# Venona: Soviet Espionage and The American Response 1939-1957

## Forward

In July 1995, in a ceremony at CIA Headquarters, Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch released the first group of NSA's Venona translations to the public. The DCI announced that a public conference on the Venona story would be held in 1996 as soon as the declassification of the translations had been completed. This conference is now at hand and follows the release of the last set of Venona translations. Some 2,900 Soviet intelligence messages are now on the Internet and in hard copy at major archives around the country.

While the cryptologic side of the Venona story belongs to NSA and its partners, the overall achievement is one of Intelligence Community cooperation. NSA and its US Army predecessor worked with FBI, CIA, the British, and allied services. This conference volume is itself a cooperative effort in keeping with the spirit of the times. It provides the public with information that had been closely held until recently and which is of extraordinary interest and importance.

It may be some time before historians and the general public sort out the full meaning of Venona. Lou Benson, co-editor of this conference volume, has prepared five historical monographs about the program. Considerable research, discussion, and writing by journalists and historians is already in progress, making this volume and the presentations at its accompanying conference potentially all the more timely and valuable to these scholarly efforts.

There can no longer be any doubt about the widespread and successful Soviet espionage operations against the United States and Great Britain during the 1940s, and that, aside from their own professional skill, Soviet intelligence services could count on the aid of the Communist parties of the target countries.

Earlier in my career I had the opportunity to supervise and participate in the last stages of the Venona program. From that experience I learned of the incredible determination and great skill of the analysts who made Venona possible. The result of their work was the body of translated messages, each one produced with the most painstaking and, I might add, honest effort. This is authentic material deserving of the most careful study.

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## Preface

The muggy Washington summer of 1948 grew even hotter when news media reported that a "blonde spy queen" three years earlier had given federal investigators convincing evidence of widespread Soviet espionage in America during World War II. In a few days the world learned her name—Elizabeth Bentley—and heard her and another ex-Communist agent, Whittaker Chambers, repeat their charges before Congress. Republican congressmen and candidates cited the stories as further evidence of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations' softness toward Communism and neglect of national security. Outraged officials both in and out of government, as well as Democrats fearing a campaign issue that would sink President Truman's apparently foundering re-election chances, insisted that Bentley and Chambers were peddling hearsay and innuendo.

Almost lost in the furor was one isolated recollection of Bentley's that ultimately would provide a clue to the truth behind the charges and denials. Bentley, according to press reports, had told a federal grand jury that an aide to President Roosevelt had learned during the war that American intelligence was on the verge of breaking "the Russian secret code." The aide, said Bentley, had passed this nugget to his Soviet contact. **(1)** For almost 30 years this fragmentary anecdote remained virtually all that the public would hear about one of the Cold War's greatest intelligence coups.

Bentley's charges, and the debates they fueled, typified the American experience with intelligence and related "internal security" issues in the era of totalitarianism and total war. For roughly 60 years the Western democracies struggled to preserve civil liberties and due process while ascertaining the extent of clandestine penetrations by the intelligence services of fascist and Communist regimes. At midcentury the Soviet Union's main strength was "human" intelligence—the collection of information through agents with access to foreign secrets. Washington's forte was "signals" intelligence—the procurement and analysis of coded foreign messages. At the beginning of the Cold War strength met strength in a struggle that still reverberates 50 years later. The tale of this struggle is the Venona story.

The term "Venona" served as an arbitrary codeword stamped on a relatively small number of documents in order to limit access to a particular cryptanalytic breakthrough. This achievement enabled Western counterintelligence specialists to read portions of more than 2,900 Soviet diplomatic telegrams sent between 1940 and 1948. The encipherment of these telegrams shared a common flaw that left them vulnerable to cryptanalysis. It was that flawærather than any commonality of dates, origins, or subject matteræthat made the messages a unique and discrete body of documents. American and allied services spent almost four decades deciphering the original texts and then puzzling over their meanings. By the time this effort was formally closed in 1980, the codeword "Venona" meant, to a handful of witting US Intelligence Community officers, the entire program of crypt-analytic and exploitation activities based on the messages.

## Espionage in America

The United States made a tempting espionage target for allies and adversaries alike in the 1940s. Berlin, Tokyo, and Moscow all wanted to discover Washington's strategic plans and the progress being made in American factories and laboratories. Axis spies fared poorly in North America, however, in part because allied civilian and military counterintelligence services rolled up Axis nets and agents early in the war. Soviet intelligence fared much better. Indeed, the tensions and crises in East-West relations in the 1940s and 1950s unfolded along patterns determined in no small part by the success of Soviet intelligence officers, and, belatedly, by the growing ability of Western services to counter Moscow's espionage campaign.

Several advantages helped Soviet intelligence succeed where the Axis services failed. First, Soviet intelligence services, in many respects, were stronger than their Axis counterparts, with better leadership and more resources. Second, operating conditions in America were easier for several reasons, the foremost being the fact that the Soviet Union was an ally and therefore was able to post large numbers of officials on American soil in various liaison capacities. Beyond this, many Americans regarded their Russian allies as comrades-in-arms who should be helped with material as well as rhetorical support. There were some instances of American citizens volunteering actual secrets to Soviets during the war, and Soviet officials in the United States sometimes enjoyed considerable hospitality and access. Finally, Soviet intelligence benefited directly and indirectly from the activities and infrastructure of the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA).

Moscow collected secrets in the United States through overlapping organizations. The Communist International (better known as the Comintern) monitored the CPUSA and supervised the Party's clandestine apparatus. The CPUSA had reached the peak of its strength and limited influence in American life in the late 1930s, when the Great Depression and Stalin's opposition to Hitler and Mussolini convinced thousands of native-born Americans that capitalism was doomed and that the socialist experiment in Russia represented the world's only reliable bulwark against fascism. (2) Party leaders and some trusted members gathered political and industrial information, most of which probably made its way to Soviet intelligence services. (3) Although the CPUSA lost perhaps a third of its members after the Hitler-Stalin pact of August 1939 temporarily made the USSR a junior partner in Nazi aggression, a committed core remained in the ranks. (4) In addition, military intelligence (GRU) officers based in Soviet consular posts worked with the Comintern and with Party-controlled agents in US Government agencies and private industry. (5)

Another Soviet organization, the NKVD (later to become the KGB)— Moscow's secret police and quasi-civilian intelligence service—had its own foreign intelligence arm. The service had long busied itself with internal repression and with foreign counterintelligence that helped guide covert action against émigré Russian political factions. In other types of foreign operations it had been overshadowed by the GRU, at least in the United States. **(6)** This relationship would be reversed during the war. **(7)** 

The KGB and GRU ran parallel "legal" and "illegal" intelligence networks in the United States. One set of operations was run by intelligence officers working under legal (usually diplomatic) cover in the "residencies" located clandestinely in Soviet diplomatic missions, trade, and media organizations—for example, the Amtorg Trading Corporation, the Soviet Purchasing Commission, and the Tass news agency. **(8)** Other KGB and GRU networks, in contrast, had no apparent connections to Soviet establishments and were run by "illegals"—Soviet intelligence officers usually living under false identities. In addition, some GRU and KGB agents were themselves CPUSA officers whose clandestine activities were known, to a greater or lesser extent, to the CPUSA leadership and the Comintern. KGB officer Jacob Golos (covername SOUND), for instance, ran the Soviet-sponsored World Tourists corporation in New York and allegedly also served on the central control commission of the CPUSA. His lover, Elizabeth Bentley (covernames SMART GIRL and MYRNA), had moved from the open Party into underground work in the late 1930s. She helped Golos service various agents and run the World Tourists business.

Stalin wanted his intelligence officers in America to collect information in four main areas. He directed Pavel M. Fitin, the 34-year-old chief of the KGB's First Directorate, to seek American intelligence concerning Hitler's plans for the war in Russia; secret war aims of London and Washington, particularly with regard to planning for a second front in Europe; any indications that the Western allies might cut a separate peace with Hitler; and, finally, American scientific and technological progress, particularly in developing an atomic weapon. (9)

Soviet espionage operatives in the United States during World War II funneled information to Moscow through a handful of professional intelligence officers who sent reports to the Center and relayed orders and questions from the Center to agents in the field. Operations in America were led by experienced hands such as Vassili M. Zarubin (covername MAKSIM), who served as *rezident* in New York and later in Washington, and Iskhak A. Akhmerov (covernames MER and ALBERT), the senior illegal. Some Soviet case officers, however, were raw recruits recently brought into the services in order to fill out ranks depleted during Stalin's purges of the late 1930s.**(10)** For many of these officers, America was their first overseas post. Elizabeth Bentley described her initial meeting with "John" (Anatoli A. Yatskov, Venona covername ALEKSEI), who turned out to be

a thin, pale, blond, young man of about my height, who was dressed in badly fitting clothes of obviously European make... . He had that half-starved look so characteristic of new Soviet arrivals, his English was so meager I had difficulty in understanding him, and he displayed an astounding ignorance of American life.

"John," despite his unpromising debut, would play a key role in Soviet espionage against the atomic bomb.(11)

During the latter part of the war, the KGB gradually took over assets and networks originally established by the GRU and the Comintern (particularly after Stalin dissolved the latter body in May 1943).(12) A general re-division of labor among the Soviet services appears to have given political tasks to the KGB, while focusing the GRU more on military collection; both collected scientific and technical data. In addition, agents hitherto run in cooperation with the CPUSA were turned over to direct Soviet control. This streamlining effort faced daunting operational security challenges; Bentley and others who had worked with the Soviets had learned far more than they needed to about other agents and operations—and resented the change in direction.

## A Slow Response

The US Government had grown concerned about reputed fascist and Communist subversion in the late 1930s. The war in Europe—and the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact of 1939—gave J. Edgar Hoover's Federal Bureau of Investigation an opportunity to move against individuals and organizations suspected of working with the Russians. Tipped by a State Department probe that had uncovered American and foreign Communists traveling on fraudulent American passports, FBI Special Agents in 1939 raided the facilities of several organizations linked to the CPUSA and found sufficient evidence to arrest General Secretary Earl Browder on charges of passport fraud. (13) In 1940, leads developed by British and Canadian investigators in the Woolwich Arsenal spy case pointed the Bureau toward the senior KGB officer in America, New York *rezident* Gaik Ovakimian (covername GENNADI), whom the FBI arrested in May 1941 for violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act.(14) Information on Soviet intelligence contacts and methods obtained by the Bureau in these early investigations would prove valuable during and after the war.

American authorities, nonetheless, did not act as decisively as they might have at the time. At least three defectors from Soviet intelligence were in the United States (Alexander Orlov, Walter Krivitsky, and Whittaker Chambers) and have given the Bureau relatively current information, had they been questioned in depth—and well protected—by federal officials.(15) In addition, the German invasion of the USSR in June 1941 virtually reversed American attitudes toward the Soviets. The State Department quickly reached an understanding with Moscow that allowed Ovakimian to leave the country. Similarly, President Roosevelt commuted Browder's sentence in May 1942 in the interest of inter-allied relations. The FBI remained watchful, but the raids and prosecutions ceased.

Any foreign intelligence service needs secure communications channels between its headquarters and its officers abroad. Although Soviet intelligence services had clandestine radio transmitters in diplomatic missions located in several American cities, these apparently were to be used only in emergencies.**(16)** In consequence, KGB and GRU stations cabled their important messages over commercial telegraph lines and sent bulky reports and documents—including most of the information acquired by agents—in diplomatic pouches. As a new European war loomed in 1939, the US Army had begun collecting enciphered Soviet telegrams, and soon thousands of cables were piling up in the offices of the Army's Signals Security Agency (SSA). A June 1942 agreement with the Navy and FBI gave the Army exclusive responsibility for analysis of foreign diplomatic and military ciphers, and the Army consequently had general responsibility for studying diplomatic traffic.

SSA analysts, based at Arlington Hall in Northern Virginia, soon began to explore whether the collected Soviet diplomatic messages might be readable. The Army and Navy had sporadically studied Soviet codes and ciphers over the preceding decade, but with little success.(17) Decrypted 1942 cables between the Japanese Army's general staff and its military attaches in Berlin and Helsinki showed that Finland's excellent cryptanalysts had made progress on some Soviet military ciphers, had determined the characteristics for sorting the still unsolvable diplomatic messages, and were sharing results with the Japanese.(18) This information was probably the immediate inspiration for SSA's examination of the Soviet telegrams. On 1 February 1943, SSA created a small program to examine the encrypted Soviet telegrams on orders from Col. Carter Clarke, Chief of the Special Branch of the Army's Military Intelligence Service (MID). Clarke seemed particularly concerned that Moscow and Berlin might negotiate a separate peace, and wanted to be able to warn his superiors of such a development.

Gene Grabeel, a Virginia schoolteacher who had recently arrived at Arlington Hall as part of its large civilian contingent, began the effort to read the Soviet diplomatic messages (and would continue working on the project for the next 36 years). She and others assigned to the project in 1943 spent months sorting stored and incoming telegrams by communications circuits. They gradually expanded their knowledge of the characteristics that separated the messages into the groups that the Finnish cryptanalysts had investigated. Five separate cryptographic systems became apparent. More than half the telegrams belonged to a system that analysts dubbed "Trade" because it carried the messages of the Amtorg Trading Corporation and the Soviet Purchasing Commission—most of which concerned the transfer of Lend Lease materiel to the USSR. The other four systems were used by the KGB, GRU, Naval GRU, and Foreign Ministry, but these users would not be fully identified until the mid-1940s.

Moscow had already learned from well-placed agents that both enemies and allies were trying to read its diplomatic cables. Finnish troops found scorched codebooks and cryptographic materials in the USSR's Petsamo consulate in June 1941, and before the end of that year a Soviet agent in Berlin reported that the Germans were trying to exploit a Russian codebook acquired from their Finnish allies.(19) These developments in themselves were not alarming to Moscow, because the security of messages enciphered by one-time pads lies in the cipher and not in the codes per se (see inset). In any event, the compromised KGB codebook was not replaced until late 1943.(20) Another important piece of information came from British intelligence officer and Soviet agent H.A.R. "Kim" Philby in 1944, when he told the KGB that British cryptanalysts had turned their attention to Soviet ciphers.(21)

Philby probably reported nothing at that time about American efforts against the Soviet messages. (US analysts did not begin to collaborate with their British counterparts on Soviet communications in general until about August 1945.) Nevertheless, senior KGB officials may have become worried when White House aide Lauchlin Currie apparently told Soviet contacts (possibly in spring 1944) that the Americans were about to break a Soviet code. Currie had access to signals intelligence at the White House and could have heard overoptimistic rumors that Arlington Hall would soon be reading Soviet messages. Currie's tip probably was too vague to have alarmed Soviet cryptographers, but it might have worried higher-ups in Moscow. Indeed, the only change observed in the characteristics of the Soviet messages around that time appeared to be a cosmetic correction implemented to please higher authority. On 1 May 1944, KGB code clerks began using a new message starting-point indicator for telegrams—a change that ironically would make work easier for Arlington Hall crypt-analysts.(22)

## What Made Venona Possible?

The messages broken by the Venona program were both coded and enciphered. When a code is enciphered with a onetime pad, the cryptographer who designed the system expects the encipherment to provide absolute security—even if an adversary somehow obtains an underlying codebook or debriefs a defecting code clerk (such as Igor Gouzenko). A flaw in the encipherment, however, can leave such messages vulnerable to analysis even in the absence of a codebook. Such was the case for the Soviet diplomatic systems from which the Venona translations came. Arlington Hall's Venona breakthrough in 1943-46 was a purely analytic accomplishment, achieved without the benefit of either Soviet codebooks or plain-text copies of original messages. The 1944-46 messages—which yielded the early translations and the bulk of all translations were recovered over a period of years by Arlington Hall cryptanalysts and decoded from a "codebook" that crypto- linguist Meredith Gardner reconstructed by using classic codebreaking techniques.

A Soviet code clerk preparing a message first reduced its text into numeric code groups drawn from a codebook (a kind of dictionary in which the words and common phrases correspond to four-digit numbers). After encoding the plain text with

numeric code groups, the clerk would obscure the code groups by adding them, digit by digit, to a string of random digits. This second series of digits, called "additive" or "key," was known to both the sender and receiver because it was printed on the pages of a "one-time pad." One-time pads were periodically pouched to Soviet consular missions in sealed packets. The pad pages—with 60 five-digit additive groups per page—were used in order, always starting with the group in the upper lefthand corner (the pad-page number to be used was more or less concealed somewhere on the face of the message). Code clerks in different Soviet missions used up these packets at varying rates, depending on the volume of messages to be enciphered or deciphered.

The security of such an encipherment-decipherment system depends on both the randomness (that is, unpredictability) of the "key" on the one-time pad pages and the uniqueness of the one-time pad sets held by the sender and the receiver. Different Soviet organizations used their own codes, changing them every few years (probably more to improve vocabulary and convenience than to enhance security).

The flaw in the Soviet messages resulted from the manufacturers' duplication of one-time pad pages, rather than from a malfunctioning random-number generator or extensive re-use of pages by code clerks. For a few months in early 1942, a time of great strain on the Soviet regime, the KGB's cryptographic center in the Soviet Union for some unknown reason printed duplicate copies of the "key" on more than 35,000 pages of additive and then assembled and bound these in one-time pads. Arlington Hall's Lt. Richard Hallock analyzed Soviet "Trade" messages in autumn 1943, producing evidence of extensive use of duplicate key pages (often with different page numbers) assembled in separate one-time pad books. Thus, two sets of the ostensibly unique one-time pad-page sets were manufactured. Despite the opinion that a single duplication was insufficient for solution, Hallock and his colleagues continued to attack the Trade messages and made considerable progress in understanding the cryptographic basis of the diplomatic systems. From Hallock's original discovery, additional analysis yielded techniques for finding duplicate pages separated in time and among different users. The duplicate pages began showing up in messages in mid-1942 and were still occurring in one circuit as late as June 1948. Nevertheless, most of the duplicate pages were used between 1942 and 1944—years of rapid expansion of Soviet diplomatic communications.

We do not know how and when the Soviets discovered the flaw, but we believe Moscow learned of it through agents William W. Weisband and Kim Philby. By the time the Soviets saw the consequences of the manufacturing flaw in the late 1940s, however, most of the duplicate one-time pad pages had already been used. The set of potentially exploitable messages thus was bound by the production of the duplicate pages and the West's ability to spot duplicate uses. Finding duplicates, however, only made the messages potentially readable; indeed, some messages and passages remained unexploitable even after 37 years of effort.

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In November 1944 Arlington Hall analysts solved this new starting-point indicator problem and soon expanded their effort against the "Trade" messages to encompass a second, still unidentified Soviet system. This was the breakthrough that eventually made the cables readable. The method revealed hundreds of instances in which individual pages of additive digits from KGB one-time pads were duplicated by key used for Trade messages. Over a period of years, cryptanalysts were able to determine the one-time pad additive values for significant parts of hundreds of enciphered telegrams, leaving the coded texts vulnerable to crypto-linguist codebuilders trying to recover the meanings of the four-digit words and phrases. **(23)** 

American authorities inferred during World War II that the Soviets were engaged in espionage, but as yet there was little coordination among the various counterintelligence organizations. A June 1939 Presidential directive gave the FBI responsibility for domestic counterintelligence with the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the War Department's Military Intelligence Division (better known as the G-2).(24) The three organizations comprised a body known as the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and stood together to protect their monopoly on domestic counterintelligence work from other agencies, particularly the new Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and its activist chief, Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan. OSS eventually developed a capable counterintelligence apparatus of its own in Europe—the X-2 Branch—but it had no authority to operate on American soil.

In keeping with the limited extent of interagency cooperation, American counterintelligence organizations made uneven progress in integrating signals intelligence leads during the war. OSS and the FBI separately launched their own cryptologic intelligence operations, but these were short-lived. (25) (Neither OSS nor the FBI, incidentally, was shown the Army's "MAGIC" intercepts of wartime foreign diplomatic messages.) The X-2 Branch of OSS had been created to provide British intelligence services with a point of contact in OSS for sharing certain sensitive "ULTRA" reports derived from decrypted German military and intelligence communications.(26) Unfortunately for OSS, however, X-2 monitored the agents of Axis— not allie—services. It had little influence over security clearances for OSS personnel (some of whom indeed spied for the Soviets).(27)

Coordination was little better between the military's cryptologic services, which in any event had left domestic security

largely to the FBI. The Army and Navy signals intelligence organizations barely cooperated with one another, jealously guarding their reports and their access to President Roosevelt. Outside of the Oval Office there was no collation and analysis of the totality of the intelligence information—let alone the counter- intelligence leads—collected by the US Government.

Hoover's FBI monitored the CPUSA during the war but did not always share its leads with other agencies. In April 1943, FBI agents began to collect solid information on current KGB activities and personnel. New York consular officer Vassili M. Zarubin (a KGB general operating under the alias Zubilin) called on senior CPUSA officer Steve Nelson in Berkeley, California. Unbeknownst to both, the FBI had been watching Nelson for weeks. Zarubin's conversation made it obvious to Bureau eavesdroppers that he was an important KGB officer (although they could not yet know that he was Gaik Ovakimian's replacement as senior KGB *rezident* in America). **(28)** The FBI watched Zarubin from that day until he left the United States in 1944 (although he occasionally gave his trailers the slip), and Bureau agents catalogued hundreds of contacts and leads developed by this operation. **(29)** 

More leads dropped into the Bureau's mailbox in August 1943, in the form of an anonymous letter drafted on a Russian typewriter and mailed in Washington, DC. This extraordinary note—the author's identity still is uncertain—denounced Zarubin and 10 other KGB officers in North America, along with two of their assets. **(30)** Special Agents quickly concluded that the letter was genuine and largely accurate, although they gave little credence to its claim that the Soviets were passing secrets to Japan. The FBI subsequently increased surveillance of persons named in the letter and even doubled two agents recruited by one of them, KGB officer Andrei Shevchenko.**(31)** Nevertheless, the FBI did apparently not pass copies of the anonymous letter to other agencies until after World War II, nor did Special Agents try to recruit Soviet officers named by its author.

## The Atomic Era

US Government agencies ran a wartime security system that was porous for Soviet agents and yet opaque for American counterintelligence agencies charged with protecting secrets. FBI Director Hoover allegedly knew nothing of the supersecret Manhattan Project before Steve Nelson inadvertently informed him in the spring of 1943. High-level political and strategic motivations in Washington also hampered US efforts against Soviet espionage. President Roosevelt wanted to strengthen a distrustful Stalin in his fight against Hitler, and his lieutenants had no desire to antagonize Moscow by suppressing the CPUSA or publicly probing rumors that members of the Party had infiltrated government agencies.(32) Hoover, for his part, kept a close eye on the CPUSA but did not, at least before 1945, try to convince the White House that Soviet officials in the United States were actively engaged in espionage. Donovan's OSS also encountered the administration's reluctance to antagonize Moscow when OSS officers bought unidentified Soviet cryptographic documents from emigre Finnish cryptanalysts in late 1944. Secretary of State Edward P. Stettinius insisted that the papers be given back to the Russians, and Donovan promptly obeyed a White House order to return them to the Soviet Embassy.(33)

The intrigues surrounding the development of the atomic bomb both symbolized and helped widen the growing breach between the Soviet Union and its Western allies in 1945. Washington and London jointly built the bomb but said nothing about their work to Moscow. Stalin's clandestine sources, however, obtained detailed political, military, and diplomatic reports on his allies' strategic planning and war aims. **(34)** He knew of the bomb project long before the new President Truman finally divulged it to him in July 1945. The KGB effort against the Manhattan Project (codenamed ENORMOUS) represented a shift in collection emphasis. Moscow hitherto had regarded the United States primarily as a source of information useful in the war against Germany; now America became in Russian eyes a rival and even a threat to the Soviet Union itself. Soviet agents penetrated the Manhattan Project at several points. At the Los Alamos facility alone, at least four agents reported through couriers such as Lona Cohen to the Soviet consulate in New York, where a KGB sub-residency under a young engineer named Leonid R. Kvasnikov (covername ANTON) coordinated operations and dispatched intelligence to Moscow.**(35)** 

US perceptions of the Soviets began shifting after the war had been won. Two defections in autumn 1945 galvanized US counterintelligence. Igor Gouzenko, a GRU code clerk in the USSR's Ottawa Embassy, revealed to Canadian authorities that the Soviets had indeed penetrated the Manhattan Project and other agencies. **(36)** A few weeks later, Elizabeth Bentley gave the FBI details about spies in the State and Treasury Department, OSS, the Pentagon, and even the White House. Both Bentley's and Gouzenko's accounts dovetailed with the story that *Time* magazine editor and former GRU agent Whittaker Chambers had told FBI agents in 1942 and again, in detail, in May 1945. **(37)** By mid-November, the White House knew the outlines of the defectors' stories and had heard of their accusations against dozens of US Government employees, including high officials such as White House aide Lauchlin Currie, OSS executive assistant Duncan Lee, and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Harry Dexter White. **(38)** 

A Canadian Government White Paper on the Gouzenko affair in July 1946 confirmed the gist of press speculation about Soviet wartime espionage and gave the Western public its first official account of the extent of the problem. This confirmation of the essential truth behind the rumors diminished public tolerance for Communism at home and abroad. Truman became convinced of the need for a government-wide tightening of security, but he had no intention of condoning witch-hunts for allegedly disloyal Democratic officials or blanket accusations against federal workers and Roosevelt's New Deal. Little could be done, for the time being, against the individuals named by Gouzenko or Bentley—apart from corroborating their reports and limiting the suspects' access to sensitive information—until Western governments could gather evidence that would stand up in court.

Domestic politics, however, prompted the White House to act. Republicans campaigning in the 1946 Congressional elections accused Democrats of ignoring Communist infiltration and disloyalty; the charge helped the GOP regain control of Congress for the first time since 1931. Truman's response was motivated in part by his own political considerations. Hoping to deter free-ranging Congressional probes and harsh Republican-drafted loyalty legislation, he signed Executive Order 9835, which institutionalized the wartime loyalty regime. The executive order mandated loyalty boards in all federal agencies and defined employee disloyalty to include membership in groups judged subversive by the Attorney General.(39)

During this period, Bentley gave the FBI details that opened a hitherto unnoticed window on the networks run by "illegals"—Soviet citizens abroad under false identities who worked for the KGB or GRU in apparent isolation from official Soviet consular missions. Special Agents fanned out across the country to investigate Bentley's leads and to monitor persons whom she had named, and for about a year the FBI entertained hopes of "doubling" her against the KGB.(40)

The "Gregory" case—as the investigations prompted by Bentley were known inside the government—produced many leads but led to no espionage prosecutions. FBI agents could not use evidence gathered by wiretaps in court, and they were unable to catch suspected spies in the act of compromising official secrets.(41) Meanwhile, Soviet agents and intelligence officers almost certainly surmised the existence of a serious leak. They took precautions even before a federal grand jury, meeting in 1947, probed Bentley's allegations and called as witnesses dozens of individuals named in her testimony.

At roughly the same time, the renamed Army Security Agency (ASA—formerly the Signals Security Agency) developed evidence that would soon corroborate Bentley's testimony and the 1943 anonymous letter. After the war, the "Russian Section" at Arlington Hall expanded. Work on diplomatic messages benefited from additional technical personnel and new analysts—among them Samuel Chew, who had focused on Japan, and linguist Meredith Gardner, who had worked on both German and Japanese messages. Chew had considerable success at defining the underlying structure of the coded Russian texts. Gardner and his colleagues began analytically reconstructing the KGB codebooks. Late in 1946, Gardner broke the codebook's "spell table" for encoding English letters. With the solution of this spell table, ASA could read significant portions of messages that included English names and phrases. Gardner soon found himself reading a 1944 message listing prominent atomic scientists, including several with the Manhattan Project.(42)

Gardner henceforth made rapid progress, reading dozens of messages sent between Moscow and New York in 1944 and 1945. By May 1947 he had read one that implied the Soviets ran an asset with access to sensitive information from the War Department General Staff. (43) It became apparent to Gardner that he was reading KGB messages showing massive Soviet espionage in the United States.

Another problem soon arose—that of determining how and to whom to disseminate the extraordinary information Gardner was developing. ASA's reporting procedures did not seem appropriate because the decrypted messages could not even be paraphrased for Arlington Hall's regular intelligence customers without divulging their source. At this point, ASA knew nothing about the federal grand jury impaneled in Manhattan to probe the espionage and disloyalty charges leveled by Bentley and other defectors from Soviet intelligence, so no one in the US Government was aware that evidence against the Soviets was suddenly developing on two adjacent tracks. Gardner took matters into his own hands in the summer of 1947, drafting "Special Report #1," which went to a handful of senior ASA officials. One item in it about an unidentified Soviet asset would later prove fateful:

LIB?? (Lieb?) or possibly LIBERAL: was ANTENKO [later understood as ANTENNA] until 29 Sept. 1944. Occurs 6 times, 22 October—20 December 1944. Message of 27 November speaks of his wife ETHEL, 29 years old married (?) 5 years, "...... husband's work and the role of METR(O) and NIL." [Spelling and punctuation in original] **(44)** 

## **Cooperation Expands**

Deputy G-2 Carter Clarke read Special Report #1 and in late August or early September 1948 asked FBI liaison officer S. Wesley Reynolds for a list of KGB and GRU covernames. Clarke's hint that ASA had broken a KGB code piqued the interest of the Bureau, which at that time was questioning former Soviet agents living in the United States concerning the allegations of Bentley and others and information gathered from surveillance of Soviet officials during the war. The Bureau quickly sent ASA a list of some 200 names, and, although few of them appeared in the translated messages, the long cooperation later known as the Venona program had begun. **(45)** This cooperative spirit between cryptanalysts and investigators endures to the present day.

Full inter-agency cooperation, however, was still several years away. President Truman, unhappy about the mass of

unanalyzed reports that the departments daily sent to the White House, had insisted in 1945 on greater coordination of intelligence information. His new Central Intelligence Group was intended to solve this problem, but it started out slowly. American intelligence agencies on the whole did not do a good job of presenting counterintelligence analyses to the President and his aides. FBI Director Hoover, for instance, frequently sent to the Truman White House allegations of Communist plotting and Soviet espionage. It is not clear how much of this information actually reached the President, however, or how seriously it was regarded by White House aides.

Despite the Truman administration's sustained but piecemeal restructuring of the Intelligence Community, the division of labor in counter- intelligence functions remained much as it had been set early in World War II. The new National Security Council preserved the FBI's and armed services' monopoly of domestic counterintelligence in NSC-17/4 and 17/6 in 1949. **(46)** The agencies outside this monopoly were expected to provide information but were not invited to join operations involving domestic security. The new Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the closest institutional successor to OSS and CIG and, consequently, the inheritor of OSS's dismal security reputation, saw little of the information Gardner and his colleagues were developing. CIA counterintelligence officers, however, now had wider access to signals intelligence than had their predecessors in X-2, and they briefly joined the Army and Navy in a Joint Counterintelligence Information Center (JCIC) to exploit current signals intelligence leads, using X-2's wartime employment of ULTRA as its model. **(47)** The JCIC received Special Report #1 at roughly the same time Colonel Clarke notified the FBI, but the Bureau never joined the JCIC or sought its assistance with the Soviet translations. When the JCIC inquired about additional Special Reports in early 1949, Clarke apparently instructed his subordinates not to provide anything. The early American effort to use the information from the Soviet messages thus remained understaffed and highly compartmented, and exploitation opportunities were almost certainly lost in consequence. For several years the major investigative burden remained with the FBI, which assigned the most important inter-agency liaison work to a single Special Agent, Robert Lamphere.

"I stood in the vestibule of the enemy's house, having entered by stealth," Lamphere recalled in his memoir of the investigations. **(48)** Lamphere began sharing liaison duty with Wesley Reynolds in the spring of 1948. That October he had a private meeting with Meredith Gardner and began full-time liaison on the project. It was Lamphere's tenacity that taught the FBI how to use the translations against Soviet espionage. Through him the Bureau received a steady flow of translations and re-translations, as well as Gardner's insights about the "tradecraft" of Soviet spying. Gardner and his colleagues, in return, received collateral evidence, identifications, and additional leads. **(49)** The process was essentially a slow comparison of evidence for and against various competing hypotheses, with the knowledge gained in many cases being greater than the sum of its parts.

By the time Lamphere began using the translated messages, the public controversy over "loyalty" and "red-baiting" had risen dramatically amid growing concern over US-Soviet tensions. New allegations that prominent American citizens had spied for the Soviets burst upon the public in July 1948, when Bentley spoke before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Her testimony recounted, among other things, Lauchlin Currie's alleged distress over US efforts to read wartime Soviet telegrams (this seems to have been the first public clue to the existence of ASA's effort). A few days later Whittaker Chambers charged that Roosevelt administration figures Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White were secret Communists. Heated denials by the accused and their supporters added to the drama and controversy as elections loomed that autumn. Republican Congressmen and activists hailed the testimony as the long-suppressed proof of Democratic inattention toward Communist subversion. Truman bitterly resented such charges and insisted that the Hiss affair in particular was a GOP "red herring."(50)

Truman's repeated denunciations of the charges against Hiss, White, and others—all of whom appear under covernames in decrypted messages translated before he left office in January 1953—suggest that Truman either was never briefed on the Venona program or did not grasp its significance. Although it seems odd that Truman might not have been told, no definitive evidence has emerged to show he was. In any event, Truman always insisted that Republicans had trumped up the loyalty issue and that wartime espionage had been insignificant and well contained by American authorities.**(51)** 

In December 1948 the FBI identified a Soviet agent covernamed SIMA as Judith Coplon, a young Justice Department analyst recruited by the Soviets in 1944. **(52)** Coplon would become the first person arrested on the basis of a Venona lead. FBI agents detained her in March 1949 along with a KGB official under UN cover; her purse contained ostensibly sensitive documents (which the Bureau had routed through her office as bait). Director Hoover or (less likely) someone higher in the Truman administration forbade FBI officials testifying at her trial from introducing the translated messages as evidence. This protection of the cryptanalytic breakthrough forced prosecutors and government witnesses into elaborate cirumlocutions; Special Agent Lamphere, for example, testified that suspicion had fallen on Coplon because of information from a reliable "confidential informant" that was not a wiretap. **(53)** Although both of Coplon's convictions would be overturned on appeal, subsequent prosecutions developed in the same manner, with the too-sensitive codebreaking secrets obscured behind mounds of corroborating evidence.

The Coplon case set the pattern for an intense series of investigations and prosecutions that followed over the next two years. Meredith Gardner and his colleagues (working from May 1949 under the auspices of AFSA, the new Armed Forces Security Agency) supplied covernames and translations to the FBI; Lamphere and other Special Agents tracked down the leads:

• February 1949. ASA observed that messages containing "Material G" were quoting British Foreign Office telegrams sent

to the British Embassy in Washington during the war. Not until March 1951, however, did American and British cryptanalysts conclude that "G," "GOMMER," and "GOMER" (the Russian transliteration of HOMER) had to be the same agent who had provided the cables to the KGB. By the beginning of May 1951, the list of possible suspects had narrowed to one name: Donald Maclean of the Foreign Office. Maclean, with compatriot Guy Burgess, soon fled to the Soviet Union.

- September 1949. The FBI determined that covernames REST and CHARLES, both denoting a scientist in the wartime Manhattan Project, referred to physicist Klaus Fuchs, author of a paper quoted in one message. British authorities interrogated Fuchs in late 1949. His information in turn led the FBI to courier Harry Gold, arrested in Philadelphia on 22 May.(54)
- *February 1950.* Lamphere suspected that a Soviet agent covernamed CALIBRE had to be an enlisted man posted at the Manhattan Project facility at Los Alamos during the war. Subsequent AFSA analysis, and additional information from Harry Gold, led to David Greenglass, who confessed to the FBI on 15 June 1950 and also implicated his brother-in-law, Julius Rosenberg.
- Spring 1950. Covername NICK had emerged in 1949 as one Amadeo Sabatini, who had fought in Spain together with KGB asset Morris Cohen. Sabatini apparently kept quiet about Cohen but did point the FBI toward a Jones Orin York (almost simultaneously identified as Venona covername NEEDLE). When questioned in April 1950, York alleged that a former case officer of his was an AFSA employee named William Weisband. AFSA suspended Weisband in May.
- Late June 1950. The FBI discovered that information in the messages about an agent who collected technological and scientific secrets, codenamed LIBERAL and ANTENNA, matched the known facts about New York engineer Julius Rosenberg. Two messages also implicated his wife, Ethel. Rosenberg had been questioned on the basis of David Greenglass' information on 16 June and tailed ever since, but he was not arrested until a month later.(55)
- Sometime in 1949-50. Gardner translated a 1944 message that described the recruitment of Harvard physics student Theodore Alvin Hall. Soon afterward, the Bureau determined that the covername YOUNGSTER [MLAD], found in other messages, matched Hall. Special Agents questioned Hall in 1951, but he was never prosecuted (probably because a case could not have been made without revealing AFSA's program).

Translated messages also corroborated various charges made by Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers. By June 1950 the Bureau determined that the covername ALES, mentioned in one KGB message, referred to former State Department aide Alger Hiss, then serving a sentence for perjury. **(56)** Around the same time, Lamphere told Gardner that the covername JURIST meant Harry Dexter White, a former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, who had died suddenly a few days after denying Whittaker Chambers' August 1948 charge before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. **(57)** The translations also clarified another sensational spy case a few years later when the FBI identified the covername MARQUIS as Joseph Milton Bernstein, a GRU agent linked to the Institute of Pacific Relations and *Amerasia* magazine. **(58)** 

## **Double Dilemma**

The KGB had not been surprised by the wave of charges, arrests, and prosecutions. Intelligence officials in Moscow nonetheless faced much the same dilemma that confronted the FBI and AFSA. Both sides now had sources too important to risk. The Americans and their allies had to be careful in investigating certain suspects. The Soviets had to be equally wary in protecting their agents.

The Soviets apparently had monitored Arlington Hall's "Russian Section" since at least 1945, when William Weisband joined the unit (see inset). Weisband's earliest reports on the work on Soviet diplomatic systems were probably sketchy and might not have provided clear warning to Moscow about the exploitability of the KGB messages. By 1947, Weisband could have reported that KGB messages were being read, although by then virtually all of the exploitable messages had been transmitted and were in Arlington Hall's possession. Where Weisband had sketched the outlines of the cryptanalytic success, British liaison officer Kim Philby received actual translations and analyses on a regular basis after he arrived for duty in Washington in autumn 1949. (59)

Timely warnings from Philby helped the KGB protect some of its agents and operations. Various accounts indicate that in

October 1949 Moscow began advising American agents who had dealt with Klaus Fuchs that they might have to flee the country through Mexico. **(60)** Some operatives, such as Morris and Lona Cohen and their case officer "Mark," avoided the net that was closing around other KGB agents. (The Cohens, as "Helen and Peter Kroger," would be convicted of espionage in the United Kingdom in 1961.)

## Who Was William Weisband?

In 1950 one Jones Orin York (covername NEEDLE) told the FBI that he had passed secrets to the KGB since the mid-1930s. A worker in the aircraft industry on the west coast, York said that his KGB handler during 1941-42 had been one Bill Weisband, who had helped him buy a camera for photographing documents.(a)

York's allegation was disturbing news, implying that the KGB had a mole in the sensitive Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA). Born in Egypt in 1908 of Russian parents, Weisband emigrated to America in the 1920s and became a US citizen in 1938. He joined the US Army Signals Security Agency in 1942 and performed signals intelligence and communications security duties in North Africa and Italy, where he made some important friends before returning to Arlington Hall and joining its "Russian Section." Although not a cryptanalyst, as a "linguist adviser" (he spoke fluent Russian) the gregarious and popular Weisband had access to all areas of Arlington Hall's Soviet work. Meredith Gardner recalled that Weisband had watched him extract the list of Western atomic scientists from the December 1944 KGB message mentioned earlier.

Weisband always denied involvement in espionage, and the US Government never prosecuted him for it. While suspended from AFSA on suspicion of disloyalty, he skipped a federal grand jury hearing on Communist Party activity. As a result, in November 1950 Weisband was convicted of contempt and sentenced to a year in prison. He died suddenly of natural causes in 1967.

The Venona messages do not hold a definite reference to William Weisband. Nevertheless, three messages mention a "ZVENO" (the Russian word for "link"). The earliest and clearest reference suggests procedures for the KGB's London residency to use in contacting ZVENO, who was awaiting a transfer to England. ZVENO, according to one message, had spent the last four weeks in an Italian- language course in Virginia and would leave for Britain by mid-July.(b) NSA records show that Weisband spent that June honing his skills in a language (probably Italian) at Arlington Hall, shipped out on 17 July, and arrived in London by 29 July.

(a) Information that York provided in a later FBI interview can be seen in the Washington Field Office's memorandum "William Wolf Weisband," 27 November 1953, Document 34.

(b) New York 981 to Moscow, 26 June 1943; this was not fully translated until 1979.

The long spate of prosecutions and loyalty hearings coincided with, and helped heighten, the atmosphere of suspicion and accusations now known as McCarthyism. Republicans in Congress were echoing widespread sentiment when they criticized the Truman administration for its failure to prevent Communism from conquering Eastern Europe and China. "Softness" on Communism abroad was portrayed by Republicans as the corollary of laxness at home. Suspicions that the Roosevelt and Truman administrations had neglected internal security fed charges of a Democratic-led coverup of the wartime *Amerasia* affair, as well as Eisenhower administration Attorney General Herbert Brownell's 1953 accusation that then President Truman had ignored FBI warnings about Harry Dexter White in 1946. **(61)** Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy and allies exploited this confusion and rancor, blaming Communists in the State Department for "losing" China and accusing federal workers of disloyalty on flimsy pretexts.

The tacit decision to keep the translated messages secret carried a political and social price for the country. Debates over the extent of Soviet espionage in the United States were polarized in the dearth of reliable information then in the public domain. Anti-Communists suspected that some spies—perhaps including a few who were known to the US Government remained at large. Those who criticized the government's loyalty campaign as an overreaction, on the other hand, wondered if some defendants were being scapegoated; they seemed to sense that the public was not being told the whole truth about the investigations of such suspects as Julius Rosenberg and Judith Coplon. Given the dangerous international situation and what was known by the government at that time, however, continued secrecy was not illogical. With the Korean war raging and the prospect of war with the Soviet Union a real possibility, military and intelligence leaders almost certainly believed that any cryptologic edge that America gained over the Soviets was too valuable to concede—even if it was already known to Moscow.

Intensified political and legal pressure on the CPUSA coincided with shifts in Soviet intelligence tactics. Two pieces of legislation for a time gave the Justice Department broad powers against the Party. Between 1949 and 1957 the government, invoking the Alien Registration Act (better known as the Smith Act), won convictions of a dozen top CPUSA leaders for advocating the violent overthrow of the government. **(62)** The following year, Congress overrode Truman's veto and passed the Internal Security Act (often called the McCarran Act), which required Communist-affiliated organizations to register with the government and allowed emergency detention of potential spies and saboteurs.

These and other governmental actions sent the CPUSA partially underground in 1951. Party leaders took this step in an effort to protect essential cadres, but the move actually hastened the CPUSA's decline. In addition, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 critique of Stalinism prompted demoralizing internal debates in the CPUSA and precipitated the departure of still more members. (63) Soviet intelligence officers apparently received orders to steer clear of the closely monitored CPUSA, and they urged assets to avoid open contacts with Communist causes. By 1953 the FBI had concluded that the CPUSA was no longer a serious espionage threat, although the Bureau still regarded it as a potential recruiting ground for spies. (64) Nonetheless, intensive surveillance of Soviet diplomats and nationals did not stop KGB and GRU officers, even those working under official cover, from meeting with assets, and from continuing to operate with some effectiveness in the United States. (65)

## Venona in Later Years

Allied efforts to translate the wartime cables would continue for years to come (many translations would be first published in the 1960s and 1970s), but identifications of Soviet agents in America fell off in the 1950s. The CIA finally became an active partner in the Venona effort. **(66)** After senior manager Frank Rowlett transferred to the CIA in 1952, selected analysts in the Agency's Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Staffs used the translations as a reference point to check the memories of KGB and GRU officers who had defected after the death of Stalin. Defectors once again became the US Intelligence Community's primary source of relatively current information on Soviet intelligence. American analysts sifted the defectors' accounts and compared them with information supplied by Venona and various liaison services to catalogue Soviet intelligence officers worldwide.**(67)** Venona thus became a touchstone for American counterintelligence

Spy stories again dominated the headlines during 1957. In January the FBI wound up an operation it had run for almost a decade, hauling in Soviet asset Jack Soble and his associates on the basis of reports from double-agent Boris Morros— whom the Bureau had initially spotted in the company of Vassili Zarubin in April 1943.**(68)** A timely defection in Paris soon led the FBI to an even bigger catch. In the spring of 1957 the KGB recalled from New York an unreliable illegal, Lt. Col. Reino Hayhanen, who feared punishment at home and sought sanctuary in the American Embassy in Paris. Hayhanen gave the FBI enough information to locate the Brooklyn studio of his superior, an artist whom he knew only as "Mark." Special Agents spotted the elusive Mark when he returned to his studio one last time and found stolen documents and espionage gear in the artist's hotel room. Arrested in June 1957, Mark gave his name as "Col. Rudolf Abel," refusing to cooperate further. He was really William Henry Fisher, a senior KGB officer born in England who had entered the United States in 1948. Abel's arrest marked the first time the government had caught a Soviet "illegal" working in America. Indeed, Abel may well have been Iskhak A. Akhmerov's successor as illegal *rezident* in the United States.**(69)** 

The year 1957 ended with the FBI surveilling a pair of GRU illegals, Walter and Margarita Tairov, in New York. Although the Tairovs vanished and apparently fled the country in early 1958, the operation against GRU illegals was another first for American intelligence. The CIA had spotted one of the pair in Europe with help from its penetration of the GRU in East Germany, Lt. Col. Petr S. Popov. Timely liaison work enabled FBI Special Agents to amass scores of leads from surveillance of the duo.(70) Unfortunately, the couple almost certainly spotted the surveillance, and their flight and subsequent report were among the factors that soon led to Popov's arrest.

Venona had contributed to just one of these cases. Only a handful of American intelligence officials knew the truth behind the big spy cases of 1957: that US counterintelligence efforts against the Soviets, at least in the United States, had relied on volunteers since the Venona program peaked. This was not for want of trying. NSA had pored over the Soviet traffic and had kept its shrinking Venona team looking for additional leads. The FBI had penetrated the CPUSA and searched for illegals—but still did not catch Rudolf Abel for almost a decade. CIA divisions created clever but only marginally effective programs designed to establish coverage of Soviet installations abroad, to induce Soviet intelligence officers to defect (the REDCAP program), and to monitor the mail of Soviet illegals in America (HTLINGUAL). Despite all these efforts, the Intelligence Community's most important counterintelligence leads in the late 1950s came from volunteers—both walk-ins like Hayhanen and KGB Maj. Peter S. Deriabin, as well as agents-in-place like Popov and Polish intelligence officer Michal Goleniewski.**(71)** American counterintelligence was once again, as it had before Venona, left to rely on voluntary sources.

Venona, according to US policy at the time, could only be shared with a small, witting cadre of senior American intelligence officers. The tiny fraction of Soviet messages that were read convinced the CIA and FBI that Soviet espionage, at least in the 1940s, was aggressive, capable, and far-reaching—and that at least some wartime spies and agents of influence remained unidentified. Nothing that the West learned in subsequent years suggested that Soviet intelligence had grown any less capable or aggressive. Senior American intelligence officers also knew how poorly American intelligence had fared in its efforts to recruit agents to report on Soviet intelligence operations in the United States. Direct approaches to Soviet officers and illegals in the early Cold War usually failed, and by the 1960s American intelligence was relying on voluntary defectors such as Anatoli Golitsyn and Yuri Nosenko, and defectors-in-place such as Aleksi I. Kulak and Dmitri F. Polyakov, for relatively recent information about Soviet intelligence officers. Remembering how many clues to Soviet penetrations had accumulated in the files before Venona finally provided incontrovertible evidence of espionage against the West, molehunters in the CIA and FBI privately resolved to leave no defector's tip uninvestigated.

Only a short step led from this conclusion to a new concern among some, particularly in the CIA, that the Soviets might try to stage such defections to feed misinformation to American and Western intelligence services. While this possibility is now considered to have been remote, it could not be resolved beyond all doubt at the time. It was impossible to prove the negative and rule out the possible existence of Soviet misinformation operations designed to distract Western services from the most damaging penetrations in their midst. Even so, American counterintelligence services would spend much of the 1960s doing all they could to prove that negative, and to minimize the possibility of deception.

The extreme secrecy of the Venona information tended to ensure that any precautions would be viewed skeptically by some of the very intelligence personnel they were designed to protect. Only a handful of American intelligence officers had access to the Venona secret, and those who did not have such access had no way, in many cases, to judge the reliability of the evidence gathered against alleged Soviet agents in the 1940s. As a result, even seasoned intelligence professionals viewed the spy cases and internal security debates of the 1940s and early 1950s as McCarthyite hysteria. This attitude probably influenced some in the Intelligence Community as a whole to underestimate the Soviet espionage threat.

Elizabeth Bentley died in Connecticut in December 1963, long before the end of the Cold War she had helped to start. She never knew about the Venona secret, or about the way in which her testimony (among that of others) assisted the program. Before she died, she had been denounced as a traitor, a liar, and a criminal by everyone from her old comrades to a former President of the United States. The controversy over her testimony was only a skirmish in the national debate over the true extent of Soviet espionage, and over the federal government's attempts to balance competing requirements of civil liberties and internal security. The declassification of Venona augments and clarifies the evidence in the public domain, and consequently should move the debate from the politics and personalities of those who testified in public to the capabilities and actions of political leaders and intelligence officers—both American and Soviet—who worked in many cases behind the scenes.

## **Acronyms and Abbreviations**

AFSA Armed Forces Security Agency, 1949-52
ASA Army Security Agency (US Army), from 1945
CIA Central Intelligence Agency, from 1947
CIG Central Intelligence Group, 1946-47
<b>CPUSA</b> Communist Party of the United States
DCI Director of Central Intelligence, from 1946
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
GRU Chief Directorate for Intelligence, Red Army General Staff
G-2 Military Intelligence Division (US Army)
HCUA House Committee on Un-American Activities, US Congress
IIC Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
KGB Committee for State Security, from 1954
MGB Ministry for State Security, 1946-47, 1952-53
MID Military Intelligence Division (see G-2)
NIA National Intelligence Authority, 1946-47
NKGB Peoples Commissariat for State Security, 1943-46
NKVD Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs, 1934-43
NSA National Security Agency, from 1952

NSC National Security Council, from 1947

NSCID National Security Council Intelligence Directive

OGPU Unified State Political Directorate, 1923-34

**ONI** Office of Naval Intelligence

**OSS** Office of Strategic Services, 1942-45

SSA Signals Security Agency, US Army, 1942-45

USCIB United States Communications Intelligence Board, 1946-58

## Chronology

## 1939

10 January

Soviet intelligence defector Walter Krivitsky has the first of several debriefings at the Department of State.

26 June

President Roosevelt secretly gives the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Military Intelligence Division (MID), and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) exclusive responsibility for counterespionage.

23 August

Germany and USSR sign Non-Aggression Pact.

1 September World War II begins as Germany invades Poland.

#### 1940

21 May

President Roosevelt authorizes the FBI to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance of persons suspected of subversion or espionage; surveillance was to be limited insofar as possible to aliens.

5 June

FBI-MID-ONI "Delimitation Agreement" further specifies the division of labor in domestic intelligence work.

28 June

The Alien Registration Act (the "Smith Act") criminalizes conspiracy to overthrow the government, requires resident aliens to register, report annually, and provide notice of address changes.

20 August

KGB agent Ramon Mercader assassinates Leon Trotsky in Mexico.

#### 1941

10 February

Walter Krivitsky found dead of a gunshot wound in a Washington hotel; the police rule his death a suicide.

5 May

Federal agents arrest Amtorg employee and KGB New York *rezident* Gaik Ovakimian for violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

22 June

#### Germany invades Russia.

29 June

FBI arrests 29 German military intelligence agents, crippling Germany's clandestine operations in the United States.

23 July

US Government allows Ovakimian to leave the country.

25 September

London KGB rezident Anatoli Gorski informs Moscow that his agent reports London has decided to build an atomic bomb.

7 December

Japanese aircraft attack Pearl Harbor; America enters the war.

25 December

Senior KGB officer Vassili M. Zarubin arrives in San Francisco on his way to succeed Ovakimian as New York rezident.

### 1942

20 March

MID's Special Branch begins producing daily "Magic Summaries" analyzing foreign diplomatic messages for the White House and senior military commanders.

13 June

The Office of the Coordinator of Information becomes the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), subordinate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

30 June

Interagency agreement divides signals intelligence duties: Navy assigned to handle naval codebreaking; the US Army's Signals Intelligence Service to handle diplomatic and military traffic; and the FBI works clandestine radio communications.

8 July

President Roosevelt bars all agencies except the FBI and the armed services from code-breaking activities. The services interpret this directive as authorization to deny signals intelligence to OSS.

## 1943

1 February

US Army's renamed Signal Security Agency (SSA) formally begins work on Russian diplomatic traffic.

10 April

KGB New York *rezident* Vassili M. Zarubin meets CPUSA official Steve Nelson in Oakland and discusses espionage.

15 May

Communist International (Comintern) resolves to disband.

7 August

FBI receives an anonymous Russian letter naming Soviet intelligence officers in North America.

31 October

San Francisco KGB residency acknowledges the receipt of a new codebook.

## 1944

1 May

The KGB, apparently on short notice, changes the indicator system for its cables, leaving the one-time pad page numbers *en clair.* 

#### November

SSA's Cecil Phillips discovers the new KGB indicator, which is then used to detect "key" duplicated in Trade messages.

#### December

OSS purchases Soviet code and cipher material from Finnish sources; the Roosevelt administration orders the material returned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

#### 15 December

The War Department transfers operational control of SSA from the Signal Corps to MID.

## 1945

12 April

President Roosevelt dies; Harry Truman sworn in as his successor.

27 April

A US Army Target Intelligence Committee (TICOM) team finds Russian code and cipher material in a German Foreign Office cryptanalytic center in a castle in Saxony-Anhalt.

8 May

Germany surrenders.

10 May

FBI conducts a lengthy debriefing of former Soviet agent Whittaker Chambers.

June

Earl Browder ousted as leader of the Communist Political Association, which reclaims its old name, the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA).

16 July

The Manhattan Project detonates the world's first nuclear explosion, Trinity, in New Mexico; Soviet agents had warned Moscow in advance.

14 August Japan capitulates.

5 September Soviet GRU code clerk Lt. Igor Gouzenko defects in Ottawa.

6 September

The War Department authorizes merger of SSA with selected Signal Corps units to form the Army Security Agency (ASA), under MID.

12 September US-UK signals intelligence Continuation Agreement extends wartime cooperation in this field.

20 September President Truman dissolves OSS.

7 November Elizabeth Bentley interviewed at length for the first time by FBI agents about her work for the KGB.

## 1946

22 January

Truman creates the Central Intelligence Group and the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).

13 June

The State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board adds the FBI and renames itself the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB).

8 July

National Intelligence Authority Directive 5 secretly directs the DCI to conduct, as "services of common concern," all foreign

intelligence and counterespionage.

#### 10 July

CIG joins the new USCIB and gains access to signals intelligence.

#### 15 July

A Canadian Royal commission releases its report on the Gouzenko affair to the public.

#### 17 July

Attorney General Tom Clark urges Truman to renew and broaden Roosevelt's 1940 authorization to conduct electronic surveillance on "persons suspected of subversive activities"; the President soon approves.

#### 20 December

ASA's Meredith Gardner translates part of a KGB message containing a list of atomic scientists.

## 1947

22 March

Executive Order 9835 tightens protections against subversive infiltration of the US Government, defining disloyalty as membership on a list of subversive organizations maintained by the Attorney General.

#### 26 July

President Truman signs the National Security Act of 1947, creating the National Security Council (NSC) and transforming CIG into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

#### Around 1 September

Col. Carter Clarke briefs the FBI's liaison officer on the break into Soviet diplomatic traffic.

#### 12 December

NSCID-5 reiterates but qualifies DCI's counterespionage authority to avoid precluding certain "agreed" FBI and military counterintelligence activities.

## 1948

1 July

NSCID-9 puts USCIB under the NSC and increases civilian control of signals intelligence.

20 July

General Secretary Eugene Dennis and 11 other CPUSA leaders arrested and indicted under the Smith Act of conspiring to advocate violent overthrow of the US Government.

#### 31 July

Elizabeth Bentley testifies before the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA), publicly accusing Harry Dexter White and Lauchlin Currie of being Soviet agents.

3 August

Whittaker Chambers names Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White as Communists in testimony before the HCUA.

19 October

Meredith Gardner and Robert Lamphere meet at Arlington Hall and formally inaugurate full-time FBI-ASA liaison on the Soviet messages.

17 November

Chambers produces the "Pumpkin Papers" to substantiate his new charge that Hiss and White spied for Moscow during the 1930s.

16 December

A federal grand jury indicts Alger Hiss for perjury.

December

FBI identifies covername SIMA as Justice Department analyst Judith Coplon.

## 1949

4 March

FBI arrests Coplon and Soviet UN employee Valentin A. Gubitchev in New York.

23 March

Truman approves NSC 17/4, which reconstitutes the secret Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference to coordinate jurisdiction of FBI and military counterintelligence.

20 May

Defense Secretary Louis Johnson directs a quasi-merger of service signals intelligence in a new Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), subordinate to the JCS.

23 September Truman announces that the Soviets have exploded an atomic bomb.

1 October The People's Republic of China is proclaimed in Beijing.

## 1950

21 January Alger Hiss is convicted of perjury.

24 January Klaus Fuchs confesses to espionage.

9 February

Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, in a speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, brandishes a list of Communists allegedly working in the State Department.

22 May FBI arrests Harry Gold for espionage.

25 June North Korean troops invade South Korea.

17 July FBI arrests Julius Rosenberg.

24 August AFSA assigns Soviet intercept material a restricted codeword ("Bride") and special handling procedures.

23 September

Congress passes the Internal Security Act (the "McCarran Act"), which it would soon pass again over President Truman's veto. The Act requires Communist-linked organizations to register and allows emergency detention of potentially dangerous persons.

## 1951

25 May

British Foreign Office officials Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess flee Great Britain to defect to the Soviet Union.

July

CPUSA announces that the Party will operate as a "cadre organization," with many of its leaders underground.

## 1952

AFSA detects duplicate key pages in GRU messages.

4 November

Truman creates the National Security Agency (NSA) to supersede AFSA and further centralize control of signals intelligence under the Secretary of Defense and a reconstituted USCIB.

### 1953

NSA places the "POBJEDA" codebook—recovered in Germany in April 1945—against KGB messages from 1941 through 1943. More than half of the burned codebook proves useable.

5 March Stalin dies.

6 April

KGB defector Alexander Orlov's story appears in *Life* magazine; finally alerting the FBI to his residence in the United States.

19 June

Julius and Ethel Rosenberg executed after President Eisenhower again denies executive clemency.

27 July

Armistice signed in Korea.

6 November

Attorney General Herbert Brownell sparks controversy by claiming in a Chicago speech that former President Truman had appointed Harry Dexter White to head the International Monetary Fund despite FBI warnings that White was a Soviet agent.

## 1954

20 December CIA's Directorate of Plans creates the Counterintelligence Staff, with James J. Angleton as its chief.

## 1956

8 March

NSC approves the FBI's proposed "Cointelpro" operation against the CPUSA.

4 June

The Department of State releases Soviet General Secretary Khrushchev's secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, in which Khrushchev denounced Stalin's crimes.

October

Soviet troops suppress a popular uprising in Hungary.

## 1957

25 January

FBI arrests Jack and Myra Soble for espionage on the basis of evidence provided by double agent Boris Morros.

4 May

KGB officer Reino Hayhanen, en route from the United States, defects at the US Embassy in Paris.

17 June

Supreme Court in *Yates v. US* rules the government had enforced the Smith Act too broadly by targeting protected speech instead of actual action to overthrow the political system; this ruling makes the Act almost useless for prosecuting Communists.

21 June

Federal authorities detain Hayhanen's superior, KGB illegal Col. Rudolf Abel, in New York.

15 November Abel is sentenced to 30 years and conveyed to prison.

## Part I: The American Response to Soviet Espionage

## Archival Citations and a Note on the Documents

The following 35 documents are reproduced in Part I. They represent an attempt to gather some of the more interesting, important, and revealing original documents available to American policymakers and intelligence officers during the period covered by this volume. It is hoped that these documents will provide researchers with ready access to some of the key decisions of the period, as well as give them a flavor of internal US Government discussions and concerns over Soviet espionage in America. Almost all of the documents are published here for the first time anywhere; although most of the documents were already declassified, 13 were declassified by NSA, FBI, and CIA specifically for this volume. In many cases the date of the declassification is marked on the document's first page.

## NOTE TO VIEWERS: The following pages were scanned as graphics.

(Each graphic is approximately 50KB)

MR. DUNN DEPARTMENT OF STA DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS 15, 1939 March Rt tyrett a former Statement made by Gener ivitsky. 1939 general of the Soviet Army, formerly on duty in the Military Intelligence Section of the July 14 General Staff (alias Semuel Ginsberg) Soviet It will be recalled that General Krivitsky, who escaped from the Soviet Union at the time that the eight 800 Red Army generals, including Marshal Tukhachevsky, were •00 seized and executed, and whose civilian name is Samuel Ginsberg, came to this country with his wife on temporary D visitors' visas in the latter part of 1938. In January BASSOFF 1939 he called at the Department and discussed at length certain aspects of Soviet developments with which he was particularly familiar. A memorandum prepared by Mr. Page setting forth some of the statements made by General ,SERGE/4 Krivitsky is attached hereto. While the general was in the Department he told me frankly that he feared that agents of the Commissariat for Internal Affairs (the OGPU) might make some attack upon him or members of his family 22-11-1 while they were in the United States. He said he was ; و therefore living quietly and endeavoring not to attract Date attention to his actions. General Krivitsky came in to see me today and Quri the course of a rather extended conversation made 5

1. Loy W. Henderson, memorandum of conversation [with General Krivitsky], 15 March 1939.

**1.** Loy W.

Henderson, memorandum of conversation [with General Krivitsky], 15 March 1939, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 59 (Department of State).

I

	-2-
· /	of statements, the substance of some of which are set
· ·	forth below.
	He has sold a series of four articles to the Saturday
	Evening Post and is writing a book which he hopes to have
	published in the not distant future.
	On Tuesday evening, March 7, he entered a café near
	Forty-second and Broadway and took a table with a fiend,
	a Mr. Shoup, one of the editors of the <u>Jewish Daily Forward</u> ,
	whom he had met while in Paris. While they were talking at
	this table four men entered the restaurant and seated them-
	selves at an adjoining table. One of these men made obvious
Seenvirphy	efforts to attract the General's attention and the General
Semurph	recognized him as Sergei Bassoff, an agent of the OGPU who
memory	had been connected with the American work of that organiza-
to	tion for many years and whose record had become known to the
HERE YAWE TO	General while the latter was engaged in intelligence work
10,000	in Moscow. Bassoff was formerly a Soviet sailor; he joined
	the Soviet secret police in 1920; he came to the United
•	States as a Soviet secret agent some time during the early
	twenties; since his arrival in the United States he has been
	an employee of the Soviet secret service; he has been
	naturalized as an American citizen; he has been invaluable
	as a GPU courier traveling between various European coun-
	tries on an American passport; in June 1937 he was arrested
	in Holland while transporting funds but was released shortly
	thereafter

6

(Continued)

thereafter, apparently after having called upon the American Consul in Amsterdam for protection; after his release he proceeded to Moscow where he arrived in July 1937 and where he remained for some time.

-3-

Mr. Bass off indicated by gestures that he desired to speak to the General and the General in a somewhat agitated frame of mind suggested to Mr. Shoup that they leave the cafe at once. Before they could get out, however, Mr. Bassoff stopped them and told the General that he desired to have a talk with him. When the General replied that he wished to have nothing whatever to do with Mr. Bassoff, the latter repeated his statement that it was necessary that they should have a talk. Mr. Shoup interrupted to suggest that all three of them go to the New York Times Annex, which was close by, where they could talk in private. The General then asked Mr. Bassoff if he intended to shoot him and Bassoff replied in the negative.

In the office of the <u>New York Times</u> Mr. Sheplin, a member of the editorial staff of that newspaper and a friend of Mr. Shoup, conducted them to a private room. Mr. Shoup withdrew to a distance so the conversation could be carried on without a third person overhearing. The General asked Bassoff who had sent him and Bassoff replied that the meeting had been accidental. The General said that

7

(Continued)

-4that he knew that Bassoff must be acting under orders since otherwise he would not dare to talk with a person in such bad standing with the Soviet authorities as himself. Bassoff replied that the General still had friends in Moscow and that many persons continued to have confidence in him. He said, "Of course, we have read all that you have written and we suppose you are writing more." The General then inquired regarding the fate of a number of his friends and was informed that all had been shot. He was also told that the brothers of his wife "had suffered greatly". The intonations and gestures accompanying this statement were apparently made in order to convey the impression that the actions of the General and his wife were responsible for this suffering. The General asked Mr. Bassoff if the latter was not afraid to approach him in such a manner in the United States. Bassoff said, "I have no fear. I am perfectly safe here." The General then told Bassoff that the latter would not dere take his life. Bassoff made no threat but contented himself with stating that there was nothing particularly to fear; that the penalty for such an act would probably be only a couple of years in jail. The General told Bassoff to leave at once and not to approach him again. Bassoff thereupon left the building,

8

joined his three friends who had waited outside, and

disappeared.

1.

(Continued)

disappeared. The General had baid no particular attention to the three men accompanying Mr. Bassoff but Mr. Shoup told him later that they appeared to be of the gangster type.

-5-

The General told me that he believed that his life was in danger since the GPU organization in the United States was very strong and since he was certain that Bassoff would not have approached him unless he had been ordered so to do by the highest Soviet authorities and unless it had been decided that come what may the General must not be permitted to continue writing his experiences and memoirs. He said that in 1935 a GPU agent had been killed in New York City by an automobile in suspicious circumstances. There were ways of bringing about his own death in such a manner as to make it appear to be accidental.

I asked the General if he desired police protection and he replied that he did not presume to make such a request; that he hoped eventually to be able to leave New York and live quietly in some more remote place; but that he could not do so until he had finished some of his writings and had obtained an extension of his permit to remain in the United States, which expired on March 31.

Since General Krivitsky has served for many years in the Military Intelligence Service and since the work of that service is closely connected with that of the GPU (The Commissariat for Internal Affairs), I asked him

several

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(Continued)


-6several questions regarding the organization of the GPU in the United States. He replied that there were two distinct branches of the GPU operating in this country. One branch was headed by some person in the Soviet Embassy, a person probably who had no diplomatic rank or perhaps a low diplomatic rank and who had little direct contact with the Ambassador or diplomatic members of his staff. Subordinate to this person were GPU centers in Amtorg, Intourist, and the various Soviet consular offices. The second GPU branch had no connection whatever with the first and like the first, reported direct to Moscow. The head of the second branch lived in New York and undoubtedly many of his agents were American citizens. Although there was some contact between the two branches of the GPU they worked independently. furt. Eu:Henderson:LF

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
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Attorney General [Frank Murphy] to the President, 17 June 1939, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, President's Secretary's Files (Confidential File), "State 1939-40," box 9.



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
3. Franklin D. Roosevelt, to Secretary of State et al., 26 June 1939.

Hyde Park, N. Y., June 26, 1939 CONFIDENTIAL MENORANIUM FOR - THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 12/ THE SECRETARY OF MAR <u>ء</u> د ، THE ATTORNEY OFMERAL く/~ THE POSTMASTER GENERAL THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY K : 8 THE SECRETARY OF CONSERCE хЗ It is my desire that the investigation of all It is my desire that whe introdugation of all espicates, counter-espicance, and sabotage metters be con-trolled and handled by the Federal Buresu of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the Var Department, and the office of Neval Intelligence of the Navy Department. The directors of these threat execution are to function as a securities to coordinate three agencies are to function as a committee to coordinate their activities. No investigations should be conducted by any investigative agency of the Government into matters involving actually or potentially any espionage, counter-espionage, or sabotage, except by the three agencies mentioned above. I shall be glad if you will instruct the heads of all other investigative agencies than the three named, to refer immediately to the mearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation any data, information, or material that may come to their notice bearing directly or indirectly on espionage, Countermenters of substace. counter-espionage, or sabotage. (Lyned) Fronklin & Rooseels 13


Franklin D. Roosevelt, to Secretary of State et al., 26 June 1939, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, President's Secretary's Files (Confidential File), "State 1939-40," box 9.


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4. J. Edgar Hoover to Major General Edwin M. Watson, 25 October 1940.




Edgar Hoover to Major General Edwin M. Watson, 25 October 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, White House Official Files (Subject File), "Justice Department—FBI Reports," box 12.






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


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
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
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
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
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
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- 20 various governmental departments are informed promptly of any information obtained which relates to the operations of those departments. Weekly meetings are held with representatives of Lilitary and Nauel Intelligence, the Treasury and State Departments for the purpose of exchanging information of current interest, out-lining future programs and otherwise coordinating the work in the Intelligence field. In a most discreet and careful manner, constant check is being made of those Consular representatives whose conduct is reported to be detrimental to the United States. Their move-ments, contacts and financial transactions are the subject of constant observation and study.

5. Joseph A. Michela, Military Attache Moscow Report 1903, "N.K.V.D. of the U.S.S.R.," 14 April 1941 [Chart not included].

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- '	Classification Copy No
	MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
	WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
	MILITARY ATTACHE REPORT Soviet Union.
	Subject N. E. V. D. of the U. S. S. B. I.G. No. 3100
,	Boure and Degree of Reliability: Constitutional Acts 1922-1936; Collection of Laws 1934- 1941; Bolahaya Sovietskaya Ensiklopedia, Soviet press and personal contacts.
	Summarisation of Report +
1	The history and organization of the N. K. V. D.
•	1 a Commonto en Corrent Bruter Zaler Timo Roma
	INTRODUCTION.
	The N. K. V. D. is the abbreviated name most commonly
	used to designate the NARODNI KOMMISSARIAT VNUTRENIK DEL (the Peoples Commissariat of Internal Affairs). The compounded ab- beviation "NARKONVINUE" is also frequently used. The functions
	and organization of this governmental department are not wholly new, having origin as far back as 1891.
-	OKRANA.
	In 1881 was formed the OKRANOYE OTDELENOYE - loosely
	translated as the Department of Safety - in the capital dity of St. Petersburg (now Leningrad), for the purpose of "pre- serving public sefety and order". It was then a section in the
	city police appartment and its duties were to "investigate pol- itical crimes and combat the revolutionary movement". Gradually,
· ·	all the large cities organized similar police divisions. Al- though these divisions were organic parts of the city police
	departments, the Tsar's government exercises complete control
	taining "state security, order and peace". The Okrana existed up to the February Revolution of 1917.
	CHEKA.
	During the revolution the Bolsheviks realized that some organization was needed to combat counter-revolutionary
	movements, and on December 20, 1917 the VSYL-ROSISKAYA CHREZVICHAINAYA KONAUSSIA PO BORBE S KONTRE REFOLUTSITEI,
	SPEMULATSIYEI i SABOTAZHVEI (The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Nevolution, Speculation and Sabotage) was created by the Soviet or Peoples Commissars as an All-Union Commisseriat.
	G-2 Distribution: 4. 5,
	From M. A. MOSCON Report No. 1903 Date April 14, 1941
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5. Joseph

A. Michela, Military Attache Moscow Report 1903, "N.K.V.D. of the U.S.S.R.," 14 April 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Harry Hopkins Papers, "MID Reports—USSR—Volume V," box 190 [Chart not included].

G-3 Report

I.G. No. 3100

## GPU.

The Cheke lasted until March 1, 1922 when its mame was changed to the GPU - GOSUDARSTVENOVE POLITICHISKOTE UPRAVIENITE (The State Political Administration) with little er mo changes in function. Gradually, each republic organized its own GPU and on November 23, 1923 the republic GPU's wore united into the OREMINYCENOVE GOSUDARSTVENNOVE POLITICHISKOVE UPRAVIENITE (The Unitied State Political Administration) (OGPU).

OGFU.

The purpose of the OGPU was to unite all the revol-utionary forces of all the republies to "combat the political and economic counter-revolutionary movements, espionage and banditry". The chief of the OGPU was appointed by the Pre-sidium of the then Central Committee of the U. S. S. R. and had a vote in the committee. The head of the OGPU at that time was also a member of the Supreme Court; and the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. was responsible for the legality of all acts of the OGPU. It was simply another CHEKA with broader powers. These powers grew to such proportions that it became for a while the most powerful and feared government agency. It had so much power that its activities were actually curtailed in 1934 when it was incorporated into the N.K.V.D.

N. K. V. D.

At the time of the Civil War all of the republics At the time of the Civil War all of the republics organized their own republic commissariats of internal affairs. These commissariats controlled the militia, criminal investiga-tions and prisons. But in 1930 these republic N.K.V.D.'s were liquidated and the term was not used again until 1934 when the N.K.V.D. of the U.S.S.R. was formed as an <u>All-Union</u> Commissariat. It was responsible for the following:

(1) Preservation of revolutionary order and

- (1) Protection of Public property.
   (2) Protection of public property.
   (3) Registration of civil acts, and vital statistics.
   (4) Protection of the border.

The following administrations were organized and subordinated to it:

State security.
 Militia.

۰.

- (2) Militia.
  (3) Border and internal protection.
  (4) Fire protection.
  (5) Corrective labor camps and settl
  (6) Department or civil acts.
  (7) Administrative economic administ
- Corrective labor camps and settlements. Department of civil acts. Administrative economic administration.

From M. A. Moscow	<b>Re</b> port No. 1903	Date: April 14, 1941	
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		Page 2	2
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(Continued)

1.G. No. 3100 G-2 Report Although the N.K.V.D. was made an All-Union Commis-sariat, it again formed the N.K.V.D. in all the republics, except the x.S.F.S.H., which republic became directly under the All-Union N.K.V.D. The same administrations listed above were organized in all the subordinate administrative divisions down the conclusion the director and within the divisions were organized in all the subordinate administrative divisions down to and including the city or district and village. At the same time, the N.K.V.D. collegium within the Suprame Court was abolished, and certain cases were referred to the court was abolished, and certain cases were referred to the court was abolished, and certain cases were referred to the court was abolished, and certain cases were referred to the court was abolished, and certain cases were referred to the court was abolished, and certain cases of treason and es-pionage were referred to the Military collegium of the Supreme Court or to the military tribunal having jurisdiction. Cases coming within the functions of the State Security Administra-tion were all referred to the Supreme Court. coming within the functions of the State Security Administra-tion were all referred to the Supreme Court. To take over all other court functions of the abolished N.K.V.D. collegium, there was formed the Special Advisory Council within the All-Union Commissariat. It consisted of five members and was actually a court in itself. This step gave the N.K.V.D. even more power for it permitted it to try its own cases. In November, 1935, the N.K.V.D. took over the surrying and Cartoperably even interstion of the U.S. & with all of the steps. In November, 1935, the N.K.V.D. took over the surveyin and cartography administration of the U.S.S.K. with all of the technical agencies to carry out its functions. This latter was taken away in 1938 when it became an All-Union Administration under the Soviet of Peoples Commissars (SOVNARKOM). In October, 1935, the administration of highways was brought into the N.K.V.D. where it remains today. When the new Commission may matified in persember When the N.K.V.D. where it remains today. When the new Constitution was ratified in December, 1956, the N.K.V.D. became a Union-Republic Commissariat and has remained as such to the present time. In February, 1941, the State Security Administration was removed from the N.K.V.D. and formed into a new commisseriat. Today the N.K.V.D. is organized into six administrations: (1) Militia. (2) Border and Internal protection. (3) Fire protection. (4) Corrective labor camps and settlements.
 (5) Registration or civil acts, vital statistics and preservation of state papers. (6) Construction and maintainance of highways. Each republic, autonomous republic, territory, auton-omous territory, city or district and village has an agency of some kind for each one of the above named administrations. Theoretically, each one of these subordinate N.K.V.D. Commissariats controls its own aix administrations under the next higher N.K.V.D., but there is no doubt that in practice each administration works in close harmony and directly under the administration of the mext superior N.K.V.D. In close harmony and directly under the administration of the mate superior N.K.V.D. administration. Although it has not been so stated, it may be that since there are seven (7) vice commissers, each administration and the chief inspection is under one of these vice commissers. The chief inspector is responsible to the Commisser only and functions as From M. A. Moscow Report No. 1903 Date: April 14, 1941 3855 45 Page 5 · · .

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(Continued)

G-2 Report I.G. No. 3100
the Object Terror and the second s
the Chief Inspector of the Commissariat. The attached chart shows the organization of the N.K.V.D. of the U.S.S.R.
as it is today.
AIMINISTRATIONS.
Since a few of the administrations have little
or no military value they are discussed briefly below.
Fire Protection Administration.
This administration confines its activities to
cities and towns. Each city has its firs department, the- oresically subordinated to the city Soviet but with probably
WYAGEV CUTLET EDOTE 15. DIRAS for the site demonstrate
wwww.lrum.ulty Dudgets and therefore only the sime similar
The state of the U.S.S.R and the state (10)
toy doing any linenced by the mational hudget.
In rural communities all fire administrations are
that 67% of the personnel in the five administration and
WAY WADRAW TULUDIBAIRS, IN SUMITION (1) Pastanian and with
THEY WELT GET VOLUTION TITA DELEMAN WARAGE AL.
VAVJ SWARDARL IN THE CIT OF CANANAWARANAA IN MALANA
And the line set instant withhat of fine administration of a
is 60,000 for the entire country, exclusive of volunteers.
Civil Acts & Vital Statistics Administration.
quarters of this administration bids a keept for the head-
quarters of the administrations of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Republics. The personnel is estimated at 10,000.
Highway Administration. This administration is responsible for the con-
struction and maintainence of the All-Union, the Sepublic, the regional, and the territorial highways. The respon-
the regional, and the territorial highways. The respon-
Hads up principally of tachnicians . The line administration is
made up principally of technicians. The labor for highway prejects comes from the corrective labor camps. Then an
HERE'S HERE'S DISCHART DELET DE DELLE 12 12 MAN ANGEMANNA ALLA
tailed entirely by the mational budget. Its personnel is estimated at 6,000.
Press H. A. Moscow Report No. 1903 Date: April 14, 1961
* See chart.
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Page 4

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		I.G. No. 3100	
tratio	See the following reported	erts for other adminis-	•
	Militia Border Guards & Intern	- Report Ho. 1904 - 20.3	37-2105/
	Trec Corrective Laber Gamps Colonies	and	57-1552 /2: -1552 /2:
	REMARKS.		
V.S.S.R	The personnel strength . is estimated as follows	of the H.K.V.D. of the	•
	a. Militia Including: Railway Guard	\$75,000 ds {25,000}	
	Enterprise G b. Border Guards	uards (50,000)	
	c. Interior Troops	150,000 50,000	
	d. Convoy Troops e. Fire Personnel	50,000 60,000	
	<ol> <li>Civil Acts Administ</li> <li>B. Highway Administrat</li> </ol>	tration 10,000	
		Total 700,000	
rective : colorises and colorises and colori	c) our the responsibility forced upon agencies other the Soviets disclaim forces initation of this commisses in it are the means to appy (advisory council) and in labor). Any governmental sed for labor simply called to need, it is relatively sign of terror on any pret to meet requirements. The purges of the past, one governmental projects. The N.K.V.D., including it he present receive but he	ate organs is this control of maintainence and finan- of maintainence and finan- is then the U.S.S.H. Al- d labor in this country, riat is interesting to rehend (militis), try and mprison offenders (oor- organization that has a s upon the N.K.V.D. to r is insufficient to an easy matter to insti- text and fill up labor is fis in the labor is fistile doubt that by eye was kept on the labor the State Security, has has also prevented the plose supervision over the i arrests, has instilled titve in all phases of	
From M. A	. Moscow Report	No. 1903 Date: April 14, 19	941
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
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G-2 Report	1.G. No. 3100
of a mistake - and The W.K.W wation from birth i quarters, controls it prevents or perm agents are everywh simply disappears i sees or hears of hi check and balance w in the government g Stalin meeds scapeg leashes his N.K.Y.D the most powerful w	pt any changes or improvements for fear a mistake means prison. V.D. has every individual under obser- to death. It registers the birth, assigns internal, as well as external, pessports, mits travel within the country, its secret are; its actions are swift. An individual in the middle of the night and no one ever im again. The N.K.V.D. is used as the weapon by the government - whenever a group gets too popular, or too powerful, or when goats to cover government mistakes he un- D. The N.K.V.D. and the State Security are weapons in the hands of the government. s in itself a prison and the W.K.V.D. and its keepers.
· · ·	Joseph Wichely .
l enclosure: Chart.	Massith A. Michela, Major, Cavalry, Ass't. Military Attache.
	PORMANDED ivan D. Yanton, Major P.A. Military Attorne
·	
From M. A. Moscow	Heport No. 1903 Date: April 14, 1941
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6. Hoover to Watson, 18 February 1942.




Hoover to Watson, 18 February 1942, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, White House Official Files (Subject File), "Justice Department—FBI Reports," box 15.

CONTRACTOR	February 9, 1942
	SUBJECT: Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the Federal Bureau Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the <u>Wilitary Intelligence Division</u>
	The Agreement for Coordination of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division.
I. The un	ndersigned have reviewed the directive contained in the
President's Memo	prandum of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his directive
of September 6,	1939, the Delimitation Agreement of June 5, 1940, and
the supplemental	l interpretation and agreements thereunder. It is now
agreed that resp	consibility for investigation of all activities coming
under the catego	ries of espionage, counter-espionage, subversion and
sabotage, (herei	nafter referred to as "these categories") will be
delimited as ind	icated hereafter. The responsibility assumed by one
organization in a	a given field carries with it the obligation to provid
a pool of all in	formation received in that field but it does not imply
the reporting ag	ency alone is interested in or will work alone in that
field. Close co	operation between the three agencies in all fields is
a mutually recogn	nized necessity.
II. FBI wil	ll be responsible for:
	l investigation of cases in the categories involving
	ans in the United States and its territories with the
	ion of the Republic of Panama, the Panama Canal Zone,
	American Samoas, Palmyra, Johnston, Wake and Nidway
	s, the Philippine Islands and the Territory of Alaska
other t	than that specifically described in Paragraph III.
	DECLASSIFIED
	E.O. 11652, Sec. t(E)(2) Justice Dept. letter, 9-21-72
	By DBS, NLR, Date

34

(Continued)




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(Continued)

	- 3 -
	7. Keeping ONI and MID informed of any other important
	developments.
III.	
	MID will be responsible for:
	1. Investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories
	in the military establishment including civilian employ, militar
	reserve and military control.
	2. The investigation of cases in these categories involving
	civilians in the Canal Zone, the Republic of Panama, the Phil-
	ippine Islands and the Alaskan Peninsula and islands adjacent
	including Kodiak Island, the Aleutian and Pribilof Islands and
	that part of the Alaskan Peninsula which is separated by a line
	drawn from Iliamna Bay northwest to the town of old Iliamna and
	thence following the south shore of Lake Iliamna to the Kvichak
	River to Kvichak Bay.
	3. Informing FBI and ONI of any other important developments.

36

(Continued)



37

(Continued)

- 5 -
of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control as he
deems necessary. He is not authorized to control the administration
or discipline of the subscribing agencies to which he does not belong,
nor to issue instructions to such agencies beyond those necessary for
the purposes stated above.
VII. Personnel of the subscribing agencies will still send reports
to and be under the continued supervision of their respective head-
quarters. The subscribing agencies will render such aid and assistance
to the Military Commander and his designated representatives as are
possible and practicable. All pertinent information, data, and other
material that are or may be necessary or desirable to him shall be
furnished by the most expeditious means and methods possible consistent
with requisite security. The headquarters of the subscribing agencies
will promptly be advised of all information and data appropriately
identified as having been furnished to the Military Commander.
VIII. It is assumed that the Wilitary Commander will not hesitate
to call upon any governmental agency outside the three subscribing
agencies to this agreement for any assistance, cooperation, or activity.
<u>PERIODS OF PREDGUINANT MILITARY INTEREST, NOT INVOLVING MARTIAL LAW</u> .
II. In time of war certain areas will come into prominence as potential

11. In time of war certain areas will come into prominence as potential theatres of operation. When a Wilitary Commander of such a potential theatre is designated, he definitely has interest in, though not control of, the civilian life within the area. In order that the Wilitary Commander may prepare himself for the discharge of the possible responsibility which may affix to him, the following procedure is agreed upon:

38

(Continued)

<ol> <li>Agents of the FBI, of ONI, and of WID will continue to function in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs II, JII, and IV.</li> <li>In addition thereto the Wilitary Commander may take steps to analyze the facilities existing and to explore the manner in which complete coverage will be obtained if martial law is declared. Adequate liaison with the other two intelligence services will insure that the Wilitary Commander will have the benefit of the experience, judgment and knowledge of the representatives of the other services.</li> <li>The Wilitary Commander is authorized to request and receive such information from the three agencies as he may desire and they may be able to furnish.</li> </ol>		-6-
<ul> <li>II, III, and IV.</li> <li>2. In addition thereto the Military Commander may take steps to analyze the facilities existing and to explore the manner in which complete coverage will be obtained if martial law is declared. Adequate liaison with the other two intelligence services will insure that the Military Commander will have the benefit of the experience, judgment and knowledge of the representatives of the other services.</li> <li>3. The Military Commander is authorized to request and receive such information from the three agencies as he</li> </ul>	1. Agents of the FBI,	of ONI, and of WID will continue
<ol> <li>In addition thereto the Military Commander may take steps to analyze the facilities existing and to explore the manner in which complete coverage will be obtained if martial law is declared. Adequate liaison with the other two intelligence services will insure that the Military Commander will have the benefit of the experience, judgment and knowledge of the representatives of the other services.</li> <li>The Military Commander is authorized to request and receive such information from the three agencies as he</li> </ol>	to function in accordan	nce with the provisions of paragraphs
steps to analyze the facilities existing and to explore the manner in which complete coverage will be obtained if martial law is declared. Adequate liaison with the other two intelligence services will insure that the Military Commander will have the benefit of the experience, judgment and knowledge of the representatives of the other services. 3. The Military Commander is authorized to request and receive such information from the three agencies as he	II, III, and IV.	· · ·
the manner in which complete coverage will be obtained if martial law is declared. Adequate liaison with the other two intelligence services will insure that the Military Commander will have the benefit of the experience, judgment and knowledge of the representatives of the other services. 3. The Military Commander is authorized to request and receive such information from the three agencies as he	2. In addition theret	o the Military Commander may take
if martial law is declared. Adequate liaison with the other two intelligence services will insure that the Military Commander will have the benefit of the experience, judgment and knowledge of the representatives of the other services. 3. The Military Commander is authorized to request and receive such information from the three agencies as he	steps to analyze the fo	acilities existing and to explore
other two intelligence services will insure that the Military Commander will have the benefit of the experience, judgment and knowledge of the representatives of the other services. 3. The Military Commander is authorized to request and receive such information from the three agencies as he	the manner in which con	mplete coverage will be obtained
Military Commander will have the benefit of the experience, judgment and knowledge of the representatives of the other services. 3. The Military Commander is authorized to request and receive such information from the three agencies as he	if martial law is declo	ared. Adequate liaison with the
judgment and knowledge of the representatives of the other services. 3. The Military Commander is authorized to request and receive such information from the three agencies as he	other two intelligence	services will insure that the
services. 3. The Military Commander is authorized to request and receive such information from the three agencies as he	Military Commander will	l have the benefit of the experience,
3. The Wilitary Commander is authorized to request and receive such information from the three agencies as he	judgment and knowledge	of the representatives of the other
receive such information from the three agencies as he	services.	
• • •		_
may desire and they may be able to ∫urnish.	receive such information	on from the three agencies as he
	may desire and they may	y be able to furnish.
		· · ·

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(Continued)

x.	
	indigues and exploration referred to above will show the
CO	verage furnished by each of the subscribing agencies and any
ade	ditional coverage each subscribing agency can undertake. When
th	s Commander feels that more complete coverage is required, it is
rec	cognized that his service is authorized to augment the coverage.
Pri	or to any invasion of the spheres normally coming under the
cog	mizance of the other subscribing agency, the Wilitary Commander
8 h c	uld obtain the necessary authority from the War Department.
II.	Irrespective of the fact that the preceding recommendations have
pla	ced the initiative in the hands of the Military Commander, whenever
eít	her of the other two services feel that such a survey to determine
ad e	quacy of coverage should be undertaken, it should be so recommended
thr	ough the director of each service.
	. The above provisions contemplate that the War Department will be
the	agency administering martiel law w
Dr1	agency administering martial law. When appropriate, the same nciples will govern the Navy Department.
XII.	PERIODS OF NORMAL CONDITIONS
	the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
• <u> </u>	ice of Naval Intelligence and the Wilitary Intelligence Division wil
ope: 	rate in accord with the provisions of paragraphs II, III and IV.
<u> </u>	. From time to time it may be desirable in the light of changing
	litions to modify or amend this delimitation agreement. Such
amei	ndments or modifications when agreed upon by the heads of the

40

(Continued)

- 8 subscribing agencies shall be issued in the form of a revised delimitation agreement and not as separate instructions. ub. Stram Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, Par Department T.S. William Director, Office of Naval Intelligence 1. El providence ifector/Federal Bureau of Indestigation 41


(Continued)

7. Tokyo Circular 906 to Berlin and Helsinki, 6 October 1942.

From: Tokyo (WOTNS) To: Berlin and Helsinki October 6, 1942 JMA REVISED TRANSLATION Circular #906 (Seven parts complete) To Col. HAYASHI and Major HIROSE. We have commenced the study of Russian diplomatic and commercial codes, and have obtained the following results. For our information let us know how you are getting along. 1. Extent of interception. Mostly from Moscow and the Foreign Office Also from the embassies and consulates in Kuibyshev. in Japan and Manchoukuo. Very little material aside from this. 2. Diplomatic. (1) (Type 8 ?) DAR Subtracting the first group of the text from the third group, the first and second digits give the additive page; the third digit is the same as the second; the fourth and fifth digits ? give the <u>vertical</u> and <u>horizontal coordinates</u>; the fifth digit is always even; the code seems to be a 4 figure one. The additive table is 50 pages each of 50 groups. This type is used in all messages centering in Kuibyshev and about \*\*\*\*\*\* of these around Moscow. C. I. #896 (Japanese) Page 1 ARMY SECR 43


Circular 906 to Berlin and Helsinki, 6 October 1942, National Security Agency, "Jap Dip Dispatches," Venona Collection, Provisional Box 1.

7. Tokyo



44

(Continued)



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
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archine	,	· ·		
CBNI · Acc 4	17 . 5	SEGRET-	First Re	,9,1943. pnt
( see gree	MEMORANDUM ON RUS	SIAN CODES IN THE JAPANE	SE MILITARY ATTACH	IE SYSTEM
•• • • • •	· · ·	footmate 17		•
	mation concerning	memorandum records all q Russian codes which hav tary Attache (JMA) syste	e been transmitted	in
· · · · ·	(Berlin, Stockhol <u>The earliest foun</u> ber 22, 1942. Al to be an ordinary	sions seem all to have t m, Helsinki, Hungary) to <u>d_is_dated_July_1, 1941;</u> l but one (number 8 belo code, were enciphered b ate or the cipher-alphab	Tokyo-(once to Hs the most recent, w), which does not v the C additive-	inking). Decem-
	usual transmissio ference have prod	The text seems to suff n garbles. It is possib uced many of the deviati als that are found.	le that haste and	indif_
-7	memorandum to be been recorded on date, serial numb words of the code terminal_munbers	ed. Circumstances cause hasty. The various mess cards by originating sta er, additive-book page, involved. Unfortunatel had not been recorded. rincipally by inspection f each message.	age-parts had alre tion, station addr and the first and y, the correspondi Additional informa	ady essed, last ng tion
 	the work of the c	impossible in the time s inaccuracies in the Rus ompiler of the cards, al een detected <b>and</b> amended	sian words or to c though some errors	heck
	<u>Types of cod</u> easily done, as o	<u>es</u> . Each code is classe ne- or two-part and as f	d, when this could our- or fi <b>we-</b> digit	•
• •	These are properl NQAZ — Russian A. at the beginning read before each longer code-book	the Russian (Cyrillic) 3) used the code-values provided in the basic co y quadriliteral groups i (See 7.) On some occa and the end of a Russian intervening letter-pair. messages here treated, N each applicable letter-	for the letters of de of the JMA syst ntroduced by NQ; t sions, NQ is used word, and is to b (See 5.) In the O never appears, b	the em. hus, only e ut is
×.		SEGALT-		
	· ·	тан дар мен түй Эрн 1	· · · ·	

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8. US

Army Signals Security Agency, "Memorandum on Russian Codes in the Japanese Military Attache System," 9 February 1943, National Security Agency Archives [Excerpt].




48

(Continued)

9. Hoover to Harry Hopkins, 7 May 1943.


JOHN EDGAR HOOVER		2 2-	.rt
AIRECTOR		$\gamma \sim \gamma \gamma$	
	Rederal Sureau of Inve		
	United States Department		
	Washington, D. C		
	(AY) 7 1543		
		PERSONAL AND COMPTENDENT ALL BY SPECIAL MESSENGER	
Honorable Harr		Di CIEDIRE ADOBIONI	
The White Hous Washington, D.			
assurug cong p.			
Dear Harry:			-
Thre	ugh a highly confidential a	nd reliable source it has	
been determine	d that on April 10, 1943, a	Russian who is an agent of	×
the Communist	International paid a sum of	money to Steve Nelson,	
in Oakland, Ca	lifornia.	rty, USA, at the latter's home	
		<b></b>	
Diacing Commun	money was reportedly paid t ist Party members and Comin	o Nelson for the purpose of	
engaged in sec	ret war production for the	United States Government so	:
that informati	on could be obtained for tr	ansmittal to the Soviet Union.	
The	Russian agent of the Commun	ist International has been	
identified as	Vassili Zubilin, Third Secr k City is his headquarters.	stary of the Embassy of the	
0000 New Tot.	a crey is his neardiarters.		:
Both	Nelson and Zubilin will me	et in the near future with	
active in the	of the Communist Internatio United States.	nai (Comintern) apparatus	
		through a highly confidential ational Headquarters of the	
Communist Part	y, USA and, particularly, E	arl Browder, General Secretary	
	st Party, USA are aware of a	and have approved of the by the Communist International	
and the second s	ou was peak Erich to Versou	by the community of the office of the	•
	e Nelson has used the follow		
"Hugo." It is	n Mesarosh, Steve J. Mesaro reported that he was born	in Yugoslavia in 1903. His	
true name is u	nknown. According to a bio	graphical sketch of Nelson	
	in the Daily Worker for Nor as admittedly the official	vember 10, 1937 (when the organ of the Communist Party),	:
	the Communist Party, USA in		


Hoover to Harry Hopkins, 7 May 1943, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, White House Official Files (Subject File), "Justice Department—FBI Reports," box 18.



50


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


10.

Anonymous letter to Hoover, undated [received 7 August 1943], National Security Agency Venona Collection, 54-001, box D046 [Russian original with English translation].




(Continued)



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10. (Continued)




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(Continued)

11. Hoover to Birch D. O'Neal, "Alto Case," 26 February 1944.


KZAKIN Er. Birch D. O'Noal The American Embassy Mexico, D. P. Alto Case Ra: · ... 4140 2 Dear Sir: A property of the second secon 1.4 . 4 15:44 Your office stated that it was believed this individual was Your office stated that it was believed this individual was identical with Pavel P. Klarin, a Vice Consul of the Russian Concluste-Cemeral in New York City, and a suspected Russian agent who had left the United States for Mexico in Movember 1945, but has not been located. You were advised by Bureau cable dated February 24, 1944 that the Russian Consulate Gameral in New York City is located at 7 East Cist Street, and were requested to effect a discreet surveil-lance of Klarin and to forward a pisture taken of him and Probhorow at the Mexican airport. Attached for your use are three photographs of Xlarin together with his signature. You should advise the Bureau as soon as possible whether Klarin is identical with the unidentified individual mentioned above. For your information and the information of the affices receiving copies of this letter, the following is set forth. This should be maintained in a strictly confidential manner. You are aware numerous secret writing letters in this case were intercepted up until <sup>3</sup> Hovenber 10:3, at which time it appears that the subjects became approhensive of the scourity of their mothed of communication. They indicated that couriers were to be used in the future for their communications, and we know that an attempt was actually made to use itrs. Auna Colloms, How fork City, as a courier. 1 ÷ Ë, DECLASSIFIED BY\_ SALC ON. 30-9 1 ۰. مدارية أأدله 55

Hoover to Birch D. O'Neal, "Alto Case," 26 February 1944, Central Intelligence Agency, Leon Tarasov file.




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
12. Edward P. Stettinius, Jr., Memorandum for the President, "Soviet Codes," 27 December 1944. .... DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON December 27, 1944 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT Subject: Soviet Codes You will recall our conversation on the Soviet codes. I have informed General Donovan that he should send through General Deane in Moscow to General Fetin, the Soviet General with whom Donovan deals on all. matters connected with the exchange of information in his field, a message informing the Soviet Govern-ment that in dealing with other matters one of our agencies had run across certain material which purported to be related to Russian messages sent in code. He was also asked to explain that we had taken advantage of the opportunity to prevent this material from falling into the hands of the enemy and that we would immediately make it available to the Soviet Government if they so desired. I feel sure that this will take care of the matter, as the Soviet Government will be informed and will see that we are fully disposed to cooperate with them and not retain any material which they themselves might desire to have. DECLASSIFIED Dept. Letter, 1-11-72 By J. Scheuble Date FEB 1 8 1972 59

Edward P. Stettinius, Jr., Memorandum for the President, "Soviet Codes," 27 December 1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, President's Secretary's Files (Subject File), "Russia–1944," box 49.

13. Hoover to Matthew Connelly, 12 September 1945. NET (PJF - SUBT /195 JOHN EDGAR HOOVER DIRECTOR Rederal Bureau of Investigation United States Department of Justice Washington, D. C. POP SHORE September 12, 1945 Honorable Matthew Connelly Secretary to the President VICE COPY The White House Washington, D. C. NGT 78-5 (FBI Memo 9-21-85) Dear Mr. Connelly: The Royal Canadian Mounted Police have advised that they have obtained positive information through a former employee of the Soviet Military Attache at Ottawa, Canada, that the Soviets have an extensive espionage network in Canada. The Soviets have made the obtaining of complete information regarding the atomic bomb the Number One project of Soviet espionage and these data must be obtained before the end of this year. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police report that there is considerable loose talk in the Office of the Soviet Military Attache in Ottawa regarding the "next war" which the Soviet Union will have with the Anglo-American nations. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police received from the same source information that an assistant to an Assistant Secretary of State under Mr. Stettinius, was a paid Soviet spy. This man's name, or nickname, is unknown at the present time but further inquiry is being made by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in an effort to obtain further identifying data. No information regarding this situation is being furnished to the State Department in the absence of further identifying data. With regard to the atomic bomb project, Dr. Allen May, a British scientist assigned to the McGill University Laboratory in Canada, has been identified as a paid Soviet spy of long standing. May spent some time during September, 1944, at the Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago, working on the separation process for uranium and is well informed as to the methods of setting up uranium piles or lattices.

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Hoover to Matthew Connelly, 12 September 1945, Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary's Files (Subject File), "FBI—Atomic bomb," box 167.



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(Continued)

14. Hoover to Frederick B. Lyon, 24 September 1945.

EDGAR MOOVER Federal Bureau of Investigation United States Department of Justice Washington, 9. C. SPECIAL MRSSENGRE SEF 27/ 1945 Date: September 24, 1945 Mr. Frederick B. Lyon To: r, Chief Division of Foreign Activity Correlation State Department Mashington, D. C. Haroas. John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY m Э Reference is made to my memorandum of September 18, 1945. Additional information has been obtained by a Bureau representative from Igor  $\mathcal{A}^{\mathbb{Z}}$ Guzenko as follows: Ю Ö Ð INTEPNATIONAL ORGANIZATION ъ0 0 دکہ Qurenko stated that all intelligence activities outside the Soviet ົ່ານ Union and inside the Soviet Union are coordinated by G. M. Malenkov, a member. of the Political Direau of the All Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a member of the Central Committee of the same organization and the man who is Ù 1 mentioned by many Soviet officials as Stelin's successor. Malenkov, according to Guzenko, is actually the head of all intelligence activity, and Wilitary Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, the NAVD and the political apparatus are all ultimately responsible to him. There are numerous jurisdictional clashes, particularly between the 1 Military and Maval Intelligence organizations and the MMTD. All such matters are referred to Malenkov. lialenkov is the sotual head of the political apparatus in foreign countries and all communications, reports, et cetera, from the Political Secretary in any Enbassy are sent directly to Malenkov and not to Molotov or mi/R any person in the Peoples Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Likewise, no communication from the Military or Naval Attaches in any Embassy would go to Molotov. Such communications go to the Chief of -Esplonage for the area covering the particular Embassy. 500 In the same way, the Embassy Secretary who represents the NKVD does not send any correspondence to the Peoples Commissariat of Foreign Affair According to Guzenko, the only person in the Embassy who would be TORYICTORY 24 BUY corresponding with the Peoples Commissariat of Foreign Affairs would the Ambassador himself, who in every instance is only a front, and possibly one or two men close to the Ambassador who are called "innocents. DECLASSIFIED BY SPRCCCC 63


Hoover to Frederick B. Lyon, 24 September 1945, Central Intelligence Agency, Igor Gouzenko file.

14. (Continued)

Sec. 3 Guzenko stressed that the Embassador was advised in general terms of Dilitical and economic watters which the Folitical Secretary, the ENVD representative and the Filitary or Maval Attaches receive and which they felt would possibly be of interest to the Anbassador. The Anbassador, however, is not consulted or advised with regard to the primary functions of these intelligence organizations. According to Guzenko, he has heard discussions in the Soviet Embassy at Strawa indicating that the present system of supervising the activities of the Communist Party of a particular country through the Political Secretary in the Schasty is much more efficient and much more effective than the old curbersone Comintern setup. Under the present organization, the directives issued by Malenkov through the Embassies to the Parties throughout the world are much more direct and there is less possibility of misinterpretation. The man in the Embassy in Canada who handles political matters is Gousarov, the Third Secretary, who has his own cryptographer, one Patony, who also acts as a door guard at the Embassy. The aforementioned system is known to Guzenko to be in operation in The differentiationed system is known to cuzenko to be in operation in the United States, Canada and Mexico and possibly in the other Western Hemisphere countries. It is also in effect in Great Britain, to his personal knowledge. He believes that this system is likewise in effect in all other countries in the world where the Soviets have diplomatic establishments, although there are variations for those countries occupied by the Red Army. Guzenko states that in the Western Memisphere and in Ureat Britain no reports are ever made to Moscow directly by individual espionage agents, whether they refer to Military, Industrial or Political Espionage. All such reports clear through the Embassies and are transmitted by the Embassies. SOVIET PENETRATION OF DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHIENTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES Guzenko stated that from conversations which he had heard in the Embassy and from traffic which he had read, it appeared the Soviets were intending to plant many Soviet espionage agents in the diplomatic establishments already in the United States and Canada, as well as in those diplomatic establishments already in the United States and Canada, as well as in those diplomatic establishments which are yet to be set up in the United States. These espionage agents are to be sent from Eastern, Central and Falkan European countries. These would number between 50% to 100% of the employees below the rank of Ambassador and would actually be Soviet tweined Hilitery Intelligence. WWD on Consistent men trained Military Intelligence, MKVD or Comintern men. Guzenko pointed out that Lieutenant Kulakov had told him that one of his, Kulakov's, best friends is an officer in the MKYD. This MKVD officer is - 2 -. ...

(Continued)


14. (Continued)



14. (Continued)

ate the Is stated that he had been told that the Soviet Union's budget for war, which would include intelligence activities, appropriations for the Red Army and Red Mavy and for war production, would be greater during the coming year, Thich was ostensibly a year of peace, than it had been last year during a year of actual warfare. He further stated that he had been informed that the Soviet Union was He further stated that he had been informed that the poviet union was not converting its factories to consumer goods production, such as the United hand, the Soviets were increasing their war potential by setting up additional-plants devoted solely to war production in Siberia. He stated that he was in-formed that the Soviets would continue to increase their industrial production for and contain consumer goods from factories in the satellite states for war and would obtain consumer goods from factories in the satellite states of Eastern Europe and through purchases in the Western Hemisphere. Guzenko stated that the Soviets before the use of the atomic borb were confident that within ten years their military potential would enable them to conquer the world. Since the atomic bond has been used by the United States, they have set their calendar ahead and have instructed all espionage agents to No. 1 espionage project. They have issued instructions that this information about de obtained by the end of this year, 1945. Guzenko stated that the last message received at the Embassy from Moscow before he left on September 5, 1945, was stressing the necessity for obtaining the atomic bomb before the end of this year. he was asked whether this meant the Soviets had set their calendar up the full ten years. He stated he did not know, but that he was merely telling what he knew. Buzenko stated that all responsible Soviet officials know that the Soviet Union is siming toward beating the United States and Creat Britain in the next war, which will permit the Sovietization of the entire world. . THE IDENTITY OF SOVIET AGENT IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT Guzenko was questioned carefully regarding the possible identity of the individual in the Department of State under Stattinius who is a Soviet spy. Cuzenko stated he did not know the man's name but that he had been told that an Assistant to Stettinius was a Soviet spy. This information came to him in the following manner: After the arrival of Kulakov in Ottawa in the Summer of 1945, Kulakov and Guzenko got into a discussion on the agencies of the Canadian organization as compared to the United States organization. Guženko was bearing in mind the - 4 -

(Continued)



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
15. Hoover to Brigadier General Harry Hawkins Vaughan, 8 November 1945.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER DIRECTOR y cm. Whites Rederal Bureau of Investigation United States Department of Justice TIMES 11-18-53 (P Washington, B. C. 18:15 / Arr. Bate 6- 8-70 November 8, 1945 TOP SECRET BY SPECIAL MESSENGER Brigadier General Harry Hawkins Vaughan Military Aide to the President DECLASSIFIED E. O. 11637. Soc. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) THE TIEST. Soc. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) THE TIEST. Soc. 8(E). THE TIEST PROJECT DET 76 - 7 By NLT. MC. NARS Date 10.29.76 The White House Washington, D. C. Merca 180 PC-UKOT SERVISE Harry Dear General Vaughan: GOVES As a result of the Bureau's investigative operations, information has been recently developed from a highly con-fidential source indicating that a number of persons employed by the Government of the United States have been furnishing data and information to persons outside the Federal Government, who are in turn transmitting this information to espionage agents of the Source Government. At the present time it is impossible to determine exactly how many of these people had actual knowledge of the disposition being made of the informa-tion they mere transmitting. The investigation homewor at tion they were transmitting. The investigation, however, at this point has indicated that the persons named hereinafter were actually the source from which information passing through the Soviet espionage system was being obtained, and I am con-tinuing vigorous investigation for the purpose of establishing the degree and nature of the complicity of these people in The Bureau's information at this time indicates that the following persons were participants in this operation or were utilized by principals in this ring for the purpose of obtaining data in which the Soviet is interested: Dr. Gregory Silvermaster, a long time employee of the Department of Agriculture. Harry Dexter White, Assistant to the Secretary of the George Silverman, formerly employed by the Railroad Retirement Board, and now reportedly in the War Department. Laughlin Currie, former Administrative Assistant to the late President Roosevelt.

69

15.

Hoover to Brigadier General Harry Hawkins Vaughan, 8 November 1945, Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary's Files(Subject File), "FBI—S," box 169.




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
15. (Continued)

	- <i>3-</i>		
Washington, D. C ported, the contac y two weeks and w f forty rolls of	• or New York t man made tr ould pick up 35-millimeter	City. In the p ips to Washingto. on such occasion. film.	ast, n, D. C. ' s an
Investigation of y, but I thought d in having the f	this matter that the Pres oregoing prel	is being pushed ident and you wo iminary data imm	uld be ediately.
With expressions	of my highes	t esteem and bes	ŧ
Covertie	Sincer J. Cd.	ely yours,	
· .			
	Investigation of y, but I thought d in having the f	Washington, D. C. or New York orted, the contact man made tr y two weeks and would pick up f forty rolls of 35-millimeter Investigation of this matter y, but I thought that the Pres d in having the foregoing prel With expressions of my highes	Washington, D. C. or New York City. In the poorted, the contact man made trips to Washington y two weeks and would pick up on such occasion. f forty rolls of 35-millimeter film. Investigation of this matter is being pushed y, but I thought that the President and you wou d in having the foregoing preliminary data imme With expressions of my highest esteem and best Sincerely yours,


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Hoover to Vaughan, 1 February 1946, Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary's Files (Subject File), "FBI—W," box 169 [Attachment not included].




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


17. Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Underground Soviet Espionage Organization [NKVD] in Agencies of the US Government," 21 October 1946 [Excerpt].

Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Underground Soviet Espionage Organization (NKVD) in Agencies of the US Government," 21 October 1946, Harry S. Truman Library, White House Central Files (Confidential File), "Justice" (7), box 22 [Excerpt].




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
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
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
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
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







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
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


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


85


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
Charles Runyon [Department of State], Memorandum for the File, "Walter Krivitsky," 10 June 1947, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 59 (Department of State).



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



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
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






19.

[Meredith Knox Gardner], "Covernames in Diplomatic Traffic," 30 August 1947, National Security Agency, Venona Collection, box D017.



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# TOP SECRET CREAM

The classic example for the "henceforth" formula is in a message of 23 August 1944, Mew Fort-Moscow, internal address SEMION. There occurs the expression "MALUICA vitality Semicnovich (henceforth "EM")." The next sentence starts with "EM"s". Now, Vitality Semicnovich Mamluiga (usual transliteration; Vitalit Semicorich Manlyga) is the name of a person known to have been with the Soviet Purchasing Commission. After giving his name in full, the originator of the message gave hin a covername and immediately proceeded to use it. (EM is not known cutside this message, the rest of which is not yet readable; but see section 15.) In this case, where perhaps the need for security was not great, the covername to be the name of the initial letter of MAMLUICA--M. This circumstance must not, however, lead us to employ the term "covername" for initials used for the sake of brevity, the expansion of which is always evident from other passages in the message concerned. (Covernames themselves

### 5. Reliability of "readings".

In the following it must be borne in mind that some of the covernames are In the following it must be borne in mind that some of the covernames are expressed by single code groups not yot found in other contexts and others contain groups not yet found in other contexts. When any form has been assumed for the equivalent of such a group, it is here generally followed by a question mark. The forms assumed are based (1) on calculations made possible by the fact that the former assumed are based (2) on calculations made possible by the fact that the second part code and that complete one-part codes of the same length are available (this process of comparison and calculation has yielded many values that were later verified) and (2) on the analogy of verified cover-names. As maximized below, the covernames fall in part into "families".

### 6. Families of covernames.

It has become orident that many of the covernames can be put into cate-gories on the basis of some similarity between them. In the Report of the Royal Commission we find the alliterating family BACK, BACON, BADEAU, BACIEY (all members of the Group "Research"; of. p. 729). We find a Promotheus that seems to belong to a "mythology" family, examples of which in are Jupiter and Cerës. In New York message 758 appended below, we find Erie immediately followed by Huron (in fact, Erie gave the clue for the identi-fication of Huron). There is a family ofwancient Phoenician cities: Carthage, Tire. and Sidon. Tire, and Sidon.


The errangements of the material from this point will be based on such categories. First, covornames apparently for persons will be listed: Addresses, signatures, specifically Russian Christian names, Christian names not specifi-cally Russian, relationships and conditions of age, station and calling, mythological names, names of animals, names of plants, and miscellaneous. Then covornames apparently for places and institutions will be listed: Ancient

### TOP SECRET CREAM


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### TOP SECRET CREAM

#### 9. Specifically Russian Christian rames.

Some covernemes that are Russian Christian names have already been mentioned in sections 7 and 8. Others are as follows:

ARSENIY (Arsonius):	in 5 New York messages, 16 June-22 December 1944.
VITALIY (Vitalis):	occurs in 3 messages, 9 August, 23 August 31 December 1944. Also occurs in a real name (see MAMIUIGA in section 4.)
YAKOV? (Jacob):	was GHOM before September 1944.
AKTIJ (Joschim):	occurs 8 times in 8 messages (all with a SEMION address), 15 June-28 Dec. 1944. See section 8.

#### 10. Christian names not specifically Russian.

Although many Soviet citizens have Christian names virtually identical with name forms in other languages than Russian, it seems safe to set up a category that would include vaguely international forms together with definitely non-Russian forms. In connection with ecome of these names, the following quotation from This is My Story by Louis Francis Budenz, former managing editor of the Paily Worker, (McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York and London: /947) pp. 138-159, is given for whatever reference value it may have.

the so-called "Dutch" or German, commade--though his accent was indeterminate to my untrained sar--was the first of a long line of personages with foreign accents and foreign origins who paraded through the generating apparatus of the Communist party of the U.S.A. No one, and least of all any well-educated American, has any complaint about full participation of the foreign born in American life; our own ancestors came from after to make up this land of the free. But the right of these who are agents of a foreign power to cross our borders under altrast and order American citizens about, is another matter. Net, to my surprise, this was what I found in the building at Thirty-five East Twelfth Street when I entered it and began to work there.

Strict when I entered it and began to work there. These mesn of many names can no names bore aliases like Edwards\*--carelessly chosen plurals of "Christian names" such as Roberts, Richards, Stevens, Michaels, Johns and, occasionally, something more distinctive taken from England or the Middle West. The second one of these gentlemen to impress himself upon me was "Reberts," then acting in a vital secretaris capacity in the Farty. That is, he was one of the chief factors in the national sector. Still in the stage of pleasantries upon such matters, I had gaily referred to him as "The Chesh're Cat Commisser" because of his perpetual mechanical smile. It was not unpleasant but unreal. Like the


\* Budonz had met Gerhard Eisler under the name of Edwards; see pp 135 and 137 and his testimony in District Court, Washington, on 24 July 1947.

## TOP SECRET CREAM

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· ·	بری دیده همه در این د	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	TOPSE	CRET CREAM
	GENRI(H) (Henry):	was TAM before October 1944. See the last paragraph above.
	DZHON (John):	was GUDZON before October 1944; occurs once 14 December 1944, with AMUR?
	PEIER:	was CHORNOY? (Black) before October 1944.
	CEARL'Z (Charles):	was something else until October 1944.
	ERIK?:	was something else until October 1944.
	BEIS?:	Camborra, twice 1 September 1945. Seems to have -furnished information on the Anstralian Security Service. Same name twice from New York, 26 July and 16 August 1944.
	KLOD (Claude):	Canberra, April-October 1945. KLOD is Canberra's regular purveyor of information; he occurs 13 time 8 times in the formula "'KLOD' has communicated".
	BIK (Bick?):	22 July 1944; message contains names DuPont, Ford, Mellon, Weir, Pew.
	(CHARL'E BRUND (Cherle	B Eruno): in N.Y. message 14 June 1944, this is the name HERRI? is to give as a password at the rendezvous.)
	DORA:	in two messages, 23 October 1944 and 4 January, 1945.
	KORA (Cora):	20 December 1944.
та 1. ст. <b>Х</b>	OLA:	a Washington female agent; name changed to some- thing else in October 1944. Occurs in 2 messages, 3 May and 10 Angust 1944, both dealing with KOMAR (that is, probably KRAVCHENKO). It is planned to make these messages the subject of a separate repor In the former OIA is described as seeking more detailed information on the KDMAR affair. In the latter she has something to do with the supposition that (does not think that?) KDMAR is staying at 2009 West 97th Street.
	RITA:	mentioned 10 August 1944 in the phrase "the first two parts (of?) the business of RITA". (The message also mentions KOMAR, issue of IA VOZ/Merico City Communist organ/ for 7 June, HENRI?).
• .		Conditions of Age, Station and Calling.
		in 3 messages, 17 May - 27 December 1944.
•••	SVAT (Matchmaker: Son-	or Daughter-in-law's Father): 23 Aug. and 6 Dec. 1944. - 7 -
i	TOP SE	CRET CREAM

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(Continued)

	TOP SE	CRET CREAM
	•••••	9 May - 14 August 1944.
• •	NABOB (Rabob):	apparently a high American diplomatic official. Occurs 5 times in 3 messages, 9 May, 7 September, 14 December 1947; in massage of 7 September, in connection with postwar treatment of Germany.
	ATAMAN (Hetman):	occurs 4 times in 3 messages, 17 May, 7 June, 6 October, 1944.
	PILOT? (Pilot):	was DORAL'D before September 1944.
12.	Mythological Names:	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	YUPITER (Jupiter):	became ORIOL? (Eagle) in October 1944.
	SERES (Ceres):	in 4 messeages, 4 May - 25 July 1944.
·	MUZA (Muso):	4 July 1944; communicated concerning Secret Funds Division, Emerson Bigelow, aid of 92,000,000 Portuguese escudos, Northern European division of Secret Intelligence Branch, etc.
	EHO (Echo):	became DIX in October 1944; cccurs 14 times, 2 May 23 October, 1944.°
	GROM (Gnome);	beceme YAKOV? in September 1944. Occurs 3 times, 18 May, 16 June, 25 July.
13.	Names of enimals.	
	TIULEN' (Seal);	lø August 1944, (a KOMAR or Kravchenko message).
	ORIOL? (Eagle):	was MUPITER until October 1944. Occurs 5 Dec. 1944
	LUN° (Een Harrier):	in 4 messages, 3 May- 17 August 1944.
	GUS' (Goose):	changed to something else October 1944.
	KOMAR (Gnat etc.):	probably covername for Viktor Alacaevarich <u>Kreychenko.</u> For a complete development of this idea, a separate report would be nacesaery. Occurs in 8 messages so far partly read, 6 between 3 and 23 May, 1944, 2 on 10 August, 1944; KDMAR is the object of intense interest, including attempts to locate him (20 May: "is living with KERENSKOY in the state of Connecticut etc.").
		- 8 -
· ·	TOP SE	CRET CREAM

(Continued)

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	TOP SE	CRET CREAM
14.	Names of plants.	
. ·	TIUL'PAN (Tulip):	1ø August 1944; (a KOMAR or Kravchenko message) changed to something beginning with KAN Sept. 1944.
15.	Miscellaneous.	
	LIB?? (Lieb?) or possibl	y LIBERAL: was ARTENKO until Sept. 1944. Occurs 6 times, 22 October - 26 December 1944. Message of 27 November speaks of his wifs ETHEL, 29 years old married (1) 5 years, "husband's work and the role of METR(0) and NLL".
<b></b>	AMUR? (Amour?):	vas ZEA?et (Jeannette??) before October 1944; occurs once 14 December 1944 with DZEON.
: •	MFTR (like many other ed	uivalences in the code book, this might have an alternative reading, perhaps METRO; as METR it means "metor" and as METRO it is a nickname, applied for example to the Peris subway system): was SEAUT until September 1944. Occurs 27 How. 19 (something about LIBS's wife Ethel? %knowing about her husband's work and the role of METR(O) and MIL notice in message 70% below how METR(O) and MIL co toggether). Seems to occur 5 December 1944 in phra "METR(O) and THUYSON (Hughsont)". Note on page 7. of the Report of the Royal Commission: "Metro fhe Embassy of the U.S.S.R."
	GRAHT:	occurs 26 May 1944 in phrase "of GRANT and KARL"; message mentions FFI (Forces Francais de'1 Intérieur?) or possibly a name ending in FFI (FFY) In 1945, GRANT was used in Canada as the covername of Colonel Nikoloy Zabotin, Soviet Military Attach in Ottawa and head of military intelligence work i Canada (see Report of the Royal Commission).
	174 (M):	covername of Vitaliy Semionovich Memluigs in mease of 23 August 1944. He was a member of the Soviet Purchasing Commission, having entered the U.S. in December 1943. He was still here in September 194 This name may be RMA, and may be the same EMA list 28 November 1944 (see below).
• .	KANUK? (Canuck?):	Occurs 4 times in 2 messages, 24 July and 1 August 1944.
• •	SI (C?):	occurs 23 October and 6 December 1944.
	PA (Pa?):	occurs 14 December 1944.
		- 9 -
	TOP SE	CRET CREAM


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
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· .		بر محمد د	· · · · · · · ·
	•	TOP SEC	CRET CREAM
	·	Tist of 28 Formier 10th	In a message of that date the following names
		Krug), KIN? (was R?-	ating from New York: KRUC (Circle, or the name OLOV until October 1944), EMA,e;, St? wame)WALLAR (Painter), YAN (Jan), ENK
	16.	Covernames apparently for	places and institutions:
		Ancient places (also rive	rs, etc.).
•		TIR (Type):	covername for New York.
		SIDON (Siden):	covername for London.
		KARFAGEI (Carthage);	covername for Washington.
		NIL (Nilo?):	was something beginning with TU (TLMAR, Mist?) until September 1944; linked with METR, which see.
	17.	Geographical fectures.	
		STRAHA (Land, Country):	covername for the United States.
		OSTROV (Island):	covername for Greet Britain; changed October 1944. to something deginning with EX (or EX).
		OSTROVITIANIN (Islander):	Briton.
		DEREVNIA (the Country /1.	e., rural districts/): covername for Mexico.
		DEREVENSKOY (Country, Rus	al): Mexican.
		ZEMLIAR (Fellow Countryme	n): Coverword for some nationality, possibly U.S.
	18.	Miscellaneous.	· ·
		BANK (the Bank):	probably covername for the U.S. State Department; occurs 24 times, (once in the plural from Canberra, probably in the literal sense).
		DOM STARUHI (the Old Wome	n's House): in 2 messages, 26 May and 10 Aug. 1944.
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
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20. No author [probably William K. Harvey, CIA], Memorandum for the File, "COMRAP,"


20. No

author [probably William K. Harvey, CIA], Memorandum for the File, "COMRAP," 6 February 1948, Central Intelligence Agency, Vassili M. Zarubin file.




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
107

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
108

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
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


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


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21. Through the investigation of the COMRAP case, in addition to the large number of individuals identified as major participants, many others were involved as strongly suspect Soviet agents. Very briefly, there are set out below the identities of a number of these individuals.

Max and Grace GRANICH. These two individuals, husband and wife, who have long been active in Communist and Communist Front Circles in the New York area were identified as mail drops used in the operation of this parallel by NELSON'and ENDNAN. Both of them have been active in the past in the Far East and have maintained an intense interest in Far Eastern affairs. In 1947 they moved to a farm in New England, and are known to have expressed to associates a desire to return to China at some <u>Madame Sun Yat Ser</u> containing conspiratorial messages and signed by her with the cover name <u>"Sury"</u>. It is noted that one of these letters to the GRANICH's mentioned the illegal disclosure of classified documents in connection with the <u>Philip Jacob</u> <u>JAFFE</u> case and strongly suspect, in that connection, of working for Soviet Intelligence. Madame Sun Yat Ser's letter mentioned SERVICE as a "reliable individual"

In the summer of 1945 three Chinese Communist delegates to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco visited Max and Grace GRANICH in New York and were almost immediately escorted by Grace GRANICH to an apartment in lower Manhattan, subsequently identified as occupied by Aube TZERKO, a concert planist, born in Canada under the name of <u>Abraham KOTZERK</u>. TZERKO became of extreme interest in February 1946, when he was contacted by <u>Sam CARE</u> (real name <u>Schmil KOGAN</u>). It will be recalled that CARR was one of the principal recruiting agents in the GRU espionage ring operated in Canada by Colonel Nikolai ZADUIN from the summer of 1943 until back to Canada from Hawana, Cuba, where as a fraternal delegate of the Canadian Communist Party of Canada) he had attended a National Congress of the Canadian Communist Party. Subsequent investigation reflected that TZERKO was involved in the disappearance in Canada of <u>Sam CARE</u> in April 1946. It was never possible to ascertain the exact significance of the visit to TZERKO's apartment by the three important Chinese Communists attending the UNCIO.

Alexander <u>BITTELMAN</u> (real name <u>Uschur BITTELMACHER</u>). BITTELMAN was drawn into the <u>CAMAP</u> case through his close and frequent contacts with the principal figures indirectly connected with the activities of this net. <u>BITTELMAN</u>, who was born in Russia, and whose deportation was requested very recently by the Department of Justice, has long been an important national functionary of the CPUSA. He has interested himself particularly in Party organization and propaganda among the Jewish minority elements and he is considered by many Party leaders to be the

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(Continued)

-11foremost Marxist, Leninist, Stalinist dialectician in the Party. The exact extent of EITTELMAN's intelligence activities has never definitely been ascertained. of EITTELMAN's intelligence activities has never definitely been ascertained. <u>Alexander THACHTEMENE</u>. TRACHTEMEERG, a member of the National Committee of the Farty is the director of International Publishers, most important of the Com-munist Party publishing firms. TRACHTEMEERG figured in the COMFAP investigation through his intimate association with many of the other subjects thereof. Collat-erally, it was ascertained that he was in close contact with a number of other strongly suspect Soviet agents, not implicated, so far as is known in this case, but definitely implicated in other Soviet exploringe operations. Of particular in-terest in this regard is TRACHTEMERG's association with Joseph Milton-MERNSTEIN, a minor Party figure for many years, has been closely connected with a number of individuals who have figured in the <u>GREGOR</u> case, involving, it will be recalled, to have been described by Fhilip Jacob JAFFE as an important Soviet explonage agent. There is good reason to believe, on the basis of certain correspondence between subjects in the GREGORT case referring to BERNSTEIN, that at least for several years during world war II HEENNSTEIN may have been operating a Soviet explomage parallel in Washington, D.C., identical with the so-called Third Parallel referred to by GREGORT about which GREGORT knew practically nothing.

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(Continued)

21. George M. Elsey, Memorandum for Mr. [Clark M.] Clifford, 16 August 1948.

DECLASSIFIED		
E.O. 11852, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) DEPT. OF JUSTICE LTR. 2-26-73		
BY ALLT , NARS Date 2.6.73 TH	E WHITE HOUSE	
	WASHINGTON	
-SECRET	August 16, 1	1948
·		
Memorandum for Mr. Cliffo	rd:	
	epresents the consensus of opini	
meeting this morning with	the Attorney General and Mr. Pe	eyton Ford:
	ent should not at this time make	
statement regarding by Mr. Spingarn.	"spies" along the lines propose	90
(2) Attention	will be given by Justice to the	possi-
bility and desirabi	lity of referring the question of	of
	the Federal Government to a bi- the Hoover Commission.	-par or san
(3) Justice sh	ould make every effort to ascert	tain if
M. Attalena Chambone	in milter of popping	
(3年) 《meetigation (次) The Attorn	ey General will furnish the Whit	te House
with a description	of the data Miss Bentley claims	to have
House should endeav	agents during the war, and the or to determine how much of this	5 informa-
tion was freely ava	ilable to the Soviet Government aison between the U.S. and the U	through IsS.S.R.
The purpose of this	; would be to make it clear that	Miss
	cessful in transmitting secret nut they did not already have.	
	House should ascertain the facts	s concern-
ing the retention o	of Mr. Remington in OWMR, his tra	insfer to
the Council of Econ to the Department of	nomic Advisers and his subsequent of Commerce.	t transfer
-		
	,	No. 1
	h. In. E	
	GEORGE M. ELSEY	

21.

George M. Elsey, Memorandum for Mr. [Clark M.] Clifford, 16 August 1948, Harry S. Truman Library, Clark M. Clifford Papers, "Loyalty Investigations," box 11.

22. [Harry S. Truman] to the Attorney General, 16 December 1948.

The President THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON December 16, 1948 Memorandum for: Attorney General The President From: I wonder if we could not get a statement of facts from the FBI about the meddling of the House Un-American Activities Committee and how they dried up sources of information which would have been accessible in the prosecution of spies and communists. Their meddling efforts were in fact a "red herring" to detract attention not only from the shortcomings of the 80th Congress but also contributed to the escape of certain communists who should have been indicted. I'll appreciate it if you will look into this a little bit and we will talk it over at the Cabinet meeting tomorrow. ATTO 4.79 FICE OF THE RECEIVED DEC 10 1948 341-pm TTORNEY GENERA 119

22.

[Harry S. Truman] to the Attorney General, 16 December 1948, Harry S. Truman Library, Tom Clark Papers, "Attorney General— White House/President, 1948," box 83.

23. D. M. Ladd, Memorandum to the Director [J. Edgar Hoover], "JAY DAVID WHITTAKER CHAMBERS," 29 December 1948. Office Memorandum . UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT The Director DATE: December 29, 1948 D. M. Ladd SUBJECT: JAY DAVID WHITTAKER CHAMBERS, with aliases; et al; PERJURY ESPIONAGE - R Reference is made to my memorandum to you dated December 11 1948, in which you were advised that the notes of Mr. Adolf Berle conc erning his interview with Whittaker Chambers were turned over to the Bureau in June of 1943. You attached a routing slip to my memorandum and inquired, "Do I understand correctly that Chambers talked to Berle in 1939; we interviewed him first in May 1942; and Berle gave us information first in June 1943? How did we come to contact Chambers in 1942 and did we take any investigative action then? What did we do in the year from May 1942 to June 1943 about the data received from Chembers? H." You subsequently inquired by phone on December 27 as to why we did not interview Chambers sooner than May 13, 1942. The following sets forth in chronological order the various investigative steps taken by the Bureau. The Bureau's first reference to Whittaker Chambers appeared in a mhlet published in 1932 by International Pamphlets, 799 Broadway, New York. (61-7562-Sub 2-161) This pamphlet is a reprint of a short story by Whittaker Chambers entitled "Can You Hear Their Voices? - The Arkensas Farmers' Fight For Food" which was first published in the "New Masses" for March, 1931. This item was referred to by a Miss Hazel Ruffman of the Federal Theater Project in New York City in testimony before the Special Committee on Un-American Activities (Dies Committee) on August 19, 1938. (61-7582, Volume 1, page 778) The New York Office of the Bureau on October 18, 1940; submitted the original report of Confidential Informant Bob M dated September 16, 1940, advising that Ludwig Lore, a former member of the Communist Party and likewise a contast of this Bureau, had told Bob M about an unidentified individual who had been a high officer in the GPU for eight years abroad and seven years in this country. (There was nothing at this time to identify the individual referred to by Lore as Whitteker Chambers.) INDEXED - 28 IN 1977 /353 (6) RECORDED - 28 IN 1977 / 353 (6) 657 RECORDED - 28 By letter dated November 13, 1940, the Bureau instructed the New York Office to make every effort to determine the identity of this unidentified individual for the purpose of securing whatever information he had in his possession (61-7566-1977; 100-25824-1) IN:EN 35 :65 JAN 31 1949

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23. D. M.

Ladd, Memorandum to the Director [J. Edgar Hoover], "JAY DAVID WHITTAKER CHAMBERS," 29 December 1948, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Reading Room, Alger Hiss File. Memorandum to the Director

On February 28, 1941, Mr. Adolf Borle of the Department of State requested someone from the Bureau to contact him reparding Chambers. On March 1, 1941, Mr. Rosen advised Mr. Berle's secretary that it was his understanding that Mr. Carson and Mr. Foxworth of the Bureau had an appointment with Mr. Berle. (100-25824-1X)

At this time there was a nationalistic tendency card filed in the Bureau indices which indicated that Whittaker Chambers was alleged to be a Communist and formerly a member of the IWW, also former staff editor of the "Daily Worker" and contributing editor of "New Masses."

On March 3, 1941, Mr. Forworth in a memorandum to you made reference to his conversation with you that date concerning Whittaker Chambers. Reference was made to the aforementioned nationalistic tendency card and Forworth stated, "We are not conducting any investigation and I have accordingly informed Mr. Berle." (100-25824-181)

On March 10, 1941, Mr. Berle telephonically advised Mr. Forworth that he was afraid that the Russian agencies were looking for Whitaker Chambers. This matter was not followed up and the memorandum concerning it was merely filed. (100-2582k-LX2) (This is the memorandum which was referred to in the memorandum to you from Assistant Director L. B. Nichols dated September 1, 1948, which prompted the memorandum to all Assistant Directors bringing to the attention of Supervisory personnel the significance of initialing communications.) (100-2582k-52) (ATTACHED)


Information was received on April 29, 1941, from Confidential Informant Victor Riesel, then assistant editor of "New Leader" newspaper, that Whittaker Chambers, a former member of the Communist Party, was then a motion picture reviewer for "Time," "Life" and "Fortune" magazines and was at that time (1941) strongly anti-Communist. (100-5740-5)

On May 9, 1941, the New York Office reported an interview with Mr. Ludwig Lore on May 8, 1941, pursuant to the Bureau instructions of November 13, 1940. Lore declined to furnish the name of the unknown former GPU agent and stated that he had been advised that this man's case had been discussed with the Director of the FBI some six or seven months previous by an intermediary who had suggested that the former GPU agent wanted some sort of immunity guarantee before exposing himself and that the Director had stated that no such agreement could be entered into. Lore also alleged that this former GPU agent had delivered to the President of the United States through a trusted friend who had the necessary

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Memorandum to the Director	
The logical leads in the investigation into the background of	
Whittaker Chambers having been completed, the New York Office zdvised the	
Bureau on March 4, 1942, that an effort would be made to interview Chembers.	
In this regard a follow-up letter was sent to New York on April 30, 1942.(100-25824-2)	
It will be noted that there was an investigative delay from August 18,	
1941 until March 4, 1942, in conducting the necessary investigation into the	
background and activities of Chambers for the purpose of laying the proper	
predication for an interview. The Field was followed by the Eureau on this matter in October, November and December, 1941, and in January, 1942, as new	
information was received or investigative suggestions made. (100-25824-8, 13,	
15, 16, 17, 18, 19)	
It is possible that this investigative delinquency was a reflection of the	
general investigative delinquency in the Field during the period immediately	
prior to and subsequent to Pearl Herbor.	
Chambers was interviewed by Special Agents John R. Paul and E. J.	
Greenwald, Jr. of the New York Office on May 13, 1942, the results being	
transmitted to the Eureau by letter on May 14, 1942. <u>Chambers advised that he</u> had given all of the information which was in his possession to Mr. A. A. Berle	
of the State Department in Weshington, D. C., in September, 1939, and before	
discussing any of the matters with the Agents put through a long distance call	
to Mr. Berle at the latter's home.	
Chambers advised Berle in the presence of the Agents that there were	
present in his office two FBI Agents who wished to secure the information that	
he, Chambers, had given to Berle and asked if this would be all right. Appar-	
ently Berle was in accord for Chambers thanked him and thereafter supplied con- siderable information which he indicated had been furnished previously to	
Mr. Berle in September, 1939. (100-25824-22)	
During the course of this interview Chambers denied that he was	
directly connected with the OCFU and stated that he was in the underground	
movement of the Communist Party, USA as a kind of "morale officer" to guide	
recruits in the Party's policy. He denied that he had ever been to the USSE.	
(In this regard the investigation conducted by the Bureau prior to the interview failed to disclose any indications of travel by Chambers to or residence in the	
- USSR as originally alleged by Ludwig Lore, who you will recall died shortly after	
the conclusion of this investigation, and so was not evailable to recheck allega-	
tions made by him concerning Chambers.) (100-25824-22)	
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Memorandum to the Director

As will be seen from the foregoing, the first knowledge the Bureau had that Chambers had been interviewed by Adolf Berle on September 2, 1939, in Washington, D. C., came to us as a result of our interview with Chambers May 13, 1942. You will recall in connection with this matter SAC Cerson was brought up from Miami to interview Berle on September 3, 1948, regarding the latter's testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee in order to clarify the aubiguities in Berle's testimony and to cause a correction in the inference left by Berle's testimony that he had advised the FBI in 1939 of Chambers' allegations. Mr. Berle advised SAC Carson that his recollection being refreshed, he could state that he does not recall or have any record of any prior conversation with the FBI prior to March. 1941, concerning Chambers and that he does not recall having furnished to the FBI in 1941 any information concerning Chambers' interview with him. Mr. Berle advised SAC Carson on September 5, 1948, that in 1939 (and by inference in 1941 as well) he did not feel free to divulge the content of Chambers' conversation to the FBI inasmuch as Chambers hed indicated that he did not so desire and hed further indicated that he would not back up the story and also did not desire the information furnished to the FBI, particularly if the source was to be revealed. (100-25824-50) The Bureau may have been delinquent in not contacting Mr. Berle immediately upon the conclusion of the Chambers interview regarding the data which Chambers had furnished the Bureau and to Berle, in order to make sure that it was the same. However, Chambers when interviewed on May 13, 1942, had indicated that what he was furnishing to the Bureau at that time was the substance of what he had given to Mr. Berle in September, 1939. An analysis of the Bureau's action with regard to individuals men-An analysis of the Bureau's action with regard to individuals mon-tioned by Chambers in the 1942 interview shows that 21 percens were already subjects of Bureau investigations, as well as two organizations, namely, Antorg Trading Corporation and Tass News Agency. On five other persons, investigations were instituted on the basis of Chambers' allegations. These persons were: (Acimor; Barry Newit, with aliases; Paul Massing; Bed Massing; and Helen Vare (Cappel). Two Individuals, Ralph Scyman and Margaret, frowder, became the sub-jects of investigation at a later date on the basis of information developed through other sources, data furnished by Chambers in each instance already appearing in the Bureau files. With regard to Bowan, it was noted that he was established to be identical with the person mentioned by Chambers as Bud's above established to be identical with the person mentioned by Chambers as Rudy Baker but Chambers was never able to identify Bowman's photograph as Baker. Regarding those individuals mentioned by Chambers, concerning whom no investigative action was undertaken, Mrs. Lile Field and Harold ware were - 5 -

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(Continued)

Memorandum to the Director

dead and the Bureau files contained considerable information regarding yare. Gertrude Schilbach, a German Communist involved in the murder of Ignace Reiss in Switzerland, was not indicated to be in the United States. Isidore Miller was not alleged to be either a Communist or an espionage agent. The circumstances regarding the disappearance of Juliet Poyntz were generally known to the Bureau and Chambers' suspicions contributed nothing to the picture at that time. Chambers mentioned one Post who "was obtained from the underground movement of the Party" and, according to Chambers, became a co-editor of a State Department publication. He has subsequently been identified as Richard Howell Post, a State Department employee and a Loyalty investigation has been conducted concerning him. Chambers mentioned an unnamed individual "connected" with the Communist underground who.was in the Trade Agreement Section of the State Department. This person has been identified as Henry Julian Wadleigh, who was formerly employed by the State Department and who was recently interviewed in connection with the most current allegations of Chambers. As to the latter two individuals, Chambers' statements with regard to them were less positive than as to other persons and he did not state in unequivocal language that they were Party members at the time he left the movement in 1938, as he did in the cases of many of the individuals discussed.

It should be noted that subsequent to the Chambers interview on May 13, 1942, Bureau files an numerous individuals were reviewed, certain investigations were opened, and efforts were made to identify persons named by Chambers, the principal one of which was his superior "Peter." In a report dated December 1, 1942, in the Chambers file, the New York Office identified "Peter," the reputed head of the underground movement of the Communist Party, as J. Peters, author of "The Communist Party, A Manual of Organization." (100-25824-25)

Whittaker Chambers meanwhile had been bedridden with angina pectorus from November, 1942 until Merch 5, 1943, when Agents of this Bureau were able to interview him for a period of five minutes. At this time Chambers identified a photograph of Alexander Stevens, with aliases, as "Peter" his superior in the Communist Party underground. (100-184255-67)


Thereafter, the desirability of determining whether the information furnished to Mr. Berle was identical with that furnished to the Bureau by Chambers became apparent and subsequent to Mr. Berle's recovery from an illness which had afflicted him in May, 1943 (94-4-3859-8) the Liaison Section of the Bureau obtained Mr. Berle's notes of the 1939 interview, which were very

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	Memorandum to the Director
	eketchy and disjointed in June, 1943. Copies of these notes were placed in the Whittaker Chambers file. (100-25824-27)
	The Bureau was probably delinquent in not pressing Mr. Berle in June, 1943, for any independent recollection which he might have had to explain or clarify the ambiguities in his notes, although it is probable that Mr. Berle not having reduced these notes to a memorandum would have been unable to contribute materially to the matters under investigation after a lapse of almost four years since the date of his interview with Chambers.
	Delinquencies noted
	1. The Bureau did not press Mr. Berle for information which he might have had concerning Whittaker Chambers at the time he made his inquiry in March, 1941, concerning the Bureau's possible interest in Chambers. The files do not indicate a definite explanation, but if one exists it might be that the Bureau did not feel that it was desirable to press the Assistant Secretary of State for information which he did not see fit to volunteer con- cerning a subject which had been raised by him.
	2. There was an investigative delinquency in the period required for investigation of the background and activities of Whittaker Chambers from August 18, 1941 to March 4, 1942. An explanation, if such exists, might be the general investigative delinquency in the Field immediately prior to and subsequent to Fearl Harbor.
	3. The Bureau was probably delinquent in not contacting Mr. Berle immediately upon the conclusion of our interview with Whittaker Chambers on May 13, 1942, to determine the substance of the information which had been furnished by Chambers to Berle in 1933. The Bureau waited until June, 1943 to obtain Berle's notes concerning the interview. The only poesible explana- tion for this delinquency was that Chambers' telephone conversation with Berle and his interview with the Agents indicated that he was furnishing the Bureau in May, 1942, the substance of what he had given to Berle in 1939.
-	4. The Bureau was probably delinguent in not pressing Mr. Berle in June, 1943, at the time his notes were obtained, for any independent recol- lection which he might have had of the 1939 conversation in addition to the
	- 7 -

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(Continued)

**UNCRACSIFIED** Office of the Attorney General Washington, B.C. March 16, 1949. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT 1 Re: Proposed deportation of Valentine Α. Cubitchev XW.C usuca As you know, Valentine A. Gubitchev and Judith Coplon have been jointly indicted in New York City for violation of the espionage laws. Gubitchev was an ordinary employee of the United Nations, not entitled to diplometic immunity. Coplon was an employee in the Alien Registration Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. 71332pp This charge is one of conspiracy between the defendants to se-This charge is one of conspiring sources and an are papers of the Depart-inner of Justice concerning national defense. The charges carry poswible penalties against Coplon of a total of 35 years imprisonment, Yon all counts; against Gubitchev, 15 years. The case is due to be tried in the lower court within 30 to 45 days. On March 16 Coplon was indicted alone in Washington, D. C., on a UN wards to copion was indicted alone in Washington, D. C., on a charge of violating the espionage laws and removal of certain records of the Department of Justice, carrying on the first count a possible penalty of 10 years, and on the second of 3 years. This case should be tried in 90 days. In view of the recommendation of the State Department, a copy of which is attached hereto, that Gubitchev be deported to Russia rather than stand trial with Miss Coplon, I desire to submit the following reasons why I think that Gubitchev should be retained in the United States at least until after the trial of the New York case, for the 1. Successful prosecution depends on his presence, for he is one of the principals of the case and his absence affords vast opportunities to Coplon in her defense.  $\chi$ -562 ų, E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 87-3 ×220 x le. F. Loyalty Program Anthesity NIT Wate 4/2/9


24. Tom C. Clark, Memorandum for the President, "Proposed Deportation of Valentine A. Gubitchev," 16 March 1949.

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24. Tom

C. Clark, Memorandum for the President, "Proposed Deportation of Valentine A. Gubitchev," 16 March 1949, Harry S. Truman Library, White House Central Files (Confidential File), "Justice" (4), box 21.

- 2 -2. Coplon has pleaded innocent and in the event we deport Gubitchev she will claim it was done to prevent her from having his testimony in defense. 3. The jury would be adversely affected by the <u>prosecution</u> of this young woman alone. The absence of Gubitchev would, of course, be known to the jury and <u>persecution</u> against Coplon would be charged. 4. The deportation of Gubitchev would undoubtedly cause many to think and say that the Department of Justice never had an es-pionage case against him and never intended to prosecute the case to its conclusion. 5. The public reaction to immediate deportation before trial would, in my opinion, be extremely unfavorable. If Gubitchev were deported the result would be that an American citizen would remain to face possible conviction and imprisonment with the alien Russian being excused from even the embarrassment of a public trial. I cannot, of course, substitute my opinion for that of the State Department in matters of foreign relations. I only wish to state my view of the problems presented. The Secretary of State has asked that I advise him of the decision in this matter by Friday morning. I have furnished him a copy of this memorandum. Another alternative exists, i.e., to prosecute Gubitchev and then permit his deportation to Russia. In this event I am advised by the Secretary of State that this decision could not be made known by the secretary of state that this decision could not be made known until the conclusion of the prosecution. However, it might be pos-sible to inform the Russian Government that Gubichev will have to remain in this country for the trial but that the consideration of his ultimate deportation after trial would remain open. It is my considered recommendation that I be authorized to pro-ceed with the trial of Gubitchev without delay, reserving until a later time the question of deportation. S BAN ON x 20 Attorney General. ×10 130



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25.

[Robert J. Lamphere to Gardner], "FLORA DON WOVSCHIN, With Alias," 9 May 1949, National Security Agency Venona Collection at 49-005.


# 25. [Robert J. Lamphere to Gardner], "FLORA DON WOVSCHIN, With Alias," 9 May 1949.

26. Sidney W. Souers, Memorandum for the President, 22 March 1949.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON March 22, 1949 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: At its 36th Meeting, the National Security Council, including the Secretary of the Treasury and a representative of the Attorney General for this matter, agreed, subject to a dissent by the Secretary of the Army, to recommend that you approve the enclosed draft directive on coordination of internal security (NSC 17/4). The reasons for the dissent by the Secretary of the Army are stated in the enclosed memorandum dated March 21, 1949. SIDNEY W. SOUTRS Executive Secretary APPROVD: L 23, 1949 m Date: 10126.317 133

26.

Sidney W. Souers, Memorandum for the President, 22 March 1949, Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary's Files, National Security Agency File, "Meeting 36," box 205.



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(Continued)

NSC 17/4	CONFIDENT?AL
March 22, 1949	
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NOTE BY THE EXEC	CUTIVE SECRETARY
o	
	SECURITY
References: F	<ul> <li>NSC 17/3</li> <li>Memos for National Security Council from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated November 26, 1948, March 3, and March 21, 1949</li> </ul>
Council considered the ref to a dissent by the Secret to the President that he a enclosed herewith. The re	ring, the National Security Perences and agreed, subject ary of the Army, to recommend approve the proposed directive assons for the dissent by the stated in the Reference memo
the above recommendations, also directed the MSC repr to arrange for the prompt the Secretary of the Army March 21, 1949, and to sub	pproval by the President of the National Security Council esentative on Internal Security study of the points outlined by in the reference memo dated mit for Council consideration respect thereto as are deemed
	SIDNEY W. SOUERS Executive Secretary
The Secretary The Attorney The Secretary The Secretary The Secretary The Secretary	of State of the Treasury of Defense General of the Army
	<del>CONFIDENTIA</del> L
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(Continued)

March	22.	1949	
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CONFIDENTIAL

#### DRAFT

### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE

1. There is hereby established under the National Security Council, pursuant to the provisions of Section 101 of the National Security Act, the following arrangements for the purpose of effecting more adequate and coordinated internal security.

2. The following two permanent committees, together with such secretariat as may be required, shall be responsible for coordinating internal security.

<u>a</u>. The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) is responsible for the coordination of the investigation of all domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security. It consists of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice; Chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; Director of the Intelligence Division, Department of the Army; and the Director of the Office of Special Investigations, Department of the Air Force.

b. The Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) is hereby created and shall be

NSC 17/4

CONFIDENTIAL

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(Continued)

	GONFIDENTIA
	responsible for coordinating all phases of the
	internal security field other than the functions
	outlined in paragraph 2-a above. It shall be
	- composed of representatives from the Departments
	of State, Treasury, and Justice and the National
	Military Establishment.
	3. Both Committees shall invite non-member agency
rep	resentatives as ad hoc members thereof when matters
invo	olving their responsibilities are under consideration.
	4. In accordance with arrangements to be determined
in e	each case, there shall be transferred to the IIC and
the	ICIS for incorporation as subcommittees or for the
abso	orption of their functions such existing committees
as a	are operating in their respective fields of responsi-
bili	ty. The two committees shall also establish such
new	subcommittees as will assist them in carrying out
thei	r responsibilities.
	5. The IIC and the ICIS will, whenever appropriate,
hold	joint meetings or establish joint subcommittees.
	6. The National Security Council shall designate
a re	presentative who, under the direction of the Execu-
tive	Secretary of the NSC, shall:
	a. Assist and advise the NSC in coordinating
	the activities of the IIC and the ICIS;
	$\underline{b}$ . Assist and advise the IIC and the ICIS in
	carrying out their respective responsibilities and
	in collaborating on problems of common interest;
	$\underline{c}$ . Submit to the IIC or the ICIS questions
NSC/	which, in his opinion, require their consideration: 17/4 -2- <b>O<del>GNEIPENTIAL</del></b>

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	OON" IDENTIR	÷
d. As	s representative of the NSC, participate	CISSING !!
-	erver and advisor in all meetings of the	AN ARCINE
IIC and th	-	
	ubmit for consideration by the NSC problems	
	not be resolved by either the IIC or the	
	the two committees acting together, out-	
	divergent solutions which have been pro-	
	his own recommendations;	
	port to the National Security Council from	
	me, at least quarterly, on progress being	
	he provision of adequate internal security	5
—	ve no powers of instruction, direction or	
	n over either the IIC or the ICIS.	
	C and the ICIS shall prepare and submit	
	on and approval by the National Security	
	d charters for the IIC and the ICIS respec-	-
-	partment of Justice representative shall	
serve as the Cha	airman of the ICIS for this purpose. The	
Executive Secret	tary of the National Security Council shall	· .
assist the IIC a	and the ICIS in coordinating the preparatio	n
of the proposed	charters. These charters shall define, in	l
accordance with	the foregoing, the respective functions	
and responsibili	tties of the committees and shall provide	
for their chairm	manship and staff.	
NSC 17/4	3 GONFIDENTIAL	


138

(Continued)

27. [Lamphere to Gardner], "Anatoli Borisovich Gromov," 12 July 1949.

49-018 -TOP SEC ANATOLI BORISOVICH GROMOV It appears that Bademus (Vadim) is identical with Anatoli Borisovich Gromov. He arrived in the United States on September 15, 1944. He was designated as First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C. The early mention in the material of Bademus on July 25, 1944, is not inconsistent inasmuch as it is indicated therein that Bademus was not in the United States at that time. Identifying data concerning Gromov has previously been made available to you. •• First Sec 'y Str Ende to sortie in 1945. declassified by <u>572-C (CUM</u> ON<u>2-30-96</u> ETCOPSE 139

[Lamphere to Gardner], "Anatoli Borisovich Gromov," 12 July 1949, National Security Agency, Venona Collection at 49-018.




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28.


[Lamphere to Gardner], "EMIL JULIUS KLAUS FUCHS, aka; Karl Fuchs," 26 September 1949, National Security Agency, Venona Collection at 49-029.

## 28. [Lamphere to Gardner], "EMIL JULIUS KLAUS FUCHS, a.k.a. Karl Fuchs," 26 September 1949.



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(Continued)




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:			
		-SECRET	
		CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D. C.	Executive Reg stry. 0-9081
			9 February 1950
	MEMORANDUM FOR:	The Chairman, Scientific Intelligence	Committee
	FROM:	The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence	Committee
	SUBJECT:	Failure of JAEIC to Receive Counter H Information having Positive Intellige	
	and of relativel elapsed since the made a request of September 19494 request, it was 2. More sp the Fuchs case is written, the est their first bomb made in making is design and const has been under is was not informed 3. If the much counter esp real assurance w as a result of t	t has become available is of a peripher ly little value because of the length of e incidents occurred. The Nuclear Ene for specific information to the Directo and While some information was furnish only of slight value. pecifically, if the fAEIC had known of in June 1949 at the time when the July timate of the time by which the Soviets o would have been appreciably advanced, that estimate for successful espionage truction. Of course, the JAEIC does no investigation, but the fact still remai d until after the man's arrest. pattern set forth above is followed, i bionage information will not be made av re have of getting the information at p	f time which has rgy Division of OSI rgy Division of OSI rof the FBI on 21 ed in answer to this the implications of estimate was being could have obtained as no allowance was on details of bomb t know how long Fuchs ns that the JAEIC t seems obvious that ailable. The only resent seems to be
	the standpoint of that it is of	In isolated instances. This is very of time, as the information is so old b clittle value.	unsatisfactory from y the time we get
	city of informat	IC desires to point out to the SIC thi hich is being denied us. Furthermore, ion from other sources, the eliminatio ssary if the JAEIC is to perform its d	in view of the pau-
		-SECRET	

29. W. K.


Benson to Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee [H. Marshall Chadwell], "Failure of the JAEIC To Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value," 9 February 1950, Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Job 80B01731R, box 35.



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(Continued)

30. Hoover to Souers, 24 May 1950.



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Hoover to Souers, 24 May 1950, Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary's Files (Subject File), "FBI—G," box 168.

She stated that Golos told her that Brothman would furnish her with certain blueprints. Following that she met with Brothman about ten times in the summer of 1940 until the fall of that year, and obtained blueprints from him for Golos. She said that in the fall of 1940 Golos claimed to have become disgusted with Brothman and told her he was turning Brothman over to someone else.

As a result of this information an investigation of Brothman was conducted, which resulted in an interview of Brothman on May 29, 1947. At first Brothman denied recognizing the name or photograph of Golos. Upon being shown a photograph of Bentley, which he identified as a person whom he knew as "Helen," he then admitted that he did recognize the photograph of Golos.

Brothman related that some time in 1938 or 1939 Golos had come to his office at 114 East 32nd Street, New York City, and advised Brothman that he had contacts with the Russian Government, by reason of which he was in a position to obtain contracts from that government for Brothman if Brothman would turn over to him blueprints of certain products on which Brothman was working at the time. Brothman advised that the blueprints in question were his own property. He said Golos visited his office on several occasions thereafter until Golos introduced him to "Helen." Golos advised that "Helen" would thereafter obtain the blueprints. "Helen" visited Brothman's office over a dozen times during 1936, 1939, and 1940. Some time in 1940 she stopped coming and another individual nemed Harry Gold appeared at Brothman's office on a number of occasions during 1940 and 1941, and obtained blueprints from Brothman. He said the last time Gold picked up the blueprints, according to the best of his recollection, was late in 1941 to rearly 1942. He was emphatic in stating that Gold was the last individual to pick up any blueprints or material for Golos. He stated that Harry Gold was, at the time of the interview, namely May 29, 1947, employed by him as a chemist in his laboratory at Elmhurst, Long Island. A signed statement to this effect was obtained from Brothman.

Upon receiving the information about Gold from Brothman, Gold was interviewed the same day at A. Brothman Associates Laboratory, 8503-57th Avenue, Elmhurst, Long Island. Gold related in substance that he had met Jacob Golos in October, 1940, at a meeting of the American Chemical Society at the Franklin Institute, Philadelphia. At this time Golos propositioned Gold, saying that he had connections with individuals in a foreign country, not naming the country, and also had connections with Abraham Brothman in

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(Continued)

New York who was turning over certain blueprints. Golos told Gold that he required the services of a chemist to go to New York City, obtain the blueprints from Brothman, and then evaluate them on a chemical basis. Gold stated that about two weeks after this, in November, 1940, he contacted Brothman in New York City and introduced himself as a repre-sentative of Golos. For the next six months he made visits to New York City on the average of every three weeks to obtain blueprints from only on the average of every three weeks to obtain other than be Brothman. He said that during this period he received four or five telephone calls from Golos, who always stated that they would have to get together very soon, but that actually this never happened. He said the last telephone call from Golos was in May, 1941, after which time he the last component call from Golos. He denied that he ever had seen Golos had no further word from Golos. He denied that he ever had seen Golos except on the occasion when he met him in October, 1940. Gold claimed that after his second or third trip to New York City Brothman became friendly and exhibited an interest in Gold's career as a chemist. He said that ever since that time Brothman had been interested in having Gold said that ever since that time Brothman had been interested in having Gold join Brothman's organization, but that it was not until February, 1946, that he could see his way clear to accept such employment, which he did at that time. Gold denied any financial agreement with Golos, and claimed he never received a cent from Golos. He insisted that he stood the expenses for the trips to New York City on the first two occasions, after which Brothman became friendly and furnished him a five-dollar bill to cover expenses. A signed statement to this effect was obtained from Gold. cover expenses. A signed statement to this effect was obtained from Gold. On July 22 and 31, 1947, Abraham Brothman and Harry Gold, respectively, were called before the Federal Grand Jury, Southern District of New York. Both testified in substance before this Grand Jury to that which they had furnished on interview. The investigation of the Grand Jury concerning the charges of Elizabeth T. Bentley culminated in the finding of a "no bill." After extensive and intensive investigation which developed in-formation indicating that Harry Gold was very probably the United States contact of Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, he was interviewed at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and on May 22, 1950, he furnished a signed statement admitting espionage activity. He admitted that he began the procurement of industrial information for the Soviet Union in the fall of 1936, and continued this activity until 1943, except for the period from 1938 to 1940 while he attended Xavier University in Cincinnati, Ohio. After extensive and intensive investigation which developed in--3-

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(Continued)

Gold advised that very early in 1944 his then superior made arrangements for him to meet Dr. Klaus Fuchs in New York City. This first meeting occurred on a Saturday afternoon in February or March, 1944, on the East Side of Manhattan, from where they took a cab uptown to a restaurant around Third Avenue in the 50's, possibly Manny Wolf's Restaurant. Following the dinner they walked about and completed arrangements for further meetings. Gold recalled the arrangements for actual recognition to be that he was to carry a pair of gloves in one hand, plus a green-covered book, while Fuchs was to carry a handball. He introduced himself as "Raymond" and Fuchs introduced himself as Klaus Fuchs. He said that Fuchs never used the name "Raymond" because he knew it was fictitious. At this first meeting no written information was passed, but Fuchs revealed that he was with the British Mission working with the Manhattan revealed that he was with the British Mission working with the Manhattan Engineer Project. He told Gold that the British Mission was working on the separation of isotopes, and Gold believes there was at least implied the eventual utilization of the energy produced by nuclear fission in the form of a weapon. Following this, Gold had about four meetings with Fuchs in the Bronx, Brocklyn, Manhattan, and Queens. During at least two of these meetings Fuchs furnished written information to Gold, who thereafter delivered it to his superior, "John." He said that he had taken a brief glance at the material on one occasion and found it to consist of a number of folded sheets of vapor containing mathematical ecuations which seemed of folded sheets of paper containing mathematical equations which seemed to concern mathematical derivations. Gold further advised that he lost contact with Fuchs when Fuchs failed to keep a meeting in August, 1944. He stated that "John" obtained railed to keep a meeting in August, 1944. He stated that "John" obtained the information whereby he was once more enabled to contact Fuchs. "John" gave Gold the address of Mrs. Heineman in Cambridge; Massachusetts, the sister of Fuchs. As a result of this, he met Fuchs at the Heineman residence shortly after Christmas Day, 1944, or early in 1945. At that time Fuchs told him that he was at Los Alemcs, New Mexico, a short distance from Santa Fe. Fuchs also gave him written information at the time and the two made an arrangement to meet in June of that year in Santa Fe. Gold stated that on this occasion he had been given a sum of approximately fifteen hundred dollars to offer Fuchs in a very diplomatic manner so as not to offend him. He said that Fuchs "turned it down cold." Gold returned to New York with the money and information which he delivered to "John." -4-

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(Continued)

Gold has further advised that he met Fuchs in Santa Fe, New Mexico, in June, 1945, and again in September, 1945. On both of these occasions Fuchs furnished him with written information. He said that during the September, 1945, meeting Fuchs told him that he had been present at the initial large-scale trial of nuclear fission at Alamogordo, New Mexico. He also stated that Fuchs told him at the time that he probably would return to England soon, but that by paying a call to Fuchs' sister he could ascertain just when. Gold said he made one or two attempts to see Fuchs again at the home of his sister, but was not successful. After the possible second attempt, which was either in late January or early February, 1946, Gold missed a scheduled appointment with his superior, "John," and has not seen or heard from him since.

In connection with the current interview of Fuchs in London by representatives of this Bureau, still and movie photographs of Gold were surreptitiously obtained for display to Fuchs. Previously, Fuchs and Robert and Kristel Heineman had failed to recognize a photograph of Gold. On May 20, 1950, Fuchs was shown the new still photographs of Gold and he did not identify them, though he stated he could not reject them.

On May 22, 1950, Fuchs viewed three repeat showings of the moving pictures of Gold, after which he stated that Gold was very likely his contact in the United States. It is most interesting to note that this information was received by cable at 11408 AM, while Gold had first admitted his espionage activity to the interviewing agents in Philadelphia at approximately 10445 AM the same day.

On May 23, 1950, a complaint was filed before a United States Commissioner for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, New York, charging Harry Gold and "John" Doe with conspiracy to commit espionage on behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in violation of Section 32, Title 50, United States Code. A warrant was issued and Gold was thereupon taken before United States District Judge James P. McGranery at Philadelphia, Fennsylvania, for arraignment. Judge McGranery gave Gold the complaint to read and he admitted that he was the Earry Gold named in the complaint. A preliminary hearing was set for June 12, 1950, and bail was set at one hundred thousand dollars, in default of which Gold was remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

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(Continued)

Further information of interest to the President and you will be furnished as it develops. With expressions of my highest esteem and best regards, Sincerely yours, for atomin Ø  $\mathcal{O}$ -6-152

(Continued)

TOP GEORET 50-025 June 27, 1950 STUDY OF CODE NAMES IN MGB COMMUNICATIONS Reference is made to the memorandum dated June 23, 1950, bearing the above caption. Since the referenced memorandum was prepared it has been determined that one JULIUS ROSENEERG is probably identical with the individual described as ANTENNA and LIBERAL in that memorandum. It is also believed now that DAVID GREENGLASS is identical with the individual described as KALIER, and that RUTH PRINTZ GREENGLASS is identical with the individual known under the code name OSA. From the information available to date it is believed that ANATOLI ANTONOVICH YAKOVLEY is flentical with the individual described under the code name ALEKSEY in the referenced memorandum. More complete details concerning these individuals will be furnished to you at a later date. DECLASSIFIED BY SP2-CICLU ON 2-30-96 153

31. [Lamphere to Gardner], "Study of Code Names in MGB Communications," 27 June 1950.

31. Ional Secu

[Lamphere to Gardner], "Study of Code Names in MGB Communications," 27 June 1950, National Security Agency, Venona Collection, 50-025, box D045.


32. Hoover to Rear Admiral Robert L. Dennison, 18 July 1950.


OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR	Rederal Bure:	an of Invest	igation
	United States I		-
		gtan 25, D. (	
	<b>5</b> .1	10 1050	
	July	18, 1950	
ί.			PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL BY SPECIAL MESSENGER
Rear Admira	l Robert L. Dennison		
	to the President		•
Washington,			
My dear Adm	iral:		
attached me Rosenberg, violate the received yo T	morandum which sets f who was arrested on J Espionage Statute. Is further pertiment i u will be advised. This information has b	orth informa uly 17, 1950 nformation r sen made ava	egarding this matter is
Sidney W. S S. Lay, Jr.	ouers, Special Consul , Executive Secretary	tant to the , National S	President, and Mr. James ecurity Council.
W	ith expressions of my		
Enclosure	Thu MAR in the second s	J.	corely yours,

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
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
Hoover to Rear Admiral Robert L. Dennison, 18 July 1950, Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary's Files (Subject File), "FBI—R," box 169.






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
33. Armed Forces Security Agency, "Russian Cryptology During World War II," undated [ca. 1951] [Excerpt].

33. Armed Forces Security Agency, "Russian Cryptology During World War II," undated [ca. 1951], National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 457 (National Security Agency), Historic Cryptographic Collection, box 526 [Excerpt].




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


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


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


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


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
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34. No

author [Washington Field Office, FBI], "William Wolf Weisband," 27 November 1953, National Security Agency, Office of Security files [Excerpt].


## No author [Washington Field Office, FBI], "William Wolf Weisband," 34.



(Continued)

WFO 121-13210:	
cated the time of and they would no some simple great	o scotch and sodas and T noticed that he was making some marks on wspaper. 'BILL! explained that these marks were in Arabic and indi- f our next meeting. He sold that anyons could take this newspaper. It know what these marks signified. 'BILL' also told me how to say ting phrases in Arabian such as 'Salaam Alschiem,' meening 'Peace he reply, 'Alechiem Salaam.'
Oregon. BILL' a	searly part of our contacts I received a telephone call from 'BILL.' i the call was from Pendleton, and I presume she meant Pendleton, said he would not be able to keep a scheduled meeting, and would he returned to Los Angeles.
Ay next contact m about my violin.	a latter part of 1942 I met 'BILL' near the Garden of Allah on in Los Angeles, and he told me he would no longer contact me, that tight possibly be a woman, and that the new contact would inquire is It was arranged that I would meet my new contact at a shatue in Los Angeles on a date I cannot now recall.
and from what 'BI with SHUMOVSKY. was 'not in this	in w meetings with 'EILL' no one else was ever present, and I son with whom he was associated. I did ask 'EILL' about SHAMOVSKY LL' told me I gained the impression he was personally acquainted I remember that 'EILE told me SHAMOVSKY 'was fine,' and that he country.' I remember that 'EILL' was very much concerned over' the Russian people because of the war and mentioned the sacrifices Russians.
this new contact a	equently met my new contact whose name I cannot recall in accordance I had received from 'BHLL' and continued furnishing information to until the latter part of 1943, when he told me the information he g from me was unsatisfactory and then did not appear for a scheduled had no further contact with Soviet representatives since that time?
"After 1 see him again unts Angeles, having ju front steps of the about 75 yards awa	the last contact with 'BILL' in the latter part of 1942, I did not il August, 1950. At that time I was at the Federal Building, Ice ust testified before a Federal Grand Jury. I was standing on the Federal Building and I observed 'BILL' walking along the sidewalk avg. With me at this time were Special Agents THOMAS E. BRYANT and and I pointed 'BILL' out to them.
"I have and it is the trut	read the foregoing statement consisting six and one-quarter pages .
· ·	*/s/ JONES CRIN YORK
Witnessed: s/ FRANCIS D. COC	DEY Special Agent, FBI Los Angeles 10/6/53
	NE, Special Agent, FBI, Los Angeles, Calif. 10-6-53.*
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
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IN EDGAR HOOVER DIRECTOR Federal Bureau of Investigation United States Bepartment of Justice Washington, D. C. May 23, 1960 PERSONAL ATTENTION VIA LIAISON Brigadier General A. J. Goodpaster, USA White House Staff Secretary The White House Washington, D. C. Dear General: I am enclosing herewith a copy of a document en-titled, "Expose of Soviet Espionage, May 1960," which we prepared in the FBI and copies of which have been furnished to the Vice President, the Attorney General, Under Secretary of State Dillon, and Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The material contained in this document is unclassified and was prepared for use by the State Department in case it desired to use any portion of it before the United Nations or for public release. I thought that you might desire to have a copy of this in the event there is any portion which you consider should be called to the President's attention. With best regards, I am Sincerely, Hanner Enclosure 171

35. Hoover to Brigadier General A. J. Goodpaster, USA, 23 May 1960 [Table of Contents and Appendixes not included].

35.

Hoover to Brigadier General A. J. Goodpaster, USA, 23 May 1960, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, White House Staff Secretary Files (Subject Series), "Expose of Soviet Intelligence," box 23 [Table of Contents and Appendixes not included].



(Continued)

## SOVIET-BLOC INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

n. Eicans

## 1. INTRODUCTION:

Recent Soviet propaganda has denounced the United States for aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union in terms designed to convince the world that the USSR would not stoop to espionage. In discussing this subject and the reception which President Bisenhower might expect on his visit to Russia, Premier Khrushchev was quoted in the newspapers on May 11, 1960, as wondering what would have been the reaction of the American people if the Russians had sent a plane over the United States on the eve of his visit to this country.

The facts are that at the very time Premier Khrushchev was advancing to the podium to speak before the United Nations General Assembly on September 18, 1959, two Soviet espionage agents were cautiously surveying a street corner in Springfield, Massachusetts, in preparation for a clandestine meeting with an American whom they were attempting to subvert. At the very time that Khrushchev was declaring that a means must be found to stop mankind from backsliding into an abyss of war, Vadim A. Kirilyuk, Soviet employee of the United Nations, was attempting to induce this American to furnish information regarding United States cryptographic machines and to secure employment in a vital United States Government agency where he could obtain classified information for the Russians. While this meeting was taking place Kirilyuk and the American were under observation by Leonid A. Kovalev, another Soviet employee of the United Nations who was conducting a countersurveillance. Unknown to the Russians, however, this meeting was also being observed by Special Agents of the FBI who obtained photographs of the Russians.

Not only did these Russians stoop to spying, but they callously abused their status as guests of this country to spy in the most reprehensible manner -- the subversion of an American on American soil.

Although FBI Agents observed this meeting and photographed the Russians, no publicity was given to this incident in view of the negotiations which were then in progress. This incident, as contrasted with the recent handling of the plane incident by the Russians, gives ample testimony as to which country is acting in good faith in trying to maintain world peace.


And this is not an isolated incident - nor has the target always been so limited. The facts are that Soviet agents for three decades have engaged in extensive espionage against this country, and through the years have procured a volume of information which would stagger the imagination. This information includes literally dozens of aerial photographs of major

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by Soviet citizens in the United States. These restrictions were comparable to restrictions on American citizens in Russia and in part prohibited Soviet citizens from obtaining aerial photographs except where they "appear in or are appendices to newspapers, periodicals, technical journals, atlases and books commercially available to the general public."

Soviet reaction to the restrictions was typical of their philosophy. They began circumventing the restrictions by subverting Americans to purchase aerial photographs for them. One month after the restrictions became effective, Nikolai I. Trofimov, a Soviet official in Mexico, began negotiations for a resident of the west coast of the United States. to obtain aerial photographs of 45 major United States cities. Nineteen of these cities are located near Strategic Air Command bases. The remaining 26 are all strategic cities in or near which are located air bases, naval bases, research or training stations, atomic energy installations or important industrial facilities.


During April, 1958, Vladimir D. Loginov, a Soviet employee of the United Nations used the same technique to obtain an aerial map of New York City. At 10 p.m. on April 26, 1958, Loginov secretly met an individual in a darkened parking lot at the railroad station in Scarsdale, New York, where this map was delivered to Loginov. Months later on November 15, 1958, this same parking lot was again utilized by the Soviets to obtain aerial photographs of Chicago, Illinois. On this occasion, the photographs were turned over to Kirill S. Doronkin, another Soviet employee of the United Nations. In this same operation, the Soviets attempted to obtain aerial photographs of Portland, Oregon; Seattle, Washington; and San Diego and San Francisco, California.

Circumpention of the restrictions also took the form of trickery and deceit. For example, on July 17, 1959, Viktor V. Fomin, assistant Soviet military attache and Anatoli G. Vasilev, an employee of the Soviet Military Attache in Washington, D. C., obtained an aerial photograph of the Glasgow Air Force Base in Montana from the local Chamber of Commerce by posing as tourists without identifying themselves as Soviet officials. On July 24, 1959, they obtained an aerial photograph of Thermopolis, Wyoming, by bullying the clerk at the Chamber of Commerce in an arrogant and insistent manner, again posing as tourists. They were given the photograph in spite of the fact that such a photograph is not normally given to tourists.


Soviet activities did not stop there. At the present time, a Washington, D. C., photographer is under the instructions

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(Continued)

information concerning this individual; and to carefully explore the possibility of placing a secretary in his office who could furnish information to the Russians. Morros previously in 1948 had been given the assignment to attempt to obtain information which could be used by the Russians in an effort to compromise United States General Clay in Germany.

Another example occurred during 1954 when Soviet intelligence officers in Germany approached an American Army officer stationed in Germany who was soon to be retired. They propositioned him to work for the Soviets after his return to the United States and set up a schedule for meetings in New York City. Pursuant to the arrangements, Maksim G. Martymov, counselor of the Soviet Representation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee, carried out a series of clandestine meetings in New York with a person whom he believed to be the Army officer. As a result of his indiscreet abuse of his status, Martymov was declared persona non grata on February 21, 1955.

Another example is that of Eugeniy A. Zaostrovtsev, second secretary of the Soviet Embassy who was declared persona non grata on May 13, 1959, for attempting to subvert a State Department employee to obtain information from State Department files.

A more recent example has been previously cited involving the attempt by Vadim Kirilyuk, an employee of the United Nations, to penetrate a vital Government agency by instructing an American to obtain employment in that agency.

Soviet attempts to recruit Americans during this period have not been confined to attempts to infiltrate Government agencies. For example, in February, 1954, Igor A. Amosov, assistant Soviet naval attache, was declared persona non grata for attempting to obtain information concerning radar and United States naval vessels from a businessman who had commercial dealings with the Russians and who was in a position to obtain such data.


In June, 1956, Ivan A. Bubchikov, an assistant Soviet military attache was declared persona non grata for attempting to obtain data regarding radar, guided missiles, jet fuels and atomic submarines from an American businessman who during World War II had extensive contacts with the Russians on both private and United States Government business. The Soviets attempted to exploit his World War II friendliness.

In August, 1956, Viktor I. Petrov, a Soviet translator at the United Nations, was released from his employment for recruiting an employee of an American aviation company to obtain classified data regarding United States aircraft.


- 6 -

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
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
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(Continued)




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



182

(Continued)



(Continued)





(Continued)

#### 8. USE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Attention is called to the fact that many of the incidents and cases previously cited involved Soviet employees of the United Nations. They are guests of the United States and are supposedly dedicated to the cause of international peace but they are, in fact, carefully selected envoys of the international communist conspiracy, trained in trickery and deceit and dedicated to the concept of fully exploiting the freedoms of the countries they seek to destroy. It is too much to expect that they would not prostitute the United Nations.

### 9. "ILLEGAL" OPERATIONS


Although Soviet-bloc intelligence services have made extensive use of their officials stationed in foreign countries for espionage purposes throughout the years, they have, in addition, operated a parallel clandestime espionage system known as the "illegal" system. As previously noted, "illegal" Soviet agents were dispatched to the United States as early as the 1920's. Such "illegal" agents have no ostensible connection with the Soviet-bloc official establishments in the United States, but operate clandestinely, usually under false identities, making full use of secret communications channels and other clandestime techniques of operation. Their dual function is to bolster the espionage activities of the Soviet-bloc officials and to be prepared to take over all espionage operations in the event of war or other emergency which would cause a break in diplomatic

It is apparent that during the decade 1950-1960 the Soviets have placed increasing emphasis on "illegal" operations. One former intelligence officer of the Soviet Ministry of State Security has advised that a special directorate was created in 1947 for the purpose of handling "illegal" agents. Another former intelligence officer, Reino Hayhanen, has stated that he was told, while in Moscow in 1952, that plans were being made to change over Soviet contacts from "legal" to "illegal" operations. Another former officer of the Soviet Ministry of State Security has advised that as early as June, 1952, an order was sent to intelligence agents in all western countries to prepare "illegal" organizations which could function without interruption under any conditions.


That this policy was followed with respect to the United States is illustrated by the fact that in August, 1956, a female Soviet agent attempted to enter the United States from


- 14 -

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(Continued)





189

(Continued)

Thus, the fact remains that the basic principles of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, demanding the use of force and violence, represent the guides for communism to achieve world conquest. The extensive espionage activities directed against the United States which, in the past, have utilized communists and communist sympathizers in this country as well as other individuals who could be subverted, can be better understood when regarded as essential tools in the relentless and fanatical drive of international communism to conquer the world. - 18 -190

(Continued)

# Part II: Selected Venona Messages

## A Note on the Translations and List of Messages

The release of Venona translations involved careful consideration of the privacy interests of individuals mentioned, referenced, or identified in these documents. In very few cases, names have not been released because doing so would

constitute an invasion of privacy.

In some of the Venona translations, the analytic footnotes indicated that the person referred to by covername had not been identified. Another—usually later—message may have footnoted that same covername with an identification. For example, in some early message translations, the covernames MER and ALBERT were footnoted as unidentified, but analysts subsequently determined (as footnoted in later translations of other messages) that the person in question was lskhak A. Akhmerov, the KGB's chief illegal officer in the United States. Unfortunately for readers, the KGB occasionally reused covernames; consequently, a single covername can designate two different persons. Even so, readers often can determine from context or geographic location which person is being referred to.

Finally, the Venona messages are replete with specialized Soviet intelligence terminology. The following are definitions of some of the more common terms and phrases.

The Russian word *klichka* (sobriquet or nickname) appears in the Venona translations as "covername." There are hundreds of covernames in the translations, including many seen in the messages included in this volume, such as ALBERT, LIBERAL, and ALES. Covernames designated Soviet officers, active or retired assets, valued contacts, and sometimes even prominent figures (such as CAPTAIN for President Roosevelt) and were periodically changed. Assets and contacts, however, rarely knew their covernames, which were to be used primarily in cable traffic. To complicate matters further, a Soviet intelligence officer like illegal *rezident* Iskhak Akhmerov typically had a covername (MER, and later ALBERT), aliases he used in his cover identity (William Grienke and Michael Green, among others), and "street names" he used in the company of assets and contacts ("Bill").

Fellow countrymen were members of the local Communist Party.

An illegal was a KGB or GRU officer, often a Soviet citizen, working abroad under alias with neither diplomatic cover nor visible connections to legal Soviet establishments. An individual illegal's cover story was his or her legend. Iskhak Akhmerov was the KGB's principal illegal in the United States before 1946 and thus was regarded as the illegal *rezident*. He apparently was succeeded in this role by Rudolf Abel. Several KGB and GRU illegals were shown in Venona messages to be operating in the United States, Mexico, and other countries. Although some Soviet illegals later used radios for direct clandestine communication with Moscow, illegals in the United States during World War II generally transmitted and received messages through Soviet diplomatic missions.

A leader (or group leader) was a KGB officer or an experienced local agent who handled and supervised a network or subnetwork of assets. Such an officer might have either worked for an official Soviet entity or operated as an illegal. Venona messages showed that such agents as Jacob Golos and Sergei Kurnakov, while not themselves KGB officers, were nonetheless given significant responsibilities for certain networks. In many cases where the KGB gained control of older Comintern or GRU networks, the existing leader was left in charge for months or even years.

A line was a grouping of KGB officers by operational tasks. Some of these entities seen in Venona communications were the Second Line (which focused on ethnic groups of interest to Moscow, such as Ukrainians or Latvians); the Fifth Line (responsible for the security of the Soviet merchant fleet and its personnel); the White Line (concerned with White Russian emigres); and the Economic Line (a scientific and technical sub-residency, headed by Leonid Kvasnikov, in the New York consulate).

The KGB and the GRU referred to one another as the neighbors. In KGB parlance, Near Neighbors meant the GRU-Naval auxiliary, while the GRU proper was referred to as Far Neighbors.

Probationers was the cover term for KGB agents. The term—which apparently fell out of usage after the 1940s—was sometimes applied to KGB officers who were temporarily not attached to a diplomatic mission and hence were being run as agents.

To put on ice (sometimes rendered in cold storage) meant to suspend use of an agent.

The rezidentwas the KGB chief at a particular location; his station was called a residency *(rezidentura).* The New York residency supported a sub-residency, under Leonid R. Kvasnikov, to collect scientific and technological secrets.

A worker (sometimes referred to as a cadre) was the KGB's usual term for its own officers working in a diplomatic or official Soviet establishment such as the TASS press agency or the Amtorg trading company.

## Access to the Venona Translations


All the Venona translations—roughly 2,900 KGB, GRU, and GRU-Naval messages—are being released to the public. Paper copies have been sent to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, and to various federal repositories (typically at large state universities). The National Cryptologic Museum, adjacent to NSA headquarters at Ft. George G. Meade, Maryland, also has a complete set of the translations. Each release of the Venona translations in

1995 and 1996 was accompanied by an original explanatory monograph authored by Robert Louis Benson, co-editor of this volume. The translations and monographs can also be found on the Internet's World Wide Web, NSA's Homepage, at http://www.nsa.gov:8080. This conference volume can be found on the World Wide Web, CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence Homepage.

# NOTE TO VIEWERS: The following pages were scanned as graphics.

Translations included: (1) (Each graphic is approximately 50KB)

1. Moscow [Comintern] 117, 121 to the US, 21 and 23 March 1936.



199

Moscow [Comintern] 117, 121 to the US, 21 and 23 March 1936.

95		· · · · ·			
e	tor JE			TRINE	
USSR		Reference I	(P	PPDT/1;71 reviously issued s 3/NBF/T1478)	
		Issued	:	11/10/1968	
		Сору Но	:		
1. BAR	Ch's MEETING				
. 2. FUC	HS AND PROBABLE RE	FERENCE TO ATOMIC 1.3	ergy pr	OJECT	
From: LONDON Te: MJSCOW No: 2227		<b>1)%h 2</b> ~7208	: 1941		
TC DIRICTOR					
On 8th Augus Doctor FUCHS [FUK	t BARCh[i] had a m S] [a], who [1 gro	eeting with [C% a for up unidentified] [b]	rmer ac that	quaintance],	
[19 groups u					
[in] [c] BIRMINGH					
[34 groups u		then all the material	ا اما س	ill be sent	
to CANADA for ind	GERMANY, in LEIPZ	[e] [C% •] [1 group	uniden	tified] [f]	
[9 groups un					
	ERG (KhEJSENBERG)	[111]			
[34 Eroups u					
1000 tons of dyna					
	rtunity occurs (DO	KLAD OKAZIEJ]. [h]		(z.)	
No. 450			BRICH	[iv]	
" Doct On t two	or Fuchs Who	h [C% a former acqua " here is nothing to d collateral it is im	hoose t	etween these	
[b] It a that	ppears from the two the general sense	previous occurrence is "said".	s of th		
				/[c]	

2. London [GRU] to Moscow, 10 August 1941.

201

London [GRU] to Moscow, 10 August 1941. Klaus Fuchs interview

			- 2 -
[0			ranslator. The case ending indicates that in" must precede "BIRMINGHAM".
[a	] It	is almost certa	ain that this means "papers", "documents", etc.
[e	"•,	. will be sent	translation. The sense is probably: to CANADA so that industrial methods may be
	It fou	ed." is known from a und to be inadea hustrial plant.	collateral that laboratory facilities were puate and that the decision was taken to use
[f		ere is some evid	dence that the value of this group is: to"
[៩	an "••	adjective and t . in the LEIPZI	the sentence suggests that LEIPZIG should be that the passage should read: IG" tival ending has been tried without success.
(h.	to "OK Fre mea "DO whe was sig	interpret witho AZIEJ", or more nch "a l'occasi ns to send it w KLAD OKAZIEJ" t n an opportunit presumably to	ical expression which it is exceedingly hard but the full context. correctly "S OKAZIEJ", is equivalent to the ion". To send a report or letter "S OKAZIEJ" when the opportunity arises. thus suggests that a report was to be sent by for sending one arcse. If so, the report be sent in writing. (BRION could have ist any time and need not have waited for a ty.)
Comments:	[i]	BARCh:	Simon Davidovich KREMER.
	[ii]		FUCHS moved to BIRMINCHAM on 27th May 1941 and took up his research duties on the following day.
	[iii]	HEISENBERG:	Professor Werner HEISENBERG who was Professor of Theoretic Physics at LEIPZIG University 1927-1941.
	[iv]	BRION:	Lt.Col. I.A. SKLYaROV.
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		


202

3. New York 854 to Moscow, 16 June 1942.

	INONA
T <del>OP</del> -	JECRET (Envis)
	LIZA: mathe Dodd at the 20/8/24
USSR	Ref. No: (of 11/6/1957)
	Issued : 4/1964
	Copy No: 204
	2nd RE-ISSUE
•	recruitment of several agents ucn/29" and jane foster (1942)
From: NEW YORK	
To: MOSCOW	
No: 854	16 June <u>42</u>
To VIKTOR. [1]	
Reference No. 2359.[a]	
mba	an /con[ii] was deleved because of his prolonged absence
and the necessity for check shall report results.	cking additional information. He allived total and no
[1 group unrecovered]	] "LIZA" <sup>[iii]</sup> , we are cultivating the American ew to signing her on. She is about 30 years old and e Dutch [2 groups unrecovered][E5 translator] of is a FELLOWCOUNTRYWOMAN[ZMIYACHKA],[V]
Jane FOSTER[iv] with a vie works in WASHINGTON in the	ew to signing her on. She is about 30 years old and he Dutch [2 groups unrecovered][H5 translator] of
Malay languages. FOSTER i	[86 groups mnrecoverable]
[D%SK] was given [1	group unrecovered].
	ied out by us. She is a FELLOWCOUNTRYNOMAN. She is UNTRYNEN[ZEMLYAK] as a [4 group unrecovered], dedicated has also been reported on favourably by "%/R"[vi] who
We intend to sign her [2 groups unrecovered] [M2 [1 group unrecovered], We	er on with a view to making use of her connections and 35 her] [1 group unrecovered] SOUTH AMERICA our tasks 36 urgently request approval. [viii]
No. 552	MAKSIK[viii]
Distribution	[Note and Comments overleaf]
	w. f. 21 M. H. file Soundary / Vedling ? Oracle Pase, oss
۰. ج	DINAT -
•	VENONA
· .	

203

New York 854 to Moscow, 16 June 1942. Recruiting proposals



204

4. Moscow 424 to New York, 1 July 1942.

	TOP SECRET
	USSR Ref. No.: (of 13/12/60)
	Issued : 20/10/67
	Copy No.: 204
	REISSUE
	REFERENCE TO SIGNING ON OF PIERRE COT AND ALLOCATION TO HIM OF CUVERNAME "DAEDALUS" (1942)
	From: MOSCOF
	To: NEW YORK
	No: 424 1st July 1942
	[Addressee not recovered]
S	Reference No. 579.[a]
<sub>ટે</sub> , ઝંપ	[3 groups unrecovered] our [2 groups unrecovered] about the signing on of Pierre COT (henceforth "DAEDALUS[DEDAL]")
	[45 groups unrecoverable]
·	[1 group unrecovered] and how [ho][b] carries out[o] [2 groups unrecovered]. [2 groups unrecovered] information about his wife, her [1 group unrecovered], the social status of [her][b] contexts, [1 group unrecovered] of DARDALUS. Report on how the preparation[d] is progressing. [Internet Write Not success]. [Signatury net success]
	Notes: [a] NEW YORK to MOSCOW No. 894 of 26th June (942)
	[b] Inserted by the translator.
•.	[c] or "spends/conducts".
	[d] or "training".
	DISTRIBUTION
:	
	• •
	TOP-SECRET

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Moscow 424 to New York, 1 July 1942. More recruiting proposals

5. Washington [Naval-GRU] 2505-12 to Moscow, 31 December 1942.

95	VEN	NONA
•	TOP S	ECRET (Since)
	USSR	Ref. No: 3/NEF/T1720
		Issued: 124/8/1965
	· ·	Copy No: 204 Mind
	THE DESPATCH A	ND LEGALIZATION OF THE AUSTRALIAN WOMAN (1943)
	From: WASHINGTON	
	To: MOSCOW	-
	No: 2505-2512	31 December <u>42</u>
•	· · ·	[8 part message complete]
•	[Part I]	
	To [Name No. 42]	][1].
	Herewith materia of the "AUSTRALIAN W	al[a] on the despatch [PYERBROSKA][b] and legalization OMNN[AVSTRALLJKA]"[ii].
	Part [C% one]	• · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
		[16 groups unrecovered]
	Chiefly	[36 groups unrecoverable]
	and demanded	· · · ·
	ĩ	[52 groups unrecovered]
	for a month or two it In [4 groups unrecove	t is possible to [3 groups unrecovered] documents. ered] the AUSTEALLAN WOMAN
		[32 groups unrecovered]
	(establishments[KhoZ]	Yajstv0])[0]
		[104 groups unrecovered]
	Distribution:	
	3/NBF/T1720	
	, Asia	T-JECKET-
		VENONA

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Washington [Naval-GRU] 2505-12 to Moscow, 31 December 1942.

<sup>95</sup> VENONA
LOD SECRET
- 2 -
3/NBF/T1 72Ø
[6 groups unrecoverable]
presentation of documents, three referees and the completion of a detailed questionnaire including such questions as the names and addresses of previous employers[d], places of residence, particulars of parents, relations, etc, after which all the papers go to the F.B.I. (counter- intelligence) for checking. It is impossible at present for the AUSTERLIAN WOMAN to get work in these establishments. [Part II]
2. The basic document which gives proof of American citizenship is the birth certificate. The birth certificate doos not, as a rule, serve es an everyday means of identification. The ordinary, everyday documents are the driver's licence, the drait registration card (for men) and various passes and identity papers issued by getablishments, businesses, companies and firms. The NEIGROUMS [SOSED][e] "Are of the opinion that birth certificates were formerly issued by the churches. Now they are issued by hospitals, Archives of birth records are cerefully preserved by the Americans and checking a copy of a birth certificate does not cause the P.B.I. any great difficulty. The driver's licence [2 groups unrecoverable] [15% and] shalt. As the names and adhress of the helder are recorded on it, it also serves as an ordinary, everyday means of identification. Licences are issued by the transport department' of the City Police (Traffic Department). To obtain then one has to fill up a short questionmate giving basic to rease and there is and and rest of the city in question and a driving test. An American meds no other captra. The NEIGROUM work of the postponent of his appointment to CANEL, his opportunities in this respect hyd come to naught.
[13 groups unrecovered]
posting to GANDA for this purpose. In his opinion it is possible in the last resort to forge a birth certificate at home or simply to do without papers at first.
[Part III]
[29 groups unrecoverable]
The prospects of a new system of documentation being instituted in the USA are uncertain. The F.B.I. insists on registration and on taking[ $f$ ]
[38 groups unrecoverable]
about 20 million persons have been fingerprinted. These are mainly: aliens (all aliens are fingerprinted), surchant seamen and crews of ships coming here, serviceman, employees and workers in defence plants and government establishments. The issue of fingerprint identifications to [2 groups unrecovered] is boccaing popular. A number of ThiOR*5[iii] people had their fingerprints taken in order to get passes into the ports.
[Continuer]
J/MEP/T1720
VENONA

<sup>95</sup> VENONA
- 3 - 3/NBF/T1 72Ø
[Part IV]
3. The landing of an illegal[g] from our ship requires careful organization. The "GREENS[ZELENYE]"[iv] keep a watchful eye on our ships and people. During the period from September to December 1942 there were two cases of attempts to inspect two ships for a second time. The following cases are known:
<ul> <li>(a) During the inspection of a ship, the passengers and crew were checked a second time on a trivial pretext.</li> </ul>
(b) There was a personal search of members of a crew going into the city "in order to discover smuggled lotters[h]". [2 groups unrecovered] to search
[41 groups unrecoverable]
naval intelligence [3 groups unrecovered] with the object of recruitment. There are repeated cases of our sailors not returning to their ships. Individual members of crews are questioned as to whether there are any outsiders on board.
[Part V]
Contrary to the previous arrangements, the American's only admit the crews of our ships into the city if they show their passes. They are permanen' passes and are kept by the Captain. They are issued to each sailor arriving in the USA for the first time after his fingerprints have been taken. The information[MATRILL][3] on the pass is checked on departure from the port and on return. The number of check points varies. Crews of ships
[45 groups unrecoverable]
in principle remains as before. All objects brought here which are being taken away[ $3$ ], packages and letters are inspected.
4. In clothing and appearance, our women [B% serving] on ships are clearly distinguishable from the local women. This is because of their stockings, their berets (American women wear hats), their handbags and their untildness. They do not take any trouble over their hair or their make-up. Suits or overcoats of medium quality differ little from the American ones.
[Part VI]
5. The possible landing ports are SAN FRANCISCO and PORTLAND. Up to 15 of our ships arrive in PORTLAND each month. 6 to 7 arrive in SAN FRANCISCO.
SAN FRANCISCO
Advantages:
(a) A large city in which it is easy to disappear.
[Continued overleaf]
3/NBF/T1728
TOP SECRET
VENONA

5. (0	Continued)
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
95	VENONA TOP-SECRET
	- 4 - 3/NBF/T172Ø
	Rasier to get a hotel room or a [furnished][k] room if necessary.
(c)	Basier to buy a train ticket.
(a)	Less danger of the AUSTRALIAN WOMAN's meeting
	[6Ø groups unrecoverable]
	RTLA ND[ k]
	antages:
(a)	DAVIS $[D\bar{N}VIS][v]$ can be relied on. His work is such that he sees personally to the ships and is in the port practically all the time.
•	If necessary DAVIS can avail himself of the help of our other people there.
	advantages:
	The city is small. It would be harder to disappear in it. It is necessary to [2 groups unrecovered] on the day of landing.
(Б)	It is harder to get a hotel room and practically impossible to take a [furnished][x] room. Our people have been watched and are well known. It would be more difficult to pass the time until the departure of the train.
(c)	DAVIS is overburdened with his own work.
[Part VII	. <b>]</b>
office tw making a trip take	per tickets on long distance trains may be bought at the ticket to or three days in advance. Names and addresses are required when reservation. Two or three trains a day.leave for NEW YORK. The s up to five days and one must change in CHICAGO. The southern ough NEW ORLEANS should be rejected.
	[55 groups unrecoverable]
especial military SAN FRANC Carriages compartme two or th rooms). the train	reports that the checking of cars is in force along the west coast, y around LOS ANGENES and to the south. To coubst descrition, the police check the papers of enlisted mon in trains at PORTLAND and ISCO. Civilians are not liable to have their papers checked. on long distance trains consist of common sleepers and separate ints - there are compariments for oner person (roomettes) and for ree persons (compariments) and special class compariments (drawing- In this instance a roomette would be the most suitable. One boards $20 \pm 0.5\%$ minutes in advance. One can eat in the restaurant car in the compariment.
	[Continued everleaf]
3/NEF/217	TOP SECRET
	VENONA

· 95		VENONA
	I	OP-SECRET
<del></del>		
		- 5 - 3/NEF/T172Ø
[Part VI]		
7. <u>Mone</u>	_	. keeps a strict check of all the numbers and series of
banknotes	. Му	expenditure is also subjected to checking through the socived in the homeland by our citizens who come here
series.		[15 groups unrecoverable]
	of pa	rt ons[1].
No. 745-7		[Name No. 91][vi]
Notes:	[a]	The Russian Ford MATERIAL is often used in the sense of "Rocuments" or "Socumentary material". In this context it appears to mean "information".
	[b]	FEREROSKA generally means the transfer of troops or goods from one place to another. In conspiratorial language it means the despatch of an agent to a given country.
	[0]	KhoZYaJSIYO is very difficult to translate out of context. it can mean "seconomy", "farm", "establishment", "household".
	[a]	Literally "the designations and addresses of previous service".
	[0]	Or "NEEGBOUR".
	[ <b>f</b> ]	There is technical evidence that the word after "taking" is "fingerprints".
	[s]	I.e. "an illegal agent".
	[h]	This can either be interpreted as "contraband and lotters" or "contrabandletters" i.e. "swuggled letters".
	[1]	Literally "all objects being transported, being carried away". This presumably means "all objects brought here by ship and taken out of the dock area".
	[k]	Inserted by translator.
	[1]	I.e. part one of the material on the despatch and legalization of the AUSTRALIAN WOMAN. There is no indication that part two will be sent later.
		[Continued overleaf]
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		VENONA

<sup>95</sup>		NA		
<u> </u>	<del></del>			
Compostor [1]		- 6	3/NEF/T172Ø	
Comments: [1]			apt. (1st Rank) M.A. Trancia Yakil'nilna M	
[]	in the second	(exact spe probably i PATTERSON.	dentical with Edna M	nho is Rrgaret
[111]	TAYLOR .		ed cover-name. Also s passed between 14/3 43; the latest messa, 8/6/1943 (3/NHF/T12)	
[iv]	GREANS		a non-Soviet counte:	
[v]	DAVIS[DĒVIS]	: Unidentifi	ed cover-name. Also TON's 1040-1041 of 1 f 5/6/1943.	mentioned 3/5/1943
[ <b>v</b> i]	[Name No. 91]		apt. (1st Rank) I.A.	
[<"]			Intelligence Ong a that of the N	
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6. Washington [Naval-GRU] 834, 846-8 to Moscow, 18 April 1943.




213

Washington [Naval-GRU] 834, 846-8 to Moscow, 18 April 1943.

•	TOP	VENONA 2.
[Part II]	Î)	In a personal letter the Chief of the Shipbuilders, who is in contact with us on shipbuilding matters, said that he could not give us radar. This was discovered when FINK[vii] put some oblique questions to the Department of the Navy [MORSKOE MUNISTRESTVO].
	g)	Under [] group unrecovered] of ERDMAN Captain DONALD[viii], one of the acceptance officers at the plant[b] who ishoyal to us, has been taken off the work.
	2. [C% In	formants] of the Intelligence Service [RAZVEDKA].
	a)	Interpreters: Lieutenant ANIKESV[ix] who came from ODESSA in 1922, Lieutenant FLOTKINS who is the some of a SARATOV mer- chant, emigrated in 1926 and (2 groups unrecovered] was the only worker free
		[22 groups unrecoverable]
	`.	readily[c], old sailors (over h0 years of age) no doubt dressed [B% in civilian clothes], sailors or intelligence men dressed as sailors who speak Russian, a unit of whose were specially moved to Florida, military intelligence men of the American Army particularly (5% Foles], clerks [1 group un- recovered] [D% at the] bases and others.
[Part III]	Organizati	on and method of work:
	1.	Secret surveillance by counter-espionage agents, for example at the tailor's where our people order uniforms, several cases of shadowing etc. have been noticed.
	2.	Special surveillance in key bases.
	3.	Throwing light on the functions of Deputy Commanders and their real role (Deputies for Political Matters[POMPOLIT]).
	4.	Discovering the attitude of the enlisted men towards the command, towards drink and women.
	5.	Finding out how Comrade STALIN is regarded and attempting to discredit him in the eyes of Red Fleet seamen.
	6.	Bringing to light dissatisfaction among Red Fleet seamen, boasting about their own standards of living, and attempting to win their confidence.
	7.	Attempting to get them drunk and to corrupt them by using women.
	8.	The suggestion made to Red Seaman BUShUEV[x]
		[lh groups unrecoverable]
		carbon paper
		[11 groups unrecovered]
		the NATIVES.
	· 10.	Finding out the geographical
,	• .	
		SECRET VENONA
	And the second se	


•		
	Tersette	YENONA .
	130 groups unrecovered].	
(Part IV)	I have given instructions to RUSSEL[RC ered] with ERDMAN and the NATIVES	SSEL'][xi][2 groups unrecov-
	[30 groups unrecovered]	-
	with the NATIVES by well-wishers	
	[35 groups unrecovered] [45 groups unrecoverable]	
	not to give a visa[d] for permanent work with tunity occurs this material should be used fo the bill. Discipline in the unit is good and comments [2 groups unrecovered] there was the LAUTGIN and LAUTSIKIN who were sont back in a by letter. I[e] gave KENT[xiii] and JIM[DZAL] groups unrecovered] a search locally and to b 3. A report about ERIMAN should be sent to th Foreign Affairs[NARKONINDEL]. I advise again next minesweepers until the ships [have reach reachment Places []	r presenting the MATIVES with many MATIVES make favorable case of the two Red Seamon drunken condition. Details 41[xiv] instructions [2 riof RUSSEL's people. he People's Commissariat of st sending the crews of the
	readiness. Please [1 group unrecovered] this	material to STEPANOV[xv].
	Nos. 287, 294, 296	[Name no. 91][xvi]
	<ul> <li>[b] "plant, "factory" or "yard"[ZAVOD]</li> <li>[c] readily[EOXKO]: This could possit in this context the adverb seems n</li> <li>[d] "yisa" or "visas."</li> <li>[e] "J,"we,""ha," or "they."</li> <li>[f] Inserted by translator.</li> <li>Comments:</li> <li>[i] [Name no. h2]: Possibly Capt. (la iii) TUZEMTET: the NATUFS, an unident Stocholm-Moscow message nos. 696-</li> </ul>	rt Rank) M.A. VORONTSOV. ified cover-term. (Also see
	<ul> <li>[111] Commander Robert Fark ERIMAN who i in Charge of Lisicon Personnel wit of 1942 he was to act as Liaison C cers and crew who were to man mine Tampa Shipbuilding Corporation.</li> <li>[iv] Presumably an error for Lt. Hauric assigned to the staff of Cadr. ERD in December 1943.</li> <li>[iv] KOL': Capt. (3rd Rank) Mikhail Ni Covermont European Content European Content Section 2013)</li> </ul>	n February 1943 was Officer h the Soviet Government. As fflicer for the Russian offi- sweepers being built at the e Frank PLOTEINS who was MAN in ST. PETERSDURG, Flori da
	[vi] Capt. (3rd Rank) Evgenij A. KhMYRO tor who was assigned to the Tampa ; Florida in January 1913.	V, a Soviet Marine Inspec- Shipbuilding Company, TAMPA,
	[vil] FIM: Fossibly Capt. (lst Rank) P. [vili] Captain DONAD: Unidentified. [ix] Lt. Nicholas Michael AMIKERY, U.S. sisted in the transfer of American under the Lend-Lease process	Navy interpreter, who as- ships to the Soviet Navy
	serted in the U.S. in 1943. (See i of 17 July 1943). [xi] AUSSELL: Unidentified. [xii] See WASHINGTON's no. 762 of 17 April	•
. •	waiting for visas."	
		YENONA

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
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
New York 782 to Moscow, 26 May 1943. Duncan Lee, OSS

8. New York 777-781 to Moscow, 26 May 1943.



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
New York 777-781 to Moscow, 26 May 1943. MI School



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
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	and the second sec		
		- 3 -	
	[D%6. Lieutenant] HA Pro-Soviet feelings.	CKNER[ix], 30 - 32 years ol	id, a Polish Jew.
	7. [D%Stepan] SUD emigrated from China.	AKAV[x], 21 years old. [3	groups unrecovered]
	*	[15 groups unrecovered]	
	8. [1 group unrec from China where his pare the right [1 group unreco	covered] GRADASOV[x1], 21 ye nts remained. [6 groups un overed].	ears old. Emigrated nrecovered]. Leans to
		covered OROShKO[x11], 21 yes	ars old, emigrated from
	19. [15 groups unt covered]. He lived in PA recovered] Jewish newspap	recoverable} a Jew from WAR RIS where he was a corresp per. Fro-Soviet feelings[x:	SAW. [6 groups unre- ondent [2 groups un- 111].
	11. Aleksandr ORLE has a [1 group unidentiff	SY(OVChAROV)[xiv], 32 - 33 : ied] business in NEW YORK.	years old, a Jew. He
	Russian language 13 group	r), 24 ~ 28 years old, a Je ps unrecovered] in the army g the school [5 groups unre	st the pestimite of
[Part V]		[5 groups unrecovered]:	
	<ol> <li>Nisen ChiPChli</li> <li>old, [4 groups unrecover 3871 Sedgewick Avenue Bro</li> </ol>	N[xvi] (1 group unrecovered ed] Jew. He lives in TYRE[ onx	] school. 31 - 33 years xvii] at the address
		[19 groups unrecoverable]	
	982[a]. He is a teacher examinations. Pro-Sovie	at the school. He is draw t feelings	m in exclusively during
		[55 groups unrecoverable]	
	LEBEDEV[xviii] thus grad	uated in the French section	a <b>.</b>
	The director of t	he Russian section is Lieut	tenant ZANDER[xix]
		[39 groups uprecovered]	
	For the time being we as	to the school, complement s warned about appropriate a re carrying out work with h	Sected and canoton.
	unrecoverable]		LUKA(xx]
	No. 427		
		3	
		19 <sup>1</sup> - 1	
1.1			VENONA
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9. New York 786-7 to Moscow, 26 May 1943.



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New York 786-7 to Moscow, 26 May 1943. Mrs. Roosevelt

9	5
	TOP SECRET
	2
[Part II]	[87 groups unrocoveral] [64 groups unrocoverable]
	"CLPTILI: [1 group unrecovored][a]".
	[71 groups unrecovered]
	for further processing.
	No. 432 MAKSIN[vi]
	Noto: [a] This unidentified group is not simply an inflexion added to KiETTAH. It is possible that it is added to form an oblique case of the word KAETCANSA - "Contain's wife" which might have been adopted to replace the form "wife of "CAPTAIN" which is
:	used at the opening of the message. Comments: [i] VIKTOR : Lt. Gon. F. M. FITIN.
	[ii] CaPTAIN : Franklin Delano ROOSEVELT.
	[iii] SOKINKIN : Possibly the Aleksoj F. SOKIEKIN who by 1950 was 1st Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in WASHINGTON
	[iv] SYNDICATE: People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.
	[v] VARDO : Elizaveta Yur'evaa ZUBILINA.
	[vi] MAKSIM : Vasilij Mikhajlovich ZUDILIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK.
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	TOP-SECRET
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
10. New York 812 to Moscow, 29 May 1943.

VEINUNA	
TOP SECRET	
	•
USSR Ref. Not.	/7/1953)
issued:/10/9/74	
— Copy No.: 301	
3RD REISSUE	
"19" REPORTS ON DISCUSSIONS WITH "KAPITAN", "KABAN" AND	
ZAMESTITEL' ON THE SECOND FRONT	
(1943)	
from: NEW YORK	
Co: MOSCOW	
io: 812 29 May 1943 1943	
O VIKTOR[i].	
"19"[ii] reports that "KAFITAN"[iii] and "KABAN"[iv], during conver n the "COUNTRY [STRANA][v]", invited "19" to join them and ZAMESTITEL'[v penly told "KABAN" [10 groups unrecovered]	sations Mi]
second front against GERMANY this year. KABAN considers that, if a secon ront should prove to be unsuccessful, then this [3 groups unrecovered] arm to Russian interests and [6 groups unrecovered]. He considers it fore advantageous and effective to weaken GERMANY by bombing and to use t ime for "[4 groups unrecovered] political crisis so that there may be no oubt that a second front next year will prove successful."	
ZAMESTITEL' and	
[14 groups unrecovered]	
. 19 thinks that "KAPITAN" is not informing ZAMESTITEL' of important mi ecisions and that therefore ZAMESTITEL' may not have exact knowledge of 1 group unrecovered] with the opening of a second front against GENARMY ostpomement from this year to next year. 19 says that ZAMESTITEL' ersonally is an ardent supporter of a second front at this time and cons ostpomement	and its
[Continued overlaaf	]
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VENION	
IOP SECRET	

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New York 812 to Moscow, 29 May 1943. Agent "19"

**10.** (Continued)



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11. New York 887 to Moscow, 9 June 1943.

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<pre>rs: 100000 Not: 807 Not: 807 fo VIKIOR[4]. 1. "SAVER"[11] reports that according to information of a [C\$ branch] of the "LBA"[11] . [3 groups unrecovered] In TALY: Also Italian workers are returning from GENGUAT. . "NOAM"[1v] reports that the "LBA" has received from its [C\$ branch] of in SHOM[v] two confidential reports on [3 groups unrecovered]. One of "ABAM"[v] takes a more moderate pointion proposing to eace [5] BIELORDESIS() and the UKRAINE to the USSR and Eastern FRUSSI to FOLORUSSI() and the UKRAINE to the USSR and Eastern FRUSSI to FOLORUSSI() and the UKRAINE to the USSR and Eastern FRUSSI to FOLORUSSI() . [13 groups unrecovered] FIELS" from [14 groups unrecovered] FIELS [15] . [15 groups unrecovered] . [16 groups unrecovered] . [16 groups unrecovered] . [17 GALATS[v1] . [17 GALATS[v1] . [17 GALATS[v1] . [17 GALATS[v1] . [18 [Could alternatively be "with, by" etc. The preposition is uncertain . [19 VINTOR: 1.c. Gen. P.H. FIIN. . [19 VINTOR: 1.c. Gen. P.H. FIIN. . [10 Could alternatively be "with, by" etc. The preposition is uncertain . [10 VINTOR: 1.c. Gen. P.H. FIIN. . [10 VINTOR: 1.c. Gen. P.H. FIIN. . [10 Could alternatively be "with, by" etc. The preposition is uncertain . [10 VINTOR: 1.c. MEME" or "GTONGAT. . MARE : 1.c. MOME" or "GTONGAT. . MARE : 1.c. MOME" or "GTONGAT. . [11 Could : Interview of Statistic Generation . [12 VINTOR: 1.c. MOME" or "GTONGAT. . [13 Could site means on the far a fastern fastern fastern fastern fastern fastern . [14 Could : Interview of Statistic Generation . [15 Could site means on the fastern function function is more fastern fastern fastern fastern . [15 Could : Interview of Statistic Generation Councellin . [16 Could site fastern fastern function function function fastern fastern fastern . [17 Could in the could of statistic Generation functin</pre>	* 	
<pre>No.: 897 No.: 897 To VIKTOR[1]. 1. "GATARS"[11] reports that according to information of a [CS branch] of the "IZBA"[11] . "Groups unrecovered] In ITALX: Also Italian workers are returning from GERUMAN "Gods"[1v] reports that the "IZBA" has received from its [CS branch] of in SIDON[v] two confidential reports on [3 groups unrecovered]. One of in SIDON[v] two confidential reports on [3 groups unrecovered]. One of in SIDON[v] two confidential reports on [3 groups unrecovered]. One of in SIDON[v] two confidential reports on [3 groups unrecovered] "KOAM"[v1] takes a more moderate position proposing to cone [05 BIELDARUSEAL and the UKAINK to be USBA and fastern FRUSSIA to FOLME . [13 groups unrecovered] . TEBA" from . [16 groups unrecovered] . TEBA" from . [16 groups unrecovered] . IDIMATINE velocity in the USBA [17 groups unrecovered] . IDIMATINE velocity in the USBA [18 groups unrecovered] . IDIMATINE velocity in the USBA [19 groups unrecovered] . IDIMATINE velocity in the USBA [19 groups unrecovered] . IDIMATINE velocity in the USBA [19 groups unrecovered] . IDIMATINE velocity in the USBA [19 groups unrecovered] . IDIMATINE velocity in the USBA [19 groups unrecovered] . IDIMATINE velocity in the USBA [19 groups unrecovered] . IDIMATINE velocity in the USBA [19 groups unrecovered] . IDIMATINE velocity in the USBA [10 groups unrecovered] . IDIMATINE velocity in the USBA [10 groups unrecovered] . IDIMATINE velocity in the USBA [10 groups unrecovered] . IDIMATINE velocity in the USBA [10 groups unrecovered] . IDIMATINE velocity in the USBA [10 groups unrecovered] . IDIMATINE velocity in the USBA [10 groups unrecovered] . IDIMATINE velocity in the USBA [10 groups unrecovered] . IDIMATINE velocity in the USBA [10 groups unrecovered] . IDIMATINE velocity in the USBA [10 groups unrecovered] . IDIMATINE velocity in the USBA [10 groups unrecovered] . IDIMATINE velocity in the USBA [10 groups unrecovered] . [10 groups unrecovered] . [11 groups unrecovere</pre>	From: NEW YORK	
<pre>v June 1943 To VINTOR[1]. 1. "JATATS"[11] reports that according to information of a [C5 branch] of the "IZBA"[11]</pre>	To: 605C04	
<pre>To VIKTOR[1]. 1. "ZAYATS"[11] reports that according to information of a [C\$ branch] of the "IZBA"[11]     [73 groups unrecovered] in ITALY: Also Italian workers are returning from GENGUARY. 2. "KORM"[iv] reports that the "IZBA" has received from its [C\$ branch] in ITALY: Also Italian workers are returning from GENGUARY. 2. "KORM"[iv] reports that the "IZBA" has received from its [C\$ branch] in SIDON[v] two confidential reports on [3 groups unrecovered]. 2. "KORM"[iv] asys that SDEN is inclined to side with the Foles but "KABAM"[vi] takes a more moderate position proposing to eque [D\$ BYELDRUSSIA] and the UKRAINE to the USSR and Eastern FRUSSIL to FOLABU     [13 groups unrecovered] Foles and the chances for     [18 groups unrecovered] TIZBA" from     [38 groups unrecovered] TIZBA" from     [38 groups unrecovered] MINA[vii]  Notes:     [a! Could alternatively be "with, by" etc. The preposition is uncertain. Comments:     [1] VINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIM.     [1] ANAGES i.e. "MARE" or "STONANG". Maurice HALFERIM, who became     chief of the Latin American Section of the Research and Amalysis     Branch of 0.5.5.     [11] IZBA: Offlice'ST Strategic Services.     [13] KIDNON.     [14] LIAM: Offlice'ST Strategic Services.     [15] KONNE.     [15] KONNE.     [16] LIAM: Offlice'ST Strategic Services.     [16] KIDNON.     [17] KOAMAN i.e. MOAR". Whaton CHURCHILL.     [13] KONNE.     [14] LUAM: Fowel P. KLARIM, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORG </pre>	No.: 887 •	a June Juli 3
<pre>1. "ZAYARS"[11] reports that according to information of a [C% branch] of the "LEBA"[111] [73 groups unrecovered] in HYALY: Also Italian workers are returning from GERGARY. 2. "KORA"[iv] reports that the "LEBA" has received from its [C% branch] in SIDON[v] two confidential reports on [3 groups unrecovered]. One of these from 38 April says that DEN is inclined to side with the Poles but "KABAM"[v1] takes a more moderate position proposing to case [D% BYELORUSSIA] and the UKRAIRE to the USSR and Eastern PRUSSIA to FOLAND [13 groups unrecovered] Foles and the chances for [16 groups unrecovered] Foles and the chances for [36 groups unrecovered] FLIT-GALATS[vi1] [37 groups unrecovered] fillonatic relations of [a] the USSR. No. 499 [UKA[vi11] Notes: [a] Could alternatively be "with, by" etc. The preposition is uncertain. Comments: [1] VINTOR: it. Gen. P.M. PITIN. [1] AMATE: i.e. "HARE" or "STOWART". Maurice HALFERIN, who became chief of the Letin American Section of the Research and Analysis Branch of 0.5.5. [11] IZBA: Office of Strategic Services. [12] KORN: i.e. MOAR". Minston CHURCHILL. [13] KORN: i.e. MOAR". Minston CHURCHILL. [14] KAARTS: Foesibly a reference to Narcel FILET-GOLAZ, at this time a member of the Suiss Federal Council responsible for foreign affairs. [13] LOAD. [14] LEAA: Office of Strategic Services. [14] KAARTS: i.e. MOAR". Minston CHURCHILL. [15] KAARTS: Foesibly a reference to Narcel FILET-GOLAZ, at this time a member of the Suiss Federal Council responsible for foreign affairs. [15] LKAA: Favel P. KLARIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEM YORK.</pre>		3 June 19-2
<pre>the "IZBA"[iii]</pre>	To VIKTOR[1].	
<pre>in ITALY: Also Italian workers are returning from GERMANY. 2. "XOKM"[iv] reports that the "LEBA" has received from its [C% branch] in SIDON[v] two confidential reports on [3 groups unrecovered]. One of them from 38 April says that ADEM is inclined to side with the Poles but "KABAM"[v1] takes a more moderate position proposing to ceael [0] BIELORUSSIA] and the UKRAINE to the USSR and Eastern PRUSSIA to POLAMD</pre>	<pre>L. "ZAYaTs"[ii] reports that accord the "IZBA"[iii]</pre>	ling to information of a [C% brauch] of
<pre>2. "KORA"[iv] reports that the "LEBA" has received from its [C% branch] in SIDOM[v] two confidential reports on [3 groups unrecovered]. One of them from 30 April says that EDEN is inclined to side with the Foles but "KABAM"[v] takes a more moderate position proposing to case [D% BYELORUSSIA] and the UKRAINE to the USSR and Eastern FRUSSIA to FOLAND [13 groups unrecovered] Foles and the chances for [16 groups unrecovered] "IZBA" from [30 groups unrecovered] "IZBA" from [30 groups unrecovered] diplomatic relations of [a] the USSR. No. 499 LUKA[vii1] Notes: [3] Could alternatively be "with, by" etc. The preposition is uncertain. Comments: [1] VINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITHN. [1] /AMATS: i.e. "HARE" or "STOWART". Maurice HALFERIN, who became chief of the Latin American Section of the Research and Amalysis Branch of 0.5.5. [11] ILEA: ONCH. Duncan C. LEE of the Far Eastern Section of 0.5.S. [v] SDON: LONDN. [v] KARATS: Ne. "BORT". Winston CHURCHILL. [viii] JUNTOR. Lt. Bost". Winston CHURCHILL. [viii] LUBACHIES: Fossibly a reference to Narcel FILEF-GOLAZ, at this time a member of the Swiss Federal Council responsible for foreign affairs. [viii] LUKA: Fawel P. KLARIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEM YORK.</pre>	(73 groups	s unrecovered j
<pre>in SDON[v] two confidential reports on [] groups unrecovered]. One of them from 30 April says that SDN is inclined to state with the Foles but "KABAN"[v1] takes a more moderate position proposing to case [D\$ BYELORUSSIA] and the UKRAINE to the USSR and Eastern FRUSSIA to FOLAND [13 groups unrecovered] Poles and the chances for [16 groups unrecovered] "IZEA" from [30 groups unrecovered] PLIT-GALATs[v11] [13 groups unrecovered] diplomatic relations of [a] the USSR. No. 490 [31 groups unrecovered] diplomatic relations of [a] the USSR. No. 490 [32 groups unrecovered] Notes: [a] Could alternatively be "with, by" etc. The preposition is uncertain. Comments: [1] VINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [1] /AIAFBS: i.e. "HARE" or "STOWART". Maurice HALFERIN, who became chief of the Latin American Section of the Research and Analysis Branch of 0.S.S. [11] IZEA. Office of Strategic Services. [12] KOKh: i.e. MOCK. Duncan C. LEE of the Far Eastern Section of 0.S.S. [13] KABAN: i.e. "BORA". Winston CHURCHILL. [v1] KUNDN: Lt. "BORA". Winston CHURCHILL. [v1] HURA': rest Forestbly a reference to Marcel FILET-GOLX, at this time a member of the Swiss Federal Council responsible for foreign affairs. [v11] LUKA' Farel P. KLARIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK.</pre>	in ITALY. Also Italian workers are	returning from GERMANY.
<pre>[13 groups unrecovered] Foles and the chances for</pre>	in SIDON[v] two confidential reports them from 30 April says that ADEN is "KARAN"[vi] takes a more moderate by	s on [3 groups intervolved]. One of s inclined to side with the Foles but naition proposing to case [D/s BYELORUSSIA]
<pre>[18 groups unrecovered] "IZBA" from</pre>		
<pre>"IZEA" from</pre>	Poles and the chances for	
[30 groups unrecoverable] PLIT-GALATS[v11] [13 groups unrecovered] diplomatic relations of [a] the USSR. No. 490 [UKA[v111] Notes: [a] Could alternatively be "with, by" etc. The preposition is uncertain. [a] Could alternatively be "with, by" etc. The preposition is uncertain. [a] Counsents: [1] VINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [11] /ANGF3: i.e. "HARE" or "STOWARD". Maurice HALFERIN, who became chief of the Latin American Section of the Research and Analysis Branch of O.S.S. [11] ILZBA: Office of Strategic Services. [12] KOKh: i.e. MOCH. Duncan C. LEE of the Far Eastern Section of O.S.S. [14] HILTGALATS: Possibly a reference to Marcel FILET-GOLAZ, at this time a member of the Swiss Federal Council responsible for foreign affairs. [viii] LUKA: Fawel F. KLARIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK.	[18 group	s unrecovered]
[13 groups unrecovered]         diplomatic relations of [a] the USSR.         No. 499       LUKA[vii1]         Notes:       [a] Could alternatively be "with, by" etc. The preposition is uncertain.         Comments:       [1] VINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.         [1] XINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.       [1] XINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.         [1] VINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.       [1] XINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.         [1] XINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.       [1] XINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.         [1] XINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.       [1] XINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.         [1] XINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.       [1] XINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.         [1] XINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.       [1] XINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.         [1] XINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.       [1] XINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.         [1] XINTOR: L. Gen. P.M. FITIN.       [1] XINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.         [1] XINTOR: L. Gen. P.M. FITIN.       [1] XINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.         [1] XINTOR: L. GEN. DUNCA.       [1] XINTOR: L. GEN. DUNCA.         [1] XINTOR: LUBON.       [1] XINTOR: LUBON.         [1] KABARI I. e. BOAR". Winston CHURCHILL.       [1] YIIT GALATS: Possibly a reference to Marcel PILET-COLV., at this time a member of the Suiss Federal Council responsible for foreign affairs.         [1] YUKA: Fawel P. KLARIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK.       [1] YORK.	"IZBA" from	
<pre>(13 groups unrecovered] diplomatic relations of (a) the USSR. No. 499 LUKA[vii1] Notes: [a] Could alternatively be "with, by" etc. The preposition is uncertain. Comments: [1] VINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [1] /ATATS: i.e. "HAREM or "STOKANTY". Maurice HALFERIN, who became chief of the Latin American Section of the Research and Analysis Branch of 0.5.8. [11] LIZBA: Office of Strategic Services. [14] KADAN: i.e. MORM. Minston CHNRCHILL. [15] VINDON. [14] HARDAN". Minston CHNRCHILL. [14] HALTAGALATS: Fossibly a reference to Marcel PILER-GOLW, at this time a member of the Swiss Federal Council responsible for foreign affairs. [14] LUKA: Fawel P. KLARIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK.</pre>	[30 group	s unrecoverable]
<pre>(13 groups unrecovered) diplomatic relations of {a} the USSR. No. 490 LUKA[viii] Notes: [a] Could alternatively be "with, by" etc. The preposition is uncertain. Comments: [1] VINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [11] AAYGTs: i.e. "HARBY or "STOWANT". Maurice HALPERIN, who became chief of the Letin American Section of the Research and Analysis Branch of 0.5.5. [11] LIZA: Office of Strategic Services. [11] KARAN: i.e. MOCH. Duncen C. LEE of the Far Eastern Section of 0.5.5. [11] KARAN: i.e. "BOAR". Minston CHURCHILL. [11] KARAN: i.e. "BOAR". Minston CHURCHILL. [11] KARAN: i.e. MEARIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK.</pre>		
<pre>diplomatic relations of [a] the USSR. No. 499 LUKA[viii] Notes: [a] Could alternatively be "with, by" etc. The preposition is uncertain. (a] VINTOR: Lt. Gen. F.M. FITIN. [ii] VINTOR: Lt. Gen. F.M. FITIN. [ii] ANAGRS: i.e. "HARE" or "STOWART". Maurice HALFERIN, who became chief of the Latin American Section of the Research and Analysis Branch of 0.5.5. [iii] LIZAA: Office of Strategic Services. [iv] KOKh: i.e. KOCH. Duncan C. LEE of the Far Eastern Section of 0.5.5. [v] KOKh: i.e. MOCH. Duncan C. LEE of the Far Eastern Section of 0.5.5. [v] KOKh: i.e. "BOAR". Winston CHURCHIL. [v1] KABAN: i.e. "BOAR". Winston CHURCHIL. [v1] PLIT GALATS: Possibly a reference to Marcel PILEP-GOLVZ, at this time a member of the Swiss Federal Council responsible for foreign affairs. [viii] LUKA: Fawel P. KLARIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK.</pre>		s unrecovered]
<ul> <li>No. 498 UUKA[vii1]</li> <li>Notes: <ul> <li>[a] Could alternatively be "with, by" etc. The preposition is uncertain.</li> </ul> </li> <li>Comments: <ul> <li>[1] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P. M. FITIN.</li> <li>[11] /AYATB: 1.e. "KARB" or "SITWANT". Maurice HALPERIN, who became chief of the Lettu American Section of the Research and Analysis Branch of 0.S.S.</li> <li>[11] IZAN: Office of Strategic Services.</li> <li>[14] SIDON: LORDON.</li> <li>[17] KLARN: I.e. "BORR". Winston CHURCHILL.</li> <li>[11] ILTWGALATE: Possibly a reference to Marcel PILEP-GOL'Z, at this time a member of the Swiss Federal Council responsible for foreign affairs.</li> <li>[vii1] LUKA: Pawel F. KLARIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>		
<ul> <li>Notes: <ul> <li>[a] Could alternatively be "with, by" etc. The preposition is uncertain.</li> </ul> </li> <li>Comments: <ul> <li>[1] VINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. PITIN.</li> <li>[1] Altars: i.e. "HARE" or "STOWART". Maurice HALPERIN, who became chief of the Latin American Section of the Research and Analysis Branch of O.S.S.</li> <li>[11] LIEA: Office of Strategic Services.</li> <li>[14] KOGA: i.e. KOCH. Duncan C. LEE of the Far Eastern Section of O.S.S.</li> <li>[V] SIDON: LONDON.</li> <li>[V] SIDON: LONDON.</li> <li>[V1] PLIT#GALATS: Possibly a reference to Marcel PILET-GOLAZ, at this time a member of the Swiss Federal Council responsible for foreign affairs.</li> <li>[V11] LUKA: Fawel F. KLARIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	•	
<ul> <li>[a] Could alternatively be "with, by" etc. The preposition is undertain.</li> <li>[comments:</li> <li>[i] VINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.</li> <li>[ii] AMAGES: i.e. "HARE" or "STOWAWI". Maurice HALFERIN, who became chief of the Latin American Section of the Research and Analysis Branch of 0.S.S.</li> <li>[iii] LEA: Office of Strategic Services.</li> <li>[iv] KOKh: i.e. KOCH. Duncan C. LEE of the Far Eastern Section of 0.S.S.</li> <li>[v] KOKh: i.e. "BOAR". Winston CHURCHILL.</li> <li>[vi] MABAN: i.e. "BOAR". Winston CHURCHILL.</li> <li>[vi] Markin: i.e. "BOAR". Winston CHURCHILL.</li> <li>[vii] HITTGALATS: Fossibly a reference to Marcel FILEF-GOLAZ, at this time a member of the Swiss Federal Council responsible for foreign affairs.</li> <li>[viii] LUKA: Fawel P. KLARIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK.</li> </ul>		والمعارية المعادية والمعادية المعارية المعارية
<ul> <li>Comments: <ul> <li>[1] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.</li> <li>[11] / ANGTS: i.e. "GARS" or "STOWAMT". Maurice HALPERIN, who became chief of the Latin American Section of the Research and Analysis Branch of 0.5.8.</li> <li>[11] LZBA: Office of Strategic Services.</li> <li>[11] KORAN: i.e. NOCH. Duncan C. LEE of the Far Eastern Section of 0.5.5.</li> <li>[17] KORAN: i.e. MORN. Minston CHURCHILL.</li> <li>[V1] KABAN: i.e. "BOAR". Minston CHURCHILL.</li> <li>[V1] FLTTGALATE: Possibly a reference to Marcel PILER-GOLWZ, at this time a member of the Swiss Federal Council responsible for foreign affairs.</li> <li>[v11] LUKA: Fawel P. KLARIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK.</li> </ul></li></ul>	Notes: [a] Could alternatively be "v	rith, by" etc. The preposition is uncertain.
<ol> <li>VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.</li> <li>(1) VIKTOR: I.e. "(RARM" or "STOWNWRT". Maurice HALFERIN, who became chief of the Latin American Section of the Research and Analysis Branch of O.S.S.</li> <li>(11) IZBA: Office of Strategic Services.</li> <li>(14) KOKA: i.e. KOCH. Duncan C. LEE of the Far Eastern Section of O.S.S.</li> <li>(17) KOKA: i.e. MOAR". Winston CHURCHILL.</li> <li>(11) FLITWOALATS: Possibly a reference to Marcel PILER-GOLVZ, at this time a member of the Swiss Federal Council responsible for foreign affairs.</li> <li>(viii) LUKA: Pawel P. KLARIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK.</li> </ol>		
<ul> <li>[111] IZBA: Office of Strategic Services.</li> <li>[1v] KOKh: i.e. KOCH. Duncan C. LEE of the Far Eastern Section of O.S.S.</li> <li>[vi] SIDON: ONBON.</li> <li>[vi] KABAN: i.e. BOAR<sup>3</sup>. Winston CHURCHILL.</li> <li>[vi] FLITWGALATS: Fossibly a reference to Marcel FILET-GOLAZ, at this time a member of the Swiss Federal Council responsible for foreign affairs.</li> <li>[vii] LUKA: Fawel P. KLARIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>[1] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FI</li> <li>[11] AXaTs: i.e. "HARB" or chief of the Latin Americ</li> </ul>	TTIN. "STOWANTI". Maurice HALPERIN, who became can Section of the Research and Analysis
<ul> <li>[vi1] PLIT#GALATS: Possibly a reference to safet interformer to reference to safet interformer time a member of the Swiss Federal Council responsible for foreign affairs.</li> <li>[vi11] LUKA: Pawel F. KLARIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK.</li> </ul>	[iii] IZBA: Office of Strategi	ic Services. an C. LEE of the Far Eastern Section of 0.S.S.
affairs. {viii} LUKA: Pawel F. KLARIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK.	[v11] PLIT*GALATs: Possibly a time a member of the Swi:	
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TO STORE VENONA	A STATE AND AND A STATE	CIAN INTERESTICATION OF
CHARLES VENUE		A F M MAR

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New York 887 to Moscow, 9 June 1943. OSS

12. New York [GRU] 927-8 to Moscow, 16 June 1943.

	TOP SECRET TRIME VENONA
	GRU
	nu li
	From: NEW YORK
	To: MOSCOW
	Nos. 927 - 928
	16 June 19 <u>43</u>
[Part I]	To the Director.
	1. MARQUIS[MARKI2][i] has established friendly relations with T.A. BISSON, (in future "AKTEUR[ATUR]") who has recently left $EEM[ii]$ ; he is now working in the Institute of Pacific Relations and in the editorial office of MARQUIS's periodical. AKTHUR evidently is well informed and has [C% agents] in government institutions.
	<ol> <li>ARTHUR passed to MARQUIS, so that as his colleague in the editorial office he might get acquainted with them, copies of four documents:</li> </ol>
	(a) his own report for BEW with his views on working out a plan for shipments of American troops to China;
	(b) a report by the Chinese embasey in WASHINTON to its government in China about the dimensions and means of trade between the Japanese in the occupied territories and Chinese industrialists in free Chinese [B% territory][a];
	(c) a brief BEW report of April 1943 on a general evaluation of the forces of the sides on the Soviet-German front and the prospects of the German summer offensive;
	(d) a report by the American consul in VLADIVOSTOK, WARD, on the economic and political situation in the VLADIVZOSTOK area.
	3. The reports are in translated form. We will pass on valuable points $[B\beta$ by telegraph].
	4. A check on ARTHUR's personal connections will be undertaken on the spot. At the same time make use of the Centre's opportunities for checking.
[Part II]	5. Concerning JACK[DZhEK][iii][:]
	(a) No transactions were arranged. A few days ago COX[KOKS][iv] met RUDI[v]. The latter [13 groups unrecovered]
	[35 groups unrecoverable]
	[13 groups unrecovered]
	. To ask RUDI [C% to replace] JACK is useless since he considers him the best of the possible candidates.
	(b) RUDI and JACK have put forward one person to set up a group of sources in REXALN[vi]. COX had [3 groups unrecovered] to use this person on pay by the month (136 American dollars). Wy instructions to him were - having received JACK's proposel, to give his views on the use and payment of the person for forwarding to the Centre. Now COX is asking the Centre to [C% agree] to the use and pay of the [C% proposed] jerson for three months to check his [b] possibilities. This person is a former member of one of the [B% local] committees of the KOFORTEXINa[Mi], a woman, name L. GORDON. I think payment for three months should be
	TOP SECRET TRINE VENON'

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New York [GRU] 927-8 to Moscow, 16 June 1943. GRU and Amerasia

12.	(Continued)
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	TOP SECRET TRINE VENONA
	-2-
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allowed, a by COX ([	it the same time insisting on her being directed personally groups unrecovered]).
6. BR days to co	NWE[BREM][viii] has been detained by the school for several nutinue his training. He will return about the **th June[c].
(C% corres unrecovers mitted by	Perence your No. 9474 [d]. The instruction to cease pondence] with the [0% city] [1 group unrecovered] ([1 group d] only on my part) has been put into effect (this was per- you in May 1942, telegram No. 5466 [d]). As soon as possible roups unrecovered] in their name.
8. The will be pu	ship's departure is being held up until 26th June. MOK[ix] t on board on 22md or 23rd June.
No. 168	MOLIÈRE[MOL'ER][x]
T.N.: [a	See New York to Moscow #989 of 24 June 1943, paragraph 1, which corrects this statement.
	Inserted by the translator. The "his" in the Russian is to be explained by the fact that the word used for "person" - is masculine.
[e	A date between 16th and 22nd June.
(a	Not available.
Comments:	MARKIZ: Joseph Milton BERNSTEIN.
	BEW: Board of Economic Warfare.
	DZhEK: Unidentified.
_	KOKS: Unidentified.
[v]	RDI: Unidentified.
[vi	NEXLIN: Unidentified, probably a city. ( presently NYC)
	KORFORATSIYa: the Communist Party.
(vii:	BREM: Thomas BABIN.
[ix]	MOK: Unidentified.
[×	MOL'ER: Pavel P. MIKhAJLOV, GRU Resident in NEW YORK.
	15 April 1968
	TOD SECRET TRINE VENIONA
	TOP SECRET TRINE VENONA

13. New York [GRU] 938 to Moscow, 17 June 1943.


	TOP SECRET TRINE VENONA
G	RU
F	rom: NEW YORK
т	o: MOSCOW
N	o. 938
	17 June 19 <u>43</u>
r	o the Director.
B	I am transmitting the main points of a report of BEW[i] compiled in April) reviewing the evaluation of the American and ritish Intelligence Services of the forces in the Soviet-German rout in 1943 (the report was given by MARQUIS[MARKIZ][ii] from RTHUR[AKTUR][iii]];
1	The main conclusion in the {C% report]
	[20 groups unrecoverable]
2	The evaluation of the British Intelligence Service:
fa ti Oi ea	The ground and air forces of the USSR considerably exceed he German. The USSR's production of tanks and aircraft exceeds by ar the German. The economic and possibly the military potential of he USSR have not reached their peak, but the German is on the decline. If the front by March there were 25% Soviet divisions, German (in the ulvalent) 16%-17%, not considering Rumanian and others. Aircraft prespondingly 4,888-4,588 and 1,688.
3	[The evaluation][a] of the American [Intelligence Service][a]:
ne	"It is inadequately defined: all the German losses on the cont will be replaced by summer; by [C% 1 June of this year] 30-40 we divisions will be formed and trained. The aim of the Germans in M43 is as before - the destruction of the Red Army in offensive perations."
4.	The BEW's own conclusions:
fo oj	a) British Intelligence grossly exaggerates the Aussian proces and underestimates the German forces, but the Americans do the posite.
s	b) A full-scale offensive by the Germans is beyond the limits ? their possibilities. At the same time the economy of the USSR is o strained that the armed forces cannot be, from the point of view of illity to conduct operations, at the 1942 level for more than a year.
ธเ	c) In the summer the Russians will have considerable periority on the ground and undisputed mastery in the air.
tł	d) The superiority of the Germans is in transport both in he rear and along the front for regrouping.
le Ge to	e) If by the summer Germany can replace all her losses and here will be no risk in weakening her garrisons in Europe, she can unch an offensive on a scale almost equal to that of 1942. The imman Command probably would not consider advantageous a transition of defense on all fronts. Their main task in 1943 will [C% therefore] the destruction of the armed strength of the USSR.
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	TOP SECRET TRINE VENONA

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New York [GRU] 938 to Moscow, 17 June 1943. Joseph Milton Bernstein

	- 2 -
t the impact	?) The ability of the Russians to withstand for a long time
	[43 groups unrecoverable]
No. 169	MOLLERS[MOL'ER][iv]
Comments:	Inserted by translator.
	EEW: Board of Economic Warfare. MARKIZ: Joseph Milton BERNSTEIN.
	ARTUR: Thomas Arthur BISSON.
[iv]	MOL'ER: Pavel P. MIKhAJLOV.
	15 April 1068
	15 April 1968
	. K


232




New York 1132-3 to Moscow, 13 July 1943. Recruiting proposals

· ·	95 <b>v</b>	ENONA		· · ·	
	<sup>22</sup> • <b>TO</b> J		6		
.•		JECKET	, l		
		••••••			
		1		of 27/1/1957)	
	UNT[v], SAINT MAURICE	E in FRANCE[.] [iii] Fro engineer [5 groups unre	m 1932 to 1933 covered to 193	ne worked	
	ab à coata (goor and	[6 groups unreco		•	
	and from 1938 to 1939 MGM Studios in PARIS of sound recording.	9 was the chief engineer . He is a prominent spe	of the Europen <u>ci</u> alist on the	n branch of the various aspects	
		[19 groups unrec	overed]		
	studio				
		[12 groups unrec	overed]		
	Studio U				
		: [48 groups unrec LGIUM, FRANCE and SWITZE		•	
	organization of film present time he is h the "ARSENAL" [vi]. to us. He is also c	we months he studied pro- tes in the best film studi- lead of the Russian secti- he has contacts in the sonnected with "GERTSOG"	os of the "COUN on of the film COUNTRY which a	rgi". At the department of	
<i>i</i> !		"PLATON's" [2 groups un	necove ed] [C.4	Liza [2 groups	
[PART II]	unrecovered)evna [v connection with "PIA	viii]who is being redevel	loped by us for	use in	
	en 11	[15 groups unreco	overed]		
	there film director				
		[37 groups unreco	C: 1 54	utanation in	
	the "OFFICE OF PR[x]	his sister - Elena KAGEN ]	[IX] [4 groups	missed]*otys in	
		[50 groups unreal [13 groups units]	coverable] recovered]		
	). He is character	rized 🏘 by KALISTRAT			
		[7 groups unre	covered]		
	of 27/2/1	1957)			
		VENONA			
		IOD CLC	DET		
		TOTOR			
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14. (Continued)



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15. New York [GRU] 1325 to Moscow, 11 August 1943.

TOP SECI	EF TRINE ENONA	
GRU		
· -		
From: NEW YORK		
To: MOSCOW	· .	
No. 1325	13. 4	
To the Director.	11 Angust 19 <u>43</u>	
	oups unrecoverable]	
house 2/6. In December 1936 we of the Lincoln Brigade. [B§ MT the commander of the 15th Divis Army as [C% interpreter] in the advisors]. Returned to the U.4 August 1943 worked in various e director of the T.N.T. factory accepted an invitation to the g inspector] attached to the Sky] War Department (the Division is has already had a conversation received from him on the techno- called pentolite (a mixture of which is used for shells, bombe structions. The question of th later. [ii] 2. MITRON[iii] just did not	Liva ZARETSKAYA, Khoromnyj Tupik [a], nt to Spain with the first [2% group] ere] held the post of aide-de-camp to ion, then staff officier in the Republican line [l group unrecovered] our [6% A. in [6% November] 1938. Up to 1 xplosives factories; last post assistant in WILLIAMSFORT, Pennsylvania. Has now ost of [6% production] safety [6] [6% osives Division [UFRAVLENLE] of the in CHICAGO). FHLL[FL1](1] eridently with him as he has passed on material logy of the production of an explosive TNT and penta-riviriol-testra-nitrate) , and torpedoes. We await your in- e means of liaison [B% can be] decided turn up for the first meeting.	
	roup unrecovered] a two weeks' vacation.	
No. 212	MO[c][v]	
T.N.: [a] These are street no	mes. The first word of the first name	
is not recoverable.		
	can also mean "security".	
<pre>[c] The remaining lette Comments:</pre>	rs of the signature are unrecoverable.	
[1] FIL: Not identifie	à.	
[ii] The information cor Daniel Abraham ZAR	tained in this paragraph relates to T.	
[iii] MITRON: Not identi	· · ·	
[iv] MARKIZ: Joseph Mil	ton BERNSTEIN.	
[v] Almost certainly M in NEW YORK.	L'ER - Pavel P. MIKhAJLOV, GRU Resident	
•		
•	15 April 1968	
TOD SECD	ET TRINE VENONA	

New York [GRU] 1325 to Moscow, 11 August 1943. GRU espionage

15.

16.	Washington [N	aval-GRU] 1969 (	to Moscow,	13	August 1943.	
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	BRIDE	
	-POP SECKET	
	USSR , Ref. No: 3/NEF/11139 (of 12/6/1959)	
	Issued: 13/7/1960	
	Copy No: 2014	
	XE-ISSUE	
	Marie OTTA des LETTER FROM CARTER (1943)	
j.	From: WASHINGTON	
:		
	To: [Name No. 42] <sup>[1]</sup> CARTER[KARTER] <sup>[1]</sup> has sent a lotter via STELLA. <sup>[131]</sup>	
	Since 26th July he has been working at the R.C.A. Taboratory, PRINUERON, NEW JIEWEY. It has a staff of 20 angineers. They are developing two projects by contract with the Army Signal Corps. These are to be reach by Cotober - November 1943. Both projects are basically for the improvement of radar and its used in radio new latter black between the intervent of radar and its	
	Notation 1940. Join projects use Sastaning for the improvement of redar and its use in radio marigation for blind bombing (that is from a high altitude and a great [2 groups unrecovered]) without visual bearings and without optical sights. It is meant to be fitted on Flying Fortresses. CANTER has been entrusted with drawing up instructions and a manual for the use of this apparatus. There is an opportunity of collaborating with other endpasses. In an endpastery note CANTER	
	Notable 1949. Both projects are called up for the improvement of redar and its use in radio argigation (both blind bothing (that is from a high altitude and a great [2 groups unrecovered]) without visual bearings and without optical sights. It is meant to be fitted on Siying Fortresses. GATTER has been entrusted with drawing up instructions and a manual for the use of this apparatus. There is an opportunity of collaborating with other engineers. In an explanatory note CARTER mentions the advantages of the new system over the British: it is not subject to interception and has greated to converge. CARTER mentions his contacts with four engineers who are working in important Far stablishments. For checking means for hear and has the before and	
	Notation 1949. Join projects use casheally for the improvement of relar and its use in radio argigation for blind bouhing (that is from a high altitude and a great [2 groups unrecovered]) without visual bearings and without optical sights. It is meant to be fitted on Siylar Fortresses. CARTER has been entrusted with drawing up instructions and a manual for the use of this apparture. There is an opportunity of collaborating with other engineers. In an explanatory note CARTER mentions the advantages of the new system over the British: it is not subject to interception and has greated accuracy. CARTER mentions his contacts with four engineers who are working in important was stablighments. For checking purposes fix we have told] the NEIGHEOUTS [SOMEDI] <sup>[147]</sup> about the last three of them. All are Communists. Philip FIED[FILIPP FIL'D], Aged 30. Mechanical engineers. Jew. Wife OL'CA is Busian (native methor).	
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Washington [Naval-GRU] 1969 to Moscow, 13 August 1943. S&T

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	TOPSECRET	
		:
	2 3/NEF/Tt139	
	Sidney BOROVICh[SHDNEJ BOROVICh][A], Aged 25. Engineer-physicist [INZABNER-FIZIK]. From a Polish-Jewish family, Norks in the MENTERN ELEVERIC	
	COMPANY on inter-aircraft radio communication. William MILES[VIL'IAM MAJLS]. Aged 29. Rubber chamist. Friend of CANTER.	
N.	lives in NEW NORK. Works as an assistant in the BELL IELEFENE OUTANN's laboratory. For the last eight years has been taking an active part in party work. Is not under suspicion with the company.	
• *	A modio engineer. Morks in the SANDY HOCK[SENDI KHUK] Army Signal Corps laboratory. His wife is a party organizer in the NSW NORK organization and is a friend of William MILES.	
	An engineer-physicist, - Director of the SPEREN laboratory. Morks on secret systems for electro-mechanical gun sights and ship and aircraft control.	
	He will let you have more precise information and the surnames later is when we get them to	
	From further information which has been reported to then about CARTER's biography, the ESIGHEDUNEs have some to the conclusion that CARTER has been in contact [BLL SYZAZAN] with () our finitizary ().	
	No. 626 [Name No. 91][v]	
	Notes: <u>[a] Or "greater</u> ".	
	[6] BOROVICh : First encoded as BORVICh, repeated as BOROVICh.	
	[6] "from our military": This is plural: perhaps means "members of our armed forces".	
	Comments: [1] Name No. 42 : Unidentified. Prailly Cape (15 Rock) M.A.	
	Comments: [1] Name No. 42 : Inidentified Prickly Cape (15 Rank) M.A.	
: •	Comments: [1] Name No. 42 : <u>Unidentified</u> frankly Cast (157 Grack) M.A. VORONTROV [11] CARTER : Eugene Franklin COLEMAN. [11] STELLA : Unidentified cover-name. [iv] NEIGHBOURS : Members of enother Soviet intelligence	
:	Comments: [1] Name No. 42 : <u>Unidentified</u> frankly Capil(157 Gr. k.) M.A. VORONTROV [11] CARTER : Eugene Franklin COLZMAN. [11] STELLA : Unidentified cover-name. [iv] NEIGHEOURS : Mambers of another Soviot intelligence organization.	
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	Comments: [1] Name No. 42 : <u>Haidentified</u> , Franklin Capt. (157 Ru-k.) M.A. VORONTEOV [11] CARTER : Eugene Franklin COLZMAN. [11] STELLA : Unidentified cover-name. [1V] NEIGHBOURS : Members of enothic Soviet intelligence organization. [V] Name No. 91 : <u>Unidentified</u> , Rade black Capt. (107 Rack) 1.A. EGRRICHEV, Standt Manual Attach (11). Wrohn of the Soviet intelligence (107 Rack) 1.A.	·
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17.	Washington	[Naval-GRU]	1983 to Moscow,	14 August 1943.
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	USSR Ref. No: 3/NEF/T1206 (of 7/10/1959)
	Issued: //30/1/1961
	Copy No: 2014
	<u>RE-ISSUE</u>
	SALLY AND THE ARRIVAL OF THE "SEVASTOPOL" (1943)
<u>.</u>	From: WASHINGTON
	To: MOSOOW
	No: 1983 14 Aug. 43
	To: [Name No. 42].[1]
	The "SEVASTOPOL'" arrived in SAN FRANCISCO on 13th August. [B. The
. <b>.</b>	The "SEVASTOPOL'" arrived in SAN FRANCISCO on 13th August. [B. The formalities with] the passengers went off normally. The formalities with the crew are being done on 14th August and about these I shall report later. SALLY[SELIT][11] is realing all right. On 15th August sho [B] will once under the control of] [1 word unrecoverable].[a]
	No. 629 Name No. 91 [iii]
	Note: [a] Very probably a name.
	Comments: [1] Name No. 42 : Unidentified.
	[ii] SALLY : Unidentified cover-name.
	[iii] Name No. 91 : Unidentified.
	<u>Distribution</u>
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Washington [Naval-GRU] 1983 to Moscow, 14 August 1943. SALLY

18. Moscow 142 (Circular), 12 September 1943.

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<pre>From: MOSCOW To: CANBERRA No: 142[a]  12 September 1943  1. A change in circumstances - and in particular the dissolution of the "BIG HOUSE[BOU!ShOT DOM]"[1] - necessitates a change in the method used by the workers of our residencies to keep in touch with the leaders of the local FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN [ZEMLYACHESKIJ[11]) organizations on intelligence matters.  2. Our workers, by continuing to meet the leaders of the FELOWCOUNTRYMAN [ZEMLYACHESKIJ[11]) organizations on intelligence matters.  3. We propose:  4.) That personal contact with leaders of the local FELLOW-COUNTRYMAN contacts of the "BIG HOUSE" is still in existence.  b) That personal contact with leaders of the "BIG HOUSE."  b) That meetings of our workers may take place only with special reliable undercover[ZENOMSPIRTHOUMNIN] contacts of the FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN [DE organizations], who are not suspected by the [1 group unidentified][b]: local authorities; explusively about specify aspects of our intelligence work (acquiring 1) group unidentified][b]: local.authorities; explusively about specify of the Soviet Union.  No. 4048  VIETOR[111]  Notes: [a] This message is known to have been sent also to MEY WORK, SAN FFANCISCO and OUTAWA.  [b] The unidentified group is the same in both casesevaluations [commons] [] BIG HOUSE, The CountyrEMA. [counterman]] [] BIG HOUSE, The Counterman]] </pre>	USSR	•		
<ul> <li>T: CANBERRA</li> <li>N: 142[s]</li> <li>12 September 1943</li> <li>1. A change in diroumstances - and in particular the dissolution of the "BIG HOUSE[SOU?ShOT DOM["[1] - necessitates a change in the mathod used by the workers of our residencies to keep in town with the leaders of the local FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN [ZEMUNACHEENTI][1]</li> <li>. Our workers, by continuing to meet the leaders of the fridowing [[1] local authorities to suspect that the "BIG HOUSE" is still in existence.</li> <li>. Me.propose:</li> <li>. Me.propose:</li> <li>. That personal contact with leaders of the local FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN [ZEMUNACHEENTI][1]</li> <li>. That personal contact with leaders of the local FELLOW material should not be accepted for forwarding to the "BIG HOUSE."</li> <li>. The meetings of our workers may take place only with study and not be accepted for forwarding to the "BIG HOUSE."</li> <li>. The meetings of our workers may take place only with study and the indecident [[2] could math [] leaders of the local fellowing to the study of the study</li></ul>	•	Reissue		
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<pre>in the method used by the workers of our residencies to keep in touch with the leaders of the local FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN [ZEMLYaChESKLJ][i] organizations on intelligence matters.</pre> 2. Our workers, by continuing to meet the leaders of the FELLOWCOUNTRYMEN, are exposing themselves to danger and are giv- ing cause [I group unidentified][b] local authorities to suspect that the "BIG HOUSE" is still in existence. 3. We propose: a) That personal contact with leaders of the local FELLOW- COUNTRYMAN organizations should cease and that FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN material should not be accepted for forwarding to the "BIG HOUSE." b) That meetings of our workers may take place only with special reliable undercover [ZAKONSPIRTROVANNU] contacts of the FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN [De organizations], who are not suspected by the [I group unidentified][b] local authorities, exclusively about specific aspects of our intelligence work (acquiring [1 group unidentified] contacts. leads[NAVODKI], rechecking of those who are being cultivated, etc.). For each meeting it is necessary to obtain our consent; [1 group unrecovered] [1 group unscing] representative of the Soviet Union. No. 4048 VIETOR[iii] Notes: [a] This message is known to have been sent also to NEW YORK, SAN FRANCISCO and OTTAWA. [b] The unidentified group is the same in both casesengline [1] BIG HOUSE: The Communist(s).			12 September :	19 <u>43</u>
<ul> <li>3. We propose:</li> <li>a) That personal contact with leaders of the local FELLOW-COUNTRYMAN organizations should cease and that FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN material should not be accepted for forwarding to the "BIG HOUSE."</li> <li>b) That meetings of our workers may take place only with special reliable undercever [ZAKONSPIRTROVANNU] contacts of the FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN [] contacts of our intelligence work (acquiring [] group unidentified][] [] iconl authorities, exclusively about specific aspects of our intelligence work (acquiring [] group unidentified] contacts. leads [NAVODXI], rechecking of those who are being cultivated, etc.]. For each meeting it is necessary to obtain our consent;</li></ul>	in the mathod touch with th organizations	l used by the workers of le leaders of the local i on intelligence matter	"[1] - necessitates a change our residencies to keep in PELLOWCOUNTRYMAN [ZEMLYaCHES] s.	(IJ](II) 3
<ul> <li>3. We propose:</li> <li>a) That personal contact with leaders of the local FELLOW-COUNTRYMAN organizations should cause and that FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN material should not be accepted for forwarding to the "BIG HOUSE."</li> <li>b) That meetings of our workers may take place only with special reliable undercover [2AKONSPIRTRYMANNJ] contacts of the FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN [De organizations], who are not suspected by the [1 group unidentified][b] hogal authorities, exclusively about specific aspects of our intelligence work (acquiring [1 group unidentified][c] hogal. authorities, exclusively about specific aspects of our intelligence work (acquiring finder of those who are hold or consent.</li> <li>[1 group unidentified]</li> <li>representative of the Soviet Union.</li> <li>No. 4048 VIETOR[iii]</li> <li>Notes: [a] This massage is known to have been sent also to NEW YORK, SAN PRANCISCO and OTTAWA.</li> <li>[b] The unidentified group is the same in both caseserganizations:</li> <li>[1] BIG HOUSE: The Community[a].</li> </ul>	2. Our wo FELLOWCOUNTRY ing cause [1] that the "BIG	rkers, by continuing to MEN, are exposing thems group unidentified][b] HOUSE" is still in exis	meet the leaders of the alves to danger and are giv- local authorities to suspect stance.	11,4 • • •
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<ul> <li>b) That meetings of our workers may take place only with special reliable undercover [2AKONSPIRROVANNU] contacts of the FELLOWCOUNTRYNNAN. [D8 organizations], who are not suspected by the [1° group unidentified] [b] focal authorities, exclusively about specific aspects of our intelligence work (acquiring [1 group unidentified] contacts, leads [NAVOKT], rechecking of those who are being cultivated, etc.]. For each meeting it is necessary to obtain our consent.</li> <li>[1 group missing]</li> <li>representative of the Soviet Union.</li> <li>No. 4048 VIKTOR[iii]</li> <li>Notes: [a] This message is known to have been sent also to NEW YORK, SAN PRANCISCO and OTTAWA.</li> <li>[b] The unidentified group is the same in both casesorganized for the set of the Soviet material of the sense in both casesorganized for the sens</li></ul>	material shou	d not be accepted for	and that FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN forwarding to the "BIG HOUSE	: 5
representative of the Soviet Union. No. 4048 Notes: [a] This message is known to have been sent also to NEW YORK, SAN FRANCISCO and OTTAWA. [b] The unidentified group is the same in both casesorgani Comments: [1] EIG HOUSE: The COMINTERN. [1] EIG HOUSE: The COMINTERN.	b) That m special relia PELLOWCOUNTRY the [1 group about specifi group unident those who are	eetings of our workers n ble undercover [ZAKOMSPI] MAN (D& organizations], unidentified][b] focal. d aspects of our intell: field] contacts, leads [1 being outbivated, sto.]	may take place only with	
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No. 4048 VIKTOR[ii1] Notes: [a] This message is known to have been sent also to NEW YORK, SAN FRANCISCO and OTTAWA. [b] The unidentified group is the same in both casesorganic Comments: [i] BIG HOUSE: The COMINTERN. [ii] FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN.TAMEN): Communist(s).	representativ		151	
Notes: [a] This massage is known to have been sent also to NEW YORK, SAN FRANCISCO and OTTAWA. [b] The unidentified group is the same in both casesorganic Comments: [i] EIG HOUSE: The COMINTERN. [ii] FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN(-MEN): Communist(s).			VIKTOR (111)	
<ul> <li>[1] The unidentified group is the same in both cases. ""</li> <li>[1] BIG HOUSE: The COMINTERN.</li> <li>[11] FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN(-MEN): Communist(s).</li> </ul>		NEW IURK, SAN FRANCISCU	to have been sent also to	<del></del>
	Comments: [1] [11]	BIG HOUSE: The COMINT FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN (-MEN)	is the same in both cases.~ RN. Communist(s).	engens To
17 August 1971			17 August 1971	
		\$ •	. · · · ·	•*.
TOP SECRET WENDNA	TOPSE	CRET C	YENONA	· ·

243

Moscow 142 (Circular), 12 September 1943. Comintern dissolved

Meddel From: AM FRANCISCO To: MOSCOW No: 441 Inconfirm receipt of Code "075-B"[1] copy No.2f. Code "POBEDDA"[11] will be destroyed [2 groups unidentified] To: To: Gode nas been received [2 groups unidentified] (Inconfirm receipt of Code "075-B"[1] copy No.2f. Code "POBEDDA"[11] will be destroyed [2 groups unidentified] (Inconfirm receipt of Code "075-B"[1] copy No.2f. Code "POBEDDA"[11] will be destroyed [2 groups unidentified] (Inconfirm receipt of Code "075-B"[1] copy No.2f. Code "POBEDDA"[11] will be destroyed [2 groups unidentified] (Inconfirm receipt of Code destroyed [2 groups unidentified] (Inconfirm receipt of Code designated for the state of the state of the state of the receive use by the NKOB." (Inconfirm receipt of Code designated for the state of the receipt of the state of the receive use by the NKOB." (Inconfirm receipt of the state of the receipt of the
To: MOSCOW No.: 441 31 October 1943 I confirm receipt of Code "075-B"[1] copy No.27. Code "POBEDA"[ii] will be destroyed [2 groups unidentified] after [B% such] code has been received in TYRE [TIR][ii1]. 242 CHARON [KhARON][iv] Comments: [1] KOD "075-B": The code designated for and for BEZOFASNOST" (Security), that is, "for use by the NKGB." [11] KOD. "POBEDA"; The code designated for "POBEDA" [11] TIR: New York.
To: MOSCOW No.: 441 31 October 1943 I confirm receipt of Code "075-B"[1] copy No.27. Code "POBEDA"[ii] will be destroyed [2 groups unidentified] after [B% such] code has been received in TYRE [TIR][ii1]. 242 CHARON [KhARON][iv] Comments: [1] KOD "075-B": The code designated for and for BEZOFASNOST" (Security), that is, "for use by the NKGB." [11] KOD. "POBEDA"; The code designated for "POBEDA" [11] TIR: New York.
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I confirm receipt of Code "075-B"[i] copy No.27. Code "PODEDA"[ii] will be destroyed [2 groups unidentified] after [B% such] code has been received in TYRE [TIR][ii1]. 242 CHARON [KhARON][iv] Comments: [1] KOD "075-B": The code designated comments and comment under different system of pad-page identification. The "B" stands for BEZOFANOST' (Security), that is, "for use by the NKGB." [11] KOD. "POBEDA"; The code designated comment." [11] TIR: New York.
<pre>242 CHARON [KhARON][iv] Comments: [1] KOD "075-B": The code designated and and and and and and and and and an</pre>
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<ul> <li>[1] KOD "075-B": The code designated "Details and details under different system of pad-page identification. The "B" stands for BEZOPASNOST' (Security), that is, "for use by the NKGB."</li> <li>[11] KOD. "POBEDA"; The code designated "POBEDA" means "Victory."</li> <li>[11] TIR: New York.</li> </ul>
[11] KOD. "POBEDA"; The code designated <b>and the set of the set of</b>
[iii] TIR: New York.
[iv] KhARON: Grigorij KhEJFETS
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19. San Francisco 441 to Moscow, 31 October 1943.

San Francisco 441 to Moscow, 31 October 1943. Pobjeda codebook

19.

20.	Moscow	232-3	to all	Residents,	2	December	1943.
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	TO		YENONA
		Aven blogst	
		,	
		Peissue	
	From: HOSC	014	
		BEBBY	
	No: 233,	, 232	
			2 December 19 <u>43</u>
(Part	<ol> <li>Circular[a]</li> </ol>	1.	
- 	secrecy in the resider into affali work which of talkativ tions which to all 16 c worker shou is necessar In the prem studies and partments, discussion have even 1 of all the of instruct den during within the bationers [1 and other of	rs of the residencies which he they are carrying out. Of or veness and the inevitable rate h are maintained among our wor groups unrecovered) but each: uld know on the general work or ry in order to carry out the v mises of the embaasy, legation d work rooms of the residents; probably fitted with special 8 are being conducted on oper: been cases of setting up in th workers of the residency for tions of the [Cs center]. It instruction and generally in premises, to use the real su STATERRY, names of cities an objectives. All this should b	perational workers of trs are being initiated we no relation to the purse this is the result oncess of brotherly rela- thers. It is necessary individual operational of the residency only what work on his own assignment. a consulate (in the and in the private a- [1] group unidentified], ational questions. There he work room a conference a collective discussion is categorically forbid- discussion, particularly rnames of workers and pro- a condities, officials be encoded.
[Part	recommended which immed unidentifie in private dentified] evitably 10	nrecovered] considering the c. d instead of conversations al diately after such a "secrat ed] are destroyed. Our worke life [4 groups unrecovered] apparatus and [1 group unrec ead to disclosure. [1 group covered] discussions in Russi	oud to exchange notes, conversation" [1 group rs must not at work and from other [1 group uni- overed] that it will in- unrecovered] other [1 an about [5 groups unre-
	wieletten .	[5 groups unrecovera of rules of secrecy we will t	
•	group unid to a considencies the	entified] providing the neces derable extent depends upon t emselves. The residents shou les communications which they	sary secrecy in our work be leadors of the resi- ld not share with their
	No. 677		petrov[1]
	Notes: [a]	This message is known to ha HAVANA, MEXICO CITY, OTTAWA NEW YORK.	ve been sent also to
	Comments: [1]	PETROV: Unidentified MOSCO	W signature.
	TOP SE	CRET	16 August 1971

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Moscow 232-3 to all Residents, 2 December 1943. PETROV on security

21. §	San Fran	icisco 510	to to	Moscow,	7	December	1943.
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,	2	BRIDE	
		TOP SECPET	
USSR		Ref. No: 3/NBF/T1045 (of Issued: 27/1/1959	
Sec.		Copy No: 204	DØI
		<u>RE-ISSUE</u>	
	· RE	TERENCE TO "JULLA", "IVERI", AND "ZARE" (1943)	
Fran	SAN FRA	ICISCO	
Te:	MOSCOV7		
No:	510	7 Dec. <u>43</u>	
Perso	wal to PE	EROV. [1]	
No. 2	sending	substring and the subsequent [] group uni- sovered] soundal that IVERI in his reports to you man sovered] soundal that IVERI in his reports to you man a detailed letter of ZARE's on this case. KhikON[[vi]]	оц. ву ра
we are	6 hts: [1]	Rhykov : Unidentified MOSCOW addressee.	оц. <sub>Б</sub> урл
No. 2	sending	RhAKON[vi] PETROV : Unidentified MCSCOW addressee. JULLA : Olga Velentinovna KhLOFKOVA. IVEXI : Probably Mikhail Konstantinovich KALAT GOLDSFERI: Not koran.	
No. 2	36 1ts: [1] [11] [11]	Rhykowie i Unidentified MOSCOW addressee. JULLA : Olga Valentinovna KhlORKOV JVERI : Frobably Mikhail Konstantinovich KALAT	0207.
We ard No. 28 Commen	36 nts: [1] [11] [11] [v]	Rhykowie i Unidentified MOSCOW addressee. JULIA : Olga Valentinovna KhlORKOV IVERI : Frobably Nikhail Konstantinovich KALAT COLDSTEIN: Not known.	0207.
We ard No. 28 Commen	36 [11] [11] [11] [11] [17] [v]	Rhykowie i Unidentified MOSCOW addressee. JULIA : Olga Valentinovna KhlORKOV IVERI : Frobably Nikhail Konstantinovich KALAT COLDSTEIN: Not known.	0207.
We ard No. 28 Commen	36 [11] [11] [11] [11] [17] [v]	Rhykowie i Unidentified MOSCOW addressee. JULIA : Olga Valentinovna KhlORKOV IVERI : Frobably Nikhail Konstantinovich KALAT COLDSTEIN: Not known.	0207.
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We ard No. 28 Commen	36 [11] [11] [11] [11] [17] [v]	Rhykowie i Unidentified MOSCOW addressee. JULIA : Olga Valentinovna KhlORKOV IVERI : Frobably Nikhail Konstantinovich KALAT COLDSTEIN: Not known.	0207.
We ard No. 28 Commen	36 [11] [11] [11] [11] [17] [v]	Rhykowie i Unidentified MOSCOW addressee. JULIA : Olga Valentinovna KhlORKOV IVERI : Frobably Nikhail Konstantinovich KALAT COLDSTEIN: Not known.	0207.
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249

San Francisco 510 to Moscow, 7 December 1943. Olga Khlopkova

<sup>95</sup> VI	ENONA	
101	PSECKET	
USSR	Ref. No.: 3/NBF/T2242	
	Issued: 19/5/77	
	Copy No.: 301	
	FOR SURGICAL OPERATION, \$20,000 REQUIRED (1943)	
From: MEXICO CITY To: MOSCOW		
 No.: 158	23 December 1943	
To PETROV[ii].		
is planned by the DYMMD	stablished by LUKA[ii]. The SURGICAL OPERATION[iii] RS[ii] to take place in four days' time. At this red] by other means[iv] is impossible. Without delay ITAN's" money[v] for urgent requirements. Telegraph ed]. [2 groups unrecovered].	
No. 38	YuRIJ[vi]	
	[Continued overleaf]	
	***************************************	
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	8	
3/NBF/T2242		
[2 pages] AJV		
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7.25	VENONA	
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	I OF FECKET	
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Mexico City 158 to Moscow, 23 December 1943. Assault to free Mercader

22. Mexico City 158 to Moscow, 23 December 1943.

22.

95	V T <del>O</del>	ENONA P-secr	5. <b>.</b>
. •			
			2 3/NBF/T2242
Footnotes:	(i) PETF	: VO	Lavrentij Pavlovich BERIYa.
<u>,</u> (	ii] LUKA	<b>L:</b>	Pavel Panteleevich KLARIN: 2nd Secretary, Soviet Enhassy, MEXICO CITY, from 23 November 1943 to 24 May 1944; served previously and subsequently in the USA.
[1	iii] SURG DOCI	ICAL OPERATION, FORS:	Coverwords associated with the coverword "HOSPITAL", is "prison". They appear to denote a release from prison and those effecting it: relating here to the
			attempt to secure the release of TROTSXIJ's assassin (cf. MEXICO CITX's Nos. 55 of 15 January 1944 (umpublished) and 193, 194 of 14 March 1944 (3/NBF/T770)).
[i	.v] Or "w	ith other funds	[SREDSTVA]".
	v) KAPIT	'AN's money:	Presumably U.S. dollars: "KAPITAN", ie "CAPTAIN", is Bresident Franklin Delano ROOSEVELT's covername on the NEW YORK Lane - first occurrence on this lange.
Ęv	ri] YuRIJ	ſ:	Lev Aleksandrovich TARASOV.
		VENC	
	: . ·	TOP-S	tert
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252

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95 UG
TOP-SECRET DAUNT
D. 0. No. 7 (http://w.207
USSR Rof. No: 3/NBF/11327 Issued: 18/11/1960
Copy No: 2044
1. "BETCHER'S" CONTACTS AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF "AL'MA"
2. DIRECT CIPHER LINK WITH "JULLA" (1944) $m640$
From: SAN FRANCISCO
To: M033007 No: 34 17 Jan. 44
"BUTCHER[MYASNIK]"[1] expresses [1 group unrecovered] that the chemist Leo LEVENES[13] (in future "AL'MA) will start giving us help. AL'MA
[30 groups unrecovered]
BUTCHER in [3 groups unrevovered] through BUTCHER - AL'MA.
Among BUICHER's contacts there are also some interesting targets in the aviation plants [1-group-unrecovered] LOS ANGELES,
No. 14. CHARON[KLABON][iii]
Since a direct opher link has been set up with "JULLA" $[iv]$ she wants [1 group unrecovered] there the amount expended on telegraphic communication. I gave JULLA [3 groups unrecovered] the sum of 155 collars.
No. 15
Comments: [1] BUTCHER :
<ul> <li>[ii] LEVANES : An engineer with the Shell Oil Company at DOLDNIQUEZ, O'LIFORNIA.</li> <li>[iii] CHARON : Grigorij KhEFETS, Soviet Vice-Jonsul in SAN FRANUESCO.</li> </ul>
[iv] JULIA : Olga KhLOPKOVA.
Distribution
3/NBF/TI 327
TOP SECRET
DiUG

San Francisco 31 to Moscow, 17 January 1944. Espionage against aircraft

23.

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			and the star		
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US	SR		Re	f. No.:	
			. Is	sued :	6/1973
			Co	py No.: 301	17 - 411
	M	SETING BETWEEN "GUS"	" AND "REST"; ' (1944)	fork on enormous	
Fr	om: NEW YORK				
То	: MOSCOW			•	
No			95	h February 1944	
Pe	rsonal to VIKTO	DR[i]. No. 302[ii].			
WA hi: CO EN be Ge:	rehand GUS' was s rather cautionself that REST UNTRY[STRANA][v ORMOUS[ENORMOZ] ing carried out neral SOMERVELJ	ary a meeting took s given a detailed b ous at first, [1 grd W was aware of whom y] in September as a [[vii]]. According t under the direct o L[SCMMERVILL][vii]]	riefing by us. up unrecovered he was working member of the to him the work control of the and STIMSON[ix	REST greeted him ] the discussion GG with. R.[iv] arri ISLAND[OSTROV][vi] on ENORMOUS in the COUNTRY's army repu ]: at the head of	pleasantly but S' satisfied ved in the mission on COUNTRY is essented by the group
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WA hi: CO EN be Ge:	rehand GUS' was s rather cautionself that REST UNTRY[STRANA][v ORMOUS[ENORMOZ] ing carried out neral SOMERVELJ	s given a detailed b ous at first, [1 gro P was aware of whom J in September as s [[vil] A According t t under the direct o [[SOMMSWILL][vil]] ROVITYANE][vi] is a	riefing by us. he was working t member of the working t member of the work of the and STIMSON[ix Labour Member [C	REST greeted him 1 the discussion GG with. R.[iv] arri ISLAND[OSTROV][vi] on ENORMOUS in the COUNTRY's army repu 1: at the head of of Parliament, Ben	pleasantly but S' satisfied ved in the mission on COUNTRY is essented by the group
WA hi: CO EN be Ge:	rehand GUS' was s rather cautionself that REST UNTRY[STRANA][v ORMOUS[ENORMOZ] ing carried out neral SOMERVELJ	s given a detailed b ous at first, [1 gro P was aware of whom J in September as s [[vil] A According t t under the direct o [[SOMMSWILL][vil]] ROVITYANE][vi] is a	riefing by us. he was working t member of the working t member of the work of the and STIMSON[ix Labour Member [C	REST greeted him 1 the discussion GG with. R.[iv] arri ISLAND[OSTROV][vi] on ENORMOUS in the COUNTRY's army repu 1: at the head of of Parliament, Ben	pleasantly but S' satisfied ved in the mission on COUNTRY is essented by the group
WA hi: CO EN be Ge:	rehand GUS' was s rather cautionself that REST UNTRY[STRANA][v ORMOUS[ENORMOZ] ing carried out neral SOMERVELJ	s given a detailed b ous at first, [1 gro P was aware of whom J in September as s [[vil] A According t t under the direct o [[SOMMSWILL][vil]] ROVITYANE][vi] is a	riefing by us. he was working t member of the working t member of the work of the and STIMSON[ix Labour Member [C	REST greeted him 1 the discussion GG with. R.[iv] arri ISLAND[OSTROV][vi] on ENORMOUS in the COUNTRY's army repu 1: at the head of of Parliament, Ben	pleasantly but S' satisfied ved in the mission on COUNTRY is essented by the group
WA hi: CO EN be Ge:	rehand GUS' was s rather cautionself that REST UNTRY[STRANA][v ORMOUS[ENORMOZ] ing carried out neral SOMERVELJ	s given a detailed b ous at first, [1 gro P was aware of whom J in September as s [[vil] A According t t under the direct o [[SOMMSWILL][vil]] ROVITYANE][vi] is a	riefing by us. he was working t member of the working t member of the work of the and STIMSON[ix Labour Member [C	REST greeted him 1 the discussion GG with. R.[iv] arri ISLAND[OSTROV][vi] on ENORMOUS in the COUNTRY's army repu 1: at the head of of Parliament, Ben	pleasantly but S' satisfied ved in the mission on COUNTRY is essented by the group

New York 195 to Moscow, 9 February 1944. Gold meets Fuchs

 <u>.</u>	
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· _ 2 ·	
The whole operation amounts to t	he working out of the process for the The work is proceeding in two directions:
separation of isotopes of ENORMOUS.	ENCE[LAURENS][xi]
[71	groups unrecoveraged
moliminary and the electron method .	
18th February, we shall report the re	groups unrecovered]
No. 92	ANTONIXII
Footnotes: [i] VIKTOR:	Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.
[ii] Not available.	
[iii] GUS*:	i.e. "GOOSE"; Harry GOLD.
[iv] REST/R.:	Dr. Emil Julius Klaus FUCHS.
[v] COUNTRY:	U.S.A.
[vi] ISLAND, ISLANDERS:	GREAT BRITAIN, British.
[vii] ENORMOUS:	a) U.S. Atomic Energy Project.
CONTRACTOR A	b) Uranium. Lt. General Brehan Burke SOMERVELL,
[viii] General SOMERVELL:	Commanding General Army Service Forces, War Department.
[ix] STIMSON:	Henry Lewis STIMSON, Secretary of War.
[x] Ben SMITH:	Rt. Hon. Ben SMITH, Minister Resident in WASHINGTON for Supply from 1943.
[xi] LAWRENCE:	Professor Ernest Orlando LAWRENCE.
[xii] ANTON:	Leonid Romanovich KVASNIKOV.
VE	NONA
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256

25. San Francisco 65 to Moscow, 10 February 1944.

<image/> <image/> <image/> <image/> <image/> <image/> <image/> <image/> <image/> <text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text>		
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<text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text>		PSECRET WENONA
<text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text>		
<text><text><text><text><text><text><text><footnote><footnote><text></text></footnote></footnote></text></text></text></text></text></text></text>		Reissue (1742)
<page-header><text><text><text><text><footnote><footnote><footnote><footnote><footnote></footnote></footnote></footnote></footnote></footnote></text></text></text></text></page-header>	Fro	DE: SAN FRANCISCO
<page-header><text><text><text><footnote><footnote><footnote><footnote><footnote><footnote><footnote></footnote></footnote></footnote></footnote></footnote></footnote></footnote></text></text></text></page-header>	то:	: MOSCOW
In transmission from this year in FORTIAR second and plifts from the transmission from the indigetion authorities on the indigetion authorities on the indigetion authorities on the indigetion authorities on the indigetion authorities of the transmission from the indigetion authorities of the indigetion authorities o	No:	: 65
In the 9th of February of this year in FURTIAL second mate Elistic veta Mitrofanova KUKETBOVA, born 1919, deserted from S.S. "FRAN." KUE measing in the U.S.A. went into hiding. On this matter we are scaling "weak" [3][1] to FORMIAN. No. 3 MARON[111] MARON[111]		1# February 1944
voia Attorianova UZENTROVA, born 1316, desorted from S.S. "PRON." KUZ- Nemani in the U.S.A. vent into hiding. On this matter ve are sealing "MatQON" (solid): No. 15 EARDI(111) T.H. [a] T.e. in the musical source. The service tank is MiGRA in Parestan. Communit: 1. MIZCOR: Ls. Can. P.M. FITIN. 1.1 July 1969	То	VIKTOR[1].
T.N. [a] J.e. in the mosical sense: The service rank is MAIOR in Russian. Communic: [1] VIRTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITTM. [11] MAZDOR: J.e. "MAJOR KEX," Vyachislav Aleksandrovich MISLUK. [11] MAZDOR: J.e. "MAJOR KEX," Vyachislav Aleksandrovich MISLUK. [11] MAZDOR: J.e. "MAJOR KEX," Vyachislav Aleksandrovich MISLUK. [11] MAZDOR: J.e. "MAJOR KEX," Vyachislav Aleksandrovich MISLUK. [12] MAZDOR: J.e. "MAJOR KEX," Vyachislav Aleksandrovich MISLUK. [13] MAZDOR: J.e. "MAJOR KEX," Vyachislav Aleksandrovich MISLUK. [14] MAZDOR: J.e. "MAJOR KEX," Vyachislav Aleksandrovich MISLUK. [15] J. July 1969	NEI	ta Mitrofanovna KUZNETSOVA, born 1916, deserted from S.S. "PSKOV." KUZ- TaOVA without receiving permission from the immigration authorities to main in the U.S.A. vent into hiding. On this matter we are sending
Comments: [1] VIRTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [11] MAZLOR: 1.e. "MAJOR KEY," Vyachislav Aleksandrovich MISLUK. [11] KAARON: Grigorij KhEJFETs, Soviet Vice-Consul in SAN FRANCISCO at that time. 11 July 1969	No	. 45 KhARON[111]
Comments: [1] VIRTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [11] MAZLOR: 1.e. "MAJOR KEY," Vyachislav Aleksandrovich MISLUK. [11] KAARON: Grigorij KhEJFETs, Soviet Vice-Consul in SAN FRANCISCO at that time. 11 July 1969		
Comments: [1] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [11] MAZhOR: 1.e. "MAJOR KEY," Vyachislav Aleksandrovich MISLUK. [11] KAARON: Grigorij KhEJFETs, Soviet Vice-Consul in SAN FRANCISCO at that time. 11 July 1969		
Comments: [1] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [11] MAZhOR: 1.e. "MAJOR KEY," Vyachislav Aleksandrovich MISLUK. [11] KAARON: Grigorij KhEJFETs, Soviet Vice-Consul in SAN FRANCISCO at that time. 11 July 1969		
Comments: [1] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [11] MAZhOR: 1.e. "MAJOR KEY," Vyachislav Aleksandrovich MISLUK. [11] KAARON: Grigorij KhEJFETs, Soviet Vice-Consul in SAN FRANCISCO at that time. 11 July 1969		
Comments: [1] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [11] MAZhOR: 1.e. "MAJOR KEY," Vyachislav Aleksandrovich MISLUK. [11] KAARON: Grigorij KhEJFETs, Soviet Vice-Consul in SAN FRANCISCO at that time. 11 July 1969		
Comments: [1] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [11] MAZhOR: 1.e. "MAJOR KEY," Vyachislav Aleksandrovich MISLUK. [11] KAARON: Grigorij KhEJFETs, Soviet Vice-Consul in SAN FRANCISCO at that time. 11 July 1969		
Comments: [1] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [11] MAZhOR: 1.e. "MAJOR KEY," Vyachislav Aleksandrovich MISLUK. [11] KAARON: Grigorij KhEJFETs, Soviet Vice-Consul in SAN FRANCISCO at that time. 11 July 1969	,	
Comments: [1] VIRTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [11] MAZLOR: 1.e. "MAJOR KEY," Vyachislav Aleksandrovich MISLUK. [11] KAARON: Grigorij KhEJFETs, Soviet Vice-Consul in SAN FRANCISCO at that time. 11 July 1969		
Comments: [1] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [11] MAZhOR: 1.e. "MAJOR KEY," Vyachislav Aleksandrovich MISLUK. [11] KAARON: Grigorij KhEJFETs, Soviet Vice-Consul in SAN FRANCISCO at that time. 11 July 1969	_	
		omments: [1] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [11] MAZHOR: 1.e. "MAJOR KEY," Vyachislav Aleksandrovich MISLUK. [111] KAARON: Grigorij KhEFFETs, Soviet Vice-Consul in SAN FRANCISCO
TOP SECRET COMPA		11 July 1969
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
San Francisco 65 to Moscow, 10 February 1944. Kuznetsova deserts

26. Moscow [unnumbered], 25 April 1944.

TOP SECRET ACORN 50 M24 TOAL Roscow (Circular)\* mise . 1944 [separate numeration] (25 April) DØ13 To all residents [REZIDENT<sup>U</sup>I]<sup>6</sup>. From 1 May[,] instead of the method of setting up the indicator group (PORAZATEL "NAVA GROPPA] in effort at the present time; for the determination [or: definition; that is: identification] of the reciphering table [PEIESHIFROVAL MATA TAELITSA]<sup>b</sup> onter [or: write (down)] in clear [OTKR"ITO] at the beginning of the cipher text the first group of the table (the first indicator group") with which the leaf of the pad [LIST HLORNOTA] con the occusion?4 bogins. The reciphermont itself begins with the second group of the table. At the and of the eigher text enter, likewise in clear, the group following upon the last used group of the gamma [GAMMA]<sup>9</sup> (the second indicator group). If the recipherment ends with the last group of a table, enter the first group of the following table, [59 groups on a depth of 1, 51 groups unmatched] "Sent to Habans, Minico, New York, Ottawa, San Francisco (no others found). "Chiefe of 1808 agent systems abroad. <sup>b</sup>Table of additive key [GAUSIA], each such table being on one loaf [LINF] of a ped [ELCHNOP], whence table [TABLINSA] and Leaf [LINF] ( (oftem referred to in AFA as "page", since each leaf is printed on only one side) are up to a sericin point intervhangenble. (The <u>table</u> is what is written or printed on the <u>leaf</u>.) It is called "rediplar-ing" because it is used in a <u>second</u> succepting process (the first have being encodement with the code book). "That is; now this will be the first indicator group. <sup>d</sup>That is: the last about to be used on the respective occasion (?). SAdditive key. TOP SECRET ACORN

259

Moscow [unnumbered], 25 April 1944. Keypad indicator change



261

New York 588 to Moscow, 29 April 1944. Perlo group

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95 862.00.00
- 2 - <u>3/NBF/T11Ø</u>
AMT[ix].
group: -
<pre>KRAMER[KREIMER][x]_ PERLO[PRLO][xi], FLATO[FLETO][xi], GLASSER[GLAZER][xii], Zdward PITZGERALD[EDUARD FITsDZhERALD][xiv] and others in a group of 7 or 8 FELLOW COUNTRYMEN[ZENLYAKI][xv][c].</pre>
UMNITSA talked with AMT and PERIO. They told her that this group was neglected and that nobody was interested in them. KRANER is the leader of the group. All occupy responsible posts in CARTHAGE [KARFAGEN][xvi].
[20 groups unrecovered]
AMT and PERLO
[29 groups unrecoverable]
NEIGHBOURS[SOSEDI][xvii]. For more than a year MAKSIM and I tried to get in touch with PERLO and FLATO. For some reason or other RULEWOJ did not come to the meeting and has just decided to put U.[xviii] in touch with the whole group. If we work with this group it will be necessary to remove her and [2 groups unrecovered].
Recently I met PERIO by chance in ARENA's[xix] flat.
For your information: I have never met RULEVOJ
[7 groups unrecovered]
No. 312
Notès: [a] Literally "full monopoly over".
<ul> <li>[b] Or "express". The group represents either 3rd person singular or 3rd plural.</li> </ul>
[c] If it is assumed that a conjunction or punctuation has been omitted after "others", the passage could be interpreted as: " in the group there are 7 or 8 FOLLOF COUNTRYMEN".
Comments: [i] UMNITSA: i.e. "CLEVER GIRL"; Elizabeth BENTLEY.
(ii) ZVUK: i.e. "SCUND"; Jacob GOLOS, who died in November 1943.
[iii] RULEVOJ: i,e. "HELMSMAN"; Earl ERONDER.
[iv] PEL: Cyrillic transliteration of English word "PAL"; Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER.
3/NEF/T11Ø
TOP-SECRET-


262

27. (Continue	ed)
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95	VE	ALTON
	OP SECR	
		- 3 - <u>3/NBP/T110</u>
Comments: [v]	R.:	RULEVOJ. See comment [iii] above.
[Cont'd] [vi]	R:	Represents the abbreviation R. followed by the fullstop at the end of the sentence.
[vii]	Pa:	PEL. See comment [iv] above.
[viii]	MAKSIM:	Vasilij Mikhajlovich ZUBILIN.
(iž)	AMT:	John J. 187. (Also occurs as AMT in No. 687 of 13th May 1944 (3/NEP/791¢). It seems unlikely that this is a covername. Presumably it is a persistent misspelling.)
[x]	KRAMER:	Charles KRAMER.
[xi]	PERLO:	Victor PERLO. (Spelt as PRLO throughout the message; presumably a spelling mistake.)
[xii]	FLATO:	Charles FLATO.
(xiii)	GLASSER:	Harold GLASSER.
[xiv]	Edward FITZGERALD:	Edward Joseph FITZGERALD.
(xv)	FELLOW COUNTRYMEN:	Members of the Communist Party.
[xvi]	CARTHAGE:	WASHINGTON D.C.
(xvii)	NEIGHBOURS:	Menbers of another Soviet intelligence organisation.
[xviii]	υ.	UMNITSA. See comment [i] above.
[xix]	ARENA:	Probably Mary Wolfe PRICE.
[xx]	MER:	i.e. "MAYOR"; probably Iskhak Abdulovich AKHMEROV.
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3/NBP/T11Ø	<del>-107</del> -1	I.G. IA

263





New York 598-9 to Moscow, 2 May 1944. CPUSA political analysis

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		MENONA
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elections 80% of the Polis party, in comparison to th doubtedly will support ROO	e general figure of 6	to the Democratic 5. The British un-
[37	groups unrecoverable	l i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
will not budge. The Itali Pascists in every way poss against ROOSEVEIT. An ove ROOSEVEIT, even members of being led by supporters of for ROOSEVSIT. Various re: ROOSEVSIT, but they cannot follow them in [2 groups un 6. If the elections way	ible are trying to tu: rwhelming majority of the mass organization MIKhAJLOVICh. The ma actionary emigré group attract to their side nrecovered].	n the Italian-Americans the Yugoslavs are for is which are officially Jority will come out is [3 groups unrecovered] even all of those who
would probably receive an : but he would lose the elect concentrated in the South, half in the final total cou ROOSSVEIT has been slowly ;	tion since the votes i where the huge majority unt no more than 51%.	n his favor are strongly ty of votes on his be- For the last two months
[7 6	groups unrecoverable]	
only a favorable course of toward a more clear-cut des could secure his re-electic	finition of his policy	efforts of ROOSEVELT before the masses
<ol> <li>According to our spe during the next few weeks.</li> <li>accession to power of the f</li> </ol>	eculations a second fr A further delay woul Republicans.	ont will be launched d actually assure the
8. As far as we have be circles completely share ho fluctuations of the "New Ye of some of the groups of th most decisive groups.	opes for a quick [C% a ork Times" undoubtedly	financial and business greement]. The sharp reflect the sentiments ur opinion not of the
No. 319		MAJ[iv]
Notes: [a] "non-committa) Comments: [i] <u>RULEVOJ</u> : i.e. [ii] <u>EKN</u> O; i.e. "EK	"HELMSMAN," Earl BROW	
[iii] AFT: i.e. AMSI of Labor. [iv] MAJ: i.e. "MAJ	•	TRUDA, American Federation
	5	16 Aarch 1370
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Ţ	OP SECRET STATE VENONA
	Reissue(T154)
From:	NEW YORK
То:	MOSCOW
No:	601
	2 May 19 <u>44</u>
"BOJKI which consid BOJKIJ	he commentator of station WMCA[i] Norman JAY, henceforth JJ[[ii], has twice sent DEDUShKA[iii] the text of his talks, are consistently in a tone extremely friendly to us. We der it advisable to profit by this circumstance and to invite J [C% to a restaurant] and get acquainted in the line of cover Ya PRIKRYTIYa][a]. Telegraph what you think about BOJKIJ.
depart	EONID[iv] and ALEKSEJ[v] can hand over the "NEIGHBOR's[SOSED]" affairs to STEPAN[vii]. Advise when LEONID is to leave for and what he can occupy himself with in our line before his ture. LEONID [3 groups unrecovered]. Are we to turn that over to STEPAN?
KALIST "NEW M to be ent [D step o	t a meeting in the PLANT[ZAVOD][viii] GRIN[ix] [C% handed] RRAT[x] a letter in which[,] in the name of the editor of MASSES", Joe NORTH[NORS], he asks for financial assistance given to the magazine, which is in a bad way. For the pres- b% I] [1 group unrecoverable] the reason for so strange a on GRIN's part or his appealing to KALISTRAT in particular[.] caph your opinion and instructions.
No. 32	20 MAJ[xi]
- · ·	
Note:	would be arranged with a member of the State Security organization in his official capacity as a member of the Consulate-General.
Commen	<ul> <li>[1] Station WMCA is a NEW YORK, N.Y., broadcasting station.</li> <li>[11] BOJKIJ: i.e. PERKY, Norman JAY.</li> <li>[11] DEDUShKA: i.e. GRANDPAPA, Evgenij Dmitrievich KISELEV, Soviet Consul-General at NEW YORK.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>[iv] LEONID: Aleksej Nikolaevich PRORHOROV.</li> <li>[v] ALEKSEJ: Anatolij Antonovich YaKOVLEV.</li> <li>[vi] SOSED: Member of another Soviet intelligence organization</li> <li>[vi] STEPAN: Fossibly Pavel Ivanovich FEDOSIMOV.</li> </ul>
Į.	<ul> <li>[iii] ZAVOD: The Soviet Consulate-General at NEW YORK, N.Y.</li> <li>[ix] GRIN: If not a cover-name this may possibly refer to Abner GREEN, of the American Committee for the Protec- tion of Foreign Born.</li> </ul>
	<pre>[x] KALISTRAT: i.e. CALISTRATUS, Aleksandr Semenovich FOMIN. [xi] MAJ: i.e. MAY, Pavel Ivanovich FEDOSIMOV.</pre>
	16 March 1973

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New York 601 to Moscow, 2 May 1944. Norman Jay

30. New York 618 to Moscow, 4 May 1944.

USSR CONTRACTOR REISSU	Ref. No.: 3/NEF/T463 of 11/2/54 Issued: (8/6/75)
REISSU	
REISSU	
REISSU	
	Issued: 18/6/75
	Çopy No.: 301
	_
ASSESSMENT OF STUKACH'S DUSINESS I FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS (1944)	DEALINGS, ASSOCIATES JOSEPH WOLFSON AND BEN,
From: NEW YORK	
To: MOSCOW	·
No.: 618	4 May 1944
Your No. 1669[i].	
cheque received for the necessary this will [B% usc] the money from given some aid by a relative of h:	<pre>sum in his account in the bank and then after the bank. If it is unsufficient, S. may be is wife's who has a watch business. [Continued overleaf]</pre>
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New York 618 to Moscow, 4 May 1944. Jack Katz's cover


95	VENC	ikia 🔴
		2
		3/NBF/T463 of his own and with the money available he
three months [3 not only get ba four thousand. curry on the bu been worked out inviting any pa organise any ki in its present the watches will must be bought	groups unrecover ck the money inve He will repay hi siness without an so that S. shoul rtners into this nd of business or form is gafe and be arriving in up at once.	The new making & detailed study of the market rricles and has ascertained that these things lammad. Therefore he is sure that in the next rable] will be able to sell them: thus he will sted but will also make a profit of three to is debt to BEP out of the money he makes and will ybody's aid. We repeat, the whole business has d be the full owner of the firm and he is not (0% word). In these conditions we can always there should be no delay in organizing it since the COUNTRY [STRANA][vil] in the near future and
	reply as soon as	possible.
No. 331		MAJ[vili]
4 Мау	·····	
Footnotes: [i]	Not available.	
	STUKACh/S.:	i.e. "INFORMER"; Joseph KATZ.
[iii]	Joseph WOLFSON:	Josoph WOL7SON, as working partner, and Joseph KAIZ (Tootnote [ii]), as owner and financic; operated the MERIDEN Dental Laboratories, NERIDEN, CONNECTICUT, from 1939 to 1945/4. In 1944 WOLFSON was the sole proprietor.
		sers heabyrights
	The LEAGUE:	The U.S. Government.
[iv]	Fira:	

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<del></del>	<del></del>	3 3/NEF/T463	
Footnotes Continued: [vi	jeen:	Unidentified covername. Also occurs in NEW YORK's Nos. 1850 of 26 July 1944 (J/NEF/T22.2) and 1351 of 23 September 1944 (unpublished).	
[vii	] COUNTRY:	The U.S.A.	
[viii	] MAJ;	i.e. "MAY"; Stepan Zakharovich APRESYaN.	
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31. New York 625 to Moscow, 5 May 1944.



New York 625 to Moscow, 5 May 1944. Jack Soble's cover

31.

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٠.	dollars.		- 2 -	5/ NBE/	T916 (of 1	(/ )/ \)	
			[9 groups unrecov	erable]	•	. *	
	[Internal Seri	al No. u	unrecovered]	[Si	ignature uni	recovered]	
	Note: [a]	It is a inserte literal relativ	assumed that "in" is ad by the translator L translation would res"	understood a . Without th be " had th	nd it has, ne insertion ne business	therefore, been n of "in", the of several	1
	Comments: [i]						
·	[ii]	APPEL:	Available informat some way connected set up by Jack SOE WOISTON.	i with the S a	that a Sa and V cafet	n APPEL was in eria which was	
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	3/NBF/T916 (or	17/5/1	957) 2 -				
	. <sup>.</sup>						
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31. (Continued)

32. New York 628 to Moscow, 5 May 1944.

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**	TOP-SEC	DET		
USSR		Ref. No.		
		Issued:	15/6/76	
		Copy No.	: 3¢1	
ALFR	ED SARANT, A LEAD OF ANTENNA'S	: PROPOSED RECRUITMENT,	DETAILS (1944)	
From				
To:	MOSCOW			
No.:	628	5 May 19	44	
	Please carry out a check and	constion the manufacture	of Alfred CADANNELL	
	ad of ANTENNA's[i1]. He is 25 s in TYRE [TIR][iii]. He comp . He worked for two years in			
year	OT]. He was discharged for pa s at Western Electric	st union activity. He h	as been working for two	
	. [45	groups unrecoverable]		
entrapar	y into the FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN [Z t from his family. Answer wit	EMLYaChESKAYa][iv] [Part hout delay.	y][v]. SARANT lives	
No.	344	MAJ[vi]		
5 Mag	У.			
Foot	notes: [i] Alfred SARANT:	Alfred Epaminondas SAR	NT. Later probably	
	<b>- - - - - - - - - -</b>	either covername "SKAU "METRE") or covername	F"/"METR" (ie "SCOUT"/	
	[ii] ANTENNA:	Julius ROSENBERG.	121 200 (16 -ROOMS 7.	
	[iii] TYRE:	NEW YORK CITY.		
	[iv] FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN: [v] Inserted by trans			
	[vi] MAJ:	ie "MAY"; Stepan Zakha:	rowich APRESYaN.	
	н. Т			
	• · · · ·			
	Ń	ENTONIA		
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
, ï	<del>TOP</del>	SECRET		
		•		
			1 	

New York 628 to Moscow, 5 May 1944. Recruitment of Al Sarant

33.	New	York	640 to	Moscow,	6	May	1944.
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· TOP-(	BORET DINAR VEN	ONA
	Reissue 1)) 32	<i>Y</i>
27 DANG TON		
From: NEW YORK	OF AIDA'S WORK WITH JEWS	
To: MOSCOW	U	
No: 640	6 May 1944	
for using[c] Jewish on	[a] proposes to place AIDA [AIDA][i] etary to the Committee of Jewish Writer; she will be able to expand her opportun- ganizations and prominent figures. Worl he United Palestine Appeal, AIDA sheds Y][ii]. Sanction AIDA's shift to the new Y][ii].	ties
350 6 May	MAY [MAJ][111]	a
Translator's notes: [a] "GUDDZON" is HUDSON [GUDZ 5 October 19	presumably meant for the same name as th ON] changed to JOHN [DZhON] in No.1403 of 44.	he Df
[b] The Russian A	RTIST, meaning an "artiste" in the perfo tor, has been used mechanically because identity, instead of the more correct Kh	and the second second
[c] The word tran means "cleara But 1t appare unconsciously	slated "using" is OFORMLENIE. This somet nce" (investigation into reliability etc ntly also means "inducing to help us ", "using".	imes .).
Comments: [1] Esther Trebaci	h BAND.	
	ver word for ZIONISTS.	
	ovich APRESYAN, Soviet Vice-Consul in Ne	w York.
	M. H. Jie	

New York 640 to Moscow, 6 May 1944. Infiltration of an organization

33.

34. New York 655 to Moscow, 9 May 1944.

82	BRIDE
TO	P-SECRET
USSR	Ref No: S/NBF/T508
	Issued: 1/4/1954
	Copy No: 205
	INFORMATION FROM "PAL".
From: NEW YORK	
To: MOSCOW	
No.: 655	9 May 19 <u>14</u>
. To the 3th Departme	ent.
PAL [PEL]	][1] advises:
	g to the information of F.E.A. on 22nd April ROVITYANE][ii] gave up the plan of invading the g to await the total [C3 defeat] [1 group after that rapidly occupy Greece and Yugoslavia.
replace what was de to exact reparation does it think it po struction of her ow highly placed repre- Finland is unable to million dollars in	
4. The m a telegram to the <u>B</u> . Government does not unrecovered] <u>persis</u>	master of the COUNTRY HOUSE [D.Ch.][v1] in LNK on 15th ipril advised that the Soviet want the Average of the source of the sou
Distribution	fourtured poetrear ]
•	· .
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
`	
S/NBF/T508 [2 Pages]	TOP SECRET

279

New York 655 to Moscow, 9 May 1944. Report from Greg Silvermaster

- 2 - S/NB/T508
that it w <del>ould be</del> more in the interest of the COUNTRY [STRANA][viii] to conclude an agreement about a loan now than to wait for the end of the war.
5. NABOB [NABOB][ix] has decided to present to CAPTAIN [KAPITAN][x] a plan for a post-war trade agreement with us.
[51 groups unrecoverable]
Communts: [1] PEL: possibly Nathan Gregory SIL/ER:LSTER.
[ii] OSTROVITYENE: the British.
[iii] B.NK: the U.S. State Department.
[iv] Hjalmar PROCOPE, Finnish Minister in WASHINGTON.
[v] LIGA: the U.S. Government.
[vi] DACHA: the U.S. Embassy in MCSCOW.
[vii]—— <del>DERRET:— Lend-Leuse.</del>
[viii] STRANA: the U.S.A.
[1x] NABOB: Henry MORGENTHAU, Jr.
[x] KAPITAN: Franklin D. ROCSEVELT.

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
35. New York 687 to Moscow, 13 May 1944.

		TRINE VENONA
	<u>Reissue</u> (T91ø	)
From: NEW	YORK	
To: MOS	COW	
No: 687		
		13 May 19 <u>44</u>
On HEI through AMI	MSMAN's{RULEVOJ][i] instructions [[III] a new group [ <b>C</b> <sup>*</sup> in CARTHAGE	GOOD GIRL[UMNITSA[ii] contacted ][G% KARFAGEN][iv]:
	[53 groups unrecov	
information	KANT"[v]. GOOD CIRL's impression ZEMIYaKI][vi], politically highly . They said that they had been n . their potentialities	
	[29 groups unrecov	-
*111 go 10	R4]"[v11]. RAIDER[REJDER][v111], TYRE[TIR][x1] once every two week	s 10 turn.
PLUMB : particulars	and TED know PAL[PĒL][xii]. We s later.	hall let you have identifying
No. 373		MAYOR[MER][x111]
:; ;; ;; ;v; ;v; ;tv ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;	<ol> <li>HELMSMAN: Earl BROWDER.</li> <li>GOOD GTRL: Elizabeth EENTLE</li> <li>AMT: Fresumably a mistake f. MOSCOW No. 588 of 29 A</li> <li>CARTHAGE: WASHINGTON, D.C.</li> <li>KANE: Henry Samuel MAGDOFF.</li> <li>FORM: Unidentified.</li> <li>STORM: Unidentified.</li> <li>RAIDER: Victor FERIO.</li> <li>FLUMB: Possibly Charles KRAI</li> <li>TED: Probably Edward Joseph</li> <li>FATRE: NaW YORK CITY.</li> <li>FALOR: Probably Iskhak Abdu:</li> </ol>	pr John AET. See also NEW YORK to pril 1944. (S/NEF/Tilg). of a Communist Farty. MER. FITZSERALD. ASTER.
		•
•	<b>*</b> 	
`+	<b>&gt;</b>	25 July, 1968
	1	

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New York 687 to Moscow, 13 May 1944. Perlo group, again

36. New York 696-7 to Moscow, 16 May 1944.




283

New York 696-7 to Moscow, 16 May 1944. Walter Lippman


36.

36. (Continued)



284

37. New York 732 to Moscow, 20 May 1944.



285

New York 732 to Moscow, 20 May 1944. William Perl

37.

38.	Moscow 334	to Mexico	City, 30 May 1944.
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es :	BRIĐE		
10	PSECR		
USSR	Re	f. No: 3/NBF/T935	
		sued: 1/21/8/1957 py No: 205	
PA	MENT OF A DEPOSIT	FOR"THE PAIR" (1944)	M273.
From: MOSCOW To: MEXICO CITY			
No: 334		30 May <u>44</u>	
To YURIJ. [1]		· *	
Payment of the	deposit in the "PAI	R"[ii] business to .	pouction on princi
	[29 groups unrecon	vered]	
from the bank of ban it is desirable in o deposit from his own	motus is registere rder to avoid compu- [0% money] with the	ed by the appropriate somise that "OKh" [11] he will acpage	departments[ORGANY should pay the
	540 ·····	- 7	
sent on from here. 9 it is not secured in HSCOW-deff hot 11 go COUNTRYSIDE[V]. We a possibilities has been	the Americans will TIRE [1V] or [if][e Superinfoctored] t shall communicate was a received from MA	not give a transit vi ) for this the Maxica he passport on instru- ith you after a reply KSIM[Vi].	sa in MSSOOF if n Embassy in otions from the about the above
Ne. 2334	VIKI	OR[VII] .	, sa si si si
Distribution	- 	[Notes.and	Commonts overleaf
		۰.	
3/NBF/1935			· ·
(2 Pages)			

287

Moscow 334 to Mexico City, 30 May 1944. The Fishers

	a.
	TOP SEGRET
	* 2 - 3/NBP/T935
	Notes: [a] Supplied by translator.
	Comments: [i] YuRIJ : Lev A. TARASOV, 1st Secretary at Soviet Dubcesy in
	<ul> <li>[ii] The PAIR : Nicholas and Marie FISHER.</li> </ul>
	[iii] OKh : Adolfo ORIVE de ALBà.
	[iv] THE: NEW YORK CITY.
	[v] COUNTRYSIDE: MEXICO.
	<ul> <li>[vi] MAKSIN: Vasilij ZUBILIN, 2nd Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in WASHINGTON, April 1943-August 1944.</li> <li>[vii] VIKTOR: Lt Gen, P.M. FITIN.</li> </ul>
	[vil] VIKTOR : Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.
	entities and the second sec
	and adding to the second s
3/	/NBF/T935
	TOD SECONT

39. New York 786 to Moscow, 1 June 1944.

	BRIDE
	TOP-SECRET-
	USLR Rof No: S/MBB/T139
	Issued: 13/12/1951
	Copy No: <b>703</b> 
	Fron: NEW YORK
	To: MOSCON
	No: 786 1 June 19 <u>14</u>
	To VICTOR.
	Reference your telegram No. 2066.
	There are three possible ways of .btaining a transit visa for THE COUFLE (CHETA)[1]:
	1. The normal way - "TENOR"[11] will do everything himself. Will take several wonths, but the result will be favourable.
	2. Through the lawyer (ADVOKAT) John KEATING [KITING] - susewhat quicker [,] will cost 300-400 dollars. Both methods are lengthy as they will involve investigation [PROVZEKA] <sup>1,2</sup> ].
	J. Through GAFTAIN'S [KAFTTAN][iii] adviser, David NTLES [NAILS] - will take 3 - 4 days [,] will cost 500 dollars. Round NTLES there is a group of his friends who will arrange anything for a bribe. Through them TENCR obtains priorities and has already paid them as much as 6000 dollars. Whether NTLES takes a bribe himself is not known for estain. Telay has talked to them about the [D; payment] [12 groups unrecovered] in the CUNTRYSINE [DERWINS][V]
	[9 groups unrecovered]
	[Continued overleaf]
	Distribution
1	
	S/NBF/1139 [2 Fages]
	BRIDE

New York 786 to Moscow, 1 June 1944. Try to bribe Niles in White House

- 2 - \$/nef/t139	
<ul> <li>COUNTRYSIDE [DEREVENSIJ][Vi] visa and a ticket as far as the COUNTRYSIDE [DEREVENSid[V].</li> <li>T.(147) declares that the latter way is one hundred percent successful and there will not be any investigation [FROVERKA][A]. I reconstant the third method. Before we begin to act, THE COUNTRYSIDE must obtain a COUNTRYSIDE visa and report immediately for's information the amount of the survey deposited in the COUNTRYSIDE. Inmediately on receipt of the COUNTRYSIDE visa and sunction to put through the supcence [13 groups unrecovered]</li> <li>COUNTRYSIDE visa. T. THE COUNTRYSIDE unrecovered]</li> <li>COUNTRYSIDE visa. T. THE COUNTRYSIDE unrecovered]</li> <li>COUNTRYSIDE visa. T. (1 group unrecovered]</li> <li>COUNTRYSIDE visa. T. [1 group unrecovered]</li> <li>COUNTRYSIDE visa. T. [2 groups unrecovered]</li> <li>COUNTRYSIDE visa. T. [3 group unrecovered]</li> <li>COUNTRYSIDE visa. T. [1 group unrecovered]</li> <li>COUNTRYSIDE visa. T. [2 groups unrecovered]</li> <li>COUNTRYSIDE visa. T. [2 groups unrecovered]</li> <li>T.N.: [a] I.e., investigation by the U.S. authorities of the genuineness of the application and the credentials of the applicants.</li> <li>Comments: [i] Onera: Nicolas and Warie (BOYNO) FISHER. Their covernue appears to have been changed to THE REEPS [RIFI] by late [9<u>4</u>].</li> <li>[ii] TENCR: possibly the same as BASS [BAS] - Michael W. BURD (originally WEISBURD).</li> <li>[iii] XAPTIAN: Franklin Delano ROOSEVEIT.</li> <li>[iv] T.: i.e. TENCR.</li> </ul>	
(v) DEREVNYA: MEXICO,	
[vi] DEREVENSKIJ: Mexican.	
W.S. No. XI-47.2	
S/NBF/T139	
·	

	TOP SECRET COPSE M45
	New York-Monour
	Ro. 824 (7 Jane)
	To Victor [VINTOR].
	Your no. 2310:
	1. I conversed with Chemist (HILLER) about the OBJINTARI accord-
	ing to] his account the DENIMITA is consciontions with the acception
	of huby [NUBIT]. Rolative to the drinking bout we are souding a resume
	by Charlet. There have been no other cases [ori incidents]. I shall
	get together borors long [with] R. and IRA gasparotely?
	them? details. I shall tolograph the results,
	According to Cisculat's account right now Artonius [ARTAN] and
	Gragory [GRIGHEN] are living together with girl students they made
	the acquaintance of as the stempt. Chandet bere us to raise the
	question ogain of his wife's coming inhannoh as the MERIATA in sup-
·	posed to stay? here at least a year more. For the time being the
	DESIMIXA is making permission to send talegroups and parcels to [their]
	families by identicated? <sup>b</sup> addresses, in order that your people may
	intercept then and deliver thes to the addresses, Telegraph.
	2, By post I an sending a morendes (ar: report) [in] which I
	shall adopt the following conventions;
	Re the Plant [Marto]4.
	22. devisionert [Ruscherkalf,]
	W. editorial staff [or: office] [REDistory],
	D. the factory (Within: ) <sup>4</sup> ,
	The the neighbor [SOSKD]",
	H. cover [PRINEDTTIN],
	TOD CLOBRE CORGE
	TOP-SECRET COTSE

40. New York 824 to Moscow, 7 June 1944.


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New York 824 to Moscow, 7 June 1944. "The Ten"

······································	
TOP SECRET COPSE	
To sound-recording apparatus (270802AF10 <sup>4</sup> TVATELERAYA	
APTARATERA],	
R. screedropping [FORELTSHIVATIVE].	
N. (personnel? of the office ( southy normalis,	
P. the Syndiante [STEDIKT]h,	
H. courier guard (? courier-guard or courier's guard; . KURMER(AT) CHENNA].	
N, surveillance [KALAJUSTIYE],	
F. the Office (EUTORA) <sup>2</sup> .	
2. Conspirady (or: Conspirativeness; KORSPIRATOIXA);	
L. Cipher clerk [GHITROWAL SHCHIR].	
C. worker [Randtruk] <sup>1</sup> .	
439	
2 Jupo	
7 Jups	
7 June <sup>6</sup> Previously rendered: the Tan., This translation, while justifi- able (see balow), is scalesting, for it tends to screws that the Distinct we anonesserily composed of just bun popule. Actually, its constitution we reference may be as stronger than that of, say, the Four of Glube's or wight hall. A typusitation of the definition of DETLINEA in the Tailory Glove', follows; Regists works for the warious mean- ings are saided in brachets: <b>DETLIVE</b> is the translation of (sail) [s ten], [] The <b>DETLIVE</b> ball are, 10 (the ten (sail)], transcr, unforms no. 10 (means 10), ] a school mark denoted by this fragues (school other) [s ten], ], A school mark denoted by this fragues (school other) [s ten], ], A school mark denoted by this fragues (school other) [s ten], ], a school mark denoted by this fragues (school other) [s ten], ], a school mark denoted by this fragues (school other) [s ten], ], a school mark denoted by this fragues (school other) [s ten], ], a school mark denoted by this ten, a ten, a (the tensore)], ], a school mark denoted by this tens, a ten, 	
7 June <sup>6</sup> previously rendered: the Tab. This translation, while justifi- able (see below), is stalseding, for it tends to success that the instaltants was necessarily composed of just ten back of, early its quantilative sufference may be so surpasse than that of, early the your of Githes' or "Might hell" A translation of the definition of DEDINGA in the <u>Tolleving Slowing</u> follows; Regists words for the various men- ings are saided in Directorie;	
7 June <sup>6</sup> Treastionally rendemed: the Tan., This treaslation, while justifier oble (see balow), is minimized ing, for it wands to suggest that the minimized balow is a seconcerily composed of just was popular. Actually, its grantitative performance may be as attransper than that of, say, "the Your of fittee" or "might hell". A treaslation of the definition of DETLINEA in the "Minimized ball" is not suggest that the second management of the second management	
7 June <sup>9</sup> Treeviously rendered: the Twn. This translation, while justifi- able (see balow), is minimum, for it tanks to sergest that the suble (see balow), is minimum, for it tanks to sergest that the quantitative preference may be as drivinger than that of, say, "the Yours of Glube" or which hall? A typessintion of the definition of HETHINK into any subserved that it is the figure 10 (soli), is tank into any added in brackwater Interview and the second tanks in the result of the interview of the balow, if the second added in brackwater Interview and the second tank is the figure 10 (soli), is tank of Glube" or added in brackwater Interview of the second by this figure (soli), as the figure ball so. 10 (the ten (soli)), transary unforture second obs. (is ten). If A school mark denoted by this figure (solind) obs.) is the second. If A school mark denoted by this figure (solind) obs.) is the second. If A school mark denoted by this figure (solind) obs.) is ten, if A school mark denoted ar schol (soli).) (like sur tensor, ten-epod). Is A theorem the schoe ar schol (soli).) (like sur tensor, ten-epod). Is A laying card having ten interview.). Endermany tensories in favor of the quantifictive interviewing in the the use of THOTKA. The meanings parollal those of INTIANA, it can mean	
7 June <sup>6</sup> Interviously rendered: the Ten., This translation, while justifi- able (see balaw), is minimum, for it tends to sergest that the suble (see balaw), is minimum, for it tends to sergest that the quantitative subsequently outposed of just ten popule. Actually, its quantitative subsequently bala subsequent ten that of, say, "the Yours of Glube" or "Might hall". A typesalation of the definition of DETLINEA into an added in bunchedus; Intervious the former of the figure 10 (soli), [stem], [] The contaction of warfore dylate numbered with this figures (soli), e.e.s. billions to a store the tend by this figures (solid), obset billions (b), is A school mark denoted by this figures (solid), e.e.s. tenserpol), S. A theorethic are one (solil), [its ten, a tenser, ten-epoc), S. A theorethic are one (solil), [its our tenser, ten-epoc), S. A theorethic are one (solil), [its ten, a tenser, ten-epoc), S. A tenser the subset of solils (next.);	
7 June <sup>6</sup> Interviously rendered: the Ten., This translation, while justifi- able (see balaw), is minimum, for it tends to sergest that the suble (see balaw), is minimum, for it tends to sergest that the quantitative subsequently outposed of just ten popule. Actually, its quantitative subsequently bala subsequent ten that of, say, "the Yours of Glube" or "Might hall". A typesalation of the definition of DETLINEA into an added in bunchedus; Intervious the former of the figure 10 (soli), [stem], [] The contaction of warfore dylate numbered with this figures (soli), e.e.s. billions to a store the tend by this figures (solid), obset billions (b), is A school mark denoted by this figures (solid), e.e.s. tenserpol), S. A theorethic are one (solil), [its ten, a tenser, ten-epoc), S. A theorethic are one (solil), [its our tenser, ten-epoc), S. A theorethic are one (solil), [its ten, a tenser, ten-epoc), S. A tenser the subset of solils (next.);	
7 June <sup>6</sup> Trewiously remdered: the Ten., This tremslation, while justifi- able (see balaw), is scaleseding, for it tends to sample that the institutes we assessed by performing the popular. Actually, its constitution we reference my be so stronger than that of, say, "the Four- of Glube's or "Right hall". A typesilation of the definition of DETL/DEA in the Tulberry Glove's follows; Register works for the warious mean- ings are saided in brockets: Institution of wardow chyster suphered with this fragues (coll.), case billion of wardow chyster suphered with this fragues (coll.), a sche ten-spoin. Is A thought work by this fragues (school ches.) [s ten], S. A ploying card having ten pipe (the ten, a ten, a (the ten-spoin). S. A theoremile and are not (coll.) (like our tenner, ten-spoin). S. A theoremile and are not (coll.). However, speaking in favor of the quantitation is the use of INDEX. We meanings parollal thouse of DETLATIA, it can mean	
7 June <sup>9</sup> Treeviously rendered: the Twn. This translation, while justifi- able (see balow), is minimum, for it tanks to sergest that the suble (see balow), is minimum, for it tanks to sergest that the quantitative preference may be as drivinger than that of, say, "the Yours of Glube" or which hall? A typessintion of the definition of HETHINK into any subserved that it is the figure 10 (soli), is tank into any added in brackwater Interview and the second tanks in the result of the interview of the balow, if the second added in brackwater Interview and the second tank is the figure 10 (soli), is tank of Glube" or added in brackwater Interview of the second by this figure (soli), as the figure ball so. 10 (the ten (soli)), transary unforture second obs. (is ten). If A school mark denoted by this figure (solind) obs.) is the second. If A school mark denoted by this figure (solind) obs.) is the second. If A school mark denoted by this figure (solind) obs.) is ten, if A school mark denoted ar schol (soli).) (like sur tensor, ten-epod). Is A theorem the schoe ar schol (soli).) (like sur tensor, ten-epod). Is A laying card having ten interview.). Endermany tensories in favor of the quantifictive interviewing in the the use of THOTKA. The meanings parollal those of INTIANA, it can mean	
7 June <sup>C</sup> Trowicously rendered: the Ten., This trenslation, while justifi- able (see balaw), is stalesting, for it tends to sample that the institute was anoesserily composed of just ten pople. Actually, its quantitative references may be so stronger than that of, say, "the Four of Glube's or "Hight halt". A typesilation of the definition of DETL/DEA in the Tallefry Glube's follows; Registe works for the washout memo- ings are might halt. A typesilation of the definition of DETL/DEA ings are might halt. A type is the figure 10 (soli), [s ten], [] The designifies of wardow doine to be the institute (soli), a scatter ball in a shoul mark denoted by this figures (solind) a (the ten-spoid). S. A playing card having ten pipe (the ten, a ten, a (the ten-spoid). S. A playing card having ten figures (solind) tenser, ten-spoid). S. A theoremile and are not (solil). (like our tenser, ten-spoid). S. A theoremile and are fits (next.).(	
7 June <sup>C</sup> Trowicously rendered: the Ten., This trenslation, while justifi- able (see balaw), is stalesting, for it tends to sample that the institute was anoesserily composed of just ten pople. Actually, its quantitative references may be so stronger than that of, say, "the Four of Glube's or "Hight halt". A typesilation of the definition of DETL/DEA in the Tallefry Glube's follows; Registe works for the washout memo- ings are might halt. A typesilation of the definition of DETL/DEA ings are might halt. A type is the figure 10 (soli), [s ten], [] The designifies of wardow doine to be the institute (soli), a scatter ball in a shoul mark denoted by this figures (solind) a (the ten-spoid). S. A playing card having ten pipe (the ten, a ten, a (the ten-spoid). S. A playing card having ten figures (solind) tenser, ten-spoid). S. A theoremile and are not (solil). (like our tenser, ten-spoid). S. A theoremile and are fits (next.).(	

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40.	(Continued	)
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293

41. New York 847B-848 to Moscow, 15 June 1944.

<u>**-</u>	
USSR	Ref. No.: 3/NBF/T24 (of 21/5/51)
	Issued : 31/3/1967
	Copy No.: 2044
ATTACK NEW	REISSUE
From: NEW YORK	PORTS ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS EUROPE (1944)
To: MOSCOW	
No: 8473-848	15th June 1944
Part I	
To VIKTOR[1]	
SERGEJ[ii] rep	ports the following:
non-recognition of RA sphere of influence o CHIEP[ShEF][v] and th HARSCH[HARSh][vi] an USA with regard to FR LZAHY[LECI][x] and NU ZOUAVE[ZUAV][xii] with hoped [8% at the same permanent use of DAKA INPO-CHINK and also t	[35 groups unrecoverable] the help of COT[KOT][xii]. CAPTAIN[KAPITAN][xiv] time] to accure for the COUNTRY[STRINA][xr] the IR and CASABLANCA[KASABLANKA] and possibly a base in to oppose the attempts by the ISLANDERS[OSTROVITYANE][xvi tely under their influence before the advantage was
	[27 groups unrecovered]
DISTRIBUTION:	[Continued overleaf]
3/NBF/T24	

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
New York 847B-848 to Moscow, 15 June 1944. Walter Lippman, again

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LOP SEGREI
- 2 - 3/NBF/T24
not to recognise any such agreement. According to INFERIALIST's account HEM HARRIER[LUNY][xvii] [and][a] his deputy[xviii] are not in agreement with CAFULIN and consider that by their policy both the COUNTRY and the ISLAND [OSTROV][xxi] have already practically lest the confidence of the French while conversely our prestige there is graving. I.[xx] iffines that the BEAR CUBS [HEDWEZHATH][xxi], as well as military circles and the Navy, are in favour of recognizing R.[xxi], nowell as military circles and the Navy, are in favour of recognizing R.[xxi]. Nava Litefs[MCWODSTV0] are not domaining the annexation of DEKAR or other bases but want a military alliance which will offer the COUNTRY their use. They also have in mind bases in the Pacific. 2. According to I., the LEAGUMINGA][xxii] - contrary to its previous intentions - is not at present supporting the dismemberment of GERMANY although
it still regards the award of E.ST FRUSSI, to POLAND as essential. The question of the use of German manpower in the USSR and
[42 groups unrecoverable]
would have paid and fed them.
3. As regards the [B% Polish] question, [D% some circles] in the LEGUE think, according to I., that the USSR should yield on the LWOW question in return for a change in the composition of the Polish Cabinet. I. reinforced this argument with the following observation: "The LNOW question ought not to be a notice of importance for the USSR since it considers that in any case the MIKULAUZER government would not stay in power and that this would therefore any be a temporary concession which right be reutified in the future["][a].
4. I. anys that Wall Street considers the forthcoming mometary conference to be pointless. It is stated in financial circles that the currency of European occupied countries cannot be stabilized at present as the prespects for their economy in the future are not known: consequently stabilization should be limited to the dollar-steriling bloc and the USSR should not be included in the conference as the rouble is stable.
5. Considering European questions to be of secondary importance, I. constantly emphasized, as in previous discussions, that it was essential for the USSR to participate in the future in the destruction of JHEN in order to secure firm friendly relations with the COUNTRY. As regards FINLAND, I. hinted that the treaking off of diplomatic relations would depend on the breaking eff by the USSR of relations with BULGARIA. However in a conversation with INE[Ya2][xxiv], HARSCH affirmed that CAPPAIN had finally rejected the proposal by HEN HARRIER and MARENIL[[KARIAL]][xxi] to break with FINLAND on the grounds that this would be inexpedient before the elections.
6. I. is well acquainted with DULLES[MILLES][xrri], one of FISTs[KULAX][xrri] [0% group of] political advisers. D.[xrrii] consulted [I.][a] as to how the BERE CUES' position'on the question of postwar uterWANN should be set out and included I.'s statement of the position in a speech of FIST's in May.
No. 453 MAY[MAJ][xxix]
3/HEF/T24
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Notes: [a]	Insorted by the	translator.
Comments: [i]	VINTOR:	Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.
[11]	SERCEJ:	Vladimir Sergeevich PEAVDIN, YASS representative in U.S.A.
[111]	R/.S:	General Charles de GAULLE.
[iv]	lmperfallst:	Walter LIPPAINN.
[v]	CHIEF:	Unidentified covername.
[vi]	LINDLEY:	Ernest Kidder LINDLEY.
[vii]	HARSCH:	Joseph C. HARSCH.
	VISSON:	Andre VISSON.
	CALIFH:	William Christian BULLITT.
	LETHA:	Agmiral William D. LEAHY.
	MJRPHY :	Robert Daniel MURPHY.
	ZOUAVE :	. Unidentified,
[xiii]		Possibly Pierre COT.
	CAPFIAN:	Franklin D. ROOSEVELT.
	COUNTRY: ISLANDERS:	U.S.A.
	HEN HARRIER:	the British. Cordell HULL
		Edward R. STETTINIUS, Jr.
	ISLAND:	Great Britain.
[xx]		i.e. IMPERIALIST, Walter LIPPMANN.
	BEAR CUBS:	U.S. Republican Party.
[xdi]		i.e. RAS/General Charles de GAULLE
[xciii]	The LEAGUE:	U.S. Government.
▼ [xxiv]	IDE:	Simon Samuel KRAFSUR, of the TASS News Agency.
	MARSHALL	General George Catlett MARSHALL.
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
298

42. New York 850 to Moscow, 15 June 1944.

BRIDE
USSR Ref No: Issued: 16/6/1954
Copy No: 205
REFERENCE TO THE PROBIBLE DEPARTURE OF "REST".
From: NEW YORK To: MOSCO7
No.: 850 15 June 1914
To VIKTOR[1].
[1 group unrecovored][a] received from REST[i1] the third part of report MSN - 12 Efferent Fluctuation in a Stream [STRUYa]
[37 groups unrecoverable]
Diffusion[b] Method - work on his speciality. R.[iii] expressed doubt about the possibility of remaining in the COUNTRY [STR.N][iv] without arousing suspicion. According to what R. says, the ISLANDERS [OSTROVITYANE][V] and TOWNSMEN [GOROTANES][V] have finally fallen out as a result of the delay in research work on diffusion. The TOWNSMEN have told the representative of the ISLAND[vii] that construction of a plant in the ISLAND "would be in direct contradiction, to the spirit of the agreement on ENORMOUS [ENORMOZ][vii] signed together with the Atlantic Charter." At present the ISLAND's director [RUKOVODITEL'] in CARTHAGE [KARAGEN][ix] is ascertaining the details of the transfer of work to the ISLAND. R. assumes that he will have to leave in a month or six weeks.
No. 458 Mix [MiJ][x] 15th June
[T.N. and Comments overleaf]
Distribution
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TOT SECRET BRIDE

299

New York 850 to Moscow, 15 June 1944. Report from Klaus Fuchs



300

43. New York 1053 to Moscow, 26 July 1944.

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	1		1-1-4-4-5	
	Reissu	e(T282)		
From: NH	W YORK			
To: MC	SCOW			
No: 10	153			
			26 July 19 <u>44</u>	
TO VIKTOR				
In work in C friend Ma head of t [b] of ov able mate	July ANTENNA[ii] wa. ARTHAGE [KARFAGEN][i. X ELITCHER[a], who was he fire control sect: er five-inch calibre rials on guns.	s sent by the ii]. There he orks in the Bu ion for warshi . He has acce	firm for ten days visited his school reau of Standards a ps [which mount gun ss to extremely val	20 L 15 Ju-
nas been u COUNTRYMAN organizati	ve years ago Max ELT echnical Department o Master of Science deg working at the Bureau N [ZEMLYaK][iv]. He ion [ZEMLYaChESTYO] a	of Standards entered the F fter finishin	. He is a FELLOW ELLOW COUNTRYMEN's J his studies.	
she works	ANTENNA he is charac led and able man. Ma [ZEMLYaChKA]. She is at the War Departmen	t.	t by profession,	
	ELITCHER is an exce cessary equipment fo	r caring profe	graphs.	
Ple clearance	ase check ELITCHER a	nd communicate	your consent to h	is
No. 594 26 July			MAJ [v]	
			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
	Given in Roman alpl Inserted by transla	abet.		
Comments: [i]				
[ii] [iii] [iy]	VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. I ANTENNA: Julius RO KARFAGEN: WASHINGT ZEMLY2K: Mombar of	SENBERG. ON, D. C.		
Ĭv]	ZEMLYAK: MASHING ZEMLYAK: Member of MAJ: i.e. MAY, Ste	the Communis pan APRESYaN	t Party.	
		ć		
			28 April 1975	•
	ut			
			<b>YENO</b>	NIÃ
				HAR AN

301

New York 1053 to Moscow, 26 July 1944. Recruiting Max Elitcher

44.	New	York	1043	to	Moscow,	25	July	1944.
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BRIDE
- IOP SECRET
USSR Ref.No: S/NBF/T46
Issued: 14/3/1955
Copy No: 205.
Item 2
REISSUE A. A. OR
c ( lever row
REPORT OF VISIT TO "THE PLANT" BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CITY HOUSING DEPARTMENT
From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No: 1043 25 July 1944
To VIKTOR[1].
[D5 Yesterday]two fellows came to see SHAR[ShAkh] <sup>[ii]</sup> at the PLANT [ZAVOD]iii] and said that in the capacity of represen- tatives of the City Housing Department they were to inspect the PLANT building and the neighbouring house. In reply to SHAR's question about [35 the purpose][of the inspection][a] the fellows said that they <u>dif neighbouring</u> house. In reply to SHAR's question about [35 the purpose][of the inspection][a] the fellows said that they <u>dif neighbouring</u> house. In reply to SHAR's question about [35 the purpose][of the inspection][a] the fellows said that they <u>dif neighbouring</u> house. The reply to SHAR's poople who would ensure them access. GRANDPAPA[DEDUSNKA][iv] [3 groups unrecovered][ <del>35 in eace of need] [4 group unrecovered]</del> ] [4 groups unrecovered][ <del>35 in eace of need] [4 group unrecovered]</del> ] [5 groups unrecovered][ <del>35 in eace of need]</del> ]. GRANDPAPA came to an agreement that he would send our grohitect to the Housing Depart- ment and he would inform [5 hem][a] about the lifts. With this the incident was closed, but it is difficult to doubt that the fellaws
[Continued overleaf]
Distribution
<b>i</b>
S/NEF/T46 [2 Pages] BRIDE

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
New York 1043 to Moscow, 25 July 1944. FBI attempt to enter Consulate

2 - S/NPR/TH6
o/ 1.2.7/ 1.40
represented the KhATA <sup>[v]</sup> .
BORIS <sup>[vi]</sup> has no special instructions on the circum- stances in which he is to destroy the ciphers without reference to anyone and when it is permissible to use weapons. Please give some guidance.
No. 581.
In view of his having enciphered and sent off a telegram in the last 10 minutes before he left the point he was at and to his[Ex having destroyed] the originals GRIMM[vii] requests that its receipt be confirmed. The telegram was in three parts.
No. 583.
••••
We have received letter number 4 addressed to SON[SYN][viii]. Please explain [3 groups unrecovered] and whether to send it at the first opportunity or should we obtain from GRANDPAPA the immediate despatch of a courier.
No. 588 MAY[MAJ][1x]
T.N: [a] Inserted by the translator.
Comments: [1] VIKTOR: LtGeneral P.M. FITIN.
[11] ShAkh: Konstantin Alekseevich ChabANOV, clerk at the Soviet Consulate-General, NEW YORK.
[iii] ZAVOD: the Soviet Consulate-General in NEW YORK.
[iv] DEDUSHKA: Evgenij Dmitrievich KISELEV, Soviet Consul-General in NEW YORK.
[v] KhATA: the F.B.I.
[vi] BORIS: the MGB cipher clerk in NEW YORK. possibly Aleksandr Pavlovich SAPRYGIN.
[vii] GRIMM: probably Nikolaj Alekseevich GOLOVIN.
[viii] SYN: not identified.
[ix] MAJ: probably Stepan Zakharovich APRESYAN.
W.S. No.: XY-20.14 (Revision)
\$/NBF/T46
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45. New York 1065 to Moscow, 28 July 1944.

USSR	
and the second state of th	Ref No•. S/NBF/I92
	Issued: 45/5/1954
	Copy Nc: 205
REFERENCE	S TO THE YORK OF "MAYOR"
Item 2	
	REISSUE
From: NEW YORK	
To: MOSCOW	
No.: 1065	28 July 19 <u>44</u>
To VIKTOR[1]	
his opinion about the a suspects was made under reason dislikes DIR. if DIR is really ill sy rest, but afterwards be apartment etc. She ha acquired considerable e should not be employed Telegraph your opinion.	opinion DIR's nerves have been badly shaken , which renders her unsuitable for our work. is possible to get H. [R.][vii] to change advisability of this decision which MAYOR r pressure from GOOD GIRL, who for some MAYOR has informed G.C. [U.][viii] that ne will need rather to ge yithdrawn for a sused on lision [with][2] a conspirative as been working for a long time and has experience. MAYOR proposes that she on active FELLOW-COUNTRYMANLY[vi] work.
No. 596	
Distribution	[Continued overleaf]
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\$/\``37/T\$2 [2 Pages]	TOP SECRET

New York 1065 to Moscow, 28 July 1944. Browder, Bentley, Mary Price



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TOD	
USSR	Ref. No.: 3/NBF/T492 (of 5/4/54)
and a second	Issued: <b>4100000</b> /20/1/76 Copy No.: <b>36</b> /
	REISSUE
ASSESSMENTS OF ARTEK AND I	LEONID, MENTION OF SERGEJ, MAKSIM, ZVUK, SECOND LINE,
"A" TECHNIQUE (1944) From: New York	
To: MOSCOW	
No.: 1076	29 July 1944
TO VIKTOR[1].	
Herewith the personal	l reports:
. Rine[iii]. He ran these	several probationers [STAZDERY] of the Second probationers on his own only after SERGEJ[iv] had t display any particular initiative.
	[20 groups unrecovered].
conditions obtaining here. With a different cover he effectively. Perhaps he according to what he says. years because of his cover	over (messenger-guard) actually stopped him, in the , from doubling for [DUBLINGVANTE] the inspectors. could have acted with greater initiative and more is experiencing a feeling of dissatisfaction since, , he has not been able to show his worth for many r and [8 groups nurrecovered] he stops opening doors two others who are capable of nothing else.
	[Continued overleaf]
	and a second
	VENONA
	L <del>OP SECRE</del> T

46. New York 1076 to Moscow, 29 July 1944.


New York 1076 to Moscow, 29 July 1944. KGB officers

46.

<text><image/><section-header><section-header><section-header><section-header><section-header><section-header><section-header><section-header></section-header></section-header></section-header></section-header></section-header></section-header></section-header></section-header></text>	Jerescher State       Jerescher State			
Jether State Stat	Jether State Stat			
Jerescher State	Jerescher State			
Jerescher State	Jeres	95	VENC	
2. LEONID[V], before MAKSII:[Vi] was given over, was in touch with SUNK[vii] and a number of probationers of the Second Line. Yot having operational experience, he was not able to run proise unres in accordance with the requirements. He is qualified in the "A: technique[Viii] and successfully carried out a number of special tasks connected with doubserts on receiving and observing workers. He was used for tailing immediately upon MASIM's arrived. He acquired experience in external surveillance         IMANUZANOS MAKIALDENIE]. He has virtual.; no knowledge of the language and has not studied it.       [17 groups unrecovered]         "INANUZANOS MAKIALDENIE]. He has virtual.; no knowledge of the language and has not studied it.       [17 groups unrecovered]         "NANUZANOS MAKIALDENIE]. He has virtual.; no knowledge of the language and has not studied it.       [17 groups unrecovered]         "NANUZANOS MAKIALDENIE]. He has virtual.; no knowledge of the language and has not studied it.       [17 groups unrecovered]         "NANUZANOS MAKIALDENIE].       [17 groups unrecovered]       [16 groups unrecovered]         ". Latterly he [2 groups unrecovered] with Statements. He was needlessly frank with his wife about matters concerning our work, which       [23 groups unrecovered]         "Is a contained and even rule, conducted [1 group unrecovered]       [16 groups unrecovered]       [17 groups unrecovered]         "Is a contained and yee rule, ond and trans of the uses from May 1940 to 31 July 1944.       [11]       [13]         [14] Second Line:       Probably concorned with Exampland other manofer of "SEROED's' of NM NOR's No. 1287 of 22 July 19	2/12/202         2. LEONID[V], before MAKSIE[Vi] was given over, was in touch with SWUK[Vii] and a number of probationers of the Second Line. Yot having operational experience, he was not able to run product oners in accordance with the requirements. He was not able to run product oners in accordance with the requirements. He was not able to run product oners in accordance with the requirements. He was not able to run product oners in accordance with the requirements. He was used for tailing immediately upon MAKSIM's and dispatching people. He has carried out missions consisting of checking and dispatching people. He has carried out missions consisting of the language and has not studied it.         [17] groups unrecovered]         WARUZANNOS MARIYADENIE]. He has virtually no knowledge of the language and has not studied it.         [17] groups unrecovered] "independently". He was needlessly frank with his wife about matters concerning our work, which         [23] groups unrecovered]         [34] Second Line:       L Genercl Pavel Mikhajlovich FITIN.         [35] ANTEX:       Leonid Diricivich ABENNOV, in the USA from May 1940 to 31 July 1944.         [34] Second Line:       Probably concorned with Warainians and other ainority eth is groups of the USA from Janary 1944 to 11 March 1946; of NEW YORY's Job to 31 July 1945.         [4] LEONID:       Aleksed Nikolavich FRONDONV, in the USA from Janary 1944 to 11 March 1946; of NEW YORY's Job to 31 July 1945.         [4] WINDEN:       Valaini's Sergeevich PRAVDIN, in the USA from Janary 1944 to 11 March 1946; of NEW YORY's Job to 31 July 1945.         [4] LEONID:       Aleksed Nikolavich FRONDONV, i		TAD-65	
2. LEONID[V], before MAKSII:[Vi] was given over, was in touch with SUNK[vii] and a number of probationers of the Second Line. Yot having operational experience, he was not able to run proise unres in accordance with the requirements. He is qualified in the "A: technique[Viii] and successfully carried out a number of special tasks connected with doubserts on receiving and observing workers. He was used for tailing immediately upon MASIM's arrived. He acquired experience in external surveillance         IMANUZANOS MAKIALDENIE]. He has virtual.; no knowledge of the language and has not studied it.       [17 groups unrecovered]         "INANUZANOS MAKIALDENIE]. He has virtual.; no knowledge of the language and has not studied it.       [17 groups unrecovered]         "NANUZANOS MAKIALDENIE]. He has virtual.; no knowledge of the language and has not studied it.       [17 groups unrecovered]         "NANUZANOS MAKIALDENIE]. He has virtual.; no knowledge of the language and has not studied it.       [17 groups unrecovered]         "NANUZANOS MAKIALDENIE].       [17 groups unrecovered]       [16 groups unrecovered]         ". Latterly he [2 groups unrecovered] with Statements. He was needlessly frank with his wife about matters concerning our work, which       [23 groups unrecovered]         "Is a contained and even rule, conducted [1 group unrecovered]       [16 groups unrecovered]       [17 groups unrecovered]         "Is a contained and yee rule, ond and trans of the uses from May 1940 to 31 July 1944.       [11]       [13]         [14] Second Line:       Probably concorned with Exampland other manofer of "SEROED's' of NM NOR's No. 1287 of 22 July 19	2/12/202         2. LEONID[V], before MAKSIE[Vi] was given over, was in touch with SWUK[Vii] and a number of probationers of the Second Line. Yot having operational experience, he was not able to run product oners in accordance with the requirements. He is qualified in the "A technique[Vii] and dispatching people. He has carried out missions consisting of checking and dispatching people. He has carried out missions consisting of checking and observing workers. He was used for tailing immediately upon MAKSIM's arrivel. He acquired experience in external surveillance [NARUZANOS MARIYADENIE]. He has virtual; no knowledge of the language and has not studied it.         [17 groups unrecovered]       "Independently". He same an eadlessly frank with his wife about matters concerning our work, which         [13] Groups unrecovered]       "Independently". He was needlessly frank with his wife about matters concerning our work, which         [13] ANTEX:       Leonid Diricivich ABEANOV, in the USA from May 1940 to 31 July 1944.         [14] Second Line:       Probably concerned with Krainins and other minority eth.ic groups of the USA from January 1944 to 11 March 1946; of NEW YORK's Usanary 1944 to 11 March 1946; of NEW YORK's No. 1237 of 22 July 1945 (JANEF/2030) on the transfer of "SEREF's" probationers.         [vi] LEONID:       Aleksej Nikolavich FRONDONV, in the USA from January 1944 to 11 March 1946; of NEW YORK's Distance of "SEREF's" probationers.         [vi] MAKEIN:       Validini's Sergeevich FRONDONV, in the USA from January 1944 to 11 March 1946; of NEW YORK's Distance of "SEREF's" probationers.         [vi] LEONID:       Aleksej Nikolavich FRONDONV, in the USA from 25 December 1941 to 26 Anguat 1944.		TOP JE	CREI
<ul> <li>2. LEONID[v], before MAKSI:[vi] wes given cover, was in touch with NUME[vii] and a number of probationers of the Second Line. Yot having operational experience, he was not able to run probe: uners in accordance with the requirements. He is gualified in the "A technique[viii] and successfully carried out an ausber of special tasks connected with documents on receiving and dispetching people. He has carried out missions consisting of checking and dispetching expired experience in external successfully carried out Amson successfully carried out Amson successfully carried out Amson successfully and dispetching people. He has carried out missions consisting of checking and dispetching expired experience in external successfully upon MAKSIM's arrival. He was used for tailing immediately upon MAKSIM's arrival. He was not studied it.</li> <li>[17 groups unrecovered]</li> <li>". Letterly he [2 groups unrecovered] did not try to improve himself, was off-hand and even rude, conducted [1 group unrecovered] "independently". He was needlessly frank with his wife about matters concerning our work, which</li> <li>[33 groups unrecovered]</li> <li>Footnotes: [i] VIKTOR: Lt General Parel Mikhajlovich FITIN.</li> <li>[ii] ARTEX: Leonid Dmitrievich ABRANOV, in the USA from May 1946 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[iii] Second Line: Probably concerned with Wrisianians and other minority eth.Lc groups of the USA from 19 October 1944 to 14 March 1946; of NEW YORK's No. 1267 of 22 July 1945 (JNEF/2005) on the transfer of "SERMED's" probationers.</li> <li>[v] LEONID: Aleksej Nikelaevich FROKDONV, in the USA from 19 October 1944 to 14 March 1946; of NEW YORK's No. 126 of SA July 1944.</li> <li>[vi] MAKSIM: Wasilij Mikhajlovich ZUBLIN, in the USA from 25 December 1944 to 16 ZUBLEN's" probationers.</li> <li>[v] LEONID: Aleksej Nikelaevich FROKDONV, in the USA from 25 December 1944 to 26 Angust 1944.</li> <li>[vii] ZVUK: is "SOUND"; Jacob GOLOS.</li> <li>[viii] "A" technique: Apparently the manufacture and provision of falle papers. Gr r</li></ul>	<ul> <li>2. LEONID[v], before MAKSI:[vi] was given error, was in touch with MURE[vii] and a number of probationers of the Second Line. Yot having operational experience, he was not able to run probationers in accordance with the requirements. He is qualified in the "A' technique[viii] and dispatching people. He has carried out midseling consistents on receiving and dispatching people. He has carried out midseling consistents on receiving and dispatching people. He has carried out midseling consistents on receiving and dispatching people. He has carried out midseling consistents on receiving and dispatching workers. He was used for tailing immediately upon MAKSIM's arrival. He acguried experience in extended out midseling immediately upon MAKSIM's errors. He was used for tailing immediately upon MAKSIM's errors. He was used for tailing immediately upon MAKSIM's evolved of the language and has not studied it.</li> <li>[17] groups unrecovered]</li> <li>". Latterly he [2 groups unrecovered] did not try to improve himself, was off-hand and even rude, conducted [1 group unrecovered] "independently". He was needlessly frank with his wife about matters concerning our work, which</li> <li>[33 groups unrecovered]</li> <li>Footnotes: [i] VIKTOE: Lt General Parel Mikhajlovich FITIN.</li> <li>[ii] AFTEX: Leonid Daitrievich ABRANOV, in the USA from May 1940 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[iii] Second Line: Probably concerned with Wersinians and other minority ethkc groups of the USA from 19 October 1941 to 14 Mark 1933 and from January 1944 to 11 Mark 1943 and from January 1944 to 11 Mark 1945 of The Work's Moke's of MSA 1940 to 31 July 1945.</li> <li>[v] LEONID: Aleksej Nikolavich FRONDONV, in the USA from 29 October 1941 to 26 August 1944.</li> <li>[vi] NAKSIM: Wasilij Mikhajlovich ZUBTLY, in the USA from 29 December 1944 to 12 Mark 1946.</li> <li>[vi] MAKSIM: Wasilij Mikhajlovich ZUBTLY, in the USA from 25 December 1941 to 26 August 1944.</li> <li>[vii] Witk: ie "SOUND"; Jacob GOLOS.</li> <li>[viii] "A" technique: Apparently</li></ul>	_		2 C
<ul> <li>requirements. He is qualified in the "A technique[Viii] and dispetching people. He has carried out missions consisting of checking and dispetching people. He has carried out missions consisting of checking and observing workers. He was used for tailing immediately upon MAKSIM's arrivel. He acquired experience in external surveillance.</li> <li>[MARUZANOZ MAKLADENIE]. He has virtually no knowledge of the language and has not studied it.</li> <li>[17 groups unrecovered]</li> <li>". Letterly he [2 groups unrecovered] did not try to improve himself, was off-hand and even rude, conducted [1 groups unrecovered] "independently". He was needlessly frank with his wife about matters concerning our work, which</li> <li>[33 groups unrecovered]</li> <li>Footnotes: [i] VIKTOR: Lt General Pavel Mikhajlovich FITIN.</li> <li>[ii] ARTEX: Leonid Dmitrievich ABRANOV, in the USA from May 1946 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[iii] Second Line: Probably concorned with Wrainians and other minority eth.ic groups of the USSR.</li> <li>[iv] SERGEJ: Vladimir Sorgeev.ch PRAVDIN, in the USA from '9 October 1941 to Autumn 1943 and from January 1944 to 11 Aurter 1945 (3/MEF/T395) on the transfer of "SERGEJ's" probationers.</li> <li>[v] LEONID: Aleksej Nikolaevich PROKDOROV, in the USA from 19 October 1941 to 26 August 1944.</li> <li>[vii] ZVUK: ie "SOUND"; Jacob GOLOS.</li> <li>[viii] "A" technique: Apparently the manufacture and provision of false papers. CT references to the "1" Groups and the "A" Line in NEW YORK'S Nos. 626 of 5 May 1944; (3/MEF/T305), and 1465 of 14 October 1944 (3/MEF/T305), 1457 on 14 October 1944</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>requirements. He is qualified in the "A technique[viii] and dispatching people. He has carried out miscins consisting of checking and dispatching people. He has carried out miscins consisting of checking and observing workers. He was used for tailing immediately upon MAKSIM's arrival. He acquired experiance in external surveillance</li> <li>[NARUZANGZ NARIYADENIE]. He has virtually no knowledge of the language and has not studied it.</li> <li>[17 groups unrecovered]</li> <li>". Latterly he [2 groups unrecovered] did not try to improve himself, was off-hand and even rude, conducted [1 groups unrecovered] "independently". He was needlessly frank with his wife about matters concerning our work, which</li> <li>[33 groups unrecoverable]</li> <li>Footnotes: [i] VIKTOE: Lt Generel Pavel Mikhajlovich FITIN.</li> <li>[ii] AETEX: Leconid Dmitrievich ABEANOV, in the USA from May 1940 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[iii] Second Line: Probably concorned with Wrainians and other minority eth.ic groups of the USSR.</li> <li>[iv] SERGEY: Vladimir Sorgeevich PRAVDIN, in the USA from '9 October 1944 to Autum 1943 and from January 1944 to 31 July 1945.</li> <li>[v] LEDNID: Aleksej Nikolaevich PRAVDIN, in the USA from '9 October 1944 to Autum 1943 and from January 1944 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[vi] LEDNID: Aleksej Nikolaevich PRAVDIN, in the USA from '9 October 1944 to 231 July 1945.</li> <li>[vi] LEDNID: Aleksej Nikolaevich PRAVDIN, in the USA from 1940 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[vii] ZVUK: is "SOUND"; Jacob GOLOS.</li> <li>[viii] "A" technique: Apparently the manufacture and provision of false papers. Or references to the ''M Group and the ''A line in NW YORK'S Nos. 626 of 5 May 1944; (3/NEF/TS), 1455 or 14 October 1944; (3/NEF/TS),</li></ul>	<u> </u>	· <u>········</u>	3/138/5492
<ul> <li>Footnotes: [i] VIKTOR: Lt Genercl. Pavel Mikhajlovich FITIN.</li> <li>[ii] ARTEM: Leonid Dmitricvich ABRAMOV, in the USA from May 1946 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[iii] Second Line: Probably concorned with Wrighing and other minority eth.ic groups of the USSR.</li> <li>[iv] SERGEJ: Vladimir Sorgeevich PRAVDIN, in the USA from 19 October 1944 to Autumn 1943 and from January 1944 to 11 March 1946; of NEW MORK'S No. 1287 of 22 July 1945 (JAMEF/1993) on the transfer of "SENGL'S" probationers.</li> <li>[v] LEONID: Aleksej Nikolasvich PROKDENOV, in the USA from 1940 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[vi] MAKSIM: Vasilij Mikhajlovich ZUBILIN, in the USA from 1940 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[vii] ZVUK: ie "SOUND"; Jacob GOLOS.</li> <li>[viii] "A" technique: Apparently the manufacture and provision of faile papers. C7 references to the "M" Group and the "Au Line in NEW YORK'S Nos. 626 of 5 May 1944 (JAMEF/1950), 1285 of 14 October 1944 (JAMEF/1951), 129 of 23 August 1944 (JAMEF/1951), 129 of 24 October 1944 (JAMEF/1951), 129 of 23 August 1944 (JAMEF/1951), 129 of 24 October 1944</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Footnotes: [i] VIKTOR: Lt Genercl Pavel Mikhajlovich FITIN.</li> <li>[ii] ARTEX: Leonid Dmitricvich ABRAHOV, in the USA from May 1946 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[iii] Second Line: Probably concorned with Uxtaining and other minority ethic groups of the USSR.</li> <li>[iv] SERGEJ: Vladimir Sorgeevich PRAVDIN, in the USA from 19 October 1941 to Autumn 1943 and from January 1944 to 11 March 1946; of NEW MORK'S No. 1207 of 22 July 1945 (3/MEF/TM93) on the transfer of "SENGL'S" probationers.</li> <li>[v] LEONID: Aleksej Nikolaevich PROKDOROV, in the USA from 1940 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[vi] MAKSIM: Vasilij Mikhajlovich ZUBILIN, in the USA from 1940 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[vii] ZVUK: is "SOUND"; Jacob GOLOS.</li> <li>[viii] "A" technique: Apparently the manufacture and provision of false papers. CT references to the "M" Group and the "A" Line in NEW YORK'Nos. 626 of 3 May 1944 (3/MEF/TM36), 1205 of 23 August 1944 (3/MEF/TM36), 1205 of 24 October 1944</li> </ul>	Prequirements. Carried out a r and dispatching and observing w arrival. He ac UMARUZHNOZ MAEI has not studied ". Letterly he off-hand and au	Wes not adde to Re is qualified number of special people. He ha workers. He was guirad experien YuDENIE]. He h 1 it. [1 [2 groups unre- en rude, conduc ly frank with h	The product overs in accordance with the in the "A technique(Vii) and successfully 1 tasks connected with documents on receiving s carried out missions consisting of checking used for tailing immediately upon MAKSIM's ce in external surveillence as wirtual, no knowledge of the language and 7 groups unrecovered] covered] did not try to improve himself, was ted [1 group unrecovered] "independently". is wife about matters concerning our work,
<ul> <li>[ii] ARTEX: Leonid Dmitricvich AERMOV, in the USA from May 1940 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[iii] Second Line: Probably concerned with Ukrainians and other minority eth.ic groups of the USSR.</li> <li>[iv] SERGEJ: Vladimir Sorgeerach PRAVDIN, in the USA from 19 October 1941 to Autumn 1943 and from January 1944 to 11 Karch 1946: of NEW VOKY'S No. 1207 of 22 July 1945 (JANEF/U93) on the transfer of "SERGEJ'S" probationers.</li> <li>[v] LEONID: Aleksej Nikolaevich PROKDOROV, in the USA from 1940 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[vi] MAKSIM: Vasilij Mikhajlovich ZUBILIN, in the USA from 25 December 1941 to 26 August 1944.</li> <li>[vii] ZVUK: ie "SOUND"; Jacob GOLOS.</li> <li>[viii] "A" technique: Apparently the manufacture and provision of false papers. Of references to the "A" Group and the "A" Line in NEW YORK's Nos. 626 of 5 May 1944 (JANEF/U961, 709).</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>[ii] ARTEX: Leonid Dmitricvich AERMOV, in the USA from May 1940 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[iii] Second Line: Probably concerned with Ukrainians and other minority eth.ic groups of the USSR.</li> <li>[iv] SERGEJ: Vladimir Sorgeerach PRAVDIN, in the USA from 19 October 1941 to Autumn 1943 and from January 1944 to 11 Karch 1946: of NEW VOKY'S No. 1207 of 22 July 1945 (JANEF/U93) on the transfer of "SERGEJ'S" probationers.</li> <li>[v] LEONID: Aleksej Nikolaevich PROKDOROV, in the USA from 1940 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[vi] MAKSIM: Vasilij Mikhajlovich ZUBILIN, in the USA from 25 December 1941 to 26 August 1944.</li> <li>[vii] ZVUK: ie "SOUND"; Jacob GOLOS.</li> <li>[viii] "A" technique: Apparently the manufacture and provision of false papers. Of references to the "A" Group and the "A" Line in NEW YORK's Nos. 626 of 5 May 1944 (JANEF/U961, 709).</li> </ul>		L3.	5 groups wirecoverable]
<ul> <li>[ii] ARTEN: Leonid Dmitricvich ABRAHOV, in the USA from May 1948 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[iii] Second Line: Probably concerned with Withining and other minority eth.ic groups of the USSR.</li> <li>[iv] SERGEJ: Vladimir Sorgeevich PRAVDIN, in the USA from 19 October 1941 to 14 March 1946: of NEW YORK's No. 1207 of 22 July 1945 (JANEF/1903) on the transfer of "SERGEI's" probationers.</li> <li>[v] LEONID: Aleksej Nikolaevich PRAVDIN, in the USA from 1940 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[vi] MAKSIM: Vasili, Nikhajlovich ZUBILIN, in the USA from 25 December 1941 to 26 August 1944.</li> <li>[vii] ZVUK: ic "SOUND"; Jacob GOLOS.</li> <li>[viii] "A" technique: Apparently the manufacture and provision of false papers. C7 references to the 17.1% Group and the "A" Line in NEW YORK's Nos. 626 of 5 May 1944; (JANEF/1936), 1235 of 23 August 1944; (JANEF/1931, 17.5), 1455 of 14 October 1944 (JANEF/151), 1455 of 14 October 1944</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>[ii] ARTEN: Leonid Dmitricvich ABRAHOV, in the USA from May 1948 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[iii] Second Line: Probably concerned with Withining and other minority eth.ic groups of the USSR.</li> <li>[iv] SERGEJ: Vladimir Sorgeevich PRAVDIN, in the USA from 19 October 1941 to 14 March 1946: of NEW YORK's No. 1207 of 22 July 1945 (JANEF/1903) on the transfer of "SERGEI's" probationers.</li> <li>[v] LEONID: Aleksej Nikolaevich PRAVDIN, in the USA from 1940 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[vi] MAKSIM: Vasili, Nikhajlovich ZUBILIN, in the USA from 25 December 1941 to 26 August 1944.</li> <li>[vii] ZVUK: ic "SOUND"; Jacob GOLOS.</li> <li>[viii] "A" technique: Apparently the manufacture and provision of false papers. C7 references to the 17.1% Group and the "A" Line in NEW YORK's Nos. 626 of 5 May 1944; (JANEF/1936), 1235 of 23 August 1944; (JANEF/1931, 17.5), 1455 of 14 October 1944 (JANEF/151), 1455 of 14 October 1944</li> </ul>	Footnotes: [i]	VIKTOR:	Lt General Pavel Nikhajlovich FITIN.
<ul> <li>minority ethic groups of the USSR.</li> <li>[iv] SERGEJ: Vladimir Sorgeevich PRAVDIN, in the USA from 19 October 1944 to 1 Autumn 1943 and from January 1944 to 14 March 1946; cf NBW YORK's No. 1207 of 22 July 1943 (JARE/T903) on the transfer of "SERGEJ's" probationers.</li> <li>[v] LEONID: Aleksej Nikolaevich PROKDOROV, in the USA from 1940 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[vi] MAKSIM: Vasilij Mikhajlovich ZUBILIN, in the USA from 25 December 1941 to 26 August 1944.</li> <li>[vii] ZVUK: ie "SOUND"; Jacob GOLOS.</li> <li>[viii] "A" technique: Apparently the manufacture and provision of false papers. Of references to the "A" Group and the "A" Line in NEW YORK's Nos. 626 of 5 May 1944 (JAREF/T95), 1455 of 14 October 1944 (JAREF/T95), 7%9).</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>minority ethic groups of the USSR.</li> <li>[iv] SERGEJ: Vladimir Sorgeevich PRAVDIN, in the USA from '9 October 1941 to Autumn 1943 and from January 1944 to 11 March 1946; cf NSW YORK's No. 1287 of 22 July 1943 (JANEF/T993) on the transfer of "SERGEJ's" probationers.</li> <li>[v] LEONID: Aleksej Nikolaevich PROKDOROV, in the USA from 1940 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[vi] MAKSIM: Vasilij Mikhajlovich ZUBILIN, in the USA from 25 December 1941 to 26 August 1944.</li> <li>[vii] ZVUK: ie "SOUND"; Jacob GOLOS.</li> <li>[viii] "A" technique: Apparently the manufacture and provision of false papers. C7 references to the "A" Group and the "A" Line in NEW YORK's Nos. 626 of 5 May 1944 (JANEF/T95), 1455 of 14 October 1944 (JANEF/T95), 1455 of 14 October 1944 (JANEF/T95), 769).</li> </ul>	[ii]	ARTEK:	Leonid Dmitrievich ABRANOV, in the USA from May 1940 to 31 July 1944.
<ul> <li>[iv] SERGEJ: Vladimir Sorgeev.ch PRAVDIN, in the USA from 19 October 1944 to Autumn 1943 and from January 1944 to 14 March 1946: cf NEW YORK's No. 1207 of 22 July 1943 (JARE/T903) on the transfer of "SERGEJ's" probationers.</li> <li>[v] LEONID: Aleksej Nikolaevich FROKhOROV, in the USA from 1940 to 3/ July 1944.</li> <li>[vi] MAKSIM: Vasilij Mikhajlovich ZUBILIN, in the USA from 25 December 1941 to 26 August 1944.</li> <li>[vii] ZVUK: ie "SOUND"; Jacob GOLOS.</li> <li>[viii] "A" technique: Apparently the manufacture and provision of false papers. C7 references to the "A" Group and the "A" Line in NEW YORK's Nos. 626 of 5 May 1944 (JANEF/T056), 1425 of 14 October 1944 (JANEF/T051, 7457 and 1465 of 14 October 1944 (JANEF/T051, 7459).</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>[iv] SERGEJ: Vladimir Sorgeevuch PRAVDIN, in the USA from 19 October 1941 to Autumn 1943 and from January 1944 to 14 March 1946: cf NSW YORK's No. 1287 of 22 July 1943 (JARE/T993) on the transfer of "SERGEJ's" probationers.</li> <li>[v] LEONID: Aleksej Nikolaevich FROKhOROV, in the USA from 1940 to 3/ July 1944.</li> <li>[vi] MAKSIM: Vasilij Nikhajlovich ZUBILIN, in the USA from 25 December 1941 to 26 August 1944.</li> <li>[vii] ZVUK: ie "SOUND"; Jacob GOLOS.</li> <li>[viii] "A" technique: Apparently the manufacture and provision of false papers. C7 references to the "A" Group and the "A" Line in NEW YORK's Nos. 626 of 5 May 1944 (JAREF/T056), 1283 of 23 August 1944 (JAREF/T051), 7459 and 1465 of 14 October 1944 (JAREF/T051), 7459 and 1465 of 14 October 1944</li> </ul>	[111]	Second Line;	Probably concorned with Ukrainians and other minority ethic groups of the USSR.
<ul> <li>1940 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[vi] MAKSIM: Vasilij Nikhajlovich ZUBILIN, in the USA from 25 December 1941 to 26 August 1944.</li> <li>[vii] ZVUK: ie "SOUND"; Jacob GOLOS.</li> <li>[viii] "A" technique: Apparently the manufacture and provision of false popers. Of references to the "A" Group and the "A" Line in NEW YORK's Nos. 626 of 5 May 1944 (3/NEF/2066), 1233 of 23 August 1944 (3/NEF/20491, 729).</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>1940 to 31 July 1944.</li> <li>[vi] MAKSIM: Vasilij Mikhajlovich ZUBILIN, in the USA from 25 December 1941 to 26 August 1944.</li> <li>[vii] ZVUK: ie "SOUND"; Jacob GOLOS.</li> <li>[viii] "A" technique: Apparently the manufacture and provision of false papers. Of references to the "A" Group and the "A" Line in NEW YORK's Nos. 626 of 5 May 1944 (3/NEF/2066), 1233 of 23 August 1944 (3/NEF/20491, 729).</li> </ul>	[iv]	SERG <b>EJ:</b>	Vladimir Sorgeevach PRAVDIN, in the USA from 19 October 1941 to Autumn 1943 and from January 1944 to 11 March 1946; of NEW YORK's No. 1387 of 22 July 1943 I CAMPE FORM 1945
25 December 1941 to 26 August 1944. [vii] ZVUK: ie "SOUND"; Jacob GOLOS. [viii] "A" technique: Apparently the manufacture and provision of false papers. Of references to the "A" Group and the "A" Line in NEW YORK: Nos. 626 of 5 May 1944 (3/NEF/7086), 1233 of 23 August 1944 (3/NEF/70491, 789).	25 December 1941 to 26 August 1944. [vii] ZVUK: ie "SOUND"; Jacob GOLOS. [viii] "A" technique: Apparently the manufacture and provision of false papers. Of references to the "A" Group and the "A" Line in NEW YORK: Nos. 626 of 5 May 1944 (3/NEF/7086), 1233 of 23 August 1944 (3/NEF/70491, 789).	[v]	LEONID:	Aleksej Nikolaevich PROKhOROV, in the USA fro
[viii] "A" technique: Apparently the manufacture and provision of false papers. C2 references to the "A" Group and the "A" Line in NEW YORK'S Nos. 626 of 5 May 1944 (3/NEF/2056), 1237 of 23 August 1944 (3/NEF/205), 1457 and 1465 of 14 October 1944 (3/NEF/2091, 729).	[viii] "A" technique: Apparently the manufacture and provision of false papers. C2 references to the "A" Group and the "A" Line in NEW YORK'S Nos. 626 of 5 May 1944 (3/NEF/2056), 1237 of 23 August 1944 (3/NEF/205), 1457 and 1465 of 14 October 1944 (3/NEF/2091, 729).	[vi]	MAKSIM:	Vasilij Mikhajlovich ZUBILIN, in the USA from 25 December 1941 to 26 August 1944.
and the "A" Line in NEW YORK'S Nos. 626 of 5 May 1944 (3/NEF/TS6), 1235 of 23 August 1944 (3/NEF/T25), 1457 and 1465 of 14 October 1944 (3/NEF/T291, 779).	and the "A" Line in NEW YORK'S Nos. 626 of a Nay 1944 (3/NEF/T366), 1233 of 23 August 1944 (3/NEF/T215), 1457 and 1465 of 14 October 1944 (3/NEF/T2491, 789).	[vii]	ZVUK:	ie "SOUND"; Jacob GOLOS.
VENONA TOPSECRET	VENONA TOP SECRET	[ <b>viii</b> ]	"A" technique:	In the papers. Of references to the "A" Group
		/ENONA	70	PSECRET

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47. New York 1088-90 to Moscow, 30 July 1944.



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New York 1088-90 to Moscow, 30 July 1944. Problems with seamen

47.


TO TO	P SECRET DINARY ENONA
all information ] desire to leave ; to recall from P to replace [him] work on the West Viktor Vasillevi	ng position of V. is not serious; according to his absentmindedness regarding cover and his PORTLAND for home or [8 groups unrecoverable] RTLAND, although first having sent [B% instructions which could be [3 groups unrecovered] Coast. In our opinion a suitable candidate is ch S. Since V.'s conduct is a result of both of sence of his family and the [D% lack]
	[16 groups unrecovered]
Russian agent net being I have take	work on shore and on Soviet ships. For the time on the following steps:
have been taken i connected with hi is his superior. reorganization of	erous meetings with V, the way to fulfill the has been sketched out. At the same time steps to release V, as much as possible from work S cover by using as a roof (KRYSAA) VOVChEK who The latter considers essential the control or the method of work along the whole coast in our inclusion of himself in our work with V.
2. [11 gro	ups unrecovered]
IGOR'[v], VLADISI [STAZHERY] CHEKHO	AV[vi], VOVChEK, ALEKSANDR[vii] and the probationer V[viii] and ANCHOR [YaKOR'][ix].
<ol> <li>A preli</li> </ol>	minary investigation into the circumstances of the ip IL'ICh has been completed.
West Coast. On t	ANGELES I met PETR[x] whom I instructed on the the work in BABYLON [VAVILON][x1] where he is the post of deputy ship repair engineer on the he day of the meeting PETR had no agent network 3 groups unrecovered]
No.606	MAY[MAJ][x11], AKIM[x111]
Indicate the	shortcomings in my telegram.
	BORIS[xiv]
Comments: [i] SE	MEN: Unidentified cover-name.
· [11] VI	TALIJ: Pavel Kuzmich REVIZOROV.
[111] VO	VChEK: Probably Aleksandr Pavlovich BOChEK.
[iv] V	.: i.e. VITALIJ.
[v] IG	OR': Unidentified cover-name,
[vi] VL	ADISLAV: Nikolaj Grigor'evich REDIN.
[vii] AL	EKSANDR: Unidentified cover-name.
[viii] Ch	EKhOV: Unidentified cover-name.
[ix] AN	CHOR: Unidentified cover-name.
[x] PE	TR: Aleksandr Petrovich GRAChEV.
	2 -
	P SECRET DEMAR VENONA

310

TOP-SECRET DINA . . . . . [x1] BABYLON: San Francisco. [x11] MAY: Stepan APRESYaN. [xiii] AKIM: Serej Grigor'evich LUK'YaNOV. [xiv] BORIS: Aleksandr Pavlovich SAPRYKIN, MOB cipher clerk in New York. TOP DINAR RET 7 7 a.

311

48. New York 1102-3 to Moscow, 2 August 1944.




313

New York 1102-3 to Moscow, 2 August 1944. Fisher case

(wordy to gain the desired time) to obtain transit visus. Similaneously from "MAZAN" send a telegram to the Exhests of the COUNTY that a request to issue transit visus for the paragorts they will receive rare the Exhest of the COUNTY. (wordy to gain the desired time) to obtain transit visus. Similaneously from "MAZAN" send a telegran to the Exhest of the COUNTY. (wordy to gain the desired time) to obtain transit visus. Similaneously from "MAZAN" send a telegran to the Exhest of the COUNTY. (wordy to gain the desired time) to obtain the they have to apply for a transit visu to the Exhest of the COUNTY. (wordy to give all nocessary particulars([N]). (wordy to give all nocessary particulars([N]). Word to give all nocessary particulars([N]). The hart will be no complications arise the FARE set to telegraph wordstin [1 group uncecovered]. Should complication arise the FARE set to telegraph LaSS and you as so that "urse on teak and recovered the hard nor geometry intercoded for one orders and the form the COUNTEY may [0] managed. To begin with WIZES[WIJ][N] refused to intervene in the case, explaining that he had aly zeometry intercoded for one orders and recommend approaching congressan MIZES[KL,ME]. The latter did not [6 groups unrecovered] for the MAZAN in the MAZAN. No. 61 No. 61 Note: [a] Inserted by the translator. Comments: [1] VIETOR : Lt. Gen. F.H. STEN. Note: [a] Inserted by the translator. Comments: [1] VIETOR : Lt. Gen. F.H. STEN. [1] MAZENE : Vesatily MIXES[will form is used here. [1] COUNTER: I. Stall and the fourt of hard may advect the source of a server chand and there is a server chance (for a source or a server chance to his occupation. [2] No for 'NAXAN WENTER': Use and hard if a source or a server chance to his occupation. [3] No for 'NAXAN WENTER': It is not closer whether this is a cover-name or a server chance to his occupation. [4] DOUNTER': Vesation to their		TOR SECRET
<pre>SMERIA or to give all necessary particulars[05]. [51 groups unrecoverable] Enbassy of the CONNERT in SMERIA immediately to telegraph verbatim [1 group unrecovered]. Should complications arise the FAIR are to telegraph MaSS and you me so that </pre>		"KL2AN <sup>1</sup> " send a telegram to the Embassy of the CONTEXT with a request to issue transit visas for the passports they will receive from the Embassy of the CONTEX- SIDE. The FAIR [2 groups unrecovered] their return address and are sending a reply paid telegram saying that they have been notified by their relation HASS that they have got visas for the CONTEXTSIDE and that they have to apply for a
Enbassy of the COUNTRY in SMERNA immediately to telegraph verbatin [1 group unrecovered]. Should complications arise the PAR are to telegraph EASS and you me so that information there should be no complications. i. Nor your information we advise how the business of getting a visa for the COUNTRY was [05 managod]. To begin with NIESS[MuTB][X] reduced to intervene in the case, explaining that he had only recently interveded for one refugee and recommended approaching Congressman KEEDS[KLMES]. The latter did not [6 groups unrecovered], and it mas only then that NIESS intervened. The affeir was held up because of the Porty Convention and was actually sortied at the last sizi days. All documents, telegrams [kall K[21]]. The batter did not [6 groups unrecovered] and it was each and you have not the mony orders, the parcel and fild documents, telegrams [kall K[21]]. The batter did not [6] asked the daposit was received by BLSS today in an enveloped the Bast sizi days. All documents, telegrams [kall K[21]]. The business [1 group intercovered] [6 groups surrecovered] bills today in an enveloped the Bast sizi days. And the Ministry of Soringe MIRCHARL (MIRCHARL)]. Note: [a] Inserted by the translator. Comments: [i] VIETOR: 1 Lt. Gen. F.M. FITIN. [ii] MANSINE Vassing VIETOR: 1 Lt. Gen. F.M. FITIN. [iii] MANSINE Vassing in MASINEXCOM. [iv] DESS : Michael BURD. [iv] DESS : Destination to State	art TI]	SMIRNA or to give all necessary particulars [D%].
Should complications arise the FAIR are to telegraph HASS and you me so that 		Embassy of the COUNTRY in SMYRNA immediately to telegraph verbatim [1 group
<pre>the Case, explaining Congressman MLEMEN[KLJNE]. The latter did not [6 groups unreconvered] and it use only then that NILES intervened. The affair was held up because of the Party Convention and was actually settled in the last sin days. All documents, telegrans [and][a] vouchers for the money orders, the parcel and the dynosit were recoived by RASS tody in an envelope of the TEARLENGTHAL [3] groups unrecovered] from the BANK[xil]. The business [4] group unrecovered] extremely sound and there is every channe [of success][4]. The BANK them [6] saked the Ministry of Pervig: iffairs[MID] of the CONTRYENDE about [9 groups unre- covered]." No. 611 MAY[MAJ][xili] Note: [a] Inserted by the translator. Comments: [i] VIETOR : Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [ii] MANSIM : Vassilij Mikhejlovich ZUBLIN, 2nd Scoret.ry at the Soviet Enheasy in WASHINETON. [iii] TER FAIR: Nichelas and Mgrin FISHER. [iv] TER FAIR: Nichelas and Mgrin FISHER. [iv] DASS : Micheal BURD. [iv] RAIMAY WORKE: It is not clear whether this is a cover-mame or a reference to his cougation. [vi] COUNTRYENDE: Mexico. [vi] COUNTRYENDE: Mexico. [vi] COUNTRYENDE: Mexico. [vi] COUNTRYENDE: Mexico. [iv] SAIMAA : MOSOWA [iv] RAIMAY KONKE: To used here. [vi] COUNTRYENDE: Mexico. [iv] SAIMAA : MOSOWA [iv] RAIMAY (NINES: To used the measure desistant to the Prostient. [iv] TEMELY: Presumably the Anite House. Compare NEW YORK's No. 1200 of 29 December 1924. (3/NEY/L78) [iv] MAY 4: USE Senar tonk of State. [iv] May 4: 4: 4: 4: 5: 4: 5: 5: 5: 5: 5: 5: 5: 5: 5: 5: 5: 5: 5:</pre>		Should complications arise the FAIR are to telegraph EASS and you me so that
Note: [a] Inserted by the translator. Comments: [i] VIETOR: It. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [ii] MANSIM: Vasalli Mikhaglovich ZUBLIN, 2nd Secret.ry at the Soviet Enbeasy in WASHEWRY. [iii] THE FAIR: Nichelas and Marie FIER. [iv] EASS : Michael BHED. [v] RASS : Michael BHED. [v] RATHWA : MICOUNTRYSHE. MICOUNTRYSHE MERICO. [vii] COUNTRYSHE MERICO. [vii] COUNTRYSHE MERICO. [ix] ILES : David K NILES was idministrative Assistant to the Prosident. [v] TEMPLE : Presumably the White House. Compare NEW YORK's No. 1840 of 29 December 1944. [s/NEW/TA78] [iii] FANK : U.S. December 1944. [s/NEW/TA78] [v] Shepar Zakharovich AFREYAN, Soviet Vice Consul [vii] MAY : Stepan Zakharovich AFREYAN, Soviet Vice Consul [v] NEW YORK.		the case, explaining that he had call recommends intercoved if one relates and recommended approaching Congressman MEINER (KL_NNE). The latter did not [6 groups unrecovered] and it has only then that NILES intervened. The affeir was hald up because of the Party Convention and was actually settled in the last sim days. All documents, tolegrams [and][a] vouchers for the money orders, the parcel and the dsposit wave received by EMSS today in an envelope of the TEGPIE[khraid][zd] [6 groups unrecovered] from the EMN[[zd1]]. The business [1 group unrecovered] extremely sound and there is every chance [of success][a]. The EMNK then [Of saked the Ministry of Forsign infairs[MID] of the CONTENTION boot [9 groups unre- covered]."
Comments: [1] VIETOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [1] MANSIM: Vassilij Mikhejlovich ZUBILIN, 2nd Secret.ry at the Soviet Enhansy in WASHINGTON. [11] THE FAIR: Nicholas and Maria FISHER. [17] BASS : Michael BHED. [17] VRAIMAY WORKER: It is not clear whether this is a cover-mame or a reference to his coougation. [17] COUNTRYSIDE: Hestican. The adjectival form is used here. [17] COUNTRYSIDE: Hestican. [17] COUNTRYSIDE: MERICO. [17] COUNTRYSIDE: MERICO. [17] COUNTRYSIDE: MERICO. [17] COUNTRYSIDE: MERICO. [17] COUNTRYSIDE: MERICO. [17] COUNTRYSIDE: MERICO. [17] TEMPLE : David K NIES was Administrative Assistant to the Prostient. [17] FRAME : V.S. A- [17] FRAME : U.S. December 1944. (S/NEF/TL.78) [17] JANK : U.S. December 1944. (S/NEF/TL.78) [17] JANK : U.S. December 1944. (S/NEF/TL.78) [17] JANK : U.S. Department of State. [17] MAY St. Stepan Zakharovich AFRESIAN, Soviet Vice Consul [17] INF. YORK.		No. 611
<ul> <li>[ii] MANSIM: Vassilij Mikhejlovich ZUBLIN, Zuh Secretury at the Soviet Enheasy in WASHINGTON.</li> <li>[iii] THE FAIR: Nicholas and Maria FISHER.</li> <li>[iv] EASS : Michael BURD.</li> <li>[v] RIJEWAY WONKER: It is not clear whether this is a cover-mame or a reference to his coougation.</li> <li>[vi] COUNTERSIDE: Hestican. The adjectival form is used here.</li> <li>[vi] COUNTERSIDE: MERICO.</li> <li>[vi] COUNTERSIDE MERICO.</li> <li>[vi] COUNTERSTIDE MERICO.</li> <li>[iii] PROPERTY U.S.S.A.</li> <li>[iii] Prostanti V histe House. Compare NEW YORK's No. 1240 of 29 December 1944. (SAMEY/TL/78)</li> <li>[iii] PARF : U.S. Department of State.</li> <li>[iii] PARF : U.S. Department of State.</li> <li>[iii] MAY : Stepan Zakharovich AFRESIAN, Soviet Vice Consul in NEW YORK.</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>[ii] MANSIK: Vasailij Mikhaglovich ZUBLIN, And Secretary at the Soviet Subassy in KASINVOM.</li> <li>[iii] THE FAIR: Nicholas and Maria FISHER.</li> <li>[iv] HASS : Michael BURD.</li> <li>[iv] RALEAN WORKER: It is not clear whether this is a cover-name or a reference to his compation.</li> <li>[vi] COUNTRYSIDE: Maxian The adjocitval form is used here.</li> <li>[vi] COUNTRYSIDE: MEXICO.</li> <li>[vi] COUNTRYSIDE: MEXICO.</li> <li>[vi] COUNTRYSIDE: MEXICO.</li> <li>[vi] COUNTRYSIDE: Devid K NILES was Administrative Assistant to the Freedant.</li> <li>[xi] THERE: Presumably the White House. Compare NEW YORK's No. 1840 of 29 December 1944. (S/NEF/TL-78)</li> <li>[xii] MAR i: U.S. Departament of State.</li> <li>[xiii] MAR i: Stepan Zakharovich AFRESYAN, Soviet Vice Consul in NEW YORK.</li> </ul>


314

49. New York 1105-10 to Moscow, 2/3 August 1944.



New York 1105-10 to Moscow, 2/3 August 1944. Donald Maclean


<b>49.</b> (	(Continued)




316

7 VENONA
TOP-SECOLL
- 3 - 3/NBF/T3
[Part V] Vestender H [C] Jacom to a
and ANVIL[x1] will be put into effect possibly in the middle of August.
[15 groups unrecovered]
the ains that are being pursued by each: the ISLAND - the strengthening of her influence in the Ballans; the COUNTRY - the desire for the minimum involvement in European politics.
[7 groups unrecoverable]
it is clear the COUNTRY
[72 groups unrecovered]
المعنى [4 groups unrecovered] about him and [5% SIEPAN][xii] refused to pass المعلى المعني
[22 groups unrecovered]
. When [he/she] had convinced [hinself/herself]
[39 groups unrecoverable]
[Part VI] In two weeks' time [B% [on/the] agreement]
[98 groups unrecovered]
[41 groups unrecoverable]
insufficient indication was given
[31 groups unrecovered] No. 610
Notes: [2] Or agreement.
[b] EVROPAJSKLJ KONSUL'LATIVNYI SOVET: This is obviously the Buropean Advisory Commission, but the literal translation is 'European Advisory/Consultative Council'.
[c] As sent. The group for "South-Edst" is, however, only one digit different.
[d] Added by translator.
[6] Gr: by Bulgaria.
[f] Only the last digit of the groups preceding "week(s)" has been recovered and on the basis of this list in the last
pretotions of this phrase are possible: (1) "3 weeks"
(2) (3) (3) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4
[Continued overleaf]
3/NE2/T3
- VENONA

317




50. New York 1119-21 to Moscow, 4/5 August 1944.




319

New York 1119-21 to Moscow, 4/5 August 1944. Harry Dexter White



320




321

·	
1	
	<u>-</u> j
	- 4 - S/NBF/1244
	for a permanent meeting place(;) all his friends are family people. Meetings could be
	held at their houses [AS if arranged so] that
	held at their houses [C], if arranged so] that one meeting devolved on each every 4-5 months. He proposes occasional conversations lasting up to half an hour while driving in his automobile.
	JUGIST has fixed the hext meeting for 17th-19th August and arranged appropriate
	JURIST has fixed the next mosting for 17th-19th August and arranged appropriate conditions for it. He returns to CARTHAGE [KARFAGEN][X11] about the 17th of August.
	I leave for CARTHAGE on the 8th of August and from there for SMYRNA [1x] on the 12th of
	and from there for SMINNAL and on the 12th of August."
	Telegraph the date of receipt of this telegram.
	No. 621 W.Y [MAJ][Xiii]
-	
<b>۲</b> .	F.N.: [a] Or "had".
	[b] Inserted by translator.
	[c] NOVYJ KURS in the Russian. If correct it might be a way of translating "New Deal".
· c	Comments: [i] See S/NBF/T96 for another reference to KOL'TSOV.
	[11] TIR: NEW YORK, N.Y.
	[111] MAKSIM: Vasilij Mikhajlovich ZUBILIN.
	[iv] YuRIST: Harry Dexter WHITE.
	<ul> <li>[v] DEKRET: usually a cover-name for Lend-Lease in this traffic.</li> </ul>
	[vi] NABOB: Henry MORGENTHAU, Jr.
	[vi1] KAPITAN: Franklin Delano ROOSEVELT.
	[viii] STRANA: the United States of America.
	[1x] SHIRNA: MOSCOW.
	[x] SIDON: LONDON.
	[xi] OSTROV: Great Britain.
	[x11] %ARFAGEN: WASHINGTON, D.C.
	[xiii] MhJ; Favel Ivanovich FEDOSIMOV.
	W.S. No.:XY-63.2
-	
1	S/NBF/T244
	·

322

		· · · ·	
	. 8	RIDE	
	TODA		
		Ref. No: S/NBF/T244 (of 8/10/1952)	
	USSR	Issued: 10/12/23/11/1958	
		Copy No: 2044	
		T OF A CONVERSATION WITH "JURIST".	
	KOL TSOV'S ACCOM		
	From: NET YORK		
	To: MOSCOW	a manufacture of the	
	Nos. 1119-1121	4-5 Aug.	
	Amend first page to read:	ANTA CONTRACT	
		e-part message complete]	
r,	Part I] To VIKTOR.		
	replied as lollows.	"On 4th August I arrived in TARE[TIR][ii]. I have Monday. Here is the substance of a conversation with July at his apartment. To wy questions JURIST	
		vered] without attempting [3 groups unrecovered]:	
	(a) DECREE[DEER	[15 groups unrecovered]	
	interest an	a so on. Definitive decisions were not arrived at	
	[0] possibl		
		[26 groups unrecovered] the document extremely risky.	
	obtaining t		
		the document extremely risky.	
	obtaining t	the document extremely risky.	
	obtaining t	the document extremely risky.	
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	obtaining t	the document extremely risky.	
	obtaining t	the document extremely risky.	
	obtaining t	[Continued overleaf]	
	obtaining t	[Continued overleaf]	
	obtaining t	[Continued overleaf]	

323




324

<b>51.</b> I	New	York	1203	to	Moscow, 2	3	August 194	4.
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
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY. NEVER TO BE REMOVED FROM THE OF	Frice.
USSR R	ef No: S/NBF/T245
	ssued: 10/ 8/10/1952
c	opy No: 45
SETTING-UP OF TECHNICA "ODESSITE" AND "SECON	L ENTERPRISES UNDER D-HAND BOOKSELLER"
From: NEW YORK	
To: MOSCOV	
No.: 1203 2	3 Aug 19 <u>14</u>
To VICTOR.	
To organise techni- We have been compelled to set u as ODESSITE [ODESSIT] 4] covers the technical process of the mar The basic part [1 group unrecov- by SECON-HAND BOOKSELLER [6] data SECOND-HAND BOOKSELLER is person. Please authorise the u the "A" line. We consider it enterprise by organising a stam and transferring it to another p premises for this purpose have 1 organisation of the two enterprise guipment 2500 dollars comprisin 1500 for SH. B. are required.	b [ShITEMPEL NYJ] workshop part of the city. Suitable been selected. For the ises and for technical ng 1000 for 0.[iii] and Telegraph permission.
No. 673.	[Continued overleaf]
Distribution	
·····	
·	
S/NBF/T245	RIDE
[2 Pages]	PERET (CALCE)

New York 1203 to Moscow, 23 August 1944. Document forgery




326

52. New York 1251 to Moscow, 2 September 1944.






52.



328

53. New York 1271-4 to Moscow, 7 September 1944.



329

New York 1271-4 to Moscow, 7 September 1944. HOMER, again

95	
	TOD CECOLET.
-	
	- 2 - <u>3/NBZ/781</u>
	[17 groups unrecovered]
	NABOB[iv] to admit HEN-HAERIER[LUN'][v] and others who concentrate on internal political difficulties. In negotiations with the LEAGUE[LICA][vi] the British will advance the following arguments:
	[16 groups unrecovered]
	ENCLAND and eliminate her as an economic factor but this
	[39 groups unrecoverable]
	ENCLAND, [70 groups unrecovered]".
[Part II]	
	2. "The question as to whether the north-western and southern somes of GERMANY will be occupied respectively by the Britiah or the American has not yet been decided and will be discussed by CAPTANY[KAPITAN][vii] and BOAR[KABAN][vii] at their meeting which, as far as I know, will take place at QUEREC about 5th September. Besides this no decision has been taken on two furdamental questions:
	<ol> <li>Is it desirable to attempt to maintain GERMANY on a moderately high level of economic stability and well-being or should the annies of occupation let her starve and go to pieces?</li> </ol>
	<ol> <li>Is it desirable to help GARMANY to remain a single administrative [2 groups unrecovered] or should the armies of occupation do all they can to split up (GRMANY into separate states?"</li> </ol>
	Citing the STRANG[ix] documents which you know of, H. [6. ][x] emphasizes that the plans of the British, in large measure, are based on the opinion of the British Poreign Offlice. A sub-occurities on post-hostilities planning of the British Chiefs of Staff issued a paper on 19th August, the authors of which [4] group unrecovered] "[B' the consideration from a military point of view of all the facts for and against the division of GERMANY into separate German states and for the division of GERMANY into at least three states corresponding to the boundaries of the three stones of occupation and [0% it is recommended] that the Anglo-American armies of occupation should, as a first priority,
	[52 groups unrecoverable]
	divided GERMANY [25 groups unrecovered]
	[0% un]divided GERMANY would more probably get into
	[43 groups unrecovered]
(n	[25 groups unrecoverable ]
(Part III)	The Americans have created a special commission with the powers of a government department to examine policy relating to GERMANY. Among the questions which it is to discuss are: [Continued overleaf]
	3/NBP/1781
-	TOP SECRET
•	

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
53. (Continued)

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	TOP SECRET
	- 3 - 3/NEF/T81
	"1. Should CERMANY be helped (for instance by the American occupation forces) to maintain or restors order and economic stability?
	2. Should GERMANY be split up into separate states?
	<ol> <li>How should HITLER, HIMILER and the rest, be dealt with, if they abould be caught?</li> </ol>
	4. Should the RUHR be internationalised?"
	NABOS strongly opposes the first point and proposes letting economic ruin and chaos in GERMANY develop without restriction in order to show the Germans that wars are umprofitable. The assistant to the hoad [KhOZMAIN] of the ARENAL[xi], MCLOY[xi]], points out that such a situation would be intolerable for the army of occupation, that the responsibility for some MARCHAL and the army of occupation, that the responsibility for some intolerable for the suce of yellow-aced dollars by American troops instead of military marks as had been previously acred with the British and the Mussians. The purpose of this is to turn the Amarican occupation forces into the economic masters of GERMANY. MCOLON, LAWYER[LONEN][xii], high officials in MAROF's establishment as well as the British, are opposed to this. The British and MCOLOT are trying to get CAPTAIN to revoke this decision. MCOLON [& groups unrecoverable] division of GERMANY averning that this attempt is docend to failure. His views have some significance since he has direct access
	J. Under the influence of BOAR and LEEPER[LIPER][xiv], the British intend to set up and keep in power in GENECE a government well-disposed towards ENGLAND and willing to help her and hostile to communism and Russian influence. Their tactics consist in supporting the King as much as possible but also in learning on the so-called liberal elements which might take the King's place if the opposition to him were to become to strong. For military reasons the British were forced to support EAM and ELAS to a certain extent.
[Part IV]	In order to achieve their political ends the British intend to land a British division from Tkaly in GREECE to keep PARANDEEOU in power. As you know, this plan will be realized very soon. The LEACHE regards the British intrigues in GREEDEN with some summicion and HOVER hopes that we will take advantage of these of irrumstances to disrupt the plans of the British and all the more so since the IZBA[xv] still supports EAM and KLAS.
	4. After Comrade STALEN had refused to allow American aircraft to land on our territory
	[9 groups unrecovered]
	personal message suggested to CAPTAIN that [B" he should agree to] [30 groups unrecovered]
	No. 705 MaY[Maj][xvi] 6 September
	3/NBE/T84
-	TOP SECRET-
	VENONA

331



53. (Continued)

54. New York 1313 to Moscow, 13 September 1944.

Tric / From: NEW YORK To: MOSCOW No.: 1313 To VICTOR[1].	
From: NEW YORK To: MOSCOW No.: 1313 13 Sept 1944	
To: MOSCOW No.: 1313 13 Sept 1944	
No.: 1313 13 Sept 19 <u>44</u>	
13 Sept 19 <u>44</u>	
Your number 4247[a]. SERGEJ[i1] has three times attempted to effect liaison with PANCARE [BLIN][i1] in CARTHAGE [KARPAGEN][iV] in the line of cover[v] [G& but] each time PANCARK declined [G& on the grounds of] being busy with trips. IDE [YaZ'] has carefully attempted to sound him, but P. [B.][v1] did not react. P. occupies a very prominent position in the journalistic wordl and has vast connections. To determine precisely his relations to us we will commission ECHO [EKhO][v11] to make a check. No.733.	
Your number 4246[a]. NICK [NIK][viii] has been[b] summoned to TYRE [TIR][ix] and a meeting has been arranged	
[69 groups unrecoverable]	
character [KhARAKTERISTIKA] given to BOB[x] by IKS[x1]. However, BASS [BAS][x11] said that he did not intend to embark on a [0% risky][0] bustness as there was no need. In time he and BOB will get big commissions for the deal in CHILE. BASS said that BOB was behaving rather [0% despicably] with the companies who were intending[d] personal representation in Chile [0% and] if it had not been for BASS's insistence they would have broken off business relations with BOB. BASS says that BOB is not keen to get an appointment in Chile, preferring to remain in the COUNTRY [STRANA][x111]. In our work with BOB allowance should be made for the difficulties which are encountered in carrying through affairs begun by others and withoyt having received in good time exhaustive characters [KhARAKTERISTIKI] of probationers.	
No.734 MAY [MAJ][xiv]	
T.N.: [a] Not available. [b] Or "is being". [c] Or [O% compromising]. [d] A group with some such meaning as "to set up" appears to have been omitted at this point.	
Comments: [1] VICTOR: possibly Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.	
[11] SERGEJ: Vladimir Sergeevich PRAVDIN.	
<ul> <li>BLIN: Isidor Feinstein STONE. See S/NBF/T23,</li> <li>Item 4, in which on 23 October 1944 MAJ reported on a meeting between SERGEJ and BLIN in WASHINGTON.</li> </ul>	
[1v] KARFAGEN: WAEHINGTON, D.C.	
<pre>[v] i.e. in SERGEJ's capacity as TASS representative (cf S/AEF/T23). (OVER)</pre>	

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New York 1313 to Moscow, 13 September 1944. I. F. Stone

· ·	
[vi] B.: i.e. BLIN.	
[vii] EKhO: .possibly Bernard SCHUSTER (Communist Party name CHESTER).	
<pre>[viii] NIK: Amadeo SABATINI. Compare S/NBF/T166, in which on 6 Sept 1944 MAJ said: "In DOUGLAS's opinion he should not continue to work in the West" (apparently referring to NIK). SABATINI is known to have acted as "go-between" on behalf of Grigorij KhEIPETS, Soviet Vice-Consul in SAN FRANCISCO.</pre>	
[1x] TIR: NEW YORK, N.Y.	
[x] BOB: Robert Owen MENAKER.	
[x1] IKS: Joseph KATZ.	
[xi1] BAS: Michael BURD (originally WEISBURD).	
[x111] STRANA: The United States of America.	
[xiv] MAJ: Pavel Ivanovich FEDOSIMOV.	

55. New York 1314 to Moscow, 14 September 1944.

TOI .	And the second s		VENONA
· · · · ·			
	•		
	Reissu	1 <u>e</u> (T53)	
From: 1	VEW YORK		
	10SCOW		
No: 1	1314		·
			14 September 19 <u>44</u>
TO VIKTO	DR[i].		· · · ·
deserves by the r	Intil recently GNOM[ii] coming to TYRE [TIR][ received and the rest renumeration for mate est of the members of you. Please agree to	rial no less va	luable than that given
No. 736 14 Se	ptember		MAJ [v]
	·		
-			
	······································	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	····· ··· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
[] [ii: [iv]	i] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. 1 i] GNOM: i.e. GNOME, i] TIR: NEW YORK CITY	William PERL, o Y. DSENBERG	riginally MUTTERPERL.
		•	28 April 1975
TOP.	Bran San A Slow A		VENONA
		· · · · · ·	

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New York 1314 to Moscow, 14 September 1944. William Perl, again

56. New York 1325-6 to Moscow, 15 September 1944.

TOP SECRET DAUNT DRUG
DRUG
<u>Re-13sue</u> (T21)
From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No. 1325,1326
15 September 1944
To VIKTOR[1].
According to <del>KOCH's [KOKh]</del> [i1] advice, a list of "reds" has been compiled by the Security Division of IZBA[i11]. The list contains 4 surnames of persons who are supplying information to the Russians. One of them sounds like JIMENEZ.
The list is divided into two categories; 1. Open FELLOWCOUNTRYMEN [ZEMTYAKI][iv] (among them "IZRA"[v]) and 2. Sympathizers, left-wing liberals etc. (among them "HARB" "ZAYATST[v1]). KOCK is trying to get the list.tst
PILOT[vi1] [2 groups unrecovered] plan dated 22 August for the transfer of the COUNTRY's[vi11] air force from Europe
[11 groups unrecovered]
groups of B-24s: 10 will be sent to China-Burma-India,
[18 groups unrecovered]
groups of B-29s, [6 groups unrecovered] 33 groups of B-17s: 11 [5 groups unrecovered] 4 to the northerm sector of the Pacific with a reserve of 100 percent, 6 to the southwestern part with a reserve of 100 percent
[39 groups unrecoverable]
A-26, 1 to the southwestern sector of the Pacific, 3 are remaining in Europe.
4. 3 groups of B-25s: 1 to the northern sector of the Pacific, 2 to the central.
5. 3 groups of F-[1 group unrecovered]: 2 to the COUNTRY [1 group unrecovered], 1 to the central sector of the Pacific.
6. 1 group [8 groups unrecovered]
7. 23 groups of P-47s: the crew of 6 groups to the COUNTRY as strategic reserves, the material part is remaining in Europe as a reserve, 7 to the central sector of the Pacific, 10 are remaining in Europe.
8. 17 groups of P-51s: 4 to the COUNTRY, 2 to China India Burma with a reserve of 100 percent, 11 to the central sector of the Pacific.
9. 6 groups of P-38s: 1 to the COUNTRY, 2 to China India Burma with a reserve of 50 percent, 3 to the central Pacific.
TOP SECRET DAUNT DRUG

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New York 1325-6 to Moscow, 15 September 1944. OSS "Reds" list

TOP SECRET DAUNT DRUG
10. 17 groups of military transports C-47s: 3 to the COUNTRY, 1 to China India Burma with a reserve of 25 percent, 10 ½ to the central Pacific, 25 in Europe.
11. [5 groups unrecovered] 3 to the central Pacific, 4 in Europe.
[42 groups unrecovered]
except the A-26 and
[32 groups unrecoverable]
and 390; medium bombers 322, 323 and 386 - Yu; fighters 36, 353,356,358,362,365,366,373,404 and 406; night fighters 416,417, 427 and 415; transports 3123, 314, 53 and 78.
No.741 MAY [MAJ][ix]
T.N. [a] The list is transmitted in New York's No.1354 of 22 September 1944.
Comments: [1] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN
[11] KOKh: Duncan C. LEE
[111] IZBA: C.O.I O.S.S.
[iv] ZEMLYaKI: Members of the Communist Party.
[v] IZRA: Donald WHEELER
[vi] ZAYATS: Maurice HALPERIN
[vii] PILOT: William Ludwig ULLMANN
[viii] COUNTRY: U.S.A.
[ix] MAJ: Stepan APRESYAN
TOP SECRET DAUNT DRUG

338


57. Moscow 954 to New York, 20 September 1944.

NGB TOTOL	TET TRIME VENONA
	T103 8
From: 103CON	
To: NE. YORK	
No.: 954	Ord Country of a state
	2% September 19 <u>44</u>
Reference no. 7h1[a].	
	p get the list of "reas." Order "'HRMA"(ii) with "I-AA"[iii] und "A'ATE"[iv]. In future only with our permission. Give "KOKh" the the Security Division of the "L'BA"(v).
No. 14350	[Signature unrecoverable]
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	•
Welm with	
and wind with	
field wind with from the manager	·
	·
	· .
······································	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Note:	
<ul> <li>[a] No. 741 is the inter</li> <li>no. 1325 of 15 Septe</li> <li>Comments:</li> </ul>	mal seriul number of NEW YORK to MOSCOW message mber 1944.
[1] KOKh: 1.0. KOCH Du	nean C. LSS.
<ul> <li>(ii) HRNA: i.e. YRNA,</li> <li>(iii) L.RA: Donald STADLE</li> <li>(iii) L.RA: Donald STADLE</li> </ul>	Elizabeth BENTLZY. R.
(1v) Alfors: i.e. "HARE" (v) L.BA: Office of Str	Elizadeth BENTLEY. R. or "STOMAWAY," Haurice MALFERIN. ategic Services.
· · · · · · ·	1 November 1968
. T <del>or storr</del>	<del>t triff</del> yenoná

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Moscow 954 to New York, 20 September 1944. "Reds" list






341

New York 1340 to Moscow, 21 September 1944. Ruth Greenglass

58.



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
× 82	BRIDE
· .	TOP-SECRET"
ĩ	USSR Ref Ma: S/H3F/T96 Issued:
	Copy No: 201
	REISSUE
	ACCOUNT OF A DISCUSSION WITH "ALBERT" CONCERNING "ROBERT's" GROUP.
	From: NEW YORK To: MOSCOW
	Nos.: 1383 - 1389 1 Oct 19 <u>44</u>
	_[_wo-part message comylete]
[Part I]	To VIKTOR[1].
	Your telegram no. 4012[45]. HIGHT AL'BERT[116] has told me that his original proposal about new cover [FRIRMYTE] holds good and that in the near future he will send us a [OS special] nate [Os on this subject]. In order to invest wisely the sum allotted by you ALEERT has to think out a number of details which will take him some time yet.
	Your no. 4270[2].
· ·	$[\mathbb{B}^{\times}, 1_{-}]$ On the question of the negativity of splitting ROBERT's[iv] group into smaller units ALBERT gave the following answer:
	KQL'TSOV's[v] meeting with [C. RICHARD [RICHARD]][vi] and KOL'TSOV's attempt to obtain answers to a number of guestions of an international
	[Continued overleaf]
	<u>Distribution</u>
. 4	
·	S/NER/T96 [3 Pages] TOP-SECRET BRIDE

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New York 1388-9 to Moscow, 1 October 1944. White and Silvermaster

- 2 -\$/232/295 character produced an unfavourable impression on ROBERT. ROBERT was surprised at our ducision to have recourse to the aid of a special man for raising with (CA RICHARD questions on which ROBER [CA himsolf] as leader of the group, in his own words, is working ceaselessly. Why did we ducide to ask [D. RICHARD] 1 [25 groups unrecoverable] in other [C words] this step of ours ROBLAT tool as a mark of insufficient confidence in his business abilities. It is true he later ourcessed regret at having reacted touchly [30L2ZMENO] [6 groups uncovered] in LEBER's opinion shows that ROBLET is jealous about "encroachments [16 groups unrecovered] not to agree to our measures calculated to "by-pass" ROBERT. LIBERT is convinced that an attempt to "remove" members of the group, however circumspectly, will be received [1 group unrecovered] unforumably by ROBERT. I [Di said that] in that case [he][3] could in the meantime have a cint with ROBERT about the possibility of breaking the group into two or three sub-groups for greater secrecy and more effective organisation of the work, leaving however the overall direction in "ROBERT's hands. ALBERT [C. warned mc] that for the time being the question can only be nut in this form and that he will discuss it with ROBERT when consists offers. At the same time he observed that his relations with ROBERT were very good and that the latter would consent to a meeting between ALBERT himsolf or EU'''il and any member of the group. Possibly (in)[a] ROBERT's tendency not to "rollivguish" anyone (j. [d] SOBERT's [ZYUK][viii] education is making itself felt. [Part II] 2. Your points 3, 4, 5, 5 and 7 I have passed on to ALBERT in detail. ALEGRT promised to write specially on your point 1. For the time being he told me the following: ROBERT is not restricting himself to receiving material from the probationers [STATERY], but is giving them tasks in consultation with ALERT. The instruction not to impersonalise [0, the group's] materials will be borne in mind (it is already being carried out). PLOT[L1's bringing ROBERT's wife (he is not married himself) into the processing [ORLACTX.] of materials. She is not only in the know about her husband's work, but actively helps him in the processing. There is no information about the Khurn's[x] enquiry being finished. ROBERT is no less interested in a favourable outcome than we are and is trying to keep [Continued overleaf] s/NBF/796

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345

r	
	From: NEW YORK
	To: MOSCOW
	No: 1389
	1 October 1944
	Extract(a)
	Materials about the conspiracy[LACOVOR] and the COMPETITORS [KONKURLANTY][i] of the ISLAND[OSTROV][ii], as it turns out, have to be obtained through LLRA(iii] and so I am passing the task on to VADIM(iv].
	Notes: [a] This is the last paragraph of a long two-part message on an entirely different subject. The message is addressed to VINTOR[FITIN] and signed by MAJ[AFReSYaM].
	Commerts: [1] KuHKUFKATY: Members of a non-Soviet Intelligence Organization. [11] OSTROV: Great Britain. [11] IGRA: Donald Miven WHEALER. [11] IGRA: Donald Miven WHEALER. [11] VADIM: Anatolij Borisovich GROMOV, MDB resident in WASHINGTON.
	,
F	OP CHERRIE VENCHE
- 40	
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· ·	
	346


60.	New York 1410 to Moscow, 6 October 1944.

-

95 VEN	ONA		
<del>10P-51</del>	GRET		
	<u></u>		
USSR	Ref. No. : 3/NE	F/T93 (of 4/7/51)	
	Copy No. : 391	23.7.75	
	EISSUE		
<ol> <li>LUKA, PAYMENT TO ATANAN</li> <li>PROBLEM OF UNFULFILLED A</li> </ol>		RULEVOJ	
From: NEW YORK			
To: NOSCOW			
No.: 141ø	6 October 1944		
To VIKTOR[i]	N[222]	15	
In LUKA's[ii] time ATAMA for the publication of a book demanding the remaining 500.	in Polish. 500 has been pai Do you sanction payment?	d. ATAMAN is	
No. 8¢1	• • • • •		
Recently EKhO[iv] has fa the unwillingness of the FELL EKhO has been described to yo in the FELLOWCUNTRYHEN'S org quite a different pidure came question of our selecting ano	w as a worker occupying a re anisation. In an interview to light. EKhO is raising	sponsible position v with [C% IKS][vi] with IKS the	
, i, i, i,	Cont'd c	verleaf	
	•		
, i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i	VENONA		
	OP-SECRET-		
	й <b>ж</b>		
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
New York 1410 to Moscow, 6 October 1944. CPUSA work for KGB

60.



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61. New York 1433-5 to Moscow, 10 October 1944.



New York 1433-5 to Moscow, 10 October 1944. I. F. Stone, again

61.

,

·		- 2 -	S/135/7414	
	At the moment SE Office [REDAKTsI [D% Even] if	RGEJ is trying to Ya][vii] transfer	get the Editorial red to CARTHAGE.	
	[35]	groups unrecovers	ble	
	the KLATA[viii] apartment and so COUNTRYMEN "we	for the acquisition. Without the are completely po	on of a conspirative e help of the FELLOW Werless".	
	MAY's [MAT]	lix opinion.		
	1. In this not his whole concept no real advance s months. Fis vie [RULEVO][X] we s It is not true th CARTRIDE and it i we are "powerless we shall have to FELLOW CONTRYMEN and only base cap fact that in the this source may d	te SERGEJ has put ion of the reason ind [his][a] appri- to that without C. re doomed to vegnate te verything of s doubly untrue ". I consider ". I consider have recourse to how recourse to how they cught event of KULLAY's ry up.	in a nutshell[5] is why ho has made bach to the next few MITHIOE and HELMSMIN tate is mistaken. value is in that without HELMSMAN that in either case the halp of the not to be the onc ke into account the Xi] being elected	
	2. SERGEJ wil [KONTORA] itself cases when a grea appraisement pile	l not want to be any more than now t deal of materia s up.	in the Office , excepting in l requiring urgent	
	should not carry	the whole Editori	e work of the e time for developing up new ones. He al Office on his CARTHAGE more, which	
[Part III]	4. The signing inadvisable but un to use him without		obviously not only ver, it is desirable	
			oprational questions 2] and to brief rs [STACHERY] on with probationers	
	[27 gr [C% cover] the bes that we will not h education of SERGE	oups unrecoverable t for our [C% symptotic symptot symptotic symptot s	Le][d] stem]. I hopc the "theoretical" years.	
		ur opinion and po		
	No. 815 10th October	MAY		
s/nbf/t414	المراجع المراجع المراجع	[T.N. and Comm	ents overloaf]	

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BRIDE TOP SECRET
- 3 - s/n3r/TL14
C.N.: [2] Inserted by the translator.
[b] "In a nutshell" is given in English in the original.
[c] I.e. questions for which a knowledge of the possible sources (both institutions and persons) would be helpful.
[2] The last digit of the last of those groups is tho same as the last digit of the group for "his".
Comments: [i] SERGEJ: Vladimir Sergaevich PRAVDIN, TASS News Agency correspondent.
[11] YaZ': Simon Samuel KRAFSUR.
[iii] STRANA: the U.S.A.
[iv] Isidor Feinstein STONE.
[v] KLRFAGEN: 74SHINGTON.
<pre>[vi] 22MLYaXI: members of the Communist Party, in this case of the U.S.A.</pre>
[vii] REDARTSIYa: TASS News Agency.
[viii] KhiTi: the F.B.I.
[ix] MAJ: Pavel Ivanovich FEDOSIMOV.
[x] RULEVOJ: Earl BROWDER.
[xi] KULAK: Thomas E. DEWEY.
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· .
s/NBF/T414 TOP-SECRET
BRIDE

62. New York 1437 to Moscow, 10 October 1944.


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* TORGESSIT	VENONA
From: New YORK	
To: :: ::0500%	DAIS
No.: 1437	
	lø October 17 <u>44</u>
To the 8th Department.	
tions [governing] the movements and acti	supplies to the partisons and the evac- insthat the probable cause of the intro- issting to conceal from the mission: the
No. 817	[signature unrecoverable]
Jee below with	•
	•
	•
Notes: (a) Inserted by translator. Comments: (1) ZAYATS: i.e. "ZARE" or "STOWA i1) BANK: U.S. State Department.	
Notes: (a) Inserted by translator. Comments:	WAY," 'aurice HALPERIN.
Notes: (a) Inserted by translator. Comments: (1) ZAYATS: i.e. "ZARE" or "STOWA i1) BANK: U.S. State Department.	
Notes: (a) Inserted by translator. Comments: (1) ZAYATS: i.e. "ZARE" or "STOWA i1) BANK: U.S. State Department.	WAY," 'aurice HALPERIN.
Notes: (a) Inserted by translator. Comments: (1) ZAYATS: i.e. "ZARE" or "STOWA i1) BANK: U.S. State Department.	WAY," 'aurice HALPERIN.
Notes: (a) Inserted by translator. Comments: (1) ZAYATS: i.e. "ZARE" or "STOWA i1) BANK: U.S. State Department.	WAY," 'aurice HALPERIN.
Notes: (a) Inserted by translator. Comments: (1) ZAYATS: i.e. "ZARE" or "STOWA i1) BANK: U.S. State Department.	WAY," 'aurice HALPERIN.

353

New York 1437 to Moscow, 10 October 1944. Maurice Halperin

62.

63. New York 1442 to Moscow, 11 O	<b>Ctober 1944.</b>
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355

New York 1442 to Moscow, 11 October 1944. Disputes at KGB residency

		SECRET CIDER
	<u> </u>	- 2 - \$/NBF/11:75
	frequently showing himse finding time to chat wit same establishment with for several days at a ti	, MAY is utterly without the knack of dealing with them, if excessively abrupt and inclined to mag and too rarely A them. Sometimes our operational workers who work in the him cannot get an answer to an urgent question from him mee. Our permanent staff [KADRVVD SOSTAV], noting MAY's sess from the details of everyday work, do not consider der [RUKOWODITEL'], which has an effect on working
Pa	rt II] Although since the	receipt of your instructions I have formally known about work of the OFFICE [2 groups unrecovered]
	ast'	[55 groups unrecoverable]
	feilure to understand the of his capability, but mu his capabilities in this the position. The appoint worker without experient by the absence of a qua	must deside whether to send here some other experienced
	leader. MAY will need worker (KADROVIK). Wri	to work under the supervision of much a permanent solar then instructions from you to KMY cannot make up for lack edge. A worker who has no experience of work abroad cannot e work of directing the THE OFFICE.
:	No. 820 11 th Ostober	SZREJ[VII]
	Comments: [i] VIKTOR:	Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.
	[i1] OFFICE:	MGB Office in the Consulate-General in NEW YORK.
:	: YAL [111]	Stegan Zakharovich APRESYAN, Soviet Vice Consul in NET YORK
		Unidentified cover-name.
	[v] VADIM :	Anatolij Borisovich GROMOV, 1st Secretary at the Soviet Embassy, WASHINGTON.
	[vi] TYRE :	NEW YORK.
	[vii] SERGED:	Visdimir Sergeivich FRAVDIN, Editor of the TASS News Agency in NEW YORK.
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
		•
	S/NBE/11 75	TOP SECREL

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64. New York 1469 to Moscow, 17 October 1944.

VERONA
<u>Reissue</u> (T1308)
From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No: 1469
17 October 19 <u>44</u>
TO VIKTOR[i].
Today we received from ROBERT[ii] 56 undeveloped films including the following materials:
<ol> <li>Reviews by the Ministry of Economic Warfare on the Far East according to information of the economic COMPETITION[KON- KURENTSIYa][iii].</li> </ol>
<ol> <li>A review by the Ministry of Economic Warfare on the eco- nomic situation of GERMANY.</li> </ol>
3. A memorandum for KAPITAN(iv) on DECREE[DEKRET][v] to the French.
4. A review by the Ministry of Economic Warfare about
[22 groups unrecoverable]
negotiations of the COUNTRY[STRANA][vi] and the ISLAND[OSTROV][vii] about DECREE. Economic
Revent. 7. A copers of the Embassy of the COUNTRY in SIDON[viii] about [1 group unrecovered] GREECE.
8. Measures taken [6 groups unrecovered] in Sweden.
9. Negotiations on DECREE with FRANCE.
10. [8 groups unrecovered] about the situation in ITALY.
A rectoring to the Embassy of the COUNTRY in MADRID about German assets in Spain.
12. The economic scale of defense.
13. A memorandum [3 groups unrecovered] for KAPITAN on the guestion of DECREE for [1 group unrecovered].
14. A telegram to the BANK[ix] from the Embassy of the COUNTRY on [2 groups unrecovered].
15. A memorandum of the executive committee on
(19 groups unrecovered)
,
TOP SECRET VENONA

New York 1469 to Moscow, 17 October 1944. Document photography

	• •
	VENONA
	2.
<pre>16. [5 groups unrecovered] internat.</pre>	ional cartels.
17. Instructions on the dissolution Parties of GERMANY and affiliated organ	of the National Casialist
18. The situation on economic control	
[10 groups unreco	
20. A general review [4 groups unred COUNTRY.	covered] crises of the
The materials are recent.	·
[15 groups unreco	overed]
at once the undeveloped films.	
No. 835	MAJ [x]
Comments: [] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FIT: [ii] ROBERT: Nathan Gregory SII [iii] COMPETITION: Non-Soviet In [iv] KAPITAN: i.e. CAPTAIN, FTR [v] DECREE: Lend Lease. [vi] COUNTRY: The United States [vii] ISLAND: Great Britain. [viii] SIDON: LONDON. [ix] BANK: State Department. [x] MAJ: i.e. MAY, Stepa APRI in NEW YORK.	s.
• .	
	7 December 1971

65.	New	York	1506	to	Moscow,	23	October	1944.
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TOD SECRET. TRINE .
TOP SECRET TRINE YENONA
Heissue (T23.4)
From: New York
To: Moscow
No.: 1586 23 October 1944
To VINTOR(1).
SERCEJ[ii] in CARTHAGE[iii] has made the accusintence of DANGAGINETULG.
Earlier SERGEJ had several times tried to EA contact him personally and also through Db2[Xa $C^{\dagger}$ ](v) but the impression had been created that PANCAKE was avoiding a meeting. At the first conversation SERGEJ told him that he had very much desired to make his acquaintance since he greatly valued his work as a correspondent and had likewise heard flattering
[23 groups unrecoverable]
PANCAGE to give us information. F.[vi] said that he had noticed our attempts to [B% contact] him, particularly the attempts of DE and of people of the TRUST [TREST][vii], but he had reacted negatively fearing the consequences. At the same time he implied that the attempts at rapprochement had been made with insufficient caution and by people who were insufficiently responsible. To SKREP's reply that naturally we did not want to subject him to unpleasant complications, PANCARE gave him to understand that he was not refusing his aid but (B% one should] consider that he had three children and did not want to attract the attention of the KARTA[viii]. To SERGP's question how he considered it advisable to maintain liaison P. replied that he would be glad to meet but he rarely visited [B% TYRE[ix]] where he usually spent
[54 groups unrecoverable].
His fear is primarily explained by his unwillingness to spoil his career. Naterially he is well secured(.] He earns as much as 1586 dollars a month but, it seems, he would not be averse to having a supplementary income. For the estab- lishment of Duciness contact with him we are insisting on [1 group unrecovered] reciprocity. For the work is needed a qualified [2 groups unrecovered] CANTHAGE. Telegraph your opinion.
No. 843 23 October
Comments: [i] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.
(ii) ScRCEJ: Vladimir PRAVDIN, TASS representative.
[111] CARTHAGE: Washington, D.C.
(iv) PANCÁKE: Isidore F. STONE.
<pre>[v] LDE: Samuel KRAFSUR.</pre>
(vi) P.: i.e. PARCAKE.
[vii] THUST: The Soviet Embassy in Washington.
TOP SECRET TRINE YEN ONA
TOT DECRET TRIVE VENUN

359

New York 1506 to Moscow, 23 October 1944. I. F. Stone might help

T <del>OP SECRET TRINE</del> VENONA
- 2 -
Comments: [viii] XhATA: U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(Cont.) (ix) TYRE: New York City.
<pre>{x} MAJ: Stepan APRESYAN.</pre>
· ·
23 January 1968
· · ·
· · · ·
TOP SEGRET TRINE VENONA

360


. ***_	BRIDE
-10	DP SECRET
USSR	Ref. No: 3/NBF/1960
	Issued: <b>(1</b> )/0/1/1958 Copy No: えごち
	NOTIFICATION OF AN AWARD (1944)
From: MOSCOW	
To: SAN FRANCIS	00 7 Nov. <u>44</u>
The Governmen us all and of the wish you the best	t has awarded you the Order of the Red Star. On behalf of Presidium I warmly congratulate you on this high award and of success in your work for the good of our country.
No. 5215	VIRTOR [1]
Comments: [1] VI	ETOR: Lt. Gon. P.M. FIT IN.
	the second se
Distribution	
<u>Distribution</u>	
<u>Distribution</u>	
<u>Distribution</u>	
<u>Distribution</u>	
Distribution	

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Moscow 374 to San Francisco, 7 November 1944. Order of the Red Star

	95 TOP SEC	CRET	
	USSR	Ref. No:	
		Issued: <b>(1)</b> 25/4/1961 Copy No: 2014	$D^{\pm} = b^{\pm}$
		ACT WITH THEODORE HALL (1944)	
	From: NEW YORK		
	To: MOSCON		
	No: 1585	12 Nov. 44	
	To VIETOR. [1]		
	exceptionally keen mind and a broad present time H. is in charge of a g to BEK a report about the CAMP and a	named the key personnel employ	ed on ENORMOUS. VI
	He decided to do this on the advice a GYMMAST living in TIRE [viii] Sa and works for RUSSIAN WAR RELIEF. : compotent person, H. on the followin FLANT[7AVOD].[*] ALENSET 'Al recoin time. Re[b] was compelled to make a he gave BEK consent to feel cut H., to arrange liaison with him. H. le: with BEK about a place for meeting He consider it expedient to maintain S. and not to bring in anybody else the details by post.	of his colleague Saville SAX X's mother is a FELLOHOUNTRUM Ath the aim of hastening a me ng day sent a ocy of the repo ved S. H. had to leave for GA a decision quickly. Jointly w to assure him that everything If his photograph and eame to him. BEK met S. [4 group garb a liaison with H. [1 group with	<pre>fAVLD SAKS][U:1] sting with a rt by S. to the MP-2 in two days! ith MAY[MJ].zil] was in order and on understanding led] our automobile. dentified through</pre>
	He decided to do this on the advice a GYMANST living in TTRE, [viii] Sa: and works for RUSSIAN MAR RELIEF. compotent person, H. on the Collowi FLANT[AVDD].[x] ALEXENT (AI receiv time. He[b] was occupelled to make a he gave BER consent to feel cut H., to arrange liadson with him. H. le with PEK about a place for meeting He consider it expedient to maintain S. and not to bring in anybody else	of his colleague Saville SAX X's mother is a FELLOHOUNTRUM Ath the aim of hastening a me ng day sent a ocy of the repo ved S. H. had to leave for GA a decision quickly. Jointly w to assure him that everything If his photograph and eame to him. BEK met S. [4 group garb a liaison with H. [1 group with	<pre>fAVLD SAKS][U:1] sting with a rt by S. to the MP-2 in two days! ith MAY[MJ].zil] was in order and on understanding led] our automobile. dentified through</pre>
	ie declade to do this on the advice a GYMARS living in TIRE [Vil] SA: and works for RUSSIAN WAR RELIEF. competent person, H. on the followin PLANT[[ANOD]. [X] ALEXNET. A] receiv time. He[b] was compelled to make a he gave BER consent to feel cut H., to arrange liaison with him. H. le: with REK about a place for meeting He consider it expedient to maintain S. and not to bring in anybody else the details by post. No. 897	of his colleague Saville SAX X's mother is a FELLOKOUNTRUM At the aim of hastening a me ng day sent a copy of the repo red S. H. had to leave for CAA a decision quickly. Jointly w to assure him that everything If his photograph and eame to him. BEK met S. [1 group mui . MAX has no objection to thi [Signature missing]	<pre>fAVLD SAKS][U:1] sting with a rt by S. to the MP-2 in two days! ith MAY[MJ].zil] was in order and on understanding led] our automobile. dentified through</pre>
	<pre>ne decided to do this on the advice a GYMARS Living in TTRE, [viii] Sa: and works for RUSSIAN WAR RELIEF composent person, H. on the followin FLANT[/AVOD].[x] ALEXELT ad recein time. He[b] was compelled to make i he gave BEK consent to feel cut H., to arrange liadson with him. H. le with BEK about a place for meeting 100 consider it expedient to maintai S. and not to bring in anybody else the details by post. No. 897 11th November</pre>	of his colleague Saville SAX X's mother is a FELLOKOUNTRUM At the aim of hastening a me ng day sent a copy of the repo red S. H. had to leave for CAA a decision quickly. Jointly w to assure him that everything If his photograph and eame to him. BEK met S. [1 group mui . MAX has no objection to thi [Signature missing]	<pre>invtl SAKS][['x1] avt [lix] eting with a rt by S. to the MP-2 in two days! ith MAY[MJ].x1] was in order and on understanding led] cur automobile. dentified] through s. %o shall send</pre>
	<pre>ne decided to do this on the advice a GYMARS Living in TTRE, [viii] Sa: and works for RUSSIAN WAR RELIEF composent person, H. on the followin FLANT[/AVOD].[x] ALEXELT ad recein time. He[b] was compelled to make i he gave BEK consent to feel cut H., to arrange liadson with him. H. le with BEK about a place for meeting 100 consider it expedient to maintai S. and not to bring in anybody else the details by post. No. 897 11th November</pre>	of his colleague Saville SAX X's mother is a FELLOKOUNTRUM At the aim of hastening a me ng day sent a copy of the repo red S. H. had to leave for CAA a decision quickly. Jointly w to assure him that everything If his photograph and eame to him. BEK met S. [1 group mui . MAX has no objection to thi [Signature missing]	<pre>invtl SAKS][['x1] avt [lix] eting with a rt by S. to the MP-2 in two days! ith MAY[MJ].x1] was in order and on understanding led] cur automobile. dentified] through s. %o shall send</pre>
	He decided to do this on the advice a GYMARS living in TTRE, [viii] SA: and works for RUSSIAN WAR RELIEF composent person, H. on the followin FLANT[/AVOD].[x] ALEXELT d] receiv time. He[b] was compelled to make in he gave BEK consent to feel cut H., to arrange liadson with him. H. le with BEK about a place for meeting 100 consider it expedient to maintain S. and not to bring in anybody else the details by post. No. 897 11th November	of his colleague Saville SAX X's mother is a FELLOKOUNTRUM At the aim of hastening a me ng day sent a copy of the repo red S. H. had to leave for CAA a decision quickly. Jointly w to assure him that everything If his photograph and eame to him. BEK met S. [1 group mui . MAX has no objection to thi [Signature missing]	<pre>invtl SAKS][['x1] avt [lix] eting with a rt by S. to the MP-2 in two days! ith MAY[MJ].x1] was in order and on understanding led] cur automobile. dentified] through s. %o shall send</pre>
	He decided to do this on the advice a GYMARS living in TTRE, [viii] SA: and works for RUSSIAN WAR RELIEF composent person, H. on the followin FLANT[/AVOD].[x] ALEXELT d] receiv time. He[b] was compelled to make in he gave BEK consent to feel cut H., to arrange liadson with him. H. le with BEK about a place for meeting 100 consider it expedient to maintain S. and not to bring in anybody else the details by post. No. 897 11th November	of his colleague Saville SAX X's mother is a FELLOKOUNTRUM At the aim of hastening a me ng day sent a copy of the repo red S. H. had to leave for CAA a decision quickly. Jointly w to assure him that everything If his photograph and eame to him. BEK met S. [1 group mui . MAX has no objection to thi [Signature missing]	<pre>invtl SAKS][['x1] avt [lix] eting with a rt by S. to the MP-2 in two days! ith MAY[MJ].x1] was in order and on understanding led] cur automobile. dentified] through s. %o shall send</pre>
·	He decided to do this on the advice a GYMARS living in TTRE, [viii] SA: and works for RUSSIAN WAR RELIEF composent person, H. on the followin FLANT[/AVOD].[x] ALEXELT d] receiv time. He[b] was compelled to make in he gave BEK consent to feel cut H., to arrange liadson with him. H. le with BEK about a place for meeting 100 consider it expedient to maintain S. and not to bring in anybody else the details by post. No. 897 11th November	of his colleague Saville SAX X's mother is a FELLOKOUNTRUM At the aim of hastening a me ng day sent a copy of the repo red S. H. had to leave for CAA a decision quickly. Jointly w to assure him that everything If his photograph and eame to him. BEK met S. [1 group mui . MAX has no objection to thi [Signature missing]	<pre>invtl SAKS][['x1] avt [lix] eting with a rt by S. to the MP-2 in two days! ith MAY[MJ].x1] was in order and on understanding led] cur automobile. dentified] through s. %o shall send</pre>
	He decided to do this on the advice a GYMARS living in TTRE, [viii] SA: and works for RUSSIAN WAR RELIEF composent person, H. on the followin FLANT[/AVOD].[x] ALEXELT d] receiv time. He[b] was compelled to make in he gave BEK consent to feel cut H., to arrange liadson with him. H. le with BEK about a place for meeting 100 consider it expedient to maintain S. and not to bring in anybody else the details by post. No. 897 11th November	of his colleague Saville SAX X's mother is a FELLOKOUNTRUM At the aim of hastening a me ng day sent a copy of the repo red S. H. had to leave for CAA a decision quickly. Jointly w to assure him that everything If his photograph and eame to him. BEK met S. [1 group mui . MAX has no objection to thi [Signature missing]	<pre>invtl SAKS][['x1] avt [lix] eting with a rt by S. to the MP-2 in two days! ith MAY[MJ].x1] was in order and on understanding led] cur automobile. dentified] through s. %o shall send</pre>
	He decided to do this on the advice a GYMARS living in TTRE, [viii] SA: and works for RUSSIAN WAR RELIEF composent person, H. on the followin FLANT[/AVOD].[x] ALEXELT d] receiv time. He[b] was compelled to make in he gave BEK consent to feel cut H., to arrange liadson with him. H. le with BEK about a place for meeting 100 consider it expedient to maintain S. and not to bring in anybody else the details by post. No. 897 11th November	of his colleague Saville SAX X's mother is a FELLOKOUNTRUM At the aim of hastening a me ng day sent a copy of the repo red S. H. had to leave for CAA a decision quickly. Jointly w to assure him that everything If his photograph and eame to him. BEK met S. [1 group mui . MAX has no objection to thi [Signature missing]	<pre>invtl SAKS][['x1] avt [lix] eting with a rt by S. to the MP-2 in two days! ith MAY[MJ].x1] was in order and on understanding led] cur automobile. dentified] through s. %o shall send</pre>
	He decided to do this on the advice a GYMARS living in TTRE, [viii] SA: and works for RUSSIAN WAR RELIEF composent person, H. on the followin FLANT[/AVOD].[x] ALEXELT d] receiv time. He[b] was compelled to make in he gave BEK consent to feel cut H., to arrange liadson with him. H. le with BEK about a place for meeting 100 consider it expedient to maintain S. and not to bring in anybody else the details by post. No. 897 11th November	of his colleague Saville SAX X's mother is a FELLOKOUNTRUM At the aim of hastening a me ng day sent a copy of the repo red S. H. had to leave for CAA a decision quickly. Jointly w to assure him that everything If his photograph and eame to him. BEK met S. [1 group mui . MAX has no objection to thi [Signature missing]	<pre>invtl SAKS][['x1] avt [lix] eting with a rt by S. to the MP-2 in two days! ith MAY[MJ].x1] was in order and on understanding led] cur automobile. dentified] through s. %o shall send</pre>
	He decided to do this on the advice a GYMARS living in TTRE, [viii] SA: and works for RUSSIAN WAR RELIEF composent person, H. on the followin FLANT[/AVOD].[x] ALEXELT d] receiv time. He[b] was compelled to make in he gave BEK consent to feel cut H., to arrange liadson with him. H. le with BEK about a place for meeting 100 consider it expedient to maintain S. and not to bring in anybody else the details by post. No. 897 11th November	of his colleague Saville SAX X's mother is a FELLOKOUNTRUM At the aim of hastening a me ng day sent a copy of the repo red S. H. had to leave for CAA a decision quickly. Jointly w to assure him that everything If his photograph and eame to him. BEK met S. [1 group mui . MAX has no objection to thi [Signature missing]	<pre>invtl SAKS][['x1] avt [lix] eting with a rt by S. to the MP-2 in two days! ith MAY[MJ].x1] was in order and on understanding led] cur automobile. dentified] through s. %o shall send</pre>

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67. New York 1585 to Moscow, 12 November 1944.

	95
	TOP SECRET
	2
	Notes: [a] I.e. Trade Union [PROFSOYuZ].
	[b] I.C. ALEKSEJ.
	Comments: [1] VINTOR : Lt. Gon. P. M. FIFIN.
	[11] EEK : Sorgoj Nikolaevich KUINAKOV.
	[iii] HALL : Theodore Alvin HALL.
	[iv] GMMAST : Possibly a member of the Young Communist Loague. [v] CAMP-2 : LOS ALAMOS.
	[vi] ENORBOUS: Manhattan Engineering District - U.S. Atomic Energy Project.
	(vii] SAX
	[viii] TYRE : NEW YORK CITY.
	[ix] FELLORCOUNTRYMAN: Member of the Communist Party.
	[x] PLANT : Soviet Consulate.
	[xd] ALEKSEJ : Anatolij Antonovich YakOVLEW, Soviet Vice-Consul in
	[xli] MAY : Stepan Zakharovich AFRESYAN, Soviet Vice-Consul'in
	NEW YORK.
	•
	-IOP SECRET
1	

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FOP	Contraction II	VENONA
	••	
	Reissue(	T293)
From: NEW	VORK	
To: MOS	COW	•
No: 160	00 -	
	•	14 November 19 <u>44</u>
TO VIKTOR	N1. (	
pair them given a ci has a larg not have a passing oi LIBERAL, f tracting a OS [vi] (hem ENORMOUS on 22 Nov week's la	off and get them to ph mmera for this purpose. Je darkroom [KAMERA] an a Leica. LIBERAL will h. Direction of the pr this will ease the load are in letter no. 8. A[v] has agreed to coop ceforth "KALIBER" see [Foropwor] lugii] on sum	<pre>i pal of METR's[iv]. We propose to wotograph their own materials having Kh'YuS is a good photographer, d all the equipment but he does receive the films from METR for obationers will be continued through i on him. Details about the con- berate with us in drawing in ShMEL' a your no. 5258[a]) with a view to mons from KALIER she is leaving rea [viii]. XALIER will have a arture LIBERAL will carry out two</pre>
-		ANTON [ix]
No. 901		ALLON [12]
Notes: Ja Comments: Jii Jiii	<pre>Not available. J VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P. LIEBERAL: Julius ROG Kh'YUS: i.e. HUGHES SARANT. METER, i.e. METER, I SARANT.:</pre>	. M. FITIN. SENBERG. 5, probably Joel BARR or Alfred probably either Joel BARR or Alfred SS. . BUMBLEBEE/CALIBRE, David GREENGLASS. ergy Project. Laboratory, New Mexico.
Notes: [a Comments: [ii [iii [iv [v [vi [vii ]vii]	<pre>Not available. J VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P. LIBERAL: JULIUS ROG Kh'YUS: i.e. HUGHES SARANT. METER, i.e. METER, p SARANT.'.'. AMSP OSA: AVALL GREENGLA: ShMEL'/KALIBR: i.e ENORMOZ: Atomic En. Camp 2: LOS ALAMOS</pre>	. M. FITIN. SENBERG. 5, probably Joel BARR or Alfred probably either Joel BARR or Alfred SS. . BUMBLEBEE/CALIBRE, David GREENGLASS. ergy Project. Laboratory, New Mexico.

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New York 1600 to Moscow, 14 November 1944. Greenglass, Sarant

	TOP SECKET	
	USSR Ref. No: 3/NBF/T798 (of 19/7/1956)	
	Issued: 1/9/10/1961	
	Copy No: 204	
	2nd RE-ISSUE	
	ISTABLISHINT IN SAN FRANCISCO OF A SUB-RESIDENCY FOR THE FIFTH LINE (1944)	
	From: HOSOON	
	To: Sin Francisco	
	No: 379[a] 16 Nov. <u>44</u>	
	According to a plan approved by Comrade PETROV <sup>[1]</sup> on 26 October 1944, a special sub-residency [FODREZIDENTURA] for the Fifth Line is being established within the framework of your residency. It will not be subject to the authority	
	[16 groups unrecovered]	
	right to give independent decisions [i group unrecovared] questions relating to the operations of the agent network and to have direct communication with the CENTE. I You [6 groups unrecovered] of the sub-residency in accordance with instructions of the TU[iii], directing the work of the sub-resident and taking the necessary steps for the successful	å1]
	[63 groups unrecoverable] , LOS ANCELES. The following changes among the permanent staff workers [KADAOVIK] of the submost decover here here here here and the permanent staff workers [KADAOVIK]	
	the residency have been approved:	
	1. "SNALL[MALN]"[17], when we are transferring from VANCOUVER, is appointed [05 to] help your deputy with the work in the pert of SAN FRANCISCO.	
	2. "VITALLJ"[V] is being recalled home and "VOVChEK"[Vi] is appointed senior man [STARShLJ] in FORTLAND. "YAROV"[vi], when we are transferring from OTEXAL, is appointed second worker in FORTLAND.	
	Distribution [Continued overleaf]	
•		
	3/\N38/T798	-
	TOP SECRET	

69. Moscow 379 to San Francisco, 16 November 1944.

Moscow 379 to San Francisco, 16 November 1944. Fifth Line reorganized

95
IOP-SECRET_
2 3/NBF/T798
<ol> <li>"YOIKOU" [vili], who especially at the beginning will need a lot of help,</li> </ol>
Penains in Shattle.
4. "PETR" [in:] remains in LOS ANGELES.
The permanent shift workers listed above, will for the time being work under cover of Inspectors of the Purchasing Condission. After the Herchant Fleet [MORTOT] has acceeded in setting up in the U.S.A. a special department for vessels sailing to foreign ports [SUDA ZAGRANIDANCOS PLAVANIA], the permanent staff workers will be transferred to the strength of that department as Personnel Inspectors. In the meantime it is essential to ensure, through the mangement[MIROVDERVO] of the Purchasing Commission, that the permanent shift workers are in a position which will give them just the right kind of influence to establish conditions favourable to [C, their] work in our line.
According to the plan approved by Comrade FETROV the sub-residency is charged with:
<ol> <li>Devalupment of counter-intolligence work among sailors of Soviet vessels to detect and suppress recruiting and anti-Soviet work by foreign intelligence services.</li> </ol>
2. Detection of anti-Soviet and traitorous elements among the orous of vessels sailing to foreign ports.
<ol> <li>Prevention of sabotage in Soviet vessels sailing to foreign ports and safe- guarding cargoes and vessels from sabotage.</li> </ol>
Inform each perminent staff worker of these tasks, explaining them in dotail and outlining practical measures. This activity will dopond on the skilful co-ordination of the work of the ship and shore probationers[SDLART]. The work of the VLMINDERNA office is being reorganized to fit in with the tasks indicated, and for this purpose special instructions are also being issued by Commade PEPHOV. Start carrying out the present instructions dishout waiting for "CINETY!"." First carrying out the present instructions dishout waiting for "CINETY!"." Friedman, See the permentiateff workers personally and give and not a specific briefing. Proceed with the proliminary solociton [2 groups uncoordered] candidates from compast Soviet workers who have been votted and who are connected with our vasuls and pert operations, with a vice to exploying them as contact son "MIARZIK] between the permanent staff workers and the ships' probations rectards. The object, once the appointment of these candidates has been confirmed, is to make greater use of ships'probationers and to succeed in meeting every single one of the ships'
Vo require:
1. that each permanent staff worker should present to you a $[B_{\lambda}]$ wonthly] report concerning the work.
2. that a report should be sent each month, addressed to SEARY[1], concerning the work of the sub-residency and enclosing the reports of the permanent staff workers.
3. that the cover-manes used should be reported immediately - c:plain
[70 groups unrecovered and unrecoverable]
3/NBE/T798 [Notes and Compared and ge 3]
TOD-CECOET
-IOP JECKET

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95		DRUG
•	TOP	SECRET CINAR
<u></u>	÷	3 3/HBF/T798
Note : [a] Se	e MOSCON to	OTTAMA No. 568 of the sense date - 3/NEF/T1275
Commonts: [i]	FETEROV :	Unidentified MOSCON cover-name.
[11]	CIMTRE :	KGB Headquarters in HOSCON.
[111]	TU :	Prosumably this is an abbreviation referring to some directorate [UERAVLINTE], and T possibly stands for Transport[TR.NSFORMOR], Technical[TERANUCH_SIGN] or Territorial[TERRITORI.L'NO2].
[iv]	SMALL :	Unidentified cover-name.
[v]	VITALLJ :	Pavel Kusmich REVIZOROV of the S.G.P.C.
[vi]	VOVChEK :	Probably Aleksandr Pavlovich BOCHEK of the S.G.P.C.
[vii]	YaKOV :	Unidentified covor-name.
(viii)	AOTKOA :	Andrej Romanovich ORLOV of the S.G.P.C.
[ix]	PETR	Aleksandr Petrovich GRiChEV of the 5.G.P.C.
[=]	SERGEJ :	Viktor Vasil'ovich AFM/AS'EV, described as Director of the Fifth Line in MOSCOF-NEW YORK No. 303 of 1st April 1945 (3/MEF/T1097).
· [:=]	sean :	Unidentified MOSCON cover-name.
3/NBF/T798		•
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	• . • .	TOP-SECRET-

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ENGR. I. SUMPLY INTERPORTED AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AN	Ţ	OP SEGRET	acar (
ENGR. I. SUMPLY INTERPORTED AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AN	No. of Contraction of Contraction		
ENGR. I. SUMPLY INTERPORTED AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AN		·	
Logy No.: 30/ <u>REISSUE OF ITEM I OF 3/NBF/T37</u> (of 7/3/1951) DISCUSSION OF FUTURE USE OF KNYA2': AL'PENT, JLEXH, VALIM (1944) From: NEW YORK No.: 1613 No.: 1613 Not Movember 1944 To VIKTOR[1]. In mid-October AL'REFM[1] tried to get in touch with KNYA2'[iii]. The latter's wife stated that KNYA2' had left for the PROVINCES[iv] and would return after Christmae. At one time KNYA2' had left for the SROWINCES[iv] and would return after Christmae. At one time KNYA2' had left for the SROWINCES[iv] and would return after Christmae. At one time KNYA2' had scompelled to resign because of the disensement. As a result of the election, LUN's dismissal and the appointment of LOTSMAN[vi] [1 group unrecovered] he could count on a leading post in the EANK[vi]. [1 Gontinued overleaf]	USSR		Ref. No.: 3/NBF/T1996
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DISCUSSION OF FUTURE USE OF KNY2Z': AL'DENT, JLEXH, VALLM (1944) From: NEW YORK To: NOSCOW No.: 1613 18th November 1944 To VIKTOR[i]. In mid-October AL'HERT[ii] tried to get in touch with KNY2Z'[iii]. The latter's wife stated that KNY2Z' had left for the PROFINESE[iv] and would return after Christmas. At one time KNY2Z' was compelled to resign because of the diamissal of LUM''s[v] former deputy on the grounds of organisational and political disagreement. As a result of the election, LUN's dismissal and the appointment of LOTSMAN[vi] in his place are not ruled out. Inasmuch as KNY2Z' is friendly with LOTSMAN [1 group unrecovered] he could count on a leading post in the EANK[vi]. [Continued overleaf]			
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	in his place are n	ot ruled out. Inasmuch as H	NYaZ' is friendly with LOTSMAN
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70. New York 1613 to Moscow, 18 November 1944.

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New York 1613 to Moscow, 18 November 1944. Laurence Duggan

95 VENOMA
TODEFORE
- 2 - 3/NBF/T1996
About five months ago, having proposed to AL'EERT the suspension of meetings with KNYaZ', you promised to give, subsequently, instructions on how AL'EERT would explain the break to KNYaZ'. AL'EERT considers that a complicated explanation is not necessary as KNYaZ' knew of AL'EERT's chronic illness and himself recommended the latter to go away to the COUNTRYSIDE[vii] or to ARIZONA for a few months [34 groups unrecoverable]
use:
<ol> <li>If LOTSMAN gets an interesting post it goes without saying that KNYaZ' must "get in on it" by using his friendship.</li> </ol>
2. If not, then we can try notwithstanding to use KNYaZ''s proximity to LOTSMAN to fix him up in a suitable establishment, still extracting, via him, interest- ing information which will [C% in any case] come LOTSMAN's way; or to send him to NI[ix] or to some other place in the PROVINCES, using the cover of representative of a firm (according to AL'BERT the PROVINCIAL[ir] experience of KNYaZ' allows him to count on any such appointment), and there to use him as the head of a private office (instead of, or with, ChEKh[x]). If you agree I shall brief AL'BERT in this spirit.
We consider that KNYaZ' should be turned over to VADIM[xi] only after AL'BERT
has ascertained his prospects.
No. 907 MAJ[X1] 18th November
Comments: [i] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.
[ii] AL'EERT: i.e. "ALBERT"; probably Iskhak Abdulovich AKhMEROV.
[iii] KNYaZ': i.e. "PRINCE"; possibly Laurence DUGGAN.
[iv] PROVINCES, Latin AMERICA(N). PROVINCIAL:
<pre>[v] LUN': i.e. "HEN-HARRIER"; Cordell HULL.</pre>
[vi] LOFSMAN: i.e. "CHANNEL-PILOF"; Henry Agard WALLACE.
[vii] BANK: U.S. State Department.
[viii] COUNTRYSIDE: MEXICO.
3/NEF/T1996
TOP-SECRET

95 VENONA
- 3 - 3/NBF/T1996
Comments [Cont'd]: [ix] MI: Probably CHILE.
[x] ChEXh: i.e. "CZECH"; Robert Owen MENAKER.
[xi] VADIM: Anatolij Borisovich GROMOV, First Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in WASHINGTON.
[xii] MaJ: i.e. "MAY"; Stepen Zakharovich APRESYAN.
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71. New York 1634 to Moscow, 20 November 1944.


a	BRIDE
;	LOP-SEGRET
USSR	Ref.No.: S/NBF/T294
	Issued: 122/1/1953 Copy No.: 24
	FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR "RICHARD"
From: NEW YORK	
To: MOSCOW	
No.: 1634	20 Nov. 19 <u>14</u>
To VICTOR[1].	
Accord complained recen	ling to advice from ROBERT[i1] RICHARD's[i11] wife h htly about [D% financial]
	[65 groups unrecoverable]
in particular wi heavy expenses.	th business [BIZNES] since this would relieve them
CARTHAGE [KARFAG	told RICHARD's wife, who knows about her husband's th us, that we would willingly have helped them and all the circumstances would not allow them to leave EN [ <sup>1 Y]</sup> . ROBERT thinks that RICHARD would have r payment but might accept gifts as a mark of our
-	[7 groups unrecovered]
	ses which may come to up to two thousand a year.
ALBERT provide for RICH ROBERT, PILOT[V] assistance.	said to ROBERT that in his opinion we would agree ARD's daughter's education and definitely advised and the rest against attempting to offer RICHARD
<u> </u>	[Continued overleaf]
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New York 1634 to Moscow, 20 November 1944. Aid to Harry D. White

	- 2 - S/NBF/T294
	lo choning Arappale
assistance we the offer of	le sharing ALBERT's opinion about the necessity for draw your attention to the fact that RICHARD has taken assistance favourably. Please do not delay your answer.
No. 912 21st November	MAY [MAJ][vi]
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	VICTOR: possibly LieutGeneral Pavel M. FITIN.
	ROBERT: Nathan Grogory SILVERMASTER.
	RICHARD: possibly Harry Dexter WHITE.
	KARFAGEN: WASHINGTON, D.C.
	PILOT: William Ludwig ULLMAN.
[1]	MAJ: Pavel Ivanovich FEDOSIMOV.
	W.S. No.: XY-70.5
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71. (Continued)

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		STS OF GERMANS A	DISTRUST OF CENER ND AUSTRIANS CONSI ESPECTIVELY (1944)	DERED RELLABLE	.:
	2. MENTION OF "ROL REFERENCES TO "		SATISFACTION" WIT	'H HIS REWARD, AND	
	From: NEW YORK	• /			
	To: MOSCOW		·		
	No: 1635	14	21 Nov. 44	t vi≦a na navy	-A
	To VIKTOR. [1]				
	ROBERT[ii] repo	orts:		face la tran	
	<ol> <li>During his vis: his friendship. CH We think H. is a CH BANK[1v] considers</li> </ol>	it to the Chinese DU EN-IAI should IA-HUO LU-[0% TU] H.'s views to be	8th Army General be warned that H. (Stooge)[a] of CH in contradiction	HURLEY[a][111] assever [Kh.] cannot be trusted iLANG KAI-SHEK. Even t to the BANK's policy.	ated • he
	2. IZBA[V] has pa whom IZBA considers list here at the mo list of Austrians h	ssed on to the Ar it safe to have ment. Perhaps it as been compiled	my a list of 20,00 dealings. It is a could be procured by the ISLANDERS[(	00 "reliable Germans" : impossible to obtain th 1 in SIDON[vi]. An ans STROVITYANE][vii].	ath le logous
	No. 913		and a second	[Continued overleaf	
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72. New York 1635 to Moscow, 21 November 1944.


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New York 1635 to Moscow, 21 November 1944. Reward for Silvermaster

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<ul> <li>ALBERT asks for word to be passed to you that EL'(b) and he [D; profoundly] [20 groups unrecoverable]</li> <li>ROBERT is sincerely overjoyed and profoundly satisfied with the reward [given him][c] [Q; in accordance with your instructions]. As he says his work for us is the one good thing he has done in his life. He emphasized that he did not take this only as a [Q personal] honour, but also as an honour to his group. He wants to see the reward and the book.</li> <li>DORA[Viii] is very uncasy about the fate of her relations [and][o] again asks news of their whereabouts.</li> <li>No. 914. MAX[MAJ][ix]</li> <li>T.N.?" [a] Given in Latin letters in the original.</li> <li>[b] I.e. the Russian name for the letter "L".</li> <li>[c] Inserted by translator.</li> <li>Comments: [1] LtGen. P.M. FITIN.</li> <li>[ii] Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER.</li> <li>[iii] Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER.</li> <li>[iii] Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER.</li> <li>[iii] Nothen of State.</li> <li>[x] Office of Strategic Services [0.S.S.].</li> <li>[xi] The British.</li> <li>[viii] The British.</li> <li>[viii] Helon (WITE) SILVERMASTER, wife of ROBERT.</li> <li>[ix] Frobably Stepan Zakharovich AFRENTA, Soviet Vince-Consult</li> </ul>	EOP-SECRET
<ul> <li>ALBERT asks for word to be passed to you that EL'[b] and he [D5 profoundly] [20 groups unrecoverable]</li> <li>ROBERT is sincerely overjoyed and profoundly satisfied with the reward [given him][c] [G5 in accordance with your instructions]. As he says his work for us is the one good thing he has done in his life. He emphasized that he did not take this only as a [G6 personal] honour, but also as an honour to his group. He wants to see the reward and the book.</li> <li>DORA[Viii] is very uncesy about the fate of her relations [and][o] again asks news of their whereabouts.</li> <li>No. 94, MAX[MAJ][ix]</li> <li>T.N.: [a] Given in Latin letters in the original.</li> <li>[b] I.e. the Russian name for the letter "L".</li> <li>[c] Inserted by translator.</li> <li>Comments: [1] LtGen. P.M. FITIN.</li> <li>[ii] Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER.</li> <li>[iii] Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER.</li> <li>[iii] Nothen Gregory SILVERMASTER.</li> <li>[iii] Nothen of State.</li> <li>[x] Office of Stategic Services [0.S.S.].</li> <li>[wi] JUNCON.</li> <li>[viii] The British.</li> <li>[viii] He Grittish.</li> </ul>	
<pre>[20 groups unrecoverable] 2. ROEERT is sincerely overjoyed and profoundly satisfied with the reward [given him][c] [Gs in accordance with your instructions]. As he says his work for us is the one good thing he has done in his life. He emphasized that he did not take this only as a [G/ personal] honour, but also as an honour to his group. He wants to see the reward and the book. 3. DOEM[[viii] is very uncasy about the fate of her relations [and][c] again asks news of their whereabouts. No. 914. 21st November T.N.*? [a] Given in Latin letters in the original. [b] I.e. the Russian neme for the letter "L". [c] Inserted by translator. Comments: [1] LtGen. P.M. FITTN. [ii] Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER. [iii] Department of State. [iii] Department of State. [iii] U.Si Department of State. [ii] U.Si Department of State. [ii] U.Si Department of State. [ii] INDON. [vii] The British. [viii] The British. [viii] Helen (WITTE) SILVERMASTER, wife of ROEERT. [ix] Probably Stepan Zakharovich AFRESIAN, Soviet Vice-Gommand</pre>	- 2 - S/NBP/T1 77
<pre>[20 groups unrecoverable] 2. ROEERT is sincerely overjoyed and profoundly satisfied with the reward [given him][0] [Qs in accordance with your instructions]. As he says his work for us is the one good thing he has done in his life. He emphasized that he did not take this only as a [Qs personal] honour, but also as an honour to his group. He wants to see the reward and the book. 3. DORA[Viii] is very uncasy about the fate of her relations [and][c] again asks news of their whereabouts. No. 914. MAX[MAJ][ix] 21st November T.N.*** [a] Given in Latin letters in the original. [b] I.e. the Russian neme for the letter "L". [c] Inserted by translator. Comments: [1] LtGen. P.M. FITTN. [ii] Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER. [iii] Department of State. [iv] U.Si Department of State. [x] / Office of Strategic Services [0.S.S.]. [vii] The British. [vii] The British. [viii] Helen (WITED) SILVERMASTER, wife of ROEERT. [ix] Probably Stepan Zakharovich AFRESIAN, Soviet Vice-Computed [ix] Probably Stepan Zakharovich AFRESIAN, Soviet Vice-Compute [ix]</pre>	1. ALBERT asks for word to be passed to you that $\overline{EL}'[b]$ and he [D5 profoundly]
<ul> <li>101 US 18 the one good thing he has done in his life. He emphasized that he did not take this only as a [3] percental honour, but also as an honour to his group. He wants to see the reward and the book.</li> <li>3. DORA[Viii] is very uneasy about the fate of her relations [and][0] again asks news of their whereabouts.</li> <li>No. 914. MAX[MAJ][ix]</li> <li>7.N.: [a] Given in Latin letters in the original.</li> <li>[b] I.e. the Russian name for the letter "L".</li> <li>[c] Inserted by translator.</li> <li>Comments: [1] LtGen. P.M. FITIN.</li> <li>[ii] Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER.</li> <li>[iii] Derigadier-General Patrick Jay HURLET, appointed U.S. Ambessdor's CHIMA in Docember 1944.</li> <li>[iv] U.Si Department of State.</li> <li>[x] Office of Strategic Services [0.S.S.].</li> <li>[viii] The British.</li> <li>[viii] Helen (WITES) SILVERMASTER, wife of ROEERT.</li> <li>[ix] Probably Stepan Zakharovich AFRENTAN, Soviet Vice-Comsult</li> </ul>	
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<ul> <li>[c] Inserted by translator.</li> <li>Comments: [i] LtCen. P.M. FITEN.</li> <li>[ii] Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER.</li> <li>[iii] Brighedier-General Patrick Jay HURLET, appointed U.S.</li> <li>[iv] U.S. Department of State.</li> <li>[iv] U.S. Department of State.</li> <li>[iv] Office of Strategic Services [0.S.S.].</li> <li>[ivi] LONDON.</li> <li>[vii] The Britiah.</li> <li>[viii] Helen (WITED SILVERMASTER, wife of ROEERT.</li> <li>[ix] Probably Stepan Zakharovich APRESYAN, Soviet Vice-Consult</li> </ul>	[b] I.e. the Russian name for the letter "L".
<ul> <li>[ii] Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER.</li> <li>[iii] Brigadier-General Patrick Jay HURLET, appointed U.S. Ambasshdor to CHIMA in December 1944.</li> <li>[iv] U.S. Department of State.</li> <li>[iv] Office of Strategic Services [0.S.S.].</li> <li>[ivi] LONDON.</li> <li>[vii] The British.</li> <li>[viii] Helen (WITED SILVERMASTER, wife of ROEERT.</li> <li>[ix] Probably Stepan Zakharovich APRESYAN, Soviet Vice-Consult</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>[iii] Brigadier-General Patrick Jay HURLET, appointed U.S. Ambasshdor to CHIMA in December 1944.</li> <li>[iv] U.S: Department of State.</li> <li>[x] Office of Strategic Services [0.S.S.].</li> <li>[vi] LONDON.</li> <li>[vii] The British.</li> <li>[viii] Helen (WITED SILVERMASTER, wife of ROEERT.</li> <li>[ix] Probably Stepan Zakharovich APRESYAN, Soviet Vice-Consult</li> </ul>	Comments: [1] LtGen. P.M. FITIN.
<ul> <li>[iv] U.S. Department of State.</li> <li>[x]. Office of Strategic Services [0.S.S.].</li> <li>[vi] LONDON.</li> <li>[vii] The British.</li> <li>[viii] Helen (WITED SILVERMASTER, wife of ROBERT.</li> <li>[ix] Probably Stepan Zakharovich APRESYAN, Soviet Vice-Consult</li> </ul>	[ii] Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER.
<ul> <li>[iv] U.S. Department of State.</li> <li>[x]. Office of Strategic Services [0.S.S.].</li> <li>[vi] LONDON.</li> <li>[vi1] The British.</li> <li>[vi1] Helen (WITED SILVERMASTER, wife of ROBERT.</li> <li>[ix] Probably Stepan Zakharovich APRESYAN, Soviet Vice-Consult</li> </ul>	[11] Brigadier-General Patrick Jay HURLEY, appointed U.S.
<ul> <li>[x] , Office of Strategic Services [0.5.5.].</li> <li>[vi1] IONDON.</li> <li>[vi1] The British.</li> <li>[vl11] Helen (WITED SILVERMASTER, wife of ROEERT.</li> <li>[ix] Probably Stepan Zakharovich APRESYAN, Soviet Vice-Consult</li> </ul>	[iv] U.S. Department of State.
<ul> <li>[vi1] LONDON.</li> <li>[vi1] The British.</li> <li>[vi1i] Helen (WITTE) SILVERMASTER, wife of ROBERT.</li> <li>[ix] Probably Stopan Zakharovich AFRESIAN, Soviet Vice-Consul</li> </ul>	
[vii] The British. [viii] Helon (WITES) SILVERMASTER, wife of ROBERT. [ix] Probably Stepan Zakharovich AFRESYAN, Soviet Vice-Consul	
[vili] Helen (WITTE) SILVERMASTER, wife of ROBERT. [ix] Probably Stepan Zakharovich AFRESYAN, Soviet Vice-Consul	
[ix] Probably Stepan Zakharovich APRESYAN, Soviet Vice-Consul	
in NEW YORK.	
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73. New York 1657 to Moscow, 27 November 1944.



New York 1657 to Moscow, 27 November 1944. Ethel Rosenberg

74. New York 1699 to Moscow, 2 December 1944.

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Prioritions NIS/ Trues. To: MGSCG/	<b>.</b> .		
No: 1699	. 2 Dec 194	<u>14</u>	
Condlusion of telegram No. 9	Ψυ [mic][i].	·	
Enumonates [the foll the problem [13] - Hans METHER Brune NOSSI, George KISTIAKO FENNET, inthur CAMPCA, Erne Edward TELLER, Percy BRIDGEL Our country addressed himself wanting to liston to him, so commentator of the paper. ( he-was not admitted to him by			
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New York 1699 to Moscow, 2 December 1944. Listing atomic scientists

<ul> <li>T.N.: [a] Insorted by the transforter.</li> <li>Comments: [i] This internal sorial meaber is uned for the second of two nearanges transmitted under external carial number 1694 of 4 Dec 1946 44 twos signed by Mar, and deritt with an entirely different subject [see S/HEP/37, Item 2]. The measage of which the procent court gives the last part probably combine internal serial number is not without proceedent on this lamber.</li> <li>[11] To Judge by the ranse which follow, the problem of an informal serial number is not without proceedent on this lamb.</li> <li>[12] To Judge by the ranse which follow, the problem of a static energy.</li> <li>[13] Numer, Hebela, Number, Lamber of ARKER, which produces and distributes formed former filter in the Jostern Heritelener.</li> <li>[14] Numer, Hebela, Signar, Marker, Marker, Marker of ARKER, which produces and distributes function the distribute former filter.</li> <li>[14] Numer, Hebela, Signar, Marker, M</li></ul>	
<ul> <li>(cf two neuropes transmitted under external parial number (59) cf 1 Des 1945; it was signed by Mail, and dealt with an entirely different subject [see SfRF/137, Ifes 2]. The message of which the propert brokeling equation interval formation interval entry brokeling contributions in the difference attracts of the last part probability outsides and the message of which the properties in the second of an interval second value of the neuron which follow, the problem of a table, produces and distributes fouries of AURENE, which produces and distributes fouries in both (as the provided for a table).</li> <li>[14] To Judge by the neuron which follow, the problem of a table energy.</li> <li>[14] NUBALL, Nichela, Frendacht and Manger of AURENE, which produces and distributes fourian incident (a brown of the paragraph was STAR [bardle SAX].</li> <li>[17] INEK: Sorged KUMAKAV.</li> <li>[17] NUBANUT: Burd DRUMER.</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>Ribalic energy.</li> <li>[jii] N.BAJI, Richela, Erenident and Murayer of ARKER, ulted produces and distributes Murayer of ARKER, ulted produces and distributes Murayer of Alternal Silam in the Jostern Hericphere. Wellaterd suggests that the "he" of this paragraph was SER [isulle SiX].</li> <li>[iv] DEK: Sorgej RUBERGOV.</li> <li>[v] INDEVJ: Mark BRAMER.</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>[11] KURLI, Nichela, Erenident and Humger of ARKIER, which produces and distributes kunden incline deture (ILm) in the Forteen Berichburge, (Kollateral suggests that the The' of this paragraph was STAT [Saville SAX].</li> <li>[iv] DEK: Sorgej RANGARA.</li> <li>[v] INTAVUT: Earl DRUMER.</li> </ul>	
(v) INITASVUT: LAND DRUMDER.	
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
74. (Continued)


75.	New	York	1715	to	Moscow, 5	51	December	1944.
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	Reissue	<u>=</u> (T9.3)	
From:			
To:	MOSCOW		
No:	1715		5 December 1944
			5 BBCEMBEL 19 <u>44</u>
TO VIK	TOR[i].		
OI LIB	Expedite consent to the jo ETR[ii] and Kh'YuS[iii] (se hand eight people plus the ERAL's health is nothing sp L out of action with overwo	ee our letter no. 8) s filming of materia plendid. We are afr	. LIBERAL[iv] ls. The state
No. 94	3.		
[vi] h the hu possib Struct	Your no. 5673[a]. DIK[v] usband and not with FLOKS ) sband to see RAMSEY [RAMZA ility] of avoiding a super- ions.	is directly in touc merself. The intent J[vii] is explained fluces stage for tra	h with FLOKS's ion of sending by [C% the nsmitting in-
No. 94	4 .	• •	ANTON [viji]
ships except await	Your no. 5598[a]. The ser from TYRE[TIR][ix] to Sovie ionally difficult. They ca there a ship headed for the	ding of passengers at Northern ports ha an only be sent to E a Soviet North.	on Liberty s become ngland to .
No. 94 4 D	lecember	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	MAJ [x]
Notes: Commen	<pre>[a] Not available. ts:</pre>		:
:	[i] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P. [ii] METR: i.e. METER, pr	M. FITIN. cobably either Alfre	d Sarant or
• 1	Joel BARR. iii] Kh'YuS: i.e. HUGHES		
	Alfred SARANT. [iv] LIBERAL: Julius ROSI [v] DIK: i.e. DICK, Bern	INBERG.	
t VI	<ul> <li>[vi] FLOKS: i.e. PHLOX, I</li> <li>Nos. 619 of 4 May 19</li> <li>vii] RAMZAJ: Possibly</li> <li>iii] ANTON: Leonid KNASNI</li> <li>[ix] TIR: NEW YORK CITY.</li> </ul>	probably 1000 of 20 Ju 44 and 1020 of 20 Ju	See NEW YORK's ly 1944.
ŧ	[x] MAJ: i.e. MAY, Steps		
2	ت مردد به	in an ann an Airtean Airtean Airte Airtean an Airtean Airte	1 May 1975
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New York 1715 to Moscow, 5 December 1944. Rosenberg, again






New York 1749-50 to Moscow, 13 December 1944. Rosenberg ring

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<ul> <li>NHADW[X1]</li> <li>[51 groups mirecoverable]</li> <li>[IMART II] Purther [14 groups mirecovered]. EnvisCinitial handed over the set indexings relating to the sPQ-Q[xii] (postal despatch No.90.1) is can be trusted. The transfer of Ni Nis show to SUTIXY) is no very out of the situation. It will be necessary to put SUET in touch with KALISTRATIXY [1 and out of the PLANT Late in the set indexing the index of the situation. It will be necessary to put SUET in touch with KALISTRATIXY [1 and out of the PLANT Late in the set index with the index of the situation. It will be necessary to put SUET in touch with KALISTRATIXY [1 and out of the PLANT Late in the set indicates in touch with KALISTRATIXY [1 and out of the PLANT Late in the set will be necessary into the PLANT Late in the set will be necessary into the PLANT Late in the set will be necessary into the PLANT Late in the set will be necessary to put SUET and separating both from LIDERAL.</li> <li>In TIRE[TIRE][xix]</li> <li>If a groups unrecoverable]</li> <li>No. 957[1] [1 groups unrecoverable]</li> <li>No. 957[1] [2 groups unrecoverable]</li> <li>In TIRE[TIRE][xix]</li> <li>[1 groups during used to photography. He is site in the set in the s</li></ul>		T T	OP-SI	CR			
[51 groups unrecoverable] IPART II] Further [14 groups unrecovered]. Kull despatch No.90[.5] Roth are FELLOWCOUNTRYMEND[22MLARKD][Xil]. Both are helping us and both met LIBERLA and ADNO [5 groups unrecovered]. KulluStill handed over 17 authentic drawings relating to the APQ-P(Xiv) (postal despatch No.90[.5] He can be trusted. The trensfer of KulluStill despatch No.90[.5] He can be trusted. The trensfer of KulluStill despatch No.90[.5] He can be trusted. The trensfer of KulluStill despatch No.90[.5] He can be trusted. The trensfer of KulluStrant of SVET[xvil] is no way be trusted. The trensfer of KulluStrant or SVET[xvil] to opther [XV00][xvil]. I cannot carry material for photography into the PLANT Internation of the to bring material for photography into the PLANT [4 groups unrecoverable] Intref[TIR][Xik] Intref[TIR][Xik] Round the clock. There are no major contradictions between letters 5 and 7 about LIBERLL. They complement each other. LIBERAU's shortcomings do not mean that he will be completely useless for photography. He is gradually getting used to photography. No. 957[1] [Signature unrecoverable] [1] Part II only of this message was also published earlier, as JANEF/79, Item 4. [1] VIKTON: It General Pavel Mikhajlovich FITIM. [1] Not available. No. 5740 is also referred to in NEW YORK's No.1797 of 2D becember 1944 (unpublished). [1] ENDINOUS: The U.S. Atomic Engergy Project. [1] AND: Harry GOLD. [1] FEES: is "PERSIAM"; formerly "FOGEL", is "VOGEL"; unidentified covernames. Alabo cocur in NEW YORK's Nos. 212 of 11 Pebruary 1944. [3] YORK'DS. 2. 21 of 11 Pebruary 1944. [3] YORK'DS. 21 of 11 Pebruary 1944. [3] YORK'S And 22] of 2. September 1944.	<del></del>	<u> </u>	·····		3/NBF/T	1290	
<pre>[PART II] Further [14 groups unrecovered]. Both are FELLOMCOUNTRYMENT(25MLARKE)[Kii]. Both are helping us and both main dataNO [5 groups unrecovered]. Ki'Lu[Xiii] handed over 17 anthentic drawings relating to the APQ-/Zxiv/ [costal despatch No.9/L.] He can be tructed, x The transfer of Kh'LuS (and despatch No.9/L.) He can be tructed, x The transfer of Kh'LuS (and despatch No.9/L.) He can be tructed, x The transfer of Kh'LuS (and despatch No.9/L.) He can be tructed, x The transfer of Kh'LuS (and mark) [is no way out of the situation. It will be necessary to put SWET in touch with KALLSTRATKAY!] in order to bring material for photography into the PLANN [ZAVOD][Xvii] in order to bring material for photography into the PLANN [ZAVOD][Xvii] in coder to bring material for photography into the PLANN [ZAVOD][Zvii] I connot carry material for photography into the PLANN [ZAVOD][Zvii] I connot carry material for photography into the PLANN [ZAVOD][Zvii] I connot carry material for photography into the PLANN [ZAVOD][Zvii] I connot carry material for photography into the PLANN [ZAVOD][Zvii] I connot carry material for photography into the PLANN [ZAVOD][Zvii] I connot carry material for photography. He is gradually getting used to photography. He is gradually getting used to photography. He is [A groups unrecoverable]  No. 957[1] [Signature unrecoverable]  No. 197 of 20 December 1944 (unpublished).  No.</pre>	3.	"MLAD"[x	i]				
In this       [14 groups inrecovered].         Both are FELLOWCOUNTRYMEN[ZEML/MAKI][xii]. Both are helping us and both meet LIEERAL and ANNO [25 groups unrecovered]. Nat'LuE(xii] handed over 17 authentic drawings relating to the AN2-f(xiv] (postal deepateh No.9].] He can be trusted., The transfer of Kh'YuS alone to SVETIAVI is no way used to the situation. It will be necessary to put SVET in touch with XALDSYRAM[Xvi] in order to bring material in and out of the FLANT [ZAVOD[Xvi]]. I cannot carry material in and out of the FLANT late in the evening. I insist on bringing Kh'YuS and METR[Xvii] together, putting the latter in touch with XALDSYRAM[Xvi] in order to wright Kh'YuS and METR[Xvii] together, putting the latter in touch with XALDSYRAM[Xvi] in order to wright Kh'YuS and METR[Xvii] together, putting the latter in touch with XALDSYRAM or SVET and separating both from LHEERAL.         In TYRE[TIR][Xix]         [14 groups unrecoverable]         round the clock. There are no major contradictions between letters 5 and 7 about LHEERAL. They complement each other. LHEERAL's shortcomings do not mean that he will be completely useless for photography. He is gradually getting used to photography.         No. 957[1]       [Signature unrecoverable]         Footnotes:         [1]       Part II only of this message was also published earlier, as 5/NEF/T9, Item 4.         [1]       VIKTOR:       Lt General Pavel Mikhajlovich FITIN.         [11]       Not available. No. 5740 is also referred to in NEM YORK's No.1797 of 20 December 1944 (unpublished).         [12]       FENDENOUS:       The U.S. Atomic Engergy Project.         [13]			[5]	groups	unrecoverable]		
<ul> <li>Both are FELLOWCOUNTRYMEN[ZEMLKAK][Kil]. Both are helping us and both meet LIEERAL and ANNO [3 groups unrecovered]. Ki'tus[Kil] handed over 17 authentic drawings relating to the ATQ-TKil' (gottal despetch No.99[.]). His can be trusted. The transfer of Kh'YuS alone to SVETIxvi is no way out of the situation. It will be necessary to put SVET in touch with KALISTRAT, [1] in order to bring material for photography into the PLANT [ZAVOD][Xvil] is not on bringing Kh'YuS and NETE[Xvil] together, putting the latter in touch with KALISTRAT or SVET and separating both from LIEERAL.</li> <li>In TYRE[TIR][xix]</li> <li>[14 groups unrecoverable]</li> <li>round the clock. There are no major contradictions between letters 5 and 7 about LIEERAL. They complement each other. LIEERAL's shortcomings do not mean that he will be completely useless for photography. He is gradually getting used to photography.</li> <li>No. 957[i]</li> <li>[Signature unrecoverable]</li> <li>Footnotes: <ul> <li>[i] Part II only of this message was also published earlier, as 3/NEF/T9, Item 4.</li> <li>[ii] VIKTOR: It General Pavel Mikhajlovich FITIN.</li> <li>[iii] Not available. No. 5740 is also referred to in NEW YORK'S No.1797 of 20 December 1944 (unpublished).</li> <li>[iv] ENORNOUS: The U.S. Atomic Engergy Project.</li> <li>[vi] PEES: is "PEESIAN"; formerly "FOSEL", is "YOEEL"; is "YOEEL"; is "YOEEL", is "YOEEL", is "YOEEL", is 'YOEEL', is</li></ul></li></ul>	[PART II]	Further		groups	unrecovered].		
[14 groups unrecoverable]         round the clock. There are no major contradictions between letters 5 and 7 about LIDERAL. They complement each other. LIDERAL's chortcomings do not mean that he will be completely useless for photography. He is gradually getting used to photography.         No. 957[1]       [Signature unrecoverable]         Footnotes:         [1]       Part II only of this message was also published earlier, as 3/NUE/T9, Item 4.         [13]       VIKTOR:       Lt General Pavel Mikhajlovich FITIN.         [11]       Not available. No. 5740 is also referred to in NEW YORK's No. 1797 of 20 December 1944 (unpublished).         [12]       ENORMOUS:       The U.S. Atomic Engergy Project.         [14]       MRNO:       Harry GOLD.         [17]       PERS:       is "PERSIAN"; formerly "FOGEL'", is "VOGEL'; unidentified covernames. Also occur in NEM YORK's No. 212 of 1 J Peruary 1944, 854 of 1 (3/NBF/T2053, 38, 381).         VERMICANNE	He c 'out KALJ [ZAV the putt	an be tru of the si STRAT[xvi /OD][xvii] evening. ting the ]	sted. A The th tuation. It ] in order to . I cannot I insist on . atter in tou	will be in will be in bring matery matery matery matery materials of the second	f Kh'YuS alone to S necessary to put SV aterial for photogr erial in and out of Kh'YuS and METR[xy	VET[xv] is no way ET in touch with aphy into the PLAN the PLANT late in iii] together,	ידי
round the clock. There are no major contradictions between letters 5 and 7 about LIBERAL. They complement each other. LIBERAL's shortcomings do not mean that he will be completely useless for photography. He is gradually getting used to photography. No. 957[1] [Signature unrecoverable] Footnotes: [1] Part II only of this message was also published earlier, as 3/NDF/T9, Item 4. [11] VIKTOR: Lt General Pavel Mikhajlovich FITIN. [11] Not available. No. 5740 is also referred to in NEW YORK's No.1797 of 20 December 1944 (unpublished). [1v] ENORMOUS: The U.S. Atomic Engergy Project. [v] ARNO: Harry GOLD. [vi] PERS: is "PERSIAN"; formerly "FOGEL'", is "VOGEL'; unidentified covernames. Also occur in NEW YORK's Nos. 212 of 11 Pebruary 1944, 854 of 16 June 1944 and 1251 of 2 September 1944 (3/NBF/T2053, 38, 301).		In TYRE	TIR][xix]				
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No. 957[1] [Signature unrecoverable] Footnotes: [1] Part II only of this message was also published earlier, as 3/NDF/T9, Item 4. [11] VIKTOR: Lt General Pavel Mikhajlovich FITIN. [11] Not available. No. 5740 is also referred to in NEW YORK'S No. 1797 of 20 December 1944 (unpublished). [1v] ENORMOUS: The U.S. Atomic Engergy Project. [v] ARNO: Harry GOLD. [vi] PERS: is "PERSIAN"; formerly "FOGEL'", is "VOGEL'; unidentified covernames. Also occur in NEW YORK'S Nos. 212 of 11 Pebruary 1944, 854 of 16 June 1944 and 1251 of 2 Deptember 1944 (3/NBF/T2053, 38, 301).	and t ob	7 about 3 not mean t	IBERAL. The hat he will	y complem be comple	ent each other. Ll tely useless for ph	BERAL'S SNOTCOMIN	ıge
<ul> <li>[i] Part II only of this message was also published earlier, as 3/NDF/T9, Item 4.</li> <li>[ii] VIKTOR: Lt General Pavel Mikhajlovich FITIN.</li> <li>[iii] Not available. No. 5740 is also referred to in NEW YORK'S No. 1797 of 20 December 1944 (unpublished).</li> <li>[iv] ENORMOUS: The U.S. Atomic Engergy Project.</li> <li>[v] ARNO: Harry GOLD.</li> <li>[vi] PERS: in "PERSIM"; formerly "FOGEL!", is "VOGEL"; unidentified covernames. Also occur in NEW YORK'S NORK'S NORK'S NOR. 212 of 11 Pebruary 1944, 854 of 16 June 1944 and 1251 of 2 Deptember 1944 (3/NDF/T2055, 38, 301).</li> </ul>						erable]	
as 3/NBF/T9, Item 4. [ii] VIKTOR: Lt General Pavel Mikhajlovich FITIN. [iii] Not available. No. 5740 is also referred to in NEW YORK's No.1797 of 20 December 1944 (unpublished). [iv] ENORMOUS: The U.S. Atomic Engergy Project. [v] ARNO: Harry GOLD. [v] PEES: ie "PERSIAN"; formerly "FOGEL"", ie "VOGEL"; unidentified covernames. Also occur in NEW YORK's Nos. 212 of 11 February 1944, 854 of 16 June 1944 and 1251 of 2 Beptember 1944 (3/NBF/T2953, 36, 391).							-
<ul> <li>[ii] VIKTOR: Lt General Pavel Mikhajlovich FITIN.</li> <li>[iii] Not available. No. 5740 is also referred to in NEW YORK's No. 1797 of 20 December 1944 (unpublished).</li> <li>[iv] ENORMOUS: The U.S. Atomic Engergy Project.</li> <li>[v] ARNO: Harry GOLD.</li> <li>[vi] PERS: ie "PERSIAN"; formerly "FOGEL"", ie "VOGEL"; unidentified covernames. Also occur in NEM YORK's Nos. 212 of 11 Pebruary 1944, 854 of 16 June 1944 and 1251 of 2 Deptember 1944 (3/NBF/T2053, 38, 301).</li> </ul>	 Foo	tnotes:					
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<pre>[iv] ENORMOUS: The U.S. Atomic Engergy Project. [v] ARNO: Harry GOLD. [vi] PERS: inidentified covernames. Also occur in NEM</pre>	 Foo	[i]	as 3/NBF/T9	, Item 4.			
[vi] PERS: ie "PERSIAN"; formerly "FOGEL", ie "VOGEL"; unidentified covernames. Also occur in NEM YORK'S Nos. 212 of 11 February 1944, 854 of 16 June 1944 and 1251 of 2 Beptember 1944 (3/NBF/T2053, 38, 301).	Foo	[i] [ii]	as 3/NBF/T9 VIKTOR:	, Item 4. Lt Gene	eral Pavel Mikhajlov 5740 is also referi	vich FITIN. red to in NEW YORK	15
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76. (Continued)

77. New York 1751-3 to Moscow, 13 December 1944.

	TO BE KEFT UNDER LOCK AND KEY: Never to be removed from the office.		
	USSR Ref No: S/NBF/T190 Issued: 21/5/1952 Copy No: 765		
	AMERICAN VAR DEPARMENT AND BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE Documents sent to Mascun. From: NEN YCRK To: MUSCON		
	No: 1751-1753 13 Dec 19 <u>44</u>		
	(Three-part message complete) <u>EXTRACTS</u>		
	[Part I] To VICTOR.		
	RCDERT[1] has rassed on to us a secret document "The Post- War Troop Dasis of the War Department" drawn up by division [CTT] G-3 on the 19th of August[11]		
	[Part III]		
	To the document is attached an explanation of the same date in which it is said in particular that the document replaces a provisional document drawn up on the 24th of June.		
	The document was sent to you by post on the 3th of December.		
	[5 groups unrecovered]		
. · · ·	Telegraph whether the contents of the British Ministry of Aurolga ffaire .cornentary of the in the int of the "Mandook ar"	میں انداز ا	l L
	13th December	ι. I	1
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	[2 Pages] TO-P-SECRET (SUEDE)-		

New York 1751-3 to Moscow, 13 December 1944. Silvermaster

			- 2 - 3/NDF/T190	
		Comments: [i]	RUBERT: Nathan Gregory SILVERMISTER.	
i		[ii]	The main body of the telegram consists of page 1 of this document containing a tabular summry of the rest of the document.	
		[111]	This connentary is in the form of a letter from the Foreign Office dated jrd july 15 <u>M</u> to C.B.P. <b>HEMKE</b> at S.H.M.E.F. connenting on the third draft of the S.H.M.E.F. Civil Affairs Handbook for Germany. An obstract of this letter was transmitted on 23 Dec 19 <u>M</u> in Nos. 1310-1343 (internal serial No. 937) (see PH 32).	
	-	[iv]	MJ: Pavel Ivanovich FEDCSIMUV.	
			₩.S. No: XY-56.3	
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		S/NBF/T190		
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- ENONA Reissue (T1304) NEW YORK From: To: MOSCOW 1773 No: 16 December 1944 TO VIKTOR[i]. OSA[ii] has returned from a trip to see KALIBR[iii]. KALIBR expressed his readiness to help in throwing light on the work being carried on at Camp-2[iv] and stated that he had already given thought to this question earlier. KALIBR said that the authorities of the Camp were openly taking all percautionary measures to prevent information about ENORMOUS[ENORMOZ][v] falling into Russian hands. This is causing serious discontent among the progressive [B% workers] [17 groups unrecoverable] the middle of January KALIBR will be in TYRE[TIR][vi]. LIBERAL[vii], referring to his ignorance of the problem, expresses the wish that our man should meet KALIBR and interrogate him personally. He as-serts that KALIBR would be very glad of such a meeting. Do you con-sider such a meeting advisable? If not, I shall be obliged to draw up a questionnaire and pass it to LIBERAL. Report whether you have any questions of priority interest to us. KALIBR also reports: OPPENHEIM[viii] from California and KISTIAKOWSKI[ix](MLAD's[x] report mentioned the latter) are at pres-ent working at the Camp. The latter is doing research on the ther-modynamic process. Advise whether you have information on these two professors. No. 967 15 December ANTON [xi] Comments: [i] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P. M. FITIN. [ii] OSA: i.e. WASP, Ruth GREENGLASS. [iii] KALIBR: i.e. CALIBRE, David GREENGLASS. [iv] Camp-2: Probably LOS ALAMOS. [v] ENORMOZ: Manhattan Engineering Dist., U.S. Atomic Energy Project. ENORMOZ: Manhattan Engineering List, difference TRE: NEW YORK CITY. LIBERAL: Julius ROSENBERG. OPPENHEIM: Presumably Dr. J. Robert OPPENHEIMER, Director of the LOS ALAMOS Laboratory. KISTIAKOWSKY: Dr. George Bogdan KISTIAKOWSKY, Chief of the Explosives Division at the LOS ALAMOS Laboratory. MLAD: i.e. YOUNG, [Theodore A. HALT] ANTON: Leohad Romanovich KVASNIKOV. [vi] [vii] (viii] [ix] [x] [xi] 20 May 1975 YENONA
- 78. New York 1773 to Moscow, 16 December 1944.

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New York 1773 to Moscow, 16 December 1944. Rosenberg; ENORMOZ


TOP SECRET
USSR Ref. No.:
Issued:
Copy No.: 301
1. DISCUSSION OF ARNO'S COVER AND PLAN TO SET UP LABORATORY
<ol> <li>KRON</li> <li>LINZA'S MOVE TO YAKOV'S TOWN, LIBERAL TO GO THERE AND PUT THEM IN CONTACT</li> </ol>
(1944)
From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No.: 1797 20 December 1944
To VIKTOR[i]. Your No. 5740[ii].
subject on which to work ARNO chose "Problems of the Practical Application Under Production Conditions of the Process of Thermal Diffusion of Gesse". In his note ARNO envisages concluding agreements with firms. At first he said that our help was not needed: now he explains that not more than two thousand will be needed. For our part we consider that ARNO does not give sufficient consideration to all the difficulties of organizing a laboratory and has not, as yet, adequately worked out the chances of reaching agreements with intorested firms - on the conclusion of agreements with which he is counting heavily. I suggested to him that he should
study-the possibilities in greater detail. The picture will not become clearer before the end of January. ANNO intends to open the laboratory in his own town. [Continued overleaf]
before the end of January. ARNO intends to open the laboratory in his own town.
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VENONA

New York 1797 to Moscow, 20 December 1944. Michael Sidorovich

79. New York 1797 to Moscow, 20 December 1944.

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A detailed report on KRON's[iv] office was cent in postal despatch No. 9. Let us know whether we should repeat this by telegraph. No. 978 LINZA[vi] and his wife have left for YaKOV's[vi] town, At the end of December fibereading will got three and will put LINZA in touch with YaKOV. Before making the move, LINZA and his wife have left for YaKOV's[vi] town, At the end of December money on the move. We gave him a once for all payment of 500: I consider that [24 groups unrecoverable] Footnotes: [i] VIKTOR: Lt General Pavel Mikhajlovich FITIN. [ii] Not available. Also referred to in NEW YORK's No. 1749 of 13 December 1944 [iii] ANNO: Formerly covername "GUS'", ie "GOOSE"; Harry GOLD; resident in FHILADELFHIA, FEMNSILVANNIA. [iv] KRON: ie "CHROME-YELLOW"; unidentified covername. Also occurs in NEW YORK's No. 19 of 4 January 1945 [vi] LINZA: ie "LENS"; Michael SIDOROVICh (wife Anne, née HANUSIAK); moved from NEW YORK'S At to CLEVELAND, OHDO. [vi] YaKOV: Formerly covername "GNOM", ie "GNOME"; William PERL (vi] YaKOV: Formerly OVERTARE to CLEVELAND, OHDO.	95	
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	[vi] YaKOV:	Formerly covername "GNOM", is "GNOME"; William PERL
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New York 12-3, 15-6 to Moscow, 4 January 1945. ALBERT reports

- 2 -S/N3F/7544 It is possible that RCBERT thought we wanted to take away some of his people counting on getting better results and concluded from this that we wore not altogether satisfied with his achievements. In ALZERT's optimion he succeeded in convincing ROBERT that our sole aim was organisational security. It must be said that on the basis of our workers' information ROBERT has been inclined to be critical and dubious of our ability to deal with the probationers [STLADERT]. Especially indicative from this point of view is the incident with KCU'TSOV[7] [36 groups unrécoverable] AILERGY [ELERGN][vi] our worker; if AL'BERT proposed this RCSERT would undoubtedly reject it. Therefore AL'BERT is trying to convince him of the necessity of setting up a small group whose technical work would be concentrated outside ROBERT's apartment, ROBERT retaining the general direction of it. If fection of it. It has been decided to train ACORN [ZACLUD'][V11] and ZhENYa[V111] for the processing of materials in their even apertment. The couple [SUFRUGI][0] are conscientious, capable and fainly well disciplined. Notwithstanding, however, their devotion to the FELLOTCOUNTRYNEN [ZEMLYSKI][ix] and personally to ROBERT, the latter has from time to time complained of their caprices. Thus a few weeks age DORALY told EML\*1] in ROBERT's and FILOT'SIX1] presence that the couple were trying to get themselves free of us. ALEERT does not regard this seriously but he no longer doubts that it costs ROBERT grant pains to keep the couple and the other probationers [STLIZERY] in check and to get good work out of them. Being their leader in the FELLOWOUNTRYNANLY line ROBERT has the opportunity to give them orders. [Part II] In AL"BERT's opinion our workers would hardly manage to work with the same success under the FDLLOW-COUNTRYMINTY flag. We may possibly set up direct lisison with ACORN, AILERON and the rest, but it is dcubiful whether we could secure from them the same results as ROBERT, who, constantly dealing with them, has many advantages over us. The whole group [D<sub>c</sub>] of ROBERT's] [54 groups unrecoverable] ROBERT reacted very unforwarn'ly coving that before AL'BERT's time somebody else tried to part him and PILOT, that he did not believe in our orthodox methods and so on. As he said, it would not be hard to separate PILOT from him, but he [Part III] % [32 groups unrecoverable] [D] FILOT) will not cool off towards our work. It goes without saying that FILOT is not so deeply dewoted to us as ROBERT and DORA are, for he comes from a well-to-do S/NBF/T544 [Continued overleaf]

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
82	BRIDE
	TOP_SECRET
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	family of western TO NSMEN [COROZHANE][xiii]. In AL'BERT'S opinion, for PILOT'S successful work we are in large measure indebted to ROBERT and DORA, who treat FILOT very solioitously, and in the near future we shall gain. Nothing at the cost of separating PILOT from ROBERT. AL'SERT is trying not to permit a joint business [BIZNES] like a farm or an aerodrome and has advised ROBERT to let FILOT work out this project himself if the latter is sure of success saying that in case of need we should render FILOT some financial support. In AL'BERT's opinion the project is unrealisable and later they will drop it.
	ROBERT is displeased by our interference in his personal affairs, which is what he considers the farm to be. In his words, all these years he and the others have worked at high pressure and they want to acquire a farm rather for relaxation than as a cover. For a long time PILOT and DORA have been drawing up all kinds of plans relative to the farm.
[Part IV]	In PILOT's opinion the farm will be a good pretext for his absence! in CARTHAGE [xARTAGEN][xiv] in case of dismissal, for having been dismissed he could hardly remain in CARTHAGE even temporarily without legal(d] income. Seeing how much they were carried away by the 'idea AL'ZERT did not consider it wise to insist
	[29 groups unrecoverable]
	leadership of this new group will have to be left to ROBERT.
·	That has been expounded does not mean that the mutual relations of $\Delta L^{1}$ BERT with ROBERT are strained or that ROBERT does not want to obey us. ROBERT seteems $\Delta L^{1}$ BERT highly and would not [2 groups unrecovered] any request of ours if $\Lambda L^{1}$ BERT insisted. $\Lambda L^{1}$ BERT does not doubt that ROBERT would introduce him to any of his people if $\Lambda L^{1}$ SERT requested, for organisationally ROBERT has become very close to us.
	4 AL'HERT emphasises the soundness and timeliness of the award and the gift to ROHERT, who is pleased at our high evaluation [of him][0].
	Note by the Office [KONTORA]. In the same letter AL'EERT adduces short biographical data on ACORN and ZHENYA which we shall send by post.
	No. 6 MIY [MAJ][XV] 4 January
	[T.N. and Comments overleaf] 3/NBS/7544
	BRIDE

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- 4 - S/NET/T544	
T.N.: [a] This sentence contains a similar anacoluthon in the original. Presumably some part of the subordinate clause has been omitted.	
[b] SUPRUGI means "ccuple" in the sense of a married ccuple.	
[c] Presumably an error for "presence".	
[d] I.e., overt.	
[e] Inserted by the translator.	
Comments: [i] VIKTOR: probably LtGeneral P.M. FITIN.	
[ii] AL'BERT: not identified.	
[iii] ROBERT: Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER.	
[iv] KhiTA: the F.B.I.	
<pre>[v] KOL'TSOV: not identified.</pre>	
[vi] ELERON: not identified.	
[vii] ZhOLUD': possibly Bella [criginally Bela ?] GOLD.	
[viii] ZhENYa: possibly Sonia Steinman GOLD.	
[ix] ZEMLYaKI: members of the Communist Party.	
[x] DORA: Helen Witte SILVERMISTER.	
[xi] EL': not identified.	
(xii) PILOT: possibly William Ludwig ULLMAN.	
[xiii] GORÓZhlNE: Americans.	
[xiv] KARPAGEN: WASHINGTON, D.C.	
[xv] MAJ: MOB resident in NEW YORK.	
W.S. No.: XY-1.06 (Revision)	
S/NBF/T544	
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81. New York 18-9 to Moscow, 4 January 1945.



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New York 18-9 to Moscow, 4 January 1945. Boris Morros

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	TOP SECRET DINAR VENONA
	AL'HERT(v) is urgently asking for a CONTAX camera for
	AL'HERT[v] is urgently asking for a CONTAX camera for ACORN [ZhOLUD'][vi]. It is extremely difficult to get one here. Please telegraph YuRIJ[vii] at once.
	No.13 MAY.
	Your No.6165[b]. DDT is a disinfectant used by the army of the COUNTRY [STRANA][vii1]. See our letter No.1 of 1944, the paragraph about CHROME FIGMENT [KRON][ix].
	No.14 ANTON[x]
be	Your No.5351[c]. You <u>gpread</u> to the use of AKhMED[X] in the second line. In order to decide the question of whether to use him as a group leader in this line in place of BEK[xi1]. A gran the purpose of verification. Is the up on the second with AKhMED for
	No.15 MAY. 4 January
	Notes: [a] Not available
	[b] Not available
	[c] Not available
	Comments: [i] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P. M. FITIN
	(11) LOUIS: Alfred K. STERN.
	[111] FROST: Boris MORROS.
	[iv] MAJ: Stepan Zakharovich AFRESYaN.
	[v] AL'BERT: Probably Iskhak Abdulovich AKhMEROV.
	[v1] ZhOLUD': Bella GOLD.
	[vii] YuRIJ: Lev A. TARASOV.
	[v111] STRANA: U.S.A.
	[ix] KRON: Unidentified cover-name.
	<pre>[x] ANTON: Leonid Romanovich KVASNIKOV. [xi] AKhMED: Unidentified.</pre>
	[x1] BEK: Sergej Ňikolaevich KURNAKOV.
	[xiii] NAZAR: Stepan Nikolaevich ShUNDENKO.


- VENONA Reissue(T212.1) NEW YORK From: MOSCOW To: 27 No: 8 January 19<u>45</u> TO VIKTOR[i]. SERCEJ's[ii] conversation with SIMA[iii] took place on [Bt 4 January]. SIMA gives the impression of being a serious person who is politically well developed and there is no doubt of her sincere desire to help us. She had no doubts about whom she is working for and said that the nature of the materials in which we are interested pointed to the fact that it was our country which was in question. She was very satisfied that she was dealing with us and said that she deeply appreciated the confidence shown in her and understood the importance of our work. SIMA's transfer to a new job was made at the insistence of her [D% superiors] [64 groups unrecoverable] generalizing materials from all departments [OTDELY]. SIMA will probably start work on 15 February. On the basis of this preliminary information there is reason to assume that in her new job SIMA will be able to carry out very important work for us in throwing light on the activities of the KhATA[iv]. The fruitfulness of her work will to a considerable ex-tent depend upon our ability to organize correct and constant di-rection8. It should be remembered that SIMA from an operational point of view is quite undeveloped and she will need time to learn conspiracy and to correctly gain an understanding of the questions which interest us. A final decision on the question of direction and liaison can be taken [B% only] after she has moved to CARTHAGE[KARFAGEN][v] when it will be ascertained [B% specifically] what her new job consists of. No. #22 8 January MAJ[vi] Comments: VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P. M. FITIN. SERGEJ: Vladimir Sergeevich PRAVDIN. SIMA: Judith COPLON. KhATA: The Federal Bureau of Investigation. KARFAGEN: WASHINGTON, D. C. MAJ: Stepan APRESYAN. [i] [ii] [iii] [iv] [v] [vi] 29 January 1974 VENONA
- 82. New York 27 to Moscow, 8 January 1945.

403

New York 27 to Moscow, 8 January 1945. Judith Coplon

82.

83. Moscow 14 to New York, 4 January 1945.




Moscow 14 to New York, 4 January 1945. Communist Party business

- 2 - S/NBF/T259	
Your number $6227[a]$ . The conditions for lisison with MATUS and the information [SPRAYKA] are in VADIM's[11] possession. SERGED[17] does not know anything about him. Telegraph explanation.	
No.8	
For GRCWTH's [ROST][V] enterprise we asked a thousand and a half. The amount assigned by you is one tenth of what is required and, it goes without saying, can produce no substantial results.	
No.9	
Your number 6218[a]. I am bearing in mind your reminder about the line of conduct in respect of the leader- ship of the FELLOW COUNTRYMEN's organisation [ZEMLYACDESKAYa[vi]. However, as ALBERT has already firmly promised ROBERT[vii] and SACHS [SAKS] to pass on to HELMSMAN [RULEWOJ][viii] certain materials (in particular concerning the Chinese [C% FELLOW COUNTRYMEN [ZEMLYAKI]][vi]) and it is hard for him to go back on his word, please permit by Way of exception the passing on of these materials to HELMSMAN through VADIM on ECKO [EKKD][ix], at the same time warning ALBERT that this is the last time. ALBERT emphasised that SACHS's sattitude to this question was very feelows and he gave him to understand that he would not hand certain materials over to us without a guarantee that they would be handed over to the [K.][ix] to and, should we refuse, he might try to esattlish lisison with H. over our heads.	
No.10 4th January MAY [MAJ][x1]	
T.N.: [a] Not available.	
Comments: [1] VICTOR: possibly Pavel Mikhajlovich FITIN, Lieutenant-General, head of the foreign intelligence branch of the NKUE.	
Lieutenant-General, head of the foreign	
Lieutenant-General, head of the foreign intelligence branch of the NKGB. [i1] 9 Kuznetskij Most, MOSCOW, is the address of several organizations, including the	
Lieutenant-General, head of the Foreign intelligence branch of the NNGB. [ii] 9 Kuznetskij Most, MOSCOW, is the address of several organisations, including the TORGRARK, which would presumably have correspondence with AMTORG. [iii] VADIM: Anatolij Borisovich GROMOV, First Secretary and NNGB resident in the Soviet	
<pre>Lieutenant-General, head of the INGES. intelligence branch of the NNGES. [ii] 9 Kuznetskij Most, MOSCOW, is the address of several organisations, including the TORGRAMK, which would presumably have correspondence with AMTORG. [iii] VADIM: Anatolij Borisovich GROMOV, First Secretary and NKGE resident in the Soviet Embassy in WASHINGTOW, D.C. [continued overleaf]</pre>	
<ul> <li>Lieutenant-General, head of the Nords.</li> <li>[ii] 9 Kuznetskij Most, MOSCOW, is the address of several organisations, including the TORGRANK, which would presumably have correspondence with AMTORG.</li> <li>[iii] VADIM: Anatolij Borisovich GROMOV, First Secretary and NKGB resident in the Soviet Embassy in WASHINGTON, D.C.</li> </ul>	
<pre>Lieutenant-General, head of the INGES. intelligence branch of the NNGES. [ii] 9 Kuznetskij Most, MOSCOW, is the address of several organisations, including the TORGRAMK, which would presumably have correspondence with AMTORG. [iii] VADIM: Anatolij Borisovich GROMOV, First Secretary and NKGE resident in the Soviet Embassy in WASHINGTOW, D.C. [continued overleaf]</pre>	
<pre>Lieutenant-General, head of the INGES. intelligence branch of the NNGES. [ii] 9 Kuznetskij Most, MOSCOW, is the address of several organisations, including the TORGRAMK, which would presumably have correspondence with AMTORG. [iii] VADIM: Anatolij Borisovich GROMOV, First Secretary and NKGE resident in the Soviet Embassy in WASHINGTOW, D.C. [continued overleaf]</pre>	
<pre>Lieutenant-General, head of the INGES. intelligence branch of the NNGES. [ii] 9 Kuznetskij Most, MOSCOW, is the address of several organisations, including the TORGRAMK, which would presumably have correspondence with AMTORG. [iii] VADIM: Anatolij Borisovich GROMOV, First Secretary and NKGE resident in the Soviet Embassy in WASHINGTOW, D.C. [continued overleaf]</pre>	

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•	en :	BRIDE
	TO BE	C P SEGRET E KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY : R TO BE REMOVED FROM THE OFFICE,
		- 3 - \$/NBF/T259
	[iv]	
	<b>[</b> ▼]	ROST: formerly ODESSIT. See S/NBF/T245 in which on 23 Aug 1944 M/J asked for 1000 dollars to expand "ODESSIT"s enterprise" (concerned with the manufacture of dies (ShTAMFY]), and S/NBF/T216 in which on 26 Dec 1944 BORIS (MOS cipher clerk in NEW YORK) queried "the amount additionally allotted to ODESSIT's enterprise", which he had deciphered as 150. It must be assumed that MOSCOW replied that this figure was quite correct, which gave rise to the observations in the third m' sage of the above text.
	[vi]	ZEMLYaChESKAYa: the Communist Party of the country in question. Derived from the adjectivel form of ZEMLYaK [FELLOW COUNTRYMAN] - a member of the Communist Party of the country in question. There is no English noun which can be used as an adequate translation.
	[ <b>v</b> 11]	ROBERT: Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER.
		RULEVOJ: Earl Russell BROWDER.
	[ix]	EKhO: Bernard SCHUSTER (Communist Party name - CHESTER).
	[x]	R.: i.e. RULEVOJ (see [viii] above).
	[x1]	MAJ: Pavel Ivanovich FEDOSIMOV, secretary to the Consul-General and NKGB resident in the Soviet Consulate-General in NEW YORK.
		W.S. No.: XY-66.2
		• • •
		BRIDE
	S/NBF/T259	TO D. CERDET CANOF

407



New York 79 to Moscow, 18 January 1945. KGB in Treasury

84.

84. (Continued) VENIONA 2. . . Jinotes:

[i] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P. M. FITIN.
[ii] ROBERT: Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER.
[iii] RICHARD. Earry Dexter WHITE.
[iv] ROBLE: Probably Harold GLASSER.
[v] MAJ: Pavel Ivanovich FEDOSIMOV.
[vi] NADDB: Henry MORGENTHAU, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury.
[vi] MAJ's confusion is due to the fact that the proposed promotion which latter took place, was from "assistant to the secretary of the treasury" to "assistant secretary of the treasury" to "assistant secretary of the social and "deputy" respectively.
[vii] ZEMLYACHESKIJ (adjective) and "ZEMLYAKI (noun) refer to members of the communist party of the communist party" (attributive) and "members of the American communities party" Tespectively.
[ix] ALBERT: Iskhak Abdulovich AKHMEROV, alias W. GREINKE.
[x] REJDER: i.e., RAIDER: Victor PERLO.
[xi] ZhENYA: Sonia GOLD, nee STEINMAN, employed in the Treasury UP opartment from 24 August 1943 to 21 August 1947.
If she was in fact GLASER's secretary at the time of this message, the statement here is a strong confirmation of the identifications of ROUBLE and ZHENYA; if she was not, it strongly suggests that one or both identifications are incorrect. Footnotes: [i] [ii] [ii] [v] [v] [vi] [vi] 29 September 1976 . . . VENONA 

410

84. (Continued)

	······································	
	TOP SECRET TRINEYENONA	
	Prom: New YORK	
	10: .X0200W	
	No: 32	
	lê January 19 <u>45</u>	
	To VIKTOR(1).	
	Recently TSERBER(i1) asked MOBRAT(i1i) how he could reestablish con- tact with the man through whom he was connected with the "FELLOH- COUNTRY.CMP(I2ELTAIL)[i1]. TSERBER works in the accounts section of FEAM's(PTK)[v] department. Since you advised in no. 3937 [a] that TSERBER was a probationer of the NEIGHBORS(SOGEDI][vi] allow us to inform the head NEIGHBOR about TEARBER's request. If the NEIGHBORS have lost contact with him he [5% probably]	
	[13 groups unrecoverable].	
	ALBERT[AL'223T][vii] also [3 groups unrecoverei].	
	No. 59	
	10 balliary	
	Notes: [a] Not available.	
	Comments: [1] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P. M. FITIN.	
	[11] TSERBER: Unidentified. Either a cover-name "CERBERUS" or a transliteration of a surname of German origin CERBER or ZERBER.	
	[111] ROBERT: Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER.	
	[iv] LEWLYAKI: .dembers of the Communist Party	
	<pre>[v] PIK: Fossibly Virginius Frank COE.</pre>	
	[vi] SOSEDI: Members of another Soviet Intelligence organi- zation, here apparently the CRU.	
	[vii] AL'BERT: Frobably Iskhak Abdulovich AKh4EROV.	
	[viii] AAJ: Stepan APRESYAN.	
F	27 Jay 1966	
	•	
	TOD SECRET TRANSF VENONA	
	TOP SECRET TRINE VENONA	

411


New York 82 to Moscow, 18 January 1945. GRU asks KGB aid

86. Moscow 200 to New York, 6 March 1945.

	95		<b>N</b>
	TOP	ECRET	
	A CONTRACTOR OF		
			· · ·
	USSR	Ref. No.: 3/NBF/T2208	1997 - A. 1997 -
		Issued: (17/6/7	6
		Copy No.: 30/	
	BONUSES FOR SOURCES, INCLU	DING LIBERAL AND NIL, GIFTS OR PAYMENTS FOR	PROBATIONERS
		(1945)	11669
	From: MOSCOW		
	. To: NEW YORK		•
	No.: 200	6 March 1945	
	·	66 groups unrecovered]	
	decision was made about av LIBERAL [1]4000 dollars[,]	arding the sources as a bonus the following NIL[11]	; sums: to
		58 groups unrecoverable]	,
			or payment
	to them of money on the ba	Luable gifts for the probationers [STAZAER] asis of well thought out cover-stories.	
	I	[28 groups unrecovered]	
	No. 1306	VIKTOR[iii]	·
	Footnotes: [i] LIBERAL:	Formerly covername "ANTENNA"; Julius ROSE	BERG.
	[ii] NIL:	ie either "(River) NILE" or a name eg "NE.	IL/NEALE";
		formerly "TU"; unidentified covername. "NIL" also occurs in NEW YORK's Nos. 863 ( 40/h (20/HW/HER) 1251 of 2 September 10/h	16 June (3/NEF/T301)
		1944 (3/NBF/T58), 1251 of 2 September 1944 and 1657 of 27 November 1944 (3/NBF/T9.2)	· (); •••• ; ••• ;
	[iii] VIKTOR:	Lt General Pavel Mikhajlovich FITIN.	
			······
		<i>i</i>	
-			
		VENIONIA	54 - C
	3/NBF/T2208 [1_page]		
	AJH		
		<del>IOP-SECRET</del> -	

Moscow 200 to New York, 6 March 1945. Bonus for Rosenberg






Moscow 284 and 286 to New York, 28 March 1945. Flora Wovschin


87.

TOTO NA
2.
financial operations [C% and]
[38 groups unrecoverable]
[Part II] To "ZORA's" question to SACKS and WOLWORTH, why they are not receiving material from the "RADIO STATION" through an offi- cial representative, [2 groups unrecovered] institutions of the "COUNTRY" including the "RANK", WOOLWORTH is trying to [C4 seek out] [5 groups unrecovered] the CLUB. WOOLWORTH told "ZORA" that in the IZBA[Kiii], BANK, RADIO STATION, FARM[KHUTOR][xiv] [4 groups unrecovered] many people who
[17 groups unrecovered]
by the next post answer:
1. Why [1 group unrecovered] ZORA.
<ol><li>Were these reports read [1 group unrecovered] by the liaison man.</li></ol>
3. Did "MAJ" [xv] and "SERGEJ" [xvi] see these reports.
<ol> <li>Who told "ZORA" [3 groups unrecovered] and then told "[1 group unrecovered]"</li> </ol>
[13 groups unrecovered]
to WOOLWORTH and SACKS.
6. Why did ZORA begin to take
[33 groups unrecovered]
steps taken to curtail ZORA's dangerous activities.
Without waiting for instructions from us after you reply to the questions which have been raised, immediately and in detail enlighten our liaison man about the serious mistakes he has com- mitted in the work with "ZORA". As an ultimatum warn ZORA that if she does not carry out our instructions and if she undertakes steps without our consent, we shall immediately terminate all relations with her. Forbid ZORA to recruit all her acquaintances one after the other. Take all steps to see that ZORA's activities do not lead to serious political complications with the "COUNTRY". This example clearly illustrates not only the falling off in the Resi- dency's work of controlling and educating probationers, but also the lack of understanding by our operational workers of the most elementary rules in our work.
No. 1893 [Signature unrecoverable]
AMA

416




88. Washington 1793 to Moscow, 29 March 1945.



419

Washington 1793 to Moscow, 29 March 1945. HOMER, again



420

<b>-</b> .	ET DINAR VENONA
•	
4. [10 gr	oups unrecovered]
specific points, which	
135 gr4	oups unrecoverable]
Comments: [1] G: 1.e., HOMER [G	
[ii] NOOK: The British	
[iii] POOL: British Emba	
	20 July 1965
	20 0019 1905
	•
•	

421

88. (Continued) TOP-SECRET TRINE YENONA Ξ. From: WASHINGTON To: 1:OSCOW No: 1793 29 March 1945 Attachment In paragraph 3 of the NSA version of the translation of this message the "10 groups unrecoverable" should contain the following: "instructions covering at least the more important points" Paragraph 4 should read: "4. My immediately following telegram contains arguments on specific points which you should use with Mr. STETTINUS and the President in andi-tion to those contained in the Prime kinister's message no. 912." cif and  $\langle j \rangle$ 24 May, 1968 422

89. Washington 1822 to Moscow, 30 March 1945.

	ENONA
MGB	
-	
From: WASH	HINGTON
To: MOSO	COW
No: 1822	_
	38 March 19 <u>45</u>
Fur chat with '	ther to our telegram No. 283[2]. As a result of "[D# A.'s]"[1] "ALES"[11] the following has been ascertained:
1. ALES since 1935	S has been working with the NEIGHBORS[SOSEDI][iii] continuously
2. For NEIGHBORS' relations.	some years past he has been the leader of a small group of the probationers[STAZhERY], for the most part consisting of his
only. Mate	group and ALES himself work on obtaining military information erials on the "BANK"[iv] allegedly interest the NEIGHBORS very he does not produce them regularly.
4. All also meets	the last few years ALSS has been working with "POL'"[v] who other members of the group occasionally.
5. Rec	ently ALES and his whole group were awarded Soviet decorations.
Soviet per that it was	er the YALTA Conference, when he had gone on to MOSCOW, a sonage in a very responsible position (ALES guve to understand S Comrade VYShINSKIJ) allegedly got in touch with ALES and at of the Military NEIGHBORS passed on to him their gratitude
No. 431	[iv]MIDAV
Notes: [a]	Not available.
Comments: [1] [11] [11]	A.: "A." seems the most likely garble here although "A." has not been confirmed elsewhere in the WASHINGTON traffic. ALES: Probably Alger HIES. SOSEDI: Mambers of another Soviet Intelligence organization, here probably the GRU. BANK: The U.S. State Department. POL': i.e. "FAUL," unidentified cover-name. VADIM: Anstolij Borisovich GROMOV, MOB resident in WASHINGTON.
[1v] [v] [v1]	J VADIM: Anatolij Borisovich GROMOV, Mis resident in machingion.
[vi] [v] [2v]	VADIN: Anstolij Borisovich GROMOV, MJB resident in WASHINGTON. 8 August 1969

423

Washington 1822 to Moscow, 30 March 1945. ALES interviewed by KGB

90. Moscow 298 to NY, 31 March 1945.

BOP-SE	GRET MENONA
USSR	P. C. N 2 (1) 7 (2000)
: USSK	Ref. No: 3/NBF/T2090 Issued : A265/16/08/1979
Contract of Name	Copy No:
	· · · ·
	REISSUE
	EVALUATION OF MATERIAL ON ENORMOZ: FROM CHARL'Z ON FUNICULAR AND FROM MLAD (1945)
From: MOSCOW	
To : NEW YORK	
No : 298	31 March 19 <u>45</u>
ANTON [1]	
We are send: materials from "d	ing herewith an evaluation on $\overline{\rm ENORMOZ}$ [ii]. Referenced are ChARL Z" [iii] about the FUNICULAR [iv]:
a) 5/46 [v]	]
	[31 groups unrecovered]
gaskets (SAL'NIK)	
b) 5/50 -   calculation, whic	[6 groups unrecovered] - contains an interesting method of ch will be used during the design.
c) 5/62 - 1	technical data on the FUNICULAR and
	[12 groups unrecovered]
d) 7/83, pa - offers substant	aragraph 1 - about the degree of separation of the membrane [vi] tial interest.
e) 7/84 par the layout of the covered} plan of	ragraph 1 - about tests of the membrane and information about e plant - is of interest. What is needed is [7 groups unre- the plant.
f) 7/83 and together with "C a full and valuat	d 84 - on the theory of the [c% stability] of the FUNICULAR - hARL's" materials on this question received earlier they form ble piece of information.
	[vii] report about work [4 groups unrecovered]. [1 group unre-
No. 1972	VIKTOR [viii]
Distribution	[continued]
Copies	
1-2 NSA (A20 3 FBI 4 CIA	(cu
	y Service
7 <b>4500</b> (v: 8 ASIO (v:	
	y Service/ 🌉 Representatives - WASHINGTON
3/NBF/T2090	VENONA MARINA MARINA 1232
- Martin Constant	


425

Moscow 298 to NY, 31 March 1945. Evaluating ENORMOZ take

			-2-	3/NBF/T2090	
Footnote	s: [ i] .	ANTON :	Leonid Romanovich	KVASNIKOV	
		ENORMOZ :	The Manhattan Proj	ject (Development of the Atom	ĹĊ
	[ 111]	ChARL'Z :	Bomb). ie CHARLES; Dr. KI	aus Emil FUCHS	
				Probably the gaseous dif- at CLINTON Tennessee.	
1	{v}	A dispatch month or po	reference. The fir	st element is probably the r and the second a running	
				s "barrier" in some books.	
	[vii] i	(	Theodore M. HALL.)		
	(viii) V	/IKTOR :	Lt. General Pavel	Mikhajlovich FITIN	
			-*		
		• .			
				•	
				•	
	۰.		•		
E AL PL	·		•		
3/NBF/T20	90				
		at the second surgery	and survey and the set	-	
	Yer		CONTRACTOR OF	F	

426

91. Moscow 337 to New York, 8 April 1945.



Moscow 337 to New York, 8 April 1945. Delivering Silvermaster take

95 	TOP-SEGRET
1	2 3/HBF/TH 031
WI.13	h the probationers [3 growns pressured] [FZ DORDER] and his size
"DOF	h the probationars [3 groups unrecovered] [5% ROBERT] and his wife RAN [21]
5. As 1	regards the work with the probationers in TIRE follow the same principles. anise the work of your
	[60 groups unrecovered]
No. 153	PHTROV (2111)
Comments:	: [i] VADIM : Anatolij Borisovich GRCMOV, 1st Secretary at Soviet Embassy, Washington.
	[11] COUNTRY : U.S.A.
	III ISLAND : GREAT BETTAIN.
	[iv] ELSA : Unidentified cover-name.
	[v] ALBERT :     "       [vi] JILIA : Olga Valentinguna Khiopenova
	[vil] ART : Aleksander KORAL
1. 1. K. C	[viii] BERG : Unidentified cover-masses.
	[ix] ROBERT : Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER.
	[x] TYRE : NEW YORK CITY.
	[z] CARTHAGE : WASHINGTON, D.C.
	[xii] DORA : Helen SILVERMASTER.
	xiii] PETROV : Unidentified MOSCOW signatory.
	-T 2220
	MARKAN IN THE STATE OF THE STAT
	State Provention
3/NBF/T1 03	TOD SECDET
• *	

428

92. New York 776 to Moscow, 25 May 1945.

"s VEN	ONA
<del>107-52</del>	CRET
USSR	Eef. No: 3/NBF/T15Ø (of 21/1/1952)
	Issued : 19/3/1965
	Copy No: 204
	REISUE
TRANSFER OF PROPATI	IONERS FROM "CZECH" TO "ROMAN" AND SUBSECUENT
TRANSFER OF "(	CZECH" PROM "MAZAR" TO "VADIL" (1945)
From: NET YORK	
To: LOSCON	
No: 776	25 Kay <u>45</u>
To VINTOR[1].	
Your No. 3396[a].	
of the probationers dealing On 1st June in accordance be handed over by NAZAR[vi	ChEKh]"[ii] will complete the transfer to "ROKAN"[iii] ng with "POLECARS [KhOR'NI]"[iv] and "RATS [KRYSY]"[v]. with the understanding with "VADIM"[vi], CZECH will ii] to VADIL in TYRE[viii].
No. 483 25 Lay 1945	SERGEJ[ix]
Notes: [a] No. 3396 not Comments: [i] VIKTOR : [ii] CZECH : [iii] ROMAN : [iv] POLECATS:	Lt. Gen. P. M. FITIN. Robert Owen MENAKER. Robert SOBLE. Trotskyltes.
[v] RATS :	Possibly Jems.
DISTRIBUTION	[Continued overleaf]
	•
	<b>*</b>
3/NBF/11 50	
<del>10</del>	PSECRET
	VENONA


New York 776 to Moscow, 25 May 1945. Transfer of KGB agents

35 TOP SECRET
- 2 - 3/187/T150
Comments [Cont'd]: [vi] VADIM : Anntolij Borisovich GROKOV, First Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in WAUHINGYON.
Soviet Leadedy in Astrukeruk. [vii] NAZAR : Siepan Nikolmovich SiGNDERKO, an employee at the Soviet Consulter, NSF YORK.
[vili] TYRE : YEW YORK CITY.
[ix] SERCEJ: Vladimir Sergeevich FRAVDIN, TA33 representative in NE: YORK.
·
3/YBZ/T15Ø
-TOP-SECRET-

430

93. New York 777-9 to Moscow, 25 May 1945.


95 VENONA	
TOP-SECRET	
USSR Ref. No.: 3/NEF/T2 (of 19/7/1950)	
Copy No.: 301	
<u>JUE RELESUE</u> JOSEPH BERGER, CONTACT OF "YAZ"": DETAILS, SUGGESTIONS FOR RECRUITMENT DURING VISIT TO MOSCOW (1945)	
From: NEW YORK	
To: KOSCOW	
Nos.: 777-779 25th May 1945 [3-part message complete]	
[Part I] To VIRTOR[i].	
Joseph EERGER[ii], who is a lead of "YAZ'["][iii] and has already been reported on, has left for SMYRNA[iv] as a member of the COUNTRY's[STRANA][v] delegation to the Reparations Commission. HERGER - 40 years old, [1] group unrecovered], of Russian-Jewish extraction, married, has	
[32 groups unrecoverable]	
[Continued overleaf]	
· · ·	
3/100F/12 VENONA	
TOP SECRET	



95	VENONA
	TOP SECRET~~
	- 2 - 3/NBF/T2
	North Washington Boulevard in the city of ARLINGTON, State of UHRDINTA. Formerly be lived for a long while in the city of PROVINCEPONN in an artists' colony organised by the ROGENELT Administration during the depression. He took an active part in the collection of funds
	[25 groups unrecoverable]
	,S[vi] he wrote books for children. In 1943 he worked in the Prace Social of the Department of Justice where he was given the job of writing speeches for BIDDLE[vi] and other chiefs. BERGER prepared all the materials on his own initiative, without having them approved by [1 group warecovered]
[Part II]	In 1944 he took a post in the National Democratic Committee, Where, working under HANNEGAN[vii], he wrote speeches for the leaders of the party for the election campaign. HANNEGAN, who is to be appointed Postmaster General, took BERGER on as his special assistant at a salary of ten thousand dollars a year. B.[ii] will take up his duties when he returns from SMIRNA.
	YaZ' has known B. [B% about] 5 years and describes him as a very progressive fellow who is well disposed towards us. He has often expressed a desire to live permanently in the U.S.S.R. During the past year [C% he has been maintaining contact] with the FELLOWCOUNTRYMEN[ZEMLYaKI][ix].
	Having regard to the position he is to occupy in the future and his connections in the Democratic [E% organisation] B. could become a valuable probationer[STANDAR]. I would recommond using B.'s trip to SWIRNA for working on him and [E% possibly] signing his cm. [C% By] obtaining information on the work of the delegates of the COUNTRY you could check for yourselves on the spot his potential- ities.
	[31 groups unrecovered] "YaZ'" [2 groups unrecovered] in[x] CARTHAGE[KARFAGEN][xi].
[Part III]	[/ moune unnecommend] YaZ! [B% and] his family, work and so
[Fart 111]	on depending on how B. will [5 groups unrecovered] acquaintance in the direction necessary to us. At the meeting[xi] will Ya2' before departure B. insistently inquired [2 groups unrecovered] in SWTRMA
	such an alternative(VARIAN) acceptable, upon your request we will communicate a description of YaZ' and his wife and further facts about them, so that there should be no [2 groups unrecovered] attempt on B.'s part to check whether or not our journalists
	really know YaZ'. No. 485 SERGEN[xiii]
3/NBF/T2	25 Nev 1945 VENONA
<i>)</i> / •1/ •1	TOP-SECRET-

95 VENC	)NA
IOP SECR	
	3 - 3/NBF/112
Footnotes: [i] VIKTOR:	Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.
[ii] Joseph BERGER/B.:	Joseph Isadore BERGER; nom de plume Jereniah DIGGES. See also detaile in NEW YGRX's No. 705 of 17th May 1944 (3/NEF/T242).
[iii] YeZ':	i.e. "IDE"; Simon Semuel KRAFSUR, a TASS employee.
[iv] SMYENA:	MOSCOW.
[v] COUNTRY:	U-S-A.
[vi]S:	Probably the last letter of HERGER's nom de plume (see Fortnote [ii]).
[vii] BIDDLE:	Francis BIDDLE, U.S. Attorney General.
[viii] HANNEGAN:	Robert E. HARNEGAN, elected Chairman of the Democratic National Committee on 22nd January 1944.
[ix] FELLOWCOUNTRYMEN:	Members of the Communist Party.
[x] Or "to".	
[xi] CARTHAGE:	WASHINGTON, D.C.
[xii] Or "meetings".	
[xiii] SERGEJ:	Vladimir Sergeevich PRAVDIN, Editor of the TASS News Agency in NEW YORK CITY.
3/NBF/12 V <del>TOP 1</del>	ENONA HECRET






94. New York 781-7 to Moscow, 25/26 May 1945.


435

New York 781-7 to Moscow, 25/26 May 1945. KGB political analysis



436

94. (Continued)



	95	VENONA	·
	<u> </u>	OP SEGRET	
		-4- 3/NDF/T27	
	PAULTY[POLE represents his appoint Theré is no campaign wh represented	[7], although a private owner of o the interests of Standard Cil and ment is a "gosture of friendship" need to speak of the position of ich has developed here, inasmuch in the most responsible position [72 groups unrecoverable [37 groups unrecoverable]	ilfields, actually in RICMARD's opinion by MATROS to the oil men, business circles in the as these circles are fully s [5% in the BANK]
[P	art VII] Today a personal rep	a report was published that MATRO presentatives HOPKINS	S has sent to the USSR his
	•	[122 groups unrecoverabl ] trip to SIDON[xvi]	e]
••	INVILS' S(XV)	[16 groups unrecovered]	• • •
	No. 482	SERGEJ [ XV	ii]
Not	tes: [a] Not avai	ilable.	
	[b] Inserted	d by translator.	
Coa	aments: [i] VINTOR:	LtGen. P.M. FIFIN.	
	[ii] MATROS:	i.e. "SAILOR"; Harry S. 1	RUMAN.
	[iii] COUNTRY:	: The U.S.4.	
	(iv) KAPITAN:	: i.e. "CAFTAIN"; Franklin	Delano RCOSEVELT.
	(v) BANK:	U.S. State Department.	
	[vi] BABYLON:	: SAN FRANCISCO.	
	[vii] CARTHAGE	S: WASHINGTON, D.C.	
	[viii] ShMEL':	i.e. "BUMBLEBEE"; Walter	LIPPMANN:.
	[ix] RICHARD:	: i.e. "RICHARD"; Harry Dep covername, but he seems in this list of newspaper	tter WHITE was known by this an unlikely figure to occur correspondents.
3/N	NBF/T27		
		VENIONIA	
		<del>TOP SECRET</del>	
			**

438

95			VENONA
=	, 	TOP	
			- 5 - 3/i#F/T27
Comments [Cont'd]	: [x]	Shaf:	i.e. "CHIZF"; unidentified covername.
	[xi)	KAPTIALIST:	i.e. "CAPITALIST"; probably William Averell HARREMAN.
	[xii]	Long journey:	PRAVDIN, the originator of this message, returned to NUM NORK from SAN: FRANCISCO on 14th May 1945.
	(xiii}	The ISL/MD:	CIUAT BRITAIN.
	[xiv]	KAPRAL:	i.e. "CORPORAL"; Edward R. SAETTINIUS, Jr.
	[xv]	DAVIES:	Joseph E. DAVIDS, the was engaged on special missions to LOHDON and MOSCOW as President TRUMAN's personal representative.
	[xvi]	SIDON:	LONDON.
	(xvii)	SERGEJ :	Vladimir Sergeevich FRAVDIN, Editor of the TASS Yous Agency in NEW YORK CITY. He covered the United Nations Conference at SAF FRANCISCO, which was in session from April 25th to June 26th 1945.
3/NBF/T27			TREAL CORT
		T.	
		11	OF SECRET


439

95.	Moscow	709	to	New	York,	5	July	1945.
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-		
		VENONA
	·	•
	Reissue(T223)	
From: MOSCOW		
To: NEW YORK		· .
No: 709		
		5 July 1945
ALEXSEJ'S[iii] complet [AGENTURA] on ENORMOUS recovered] for this re to ensure supervision	Sely unsatisfactory wo ENORMOZ][iv]. His wason we consider it o so that the C OUNTRY	ork with the agents ork with [9 groups un- of the utmost importance b][v]
. (	23 groups unrecoverab	le]
we once more [3 groups covered] our instructi : immediately inform the agents of ENORMOUS covered] on this same on meetings,	unrecovered] attenti ons. For the future us by telegraph about . In [C% the next po question to send the	on to [2 groups unre- [4 groups unrecovered] each meeting [with st] [3 groups unre- most precise reports
	[14 groups unrecovere	
[C% every] meeting wit:	h permanent staff[KAD	ROVYJ]
	[14 groups unrecovere	a]
from all these areas.		
	[18 groups unrecovere	
to seek safe flats in s you must	the areas of the camp	s[vi]. This question
	[17 groups unrecovered	a) .
our workers on the deve		
	[35 groups unrecovered	
GRAUBER case meetings[c [you] must [4 groups un	c] of our operational nrecovered]	worker with MLAD
No. 4533		VIKTOR [vii]
	• .	
		· •
	The second state and second states	
-OP-SECRE		YENONA
· ·	1.16	

441

Moscow 709 to New York, 5 July 1945. MLAD (Theodore Hall)



442

96. New York 1052-3 to Moscow, 5 July 1945.

USSR	Ref. No: 3/NBF/T2277
	Issued : A265/17/08/1979
	Copy No:
NEW YORK ARGUES FOR C	ONTINUATION OF MONTHLY PAYMENTS TO ART AND BERG (1945)
From: NEW YORK	
To : MOSCOW	
No : 1052	5 July 19 <u>45</u>
VIKTOR [i]	
chai we have been pay:	1). The reason for the recommendation lay in the facting monthly to ART [iii] and BERG [iv] 100 dollars each. ate the termination of their salary.
	[43 groups unrecoverable]
. With postal dispate	th No.
	[28 groups unrecovered]
No. 620	- SERGEJ [v]
[iii] ARC [ iv] BER	<ul> <li>available.</li> <li>: Helen KORAL</li> <li>G formerly SEN'OR; unidentified; also occurs in NEW YORK's No. 1267 of 6 September 1944 (3/KBF/T57) 1332 of 18 September 1944 (3/NBF/T317), 1582 of 12 November 1944 (3/NBF/T305), 1636 of 21 November 1944 (3/NBF/T295), 1803 of 22 December 1944 (3/NBF/T288) and 50 of 11 January 1945 (3/NBF/T306) and MOSCOUP's No. 1251 of 2 September 1944 (3/NBF/T301), 275 of 2 March 1945 (3/NBF/T867) and 337 of 8 April 1945 (3/NBF/T1091).</li> <li>GEJI Vladimir Sergejevich PRAVDIN; TASS representative i</li> </ul>
Distribution Copies 1-2 NSA (A265) 3 FBI 4 CIA 5 Security Servi 6 (via CIA) 8 ASIO (via NSA) 9 Security Servi 10 Security Servi 3/NBF/T2277	
CALSER CALSER STANS	SET SENGINA

443


New York 1052-3 to Moscow, 5 July 1945. Rewards to agents

96.	(Continued)
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. <del>101-5</del>	ECRET-DINAR VENONA
	<u>Reissue (</u> T226)
From: NEW YORK	
To: MOSCOW	
Nc.: 1053	5 July 19 <u>45</u>
To VICTOR.	
	49. 1. MASHA[1]
	groups unrecoverable]
	the question of placing HOOK [KhUK][i1] miversity after his discharge from the u know the outcome of the meeting.
URAL[111] for but after his transfe [C% is necessary furt	liaison with SIMA[iv] is not being used er to [4 groups unrecovered] ther working out].
Wo.629	ANTON [v]
Comments: [1] MAShA: [ii] KhUK:	Eufrosina DVOICHENKO-MARKOV. Dmetrius DVOICHENKO-MARKOV.
	Possibly Nikolaj Prokop'evich KARPEKOV.
	Judith COPLON.
[v] ANTON:	Leonid Romanovich KVASNIKOV.
	18 May 1965
TOP	
101 01	ECRET DINAR MENONA

444

97. Moscow 34 to London, 21 September 1945.





5.	ENONA
95	
TOP	CLODET.
	JECKET
	- 2 - 3/NBF/T4
being paid to you and to ou may break off contact tempor in your work with the agent covered] [O% panic and case of contact, go to theatres, check when going out to a m under any circumstances, to For such contingencies make	quence of local aircumstances, greater attention is in workers by the COLEFITTORS[KOKUERNY][vil], you arily with the sources. For the period of the "lull" a[AGENTURA], try to create a pretext [2 groups whre- s of] carelessness. Meet them more by neutral methods sinemas, etc. Warn all our comrades to make a thorough eeting and, if surveillance is observed, not to try, evade the surveillance is observed, not to try, evade the surveillance and meet the agent regardless. use of check appointments[KONTROL'NIE YaVKI]. Come h the sources. Verify once more the passwords, addresses have, so that, in case of loss of contact, the sources use difficulty.
	posal about handing over "DZhONSON"
	[4 groups unrecoverable]
	[43 groups unrecovered]
Note: [a] The word foll. "detached dut Comments: [i] BOB:	owing "from" could be "colony", "colonies" or y". Probably Boris Mikhajlovich KROTOV, 3rd Secretary and
Commentes. (13 16b.	Consul General in LONDON from August 1941 to March 1947.
[ii] NEIGHBOURS:	Members of another Soviet intelligence organisation: in this case the GRU, from which GUZENKO defected in OTTAWA on 5th September 1945.
[iii] KhIKS:	i.e. "HICKS"; probably G. F. de M. BURGESS.
[iv] ADAM:	Unidentified covername.
[v] DZhONSON:	i.e. "JOHNSON"; unidentified covername. Also occurs in MOSCOW's No. 47 of 18th September 1945 (3/MEF/T260).
[vi] STENLI:	i.e. "STANLEY"; H. A. R. PHILBY.
[vii] COMPETITORS:	Members of a non-Soviet intelligence organisation.
	VENONA
3/NBF/T4	
-	TOP SECRET
,	

98.	San	Francisco	568	to	Moscow,	7	November 1	1945.
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
	TOP SECTOR	YENONA
	And the Control of Con	
		Jural
	From: SAN FRANCISCO	<i>Million</i>
	To: MOSCOW	
	No: 568	
		7 November 1945
	To SEMEN(1).	
	-	the fatherland KUZWETAGVA(44)
	On 4 November this year the traitor to was shipped to VLADIVOSTOK on the tanker "BELC ment.	OROD." Details in a supple.
	¥0. 295	SERGEJ[111]
		,
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
f.		
	Comments:	
	[1] SHORN: Unidentified cover.com	
	<ul> <li>[11] Elizabeta Mitrofanovas KUENETSOVA, s</li> <li>who deserted in FORTLAND on 9 Febru</li> <li>[111] SERGEJ: Viktor AFARAS'EV.</li> </ul>	econd mate of the ship "PSKOV" ary 1944.
	、	26 May 1978
	· · · ·	
	TOBSECT	VENONA
	4	

San Francisco 568 to Moscow, 7 November 1945. Kuznetsova aboard

98.

99. Moscow 46 to London, 17 September 1945.

	TOP SECRET	
	DINAR	
	USSR Ref. No: 3/NBF/T726 fof 12/16/1955)	
	Di66	
	Copy No: 204	
	COMMENT-ON-THE-ACCURACY-OF-"STANLEY'S"-INFORMATION-(1945)-	
anta da Contra da		
5270	5 From: MOSCOW To: LONDON	
	No: . 46	
	To BOB[i].	
	[0% The ohiefs[NAChAL;STVO]][&] gave their consent to the checking of the accuracy of your telegram[2] concerning "STANLEY's[STENLI]"[ii] data about the events in CANDA[ii] in the "NEICHBOURS'[SOSEDI]"[iv] aphere of activity. STANLEY's information does correspond to the facts.	
• •	No. 6807 Sept. 45 VIKTOR[v]	
	Notes: [4] This message-was-accorded the highest degree of priority in	
	despatch-known-to-be-used-on-the MOSCOW-LONDON link. It was originated before 8. nam. (MOSCOW-LINK). On 1.7kh. September and transmitted between 8.11. and 8.12. p.m. It oo 10 have been deciphered in LONDON by.6.22 p.m. B.S.T. For further detail see 3/NBZ/C19.	
	[X] NACHAL'STWO is the collective noun deriving from the noun NACHAL'NIX which means 'chief' or 'head'.	
	Loj Or 'telegrams'.	
	DISTRIBUTION [Continued overleaf]	
	-	
	3/NBF/T72Ø	
	VENONA	



99.

	95
	LOP SECRET
	DINAR
	- 2 - 3/NBF/T72Ø
	Comments: [i] BOB : Unidentified LONDON Addressee.
	[ii] STANLEY : Probably H.A.R. FHILEY.
	[iii] GUZENKO defected in OITAWA on 5th September 1945.
	[iv] NEIGHBOURS : Members of another Soviet intelligence organization, in this instance the GRU.
	[v] VIKTOR : Lt. Gen. P. N. FITIN.
	3/17BF/T72\$
1	
	TORGEODET.
1	



## Footnotes

(1) All cables are KGB messages unless otherwise noted.

## Footnotes

(1) "Blonde Leader of Spy Ring Credited With Reds' Arrests," Washington Post, 22 July 1948.

(2) Maurice Isserman estimates CPUSA membership at between 50,000 and 75,000 in the years before the war; *Which Side Were You On?: The American Communist Party During the Second World War* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1993), pp. 18–21.

(3) Harvey Klehr and John Earl Haynes, with Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, *The Secret World of American Communism* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 8-11, 71-73, 323-326.

(4) Translated messages disclose examples of the CPUSA's direct and indirect assistance to both the GRU and KGB. See Moscow 142 [circular], 12 September 1943, Translation 18 in this volume; New York 598-99 to Moscow, 2 May 1944, Translation 29; New York 1065 to Moscow, 28 July 1944, Translation 45; New York 12-13 to Moscow, 4 January 1945, Translation 80.

(5) GRU refers to the Chief Directorate for Intelligence of the Red Army's General Staff (the organization was upgraded to a Chief Directorate in 1943). For a GRU view of operating conditions in the United States, see Washington [Naval-GRU] 2505-12 to Moscow, 31 December 1942.

(6) KGB stands for the Committee for State Security. For the sake of clarity and convenience, the main foreign intelligence arm of the Soviet state is here called the KGB, its final name before the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. The organization had been reorganized, reauthorized, and renamed several times. It was called the Cheka or VChK (1917-22), the GPU (1922-23), the OGPU (1923-34), the NKVD (1934-41, 1941-43), the NKGB (1941, 1943-46), the MGB (1946-47, 1952-53), the KI (1947-52), the MVD (1953-54), and the KGB (1954-91). The KI was subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1949 to 1952. See Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: *The Inside Story* (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), p. ix. See also the new "biographical reference" published by Russian Federation's Foreign Intelligence Service, *Veternay vneshney razvedki Rossii* [Veterans of Russian Foreign Intelligence], Moscow, 1995, pp. 3-4.

(7) One measure of the KGB's growing pre-eminence in the United States can be glimpsed in the message counts from the KGB and GRU residencies in New York. In 1940 the GRU New York residency sent three messages for every one sent by its KGB counterpart; in 1941 that ratio was reversed, and the KGB total remained higher from then on. An indication of the state of the US Government's knowledge of Soviet intelligence can be seen in Joseph A. Michela, Military Attaché Moscow Report 1903, "N.K.V.D. of the U.S.S.R.," 14 April 1941, Document 5.

(8) KGB use of Amtorg is discussed in Herbert Romerstein and Stanislav Levchenko, *The KGB Against the "Main Enemy": How the Soviet Intelligence Service Operates against the United States* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1989), pp. 19-21, 176-177.

(9) Stalin's four requirements are either cited or paraphrased (the text and notes do not specify which) and subsequently became a general directive sent to several residencies. Vladimir M. Chikov claims Stalin issued these requirements in the presence of the newly appointed KGB senior *rezident* in the United States, Vassili M. Zarubin; this suggests that Stalin did so in autumn 1941. See "How the Soviet Intelligence Service `Split' the American Atom," *Novoe Vremia* [*New Times;* English ed.], 23 April 1991, p. 38.

(10) According to KGB defector Alexander Orlov, more than 3,000 KGB officers were shot in 1937 alone, even before the *Yezhovchina* reached its full fury. See *The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes* (New York: Random House, 1952), p. 216.

(11) Elizabeth Bentley, *Out of Bondage* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1951), pp. 101–102. See also Yatskov's biography in *Veternay vneshney razvedki Rossii*, pp. 169–171.

(12) See Moscow 142 (circular), 12 September 1943, Translation 18, for more on the dissolution of the Comintern and the transfer of its assets to the professional Soviet intelligence services.

(13) US Senate, Committee on the Judiciary [Subcommittee on Internal Security], "Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States," Part 23, 84th Congress, 2d Session, 1956, pp. 1207-1235.

(14) Ovakimian had been in the United States since 1933, operating under cover of the Amtorg Trading Corporation. US House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, "The Shameful Years: Thirty Years of Soviet Espionage in the United States," 82d Congress, 2d Session, 1951, pp. 15-17. See also US House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, "Communist Methods of Infiltration (EducationPart 2)," 83d Congress, 1st Session, 1953, pp. 198-199, 215. In 1937 a British Security Service agent penetrated KGB officer Arnold Deutsch's spy ring in the Woolwich Arsenal. Leads from the case pointed back to Canada and eventually led Canadian authorities to arrest one of Ovakimian's contacts; see Andrew and Gordievskiy, *KGB*, pp. 223-224.

(15) Walter Krivitsky gave some information of value to the Department of State; for a sample, see Loy W. Henderson, memorandum of conversation [with General Krivitsky], 15 March 1939, Document 1. See also Charles Runyon [Department of State], Memorandum for the File, "Walter Krivitsky," 10 June 1947, Document 18.

(16) Wartime transmissions by Soviet clandestine transmitters in the United Stateswith the exception of those to Latin Americawere usually test messages. It should be noted, however, that Comintern agents in the United States operated clandestine radios in the 1930s, and clandestine radio nets apparently were important for Soviet wartime intelligence operations in Latin America. A hint of the Comintern-CPUSA radio link can be seen in Klehr and Haynes, *The Secret World of American Communism,* pp. 205-208. Examples of Comintern messages to officials in the CPUSA are Moscow 117 of 21 March 1936 and Moscow 121 of 23 March 1936, Translation 1.

(17) See, for example, Stanford C. Hooper, Director of Naval Communications, to D. M. Crawford, Chief Signal Officer (US Army), "Communist Code and Cipher Material," 7 January 1932, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 457 (National Security Agency), "Historic Cryptographic Collection," box 138.

(18) Japanese Army General Staff message to military attaches in Berlin and Helsinki, Tokyo Circular 906, 6 October 1942, Document 7. SSA translated this message in early 1943.

(19) John Costello and Oleg Tsarev, *Deadly Illusions* (New York: Crown, 1993), p. 399.

(20) San Francisco 441 to Moscow, 31 October 1943, Translation 19, acknowledges the San Francisco consulate's receipt of the new "075-B" codebook and the scheduled destruction of the "Pobjeda" code, which was almost certainly the one found in Petsamo (and recovered by the US Army in Germany in April 1945).

(21) Genrikh Borovik and Phillip Knightley, *The Philby Files: The Secret Life of Master Spy Kim Philby* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994), p. 235.

(22) The change is ordered in Moscow [no number] circular, 25 April 1944, Translation 26.

(23) Several cryptanalysts contributed to this breakthrough, including Genevieve Feinstein, Cecil Phillips, Frank Lewis, Frank Wanat, and Lucille Campbell.

(24) The reasoning and terms of Roosevelt's directive can be seen in Attorney General [Frank Murphy] to the President, 17 June 1939, Document 2; and Franklin D. Roosevelt to Secretary of State, et al., 26 June 1939, Document 3.

(25) Bradley F. Smith, *The Ultra-Magic Deals and the Most Secret Special Relationship, 1940-46* (London: Airlife, 1993), pp. 69, 110-111.

(26) Timothy J. Naftali, "ARTIFICE: James Angleton and X-2 Operations in Italy," in George C. Chalou, ed., *The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II* (Washington: National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), pp. 222-223.

(27) X-2 was prohibited from collecting on Soviet intelligence. Evidence of Soviet penetrations in OSS can be seen in New York 887 to Moscow, 9 June 1943, Translation 11; New York 1325-6 to Moscow, 15 September 1944, Translation 56; and New York 1437 to Moscow, 10 October 1944, Translation 62. For more on penetrations of OSS, see Hayden B. Peake, "Soviet Espionage and the Office of Strategic Services," in Warren F. Kimball, ed., *America Unbound: World War II and the Making of a Superpower* (New York: St. Martin's, 1992).

(28) William Branigan, comment on Herbert Romerstein's "Soviet Intelligence in the United States," in Roy Godson, ed., Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Counterintelligence (Washington: National Strategy Information Center, 1980), p. 201. Branigan was the Special Agent who recorded the Nelson-Zarubin meeting.

(29) An indication of Bureau operations at the time can be seen in Hoover to Birch D. O'Neal, "Alto Case," 26 February 1944, Document 11.

(30) The anonymous letter is included as Document 10. For an analysis, see the CIA memorandum probably drafted by William K. Harvey, "COMRAP," 6 February 1948, Document 20. Information in Pavel Sudoplatov's controversial memoir suggests the author of the Anonymous Letter might have been Zarubin's assistant, a Lt. Col. Mironov, who was discharged from the KGB in 1944 on psychiatric grounds; see Sudoplatov, with Anatoli Sudoplatov, Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter, *Special Tasks: Memoirs of an Unwanted WitnessA Soviet Spymaster* (New York: Little, Brown, 1994), pp. 196-197.

(31) Special Agents monitored Shevchenko's penetration of the Bell Aircraft Corporation in the last year of the war, feeding him innocuous information and developing leads uncovered in the operation. US House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, "Soviet Espionage Activities in Connection With Jet Propulsion and Aircraft," 81st Congress, 1st Session, 1949, pp. 101-128.

(32) Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle's and the FBI's slow reaction to allegations by former GRU courier Whittaker Chambers is cited as evidence of Roosevelt administration inattention to Communist infiltration; see Allen Weinstein, *Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), pp. 329–331.

(33) OSS purchased Soviet code and cipher material (or Finnish information on them) from émigré Finnish army officers in late 1944. The Secretary of State's protest, dated 27 December 1944, is included as Document 12. Donovan might have copied the papers before returning them the following January but there is no record of Arlington Hall receiving them, and CIA and NSA archives have no surviving copies. See Bradley F. Smith, *The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA* 

(New York: Basic Books, 1983), pp. 353-54.

(34) KGB sources, for example, reported accurately on many aspects of Anglo-American planning; see New York 887 to Moscow, 9 June 1943, Translation 11; and New York 1271-4 to Moscow, 7 September 1944, Translation 53. Ironically, the quality of KGB and Communist Party sources was not matched by any particularly insightful KGB analysis of the Western political scene. In particular, KGB officers and CPUSA officials composed some rather confused reflections on the presidential race of 1944; see New York 598-599 to Moscow, 2 May 1944, Translation 28.

(35) The four assets apparently were Klaus Fuchs (covernames CHARLES and REST), David Greenglass (covernames BUMBLEBEE and CALIBRE), Theodore Alvin Hall (covername YOUNGSTER [MLAD]), and a source covernamed FOGEL and PERS; see New York 1749-50 to Moscow, 13 December 1944, Translation 76. PERS seems to have been arbitrarily or erroneously converted to "Perseus" (there is no covername Perseus in the Venona messages) in Russian memoirs as the Soviet and Russian intelligence services sought to describe a high-level source in the Manhattan Project. For more on Russian claims for Perseus, see Chikov, "How the Soviet intelligence service` split' the American atom," (Part 1), p. 38.

(36) Gouzenko's information helped Western cryptanalysts understand Soviet communications procedures but did not directly contribute to the Venona breakthrough. He brought out GRU messages that identified Soviet assets, but no codebooks or one-time pads.

(37) Weinstein, *Perjury,* pp. 340, 347. The FBI's handling of Chambers is recounted in D. M. Ladd to Hoover, "JAY DAVID WHITTAKER CHAMBERS," 29 December 1948, Document 23.

(38) Hoover sent news of the Gouzenko defection to the White House on 12 September and reported the Bentley allegations on 8 November. See Hoover to Matthew Connelly, 12 September 1945, Document 13; and Hoover to Brigadier General Harold Hawkins Vaughan, 8 November 1945, Document 15.

(39) Alonzo L. Hamby, *Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Oxford, 1995), pp. 428-429. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs,* Volume 2, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956), p. 280.

(40) Elizabeth Bentley, with Afterword by Hayden Peake, *Out of Bondage: The Story of Elizabeth Bentley* (New York: Ballantine, 1988 [1951]); see Peake's commentary, pp. 266-267. The Gregory case is summarized in Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Underground Soviet Espionage Organization [NKVD] in Agencies of the US Government,"21 October 1946, Document 17.

(41) David C. Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors* (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), pp. 23-32. For the inadmissibility of wiretap evidence, see Robert J. Lamphere, *The FBI-KGB War: A Special Agent's Story* (New York: Random House, 1986), pp. 101-102. Daniel J. Leab has written a detailed account of the difficulty faced by the Justice Department in its 1946 prosecution of a Soviet officer accused of espionage, Lt. Nicolai G. Redin; "The Red Menace and Justice in the Pacific Northwest," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly 87* (Spring 1996), pp. 83-88.

(42) New York 1699 to Moscow, 2 December 1944, Translation 74.

(43) New York 1751-1753 to Moscow, 13 December 1944, Translation 77. The actual agent (presumably William Ludwig Ullman, covername PILOT) was not indicated on the message.

(44) New York 1657 to Moscow, 27 November 1944, Translation 73. "Special Report #1" is included as Document 19.

(45) It speaks volumes about inter-allied signals intelligence cooperation that Arlington Hall's British liaison officers learned of the breakthrough even before the FBI was notified. Meredith Gardner kept his British counterpart abreast of developments, and from 1948 on there was complete and profitable US-UK cooperation on the problem. The control term "Venona" did not appear on the translated messages until 1961. In the beginning the information was usually called the "Gardner material," and a formal control term "Bride" was finally affixed in 1950. From the late 1950s to 1961 the control term was "Drug."

(46) NSC-17/4 is included under Sidney W. Souers, Memorandum for the President, 22 March 1949, Document 26.

(47) The JCIC worked under the cover of "OP32Y1," an office at the Naval Communications Annex on Nebraska Avenue in Washington. Its CIA contingent was detailed from the Office of Special Operations and included exFBI agent William K. Harvey. The Central Intelligence Group became the Central Intelligence Agency with the implementation of the National Security Act of 1947 in September of that year.

(48) Lamphere, The FBI-KGB War, p. 86.

(49) Two of Lamphere's blind memos to Gardner can be seen as "FLORA DON WOVSCHIN, with alias," 9 May 1949, Document 25; and "Anatoli Borisovich Gromov," 12 July 1949, Document 27.

(50) Hamby, *Man of the People,* p. 453. President Truman repeated his "red herring" remark late that year; see Truman to Attorney General Tom Clark, 16 December 1948, Document 22. Another glimpse of the White House attitude can be seen in George M. Elsey's note to Clark M. Clifford, 16 August 1948, Document 21.

(51) Mr. Truman wrote in his memoirs in 1956: "The country had reason to be proud of and have confidence in our security agencies. They had kept us almost totally free of sabotage and espionage during the war;" see Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 291.

(52) New York 27 [to Moscow], 8 January 1945, Translation 82, notes Coplon's transfer to the Department of Justice headquarters in Washington. Lamphere claims the date of her transfer from New York to Washington clinched the identification; see *The FBI-KGB War*, pp. 97-98. See also the KGB's request for information on Coplon in Comintern files; Pavel Fitin to Georgi Dimitrov, 19 October 1944, reprinted in Klehr and Haynes, eds., *The Secret World of American Communism*, pp. 294-295.

(53) Lamphere, *The FBI-KGB War*, p. 115. For more on the administration's handling of the Coplon case, see Clark to Truman, "Proposed Deportation of Valentine A. Gubitchev," 16 March 1949, Document 24.

(54) See [Lamphere to Gardner], "EMIL JULIUS KLAUS FUCHS, aka; Karl Fuchs," 26 September 1949, Document 28; Lamphere, *The FBI-KGB War*, pp. 133-134. See also W. K. Benson to Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee [H. Marshall Chadwell], "Failure of the JAEIC To Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value," 9 February 1950, Document 29; Hoover to Souers, 24 May 1950, Document 30.

(55) See Lamphere's blind memo, "Study of Code Names in MGB Communications," 27 June 1950, Document 31; Hoover to Rear Admiral Robert L. Dennison, 18 July 1950, Document 32. See also Lamphere, *The FBI-KGB War*, pp. 178-186.

(56) Washington 1822 to Moscow, 30 March 1945, Translation 89.

(57) It remains unclear which messages led the FBI to the White identification, but some of the more important messages in which he appeared are New York 1119-1121 to Moscow, 4 August 1944, Translation 50; New York 1634 to Moscow, 20 November 1944, Translation 71; and New York 79 to Moscow, 18 January 1945, Translation 84.

(58) Venona sheds some light on the Amerasia affair; see New York 927-28 to Moscow, 16 June 1943, Translation 12; and New York 1103 to Moscow, 8 July 1943. See also Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh, *The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 64-65.

(59) Philby's Washington posting has been discussed in many books; a concise account is in Borovik and Knightley, *The Philby Files*, p. 273. The late John Costello clarified the timeliness of Philby's warning somewhat in his notes on Guy Burgess' KGB file (Costello cited it as File 83792, Volume 4, pp. 76-183). The Burgess file indicated that Philby had learned by late September that British and American authorities believed CHARLES was Klaus Fuchs. Mr. Costello summarized some of his notes for Robert Louis Benson in 1995.

(60) Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton, The Rosenberg File: A Search for Truth (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1983), p. 74.

(61) Attorney General Brownell had President Eisenhower's approval for this November 1953 charge; both men almost certainly had seen translated messages about White (and probably about Hiss as well). Indeed, Eisenhower may have been briefed on the program by the G-2 while he was still Army Chief of Staff in 1947. One of the FBI warnings about White is included as Hoover to Vaughan, 1 February 1946, Document 16.

(62) The Supreme Court's decision in Yates v. US, handed down in June 1957, all but voided the Smith Act as a tool for prosecuting Party leaders.

(63) Joseph R. Starobin, American Communism in Crisis, 1943-1957 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 220-230.

(64) One FBI report of the period claimed that there was "no conclusive indication that the Communist Party, USA, is playing a role [in espionage] at this time;" see "Role of the Communist Party, USA, in Soviet Intelligence," February 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Office of the Advisor for National Security Affairs, box 16, p. 48.

(65) Oleg Kalugin has written a memoir of Soviet operations in the United States during this period; see Kalugin and Fen Montaigne, *The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West* (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), pp. 1-4, 36. Some of the agents in the late 1950s and early 1960s proved devastating to American intelligence, particularly to the National Security Agency. A contemporary "exposé" can be under Hoover to Brigadier General A. J. Goodpaster, 23 May 1960, Document 35.

(66) CIA received its first Venona translations in 1953, after veteran signals intelligence officer Frank Rowlett transferred to the Agency (the aforementioned Special Reports seen by OSO personnel in 1948 were not translations per se). CIA's William Harvey was formally briefed on the program in August 1952. AFSA was reconstituted as the National Security Agency on 4 November 1952.

(67) CIA transferred the management of its portion of the Venona program to James Angleton's Counterintelligence Staff in 1965.

(68) Jack Soble was a Lithuanian whose given name was Sobolevicius; he and his brother had penetrated Leon Trotsky's

entourage for the KGB in the 1920s; see Andrew and Gordievskiy, *KGB*, pp. 154-155. Hollywood producer Boris Morros was doubled by the FBI in 1947 and reported on the activities of Soble and members of his almost-moribund spy ring, while also passing low-level secrets and misinformation back to Moscow; see Boris Morros, *My Ten Years as a Counter-Spy* (London: Werner Laurie, 1959), pp. 191, 204-206. Morros is covername FROST in New York 18-19 to Moscow, 4 January 1945, Translation 80. Soble is covername ABRAM in New York 625 to Moscow, 5 May 1944, Translation 31.

(69) See Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, *Veternay vneshney razvedki Rossii* [Veterans of Russian Foreign Intelligence], pp. 158-159. Abel was exchanged for downed U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers in 1962.

## (70) Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors, pp. 92-93.

(71) The ineffectiveness of the CIA's and FBI's mail opening operations is attested in US Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (better known as the Church Committee), "Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans," Volume III, 94th Congress, 2d Session, 1974, pp. 576-578, 652.