from Saturday, 27 October 1962 (Figure 1). The primary emphasis is placed here on a technical evaluation of force readiness, pace of construction, and changes in the deployment program (Table 1). This report does not attempt to estimate Soviet intent to attack the United States.

#### SUMMARY

1. We still have no direct knowledge of thermonuclear warheads in Cuba, but believe it prudent to assume that the Soviet missile force there is so armed.
2. We estimate that all 24 MRBM launchers are now fully operational, representing a capability to salvo 24 1000-mile missiles within 6 to 8 hours of a decision to launch.
3. The present and estimated operational capability of all Soviet defensive missiles in Cuba is summarized in Figure 2.
4. No new MRBM or IRBM sites have been detected in the past day, although we have not had high-altitude coverage appropriate for search since 23 October 1962.
5. Construction at the Soviet IRBM sites in Cuba continues at a rapid pace and missile support equipment is now being moved to the vicinity of Guanajay Site 1. No IRBM's per se have yet been observed.
6. The entire missile-launching force at the Soviet MRBM sites in Cuba is being checked out on a rapid basis. This provides an increasing, integrated, operational readiness posture.

- 1 -



~~TOP SECRET~~


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7. Automatic anti-aircraft weapons and personnel trenches for protection against air attack are now evident at many of the MRBM sites. These weapons have been introduced in the last few days and probably account for the ground fire now being noted on the low-level photographic missions.

8. Camouflage against aerial photography is being extended at the missile sites and is becoming more effective. Force dispersion is also evident.

9. A missile propellant offloading and transshipping facility has now been identified at the double-fenced area at Punta Gerada in Bahia Honda. This was suspected formerly of being a port of entry for nuclear weapons.

10. We now estimate an integrated operational capability for the SA-2 air defense network in Cuba.



12. The loss of the U-2 over Banes was probably caused by intercept by an SA-2 from the Banes site, or pilot hypoxia, with the former appearing more likely on the basis of present information.

13. Microwave relay towers have been noted at some of the MRBM and IRBM site areas covered on 27 October, indicating that an integrated microwave command and control communication system will be utilized in Cuba. However, the use of high frequency radio is also indicated by the presence of high frequency antennae at Sagua La Grande sites 1 and 2.

- 2 -

[ IPOIBADE ]

14. Construction of probable nuclear storage facilities was continuing on 26 and 27 October. None of the bunkers observed at probable nuclear storage sites are yet believed to be in operation although that at Guanajay IRBM Site No. 1 is essentially complete.

15. A new, probable nuclear storage facility has been identified at Sagua La Grande MRBM Site No. 2. Construction materials were being moved into this area on 27 October. The existence of a second, probable nuclear storage area at the Sagua La Grande launch complex indicates that each launch site is probably intended to have individual, permanent nuclear storage.

~~TOP SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

*Memorandum*



THE CRISIS  
USSR/CUBA

Information as of 0600

28 October 1962

PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE  
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION  
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED.

~~TOP SECRET~~

S+

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

28 October 1962  
[REDACTED]

SUMMARY CONTENTS

I. Surveillance of 26 October and preliminary analysis of yesterday's coverage shows that the development of both IRBM and MRBM sites in Cuba is continuing its rapid pace. All 24 MRBM launchers now appear to have reached full operational readiness. One nuclear storage facility is essentially complete, but none of the bunkers observed is yet believed to be in operation.  
[REDACTED]

There are some indications [REDACTED] that the U-2 lost yesterday over Banes was brought down by the SA-2 system.


Cuban military units remain at a high state of alert and the Castro regime is making a maximum effort to whip up troop and public morale.

II. As of 0700 EST, two or possibly three more Soviet ships are heading for Cuba in addition to the two dry cargo ships and four tankers we have been watching. The tanker GROZNY should have reached the quarantine line early this morning. One Soviet transport aircraft which reached Brazil is there to pick up the body of the Soviet ambassador. Another scheduled for Cuba via North Africa and Brazil turned back at Morocco.


III. No significant redeployment of major Soviet ground, air or naval forces has been noted. The general posture of Soviet ground forces in forward areas is one of precautionary defensive readiness. The overall total of Soviet submarines on extended operations is somewhat greater than normal, and a fourth F-class submarine may be in the area of the Cuban quarantine line.  
[REDACTED]

In non-military developments, Khrushchev's bid for reciprocal withdrawal of offensive weapons from Cuba and Turkey looks like the first step in a series of moves to demonstrate the USSR's readiness for a negotiated solution. Soviet spokesmen continue to play down the possibility that the Cuban crisis could lead to general war.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ 

IV. U Thant is thinking seriously of accepting Castro's invitation to visit Cuba, and might go as early as Tuesday. There is thus far only fragmentary mixed reaction to the President's rejection of Khrushchev's Cuba-Turkey proposal.

~~TOP SECRET~~ 



62 10 25

LOCATION OF MRBM AND IRBM SITES IN CUBA

A. MRBM SITES

1. SAN CRISTOBAL SITE #1 ( N22-40-05 W83-17-55 )
2. SAN CRISTOBAL SITE #2 ( N22-40-50 W83-15-00 )
3. SAN CRISTOBAL SITE #3 ( N22-42-40 W83-08-25 )
4. SAN CRISTOBAL SITE #4 ( N22-46-55 W82-58-50 )
5. SAGUA LA GRANDE SITE #1 ( N22-43-44 W80-01-40 )
6. SAGUA LA GRANDE SITE #2 ( N22-39-10 W79-51-55 )

B. IRBM SITES

1. GUANAJAY SITE #1 ( N22-56-50 W82-39-20 )
2. GUANAJAY SITE #2 ( N22-57-25 W82-36-55 )
3. REMEDIOS SITE #1 ( N22-25-00 W79-35-20 )

C. PROBABLE NUCLEAR STORAGE INSTALLATIONS

1. GUANAJAY ( N22-56-50 W82-39-20 )
2. PUNTA GERARDO ( Secured Port Facility ) ( N22-56-00 W83-11-00 )

62 10 25

~~TOP SECRET~~

# 54

National Security Council Meeting - Executive Committee

October 28 - 11:00 a.m. - All present

Rusk	Rec no plane surveillance
McNamara	Noted difference in Chiefs - Personally agree with Rusk recommendations
Nitze	UN ask what we want to prove inoperable of weapons
McNamara	Have as our objectives a UN recon. plane on Monday
President	Secy. not go today - but let's go on assumption either we or UN will go on Monday

Decision made to release a brief statement welcoming the K message

McCone 

~~TOP SECRET~~

106. Walter Elder, "Memorandum of Executive Committee of NSC Meeting on Sunday, 28 October 1962 Dictated by the Undersigned based on Debriefing of DCI"

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF NSC MEETING ON SUNDAY, 28 OCTOBER 1962 DICTATED BY THE UNDERSIGNED BASED ON DEBRIEFING OF DCI

1. No reconnaissance flights today despite a recommendation of the Secretary of State supported by the Secretary of Defense. It was decided to use RB-66's, which are now in Florida with UN observers aboard if arrangements can be made by the UN in time.
2. If not, the US will fly our own reconnaissance.
3. The DCI has been authorized to release to General Rickhye all pertinent information on the buildup in Cuba, protecting only intelligence sources [REDACTED]. Therefore, the portfolios can be released. Competent people are to go with Charyk and Forrestal to New York to support General Rickhye on this operation.
4. Action: Bill Tidwell and Colonel Parker were dispatched to New York by Ray Cline. This action is underway.
5. A draft reply to Khrushchev is to be written by Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson in Alexis Johnson's office.
6. Action. DD/I is to insure that the CIA input is taken account of. Cline was instructed to support the DCI's position that the removal of the missiles should not end by giving Castro's a sanctuary and thus sustain his subversive threat to other Latin American nations.
7. Action: Action was taken by Ray Cline.

Document ID: _____
No Change in Class. <input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> Declassified
Class. Changed to: IS S C
Next Review Date: _____
Auth: HR 15-3
Date: _____ By: _____

Walter Elder

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

[REDACTED]

SUPPLEMENT 9

TO

JOINT EVALUATION OF  
SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA

PREPARED BY

Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee  
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee  
National Photographic Interpretation Center

2200 HOURS

28 OCTOBER 1962

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

NOTICE

This report is based primarily on detailed analysis of low-altitude photography taken on Saturday, 27 October 1962. (See Figure 4 for tracks.) The primary emphasis is placed here on a technical evaluation of force readiness, pace of construction, and changes in the deployment program (Table 1). This report does not attempt to estimate Soviet intent to attack the United States.

SUMMARY

1. All 24 MRBM launchers are believed to be fully operational. (See Figure 2.)

2. Activity was continuing at all the MRBM and IRBM missile sites covered on Saturday, 27 October. (See Figures 1 and 2.) Camouflage and covering with canvas and natural concealment was continuing at the MRBM sites and is becoming more effective.

3. No IRBM missiles, missile transports or erectors have been identified. However, we have identified oxidizer trailers and possible fuel transporters among the support equipment near Guanajay IRBM Site 1. These fuel transporters are larger in size than similar fuel transporters at MRBM sites.

4. No new MRBM or IRBM sites have been detected; however, we have had no high altitude coverage appropriate for search since 23 October 1962.

5.



6. There is more evidence of the intent to have nuclear warhead bunkers at each launch site.

- 1 -

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]